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As scholarship on hegemonic media industries thrives in the Global North, how can we understand 
the emerging film economies in the South without perpetuating the discourse that they are simply 
“catching up”? This dissertation follows scholars of critical media industries studies, transnational 
cinema, and postcolonial studies to examine industry as a process in constant formation – grounded 
in cultural, socio-economic, and political history. In other words, industry constitutes an epistemic 
system that produces value, legitimacy, and modes of organization. This research analyzes a range 
of transnational funding streams, film festivals in Palestine, and Palestinian films produced since 
the Second Intifada onwards. It investigates the infrastructural and material conditions of 
possibility as well as the imaginaries that sustain the project of a transnational Palestinian film 
industry. Such a project takes root in the Palestinian civil society, in the paradoxical contexts of 
development under colonization in the proto-state of Palestine and the multicultural settler state of 
Israel. This dissertation uncovers the paradoxical present of cultural and political negotiations, 
attempts, and uncertainties involved in developing Palestinian film practices that are “not-yet” 
industries. 
 
Each chapter investigates the temporalities that specific developmental economies produce and 
how Palestinian film practitioners respond to it. The emerging Palestinian film economy is 
enmeshed in the peace process’ ideal of stability enforced through counterinsurgency (Chapter 
Two); the imperative of sustainability that drives human development economies (Chapter Three); 
the emergency that structures humanitarian economies (Chapter Four); and the promise of 
recognition by liberal and settler multiculturalism (Chapter Five). Palestinians adapt to these 
contexts by devising strategies that draw from global imaginaries, militant histories, regional 
human rights networks and international anticolonial struggles. By focusing on temporality to 
explain transnational, colonial, and postcolonial power relations, each chapter asks how political 
histories shape media economies, and how media economies forge political futures. This 
dissertation contributes to interdisciplinary conversations around media and development by 
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Introduction – A Time for Palestinian Cinema    
 
First tableau: In 2003, Palestinian filmmaker Annemarie Jacir co-organized a Palestinian film 
festival at Columbia University in New York. Entitled Dreams of a Nation, the event gathered 
thirty-four films and a wide-ranging audience made of diasporic Palestinians, spectators in 
solidarity with Palestine, and curious cinephiles. Eventually a success, the festival faced many 
obstacles due to its focus. Jacir describes the slew of hate mail, personal attacks, and death threats 
destined to the curators as well as other forms of intimidation, including email hacking, spamming, 
violent voicemails, and administrative pressure. She reckoned: 
 
These responses seemed excessive and absurd. Who opposes film festivals? What is so 
threatening about such an event? Is it the filmmakers, the issues they deal with, or 
something much more fundamental: the symbols, images and representations they bring 
forth? Or is it simply the fact that for the first time Palestinians had represented their own 
experiences themselves without mediations and commentary? (Jacir 2006, 28, her 
emphasis).  
 
Second tableau: A few months prior, at the height of the Second Intifada, the Israeli army 
invaded Ramallah and Nablus despite the 1994 Peace Accords which placed these cities under the 
full civilian and military control of the Palestinian Authority. The troops ransacked ministries, 
human rights organizations, medical institutions, as well as private radio and television stations 
and seized files, computers, and finances (Jacir 2006, 25). Such raids are not unique to the Second 
Intifada. Among other instances, in 2012, the Israeli forces snatched Watan TV’s transmitters in 
Ramallah, confiscated the broadcasting equipment of the Institute of Modern Media’s Al-Quds 
Educational TV in al-Bireh, and shut down the Jerusalem launch of the same Institute’s Hona al-
Quds online media network at the same time as they detained employees (Ma’an 2012).   
Third tableau: In 2009, the Toronto International Film Festival (TIFF) included a “Cities” 
sidebar focusing on Tel Aviv, funded by the Israeli government’s Brand Israel campaign. The 
program followed the recent release of the United Nations’ Goldstone Report on the 2008 war on 
Gaza. The Fact-Finding Mission concluded that Israel had unlawfully and intentionally inflicted 
collective punishment on the people of the Strip (Goldstone 2009, 405). A coalition of Canadian 
intellectuals and artists interpreted the festival’s sponsorship as a complicit promotion of Israel 
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intended to distract audiences from its crimes and called for a boycott of the event (Toronto 
Declaration 2009).  
 These three examples locate Palestinian films and media infrastructures in a vast array of 
power relations, economic and solidarity networks, geographies, and temporalities. Palestinian 
cinema, the main focus of this dissertation, exists at the confluence of overlapping, sometimes 
conflicting, politics of recognition. These develop in transnational academic and solidarity circles; 
economies of prestige such as film festivals and awards ceremonies; developmental economies; 
and humanitarian financial networks. Palestinian cinema offers a forum for sharing the plight and 
struggle of a people; provides a platform for self-representation and self-definition; introduces 
modes of representation compelling to international audiences, which may eventually attract 
foreign funding in the arts or humanitarian donations; and helps normalize Palestinian culture on 
the international diplomatic scene. Cultural and political recognition contribute to ensuring the 
financial and political persistence of Palestinian culture and constitute a strategy that might bring 
forth Palestinian rights and self-determination.  
At the same time, Palestinians’ visibility and narratives, which cinema helps advance, 
constantly face colonial forces of negation and destruction channeled through military action, 
cultural diplomacy, counter-programming efforts, and smear campaigns. Such attempts at 
overdetermining Palestinians from the outside target technological infrastructures and means of 
Palestinian production, as the regular Israeli raids on television and radio offices indicate. In 
parallel, other types of attack mine systems of meaning-making by using cultural prestige as a 
smoke screen for war crimes, which facilitates further modalities of physical and representational 
unrecognition. The coevalness of recognition and unrecognition situates Palestinian film 
production, distribution, and exhibition as a “crucial locus of political engagement.” Such sites 
take shape through the fluid articulation and negotiation of “broader social forces, political 
processes, and modalities of difference” (Stein and Swedenburg 2005, 9). The opposing dynamics 
of recognition and unrecognition doubles the contradictory present of colonization and 
development. The two sets of paradoxes delineate a terrain for Palestinian action, modes of cultural 
production understood broadly, and fields of possibility.  
This dissertation is less concerned with identifying forms of resistance in Palestinian 
cinema than grounding it in the sphere of cultural politics and political economy. Moreover, 
Palestinian cinema functions as a hermeneutic tool that yields new areas of scholarly investigation 
	
	 3 
in contemporary media studies. In 2011, David Archibald and Mitchell Miller rightfully 
contextualized the aforementioned TIFF boycott in contrast with the “notion of the apolitical 
festival…with unlimited freedom of choice and freedom of expression…which ignores the 
commercial and cultural factors that shape programming” (Archibald and Miller 2011, 279). As a 
result, studying Palestinian cinema through the contested economic and discursive networks in 
which it circulates, is produced, and denied, also necessarily points to the limits of politics of 
recognition. To put it schematically, the liberal assumption is that the free circulation of goods and 
ideas, as well as increased visibility, can bring about better human rights practices the world over 
(Fukuyama 1992). The example of TIFF demonstrates how visibility is tied to economic interests 
and regimes of governance.1 In adopting a skeptical stance vis-à-vis the emancipatory logics of the 
market, this research fully participates in the contemporary endeavor to critically examine the 
discursive, epistemological, and material foundations of media industries. At the same time, 
questioning the production of knowledge around film economies intersects with the decolonial 
project of introducing new epistemes through which to understand global power relations. This 
dissertation demonstrates that film economies crisscross broader financial and discursive networks 
in multiple ways. More particularly, it argues that Palestinian cinema emerges from the 
convergence between, on the one hand, developmental economies and discourses focused on 
growth, human capacity, human rights, and humanitarian relief; and on the other, continuing 
Palestinian histories of struggle, a present of industrial organizing, and open futures. 
This dissertation investigates the temporal and physical infrastructures, materiality, 
histories, and imaginaries that sustain the project of a transnational Palestinian film industry. These 
dynamics unfold in the paradoxical context of colonization and development which follows the 
so-called Peace Accords in 1994. More particularly, this study analyzes a range of transnational 
funding streams and film festivals in Palestine, as well as Palestinian films produced in Palestine-
Israel since the Second Intifada onwards. It reviews transnational and trans-economic contexts 
across global, European, and transregional networks of art cinema, human rights, humanitarianism, 
and various strands of development. The space of Palestine-Israel dwells at the center of its inquiry. 
This geography is not normative or fixed. Instead, it recognizes the foundational reality of settler-
                                                
1 To get a better sense of the debates around politics of recognition, see Fraser and Honneth 2003; Brown 
2006; Povinelli 2011; Ciccariello-Maher 2017. Ragan Rhyne articulates these issues beautifully in the 
context of US gay and lesbian film festivals (Rhyne 2007). Chapter Five of this dissertation examines those 
issues at length.  
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colonialism which arbitrarily fragments historic Palestinian lands. Such mapping also fits closely 
with the project of a Palestinian film industry which Palestinian cultural workers are in the process 
of defining. Finally, this cartography identifies a point of departure for imagining political futures 
and reformulating Palestinian existence alongside Jewish Israelis.  
While this dissertation does not seek to explore means of co-resistance, it investigates the 
epistemological value of the present as well as open-ended, paradoxical temporalities. These may 
co-constitute new regimes of Palestinian and Jewish Israeli rights.2 Yet, temporality also provides 
an entry point into forms of governance that inflect Palestinians’ horizons of possibility. Economic 
systems produce arrangements of time akin to what Sarah Sharma calls “temporal infrastructures” 
or “architectures of time maintenance” which sustain the tempo of some to the detriment of others 
(Sharma 2014, 30 and 44). Attached to unfolding processes, the focus on temporality finally 
supports the examination of Palestinian practitioners’ agency, their discursive and organizational 
strategies, and their responses to both structural contingency and temporal infrastructures.  
This dissertation asks four main questions: How can we study Palestinian cinema today? 
How can we understand film industries’ interactions with other economies? What do we gain by 
focusing on temporality in addition to spatiality when we study media industries? What do we gain 
by focusing on temporality to understand power? This research adds to the fields of Palestinian 
and transnational film studies, postcolonial and decolonial studies, critical media industries 
studies, critical media infrastructure studies, and post-development theory. Chapter One will 
establish my contributions in relation to their respective theoretical contexts and debates. In what 
follows, I briefly describe two ways in which this dissertation engages with issues of temporality. 
 
Time, Governance, and Economies 
This dissertation’s temporal focus uncovers time-based structures of governance that supplement 
spatial inquiries of transnational flows. The aim is to analyze how the political economies in which 
the Palestinian film industrial project is embedded produce temporalities that partially determine 
horizons of possibility. Time functions as a resource to be exploited and manipulated. Political 
economies do not simply arrange spatial configurations. They also organize the temporalities of 
                                                
2 Amal Jamal formulates the concept of “transformative temporariness” as part of a true process of 
reconciliation and conflict resolution. This concept constitutes “a form of accommodating historical 
oppression, deconstructing past injustices and addressing existential threats” (Jamal 2016, 365).  
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daily lives as well as distribute, circumscribe, and inflect temporal structures of possible actions, 
in which discourses and materiality are closely entwined. As a result, “temporality” is that which 
articulates and makes manifest “power relations as they play out in time” (Sharma 2014, 4). In 
Palestine, the “impossible political fiction” of statehood and independence (Abourahme 2016, 131) 
frames polities through civil society and institutional power. In other words, the political economy 
of occupation and development funnels imaginaries of as well as possibilities for political futures 
and actions. This economic arrangement tends to replace the struggle for self-determination with 
recourse to supranational organizations and foreign aid. At the same time, the Zionist colonial 
project narrativizes (with the hope of materializing) Palestinians as a disappearing object located 
in a distant fantasy. Palestinians are constantly constrained to re-assert the legitimacy of their past 
presence and their present tense through aporetic politics of recognition. These may become 
manifest through an engagement with economies of prestige, as they usually do in cinema. In the 
quotidian, checkpoints and forms of territorial control also discipline Palestinian management of 
time. As a result, Palestinian agency takes shape in direct confrontation with colonial and 
economic infrastructures of spatial and temporal control. 
Located at the crossroads of geopolitics and micropolitics, this dissertation takes film 
economies and their intersecting networks as the locus where contradicting, relational, and 
confrontational temporalities are made visible. As Helga Tawil-Souri reminds us after Michel 
Foucault, “time is a site of material struggle, creating social differences and inequalities structured 
in specific political and economic contexts” (Tawil-Souri 2017, 392, my emphasis). Moreover, 
temporality is not only lived, it is constructed through colonial, revolutionary, and institutional 
historiographies. Palestinian film economies form a node where past and future industrial and 
political imaginaries as well as material economies of colonization, neoliberal recognition, 
development, and humanitarianism meet. As such, the temporal analysis of Palestinian film 
economies helps us identify the complex articulations of Palestinian cultural politics and specific 
fields of Palestinian action. In what follows, I demonstrate how a temporal focus can also 
productively deconstruct film economies, media industries, and their study.   
 
Media Industries Studies and Temporality: The “Not-Yet”  
The Palestinian industrial project takes shape around a variety of temporalities. Concepts of 
suspension, flexibility, instability, sustainability, or the aspiration to recognition figure multiple 
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industrial modes of temporal existence and forms of economic duration. By bridging the gap 
between media industries studies, post-development theory, and critical media infrastructure 
studies, the goal is to provide a framework for analyzing processes of industrial formation and 
industries that are “not-yet.” These unfold carried by festivals and film initiatives that remain 
mostly unrecognized by strict industrial hierarchies of temporal worth and which bend as well as 
redefine categories of global success. The “not yet” of film economies cannot be restricted to an 
occluding form of “protracted temporariness,” which has come to define Palestinians’ relationship 
to a political future of self-determination that never comes. Instead, I propose to examine the 
thickness of the present and how it combines a multiplicity of time formations such as sequences, 
serial movements, duration, and the triad of the past, present and future. I call this contradictory 
present of uncertainties and negotiations “paradoxical.” This approach supplies us with theoretical 
tools to understand industrial formations and how these coincide with political imaginaries.  
The industrial present of the not-yet complicates the uni-directionality of “clock-time.” 
This modern division of time into sequential units is typically seen to dictate relations of 
production and industrial work as well as social normative structures of being on time. 
Contingency rules in the occupied territories and constantly disrupts clock-time. In the West Bank, 
checkpoints not only delay workers by slowing down crossings into zones of labor and back, they 
also unpredictably shut down or, as the case of “flying checkpoints,” suddenly appear on a road 
that was heretofore deemed a convenient route. In Gaza, the continuous destruction of basic 
infrastructures means that electricity and water are available only sparsely and at changing times 
of the day or night, which precludes the comfort of routine as well as forms of “productive” labor. 
In Israel, racial discrimination blocks social advancement. Acknowledging the reorganization of 
temporalities provides a productive entry point into the challenges and strategies that cultural 
workers mobilize in the pursuit of an organized Palestinian film economy. 
Finally, the rejection of dichotomist analyses of what does or does not constitute industry 
and agency delinks the epistemological foundations of media industries studies from positivist 
definitions that sustain hegemonic norms – these being often articulated by colonial powers. Albeit 
modest, this dissertation’s theoretical move partially adheres to the spirit of decolonial 
intervention. Privileging the “not completely legible,” the temporality of not-yet recoils from a 
certain “epistemic privilege” (Mignolo 2009, 8). It illuminates power relations as well as responses 
to coloniality. To a certain extent, the hope is that this knowledge gets repurposed at the service of 
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Palestinian cultural practices and anticolonial epistemology at least as much as it contributes to 
the field of media industries studies.3  
 
Chapter Breakdown 
Each chapter investigates the temporalities that specific developmental and intersecting economies 
produce, and how Palestinian film practitioners respond to these. Their strategies articulate distinct 
modes of convergence and divergence with development-as-growth, human development, 
humanitarian economies, and economies of recognition. By focusing on temporality to explain 
transnational, colonial, and postcolonial power relations, each chapter asks how political histories 
shape media economies, and how media economies forge political futures. 
 The first chapter, “Paradoxical Economies,” explains the concept that gives its name to this 
dissertation’s title. I start by situating this research in the small yet rich field of Palestinian film 
studies. I argue for an epistemological, theoretical, and methodological shift away from trauma 
and identity towards the conceptualization of Palestinian cinema as an economic practice. This 
practice is constituted through Palestinian confrontation with colonial and developmental 
environments and financial networks. Such a change in focus also operates a geographical re-
centering on the temporal space of Palestine-Israel, which establishes itself through the 
“pessoptimistic”4 and paradoxical hope for self-determination as well as its repeated impossibility. 
I then turn to what I call “paradoxical economies,” which I devise as both a methodology to study 
industrial formation in the contradictory present, and an acknowledgment of the competing forces 
invested in shaping Palestinian futures. I coin the concept by relying on theories of transnational 
and postcolonial cinema, media industries studies, post-development theory, and critical media 
infrastructure studies. The temporality of Palestinian workers’ strategizing finally crystallizes 
these paradoxes, and emerges as one focal point for this research.  
 The second chapter, “Suspended Time: Cinephilia and the Politics of Stability,” delves into 
the contradictions of Oslo’s economy of development under colonization and occupation, in the 
                                                
3 Mignolo places academic disciplines in stark opposition to decolonial epistemology. A true decolonial 
practice “advances the [decolonial] cause rather than the discipline” (Mignolo 2009, 14, my emphasis). It 
seems however artificial to argue that this doctoral research evolves outside the discipline in which it 
intervenes. 
4 The term is taken from Emile Habiby’s famous novel The Secret Life of Saeed the Pessoptimist (1974). 
Chapter One elaborates on the significance of the term for this research.  
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West Bank. Stemming from an anthology of short films of the same name, “suspended time” 
describes how stability functions as a leading ideal for the Palestinian Authority’s colonial and 
developmental program of counter-insurgency in a climate of great political and economic 
instability. At the same time, stability nurtures the imaginary of Palestinian cultural workers who 
seek to start building film institutions despite the absence of a fully-fledged Palestinian state. Here 
I rely on the concept of cinephilia, an economic engagement with the love of cinema shaped 
through and around global film festivals. Cinephilia accommodates suspended time by supplying 
models of flexible and adaptable cinema infrastructures such as film festivals, and an ideal of 
stability through the fantasy of a safe theatrical space. Such convergence of developmental, 
cinephiliac, and local film economies react against the dominant visual regime of the instability-
driven news. I build this argument through the study of the Palestine Days of Cinema, whose 
second edition I attended in October 2015. This chapter introduces a post-Oslo history for the 
emergence of art film festivals in the West Bank and provides an initial conceptualization of film 
festivals as unstable institutions.  
 Chapter Three, “Sustainability and the Politics of Cinema Outreach,” examines the 
interaction between development-as-growth, human development, and grassroots engagement 
with human rights through the conceptual convergence around sustainability. The ambivalent 
temporality of sustainability connects ideals of Palestinian agency across times and economies, 
and materializes around initiatives of cinema outreach. Human rights discourse and economies are 
mobilized differently in cinephiliac and self-described grassroots initiatives; yet, ultimately, both 
strands intend to revive Palestinian militant cinema as the first model of Palestinian film 
institutionalization. Here I shift from a focus on art cinema towards conceptions of filmmaking 
embedded in models of “capacity-building” and “empowerment.” Maybe provocatively, I take the 
Women’s Shashat Film Festival as an epitome of sustainability’s ambivalence and a converging 
site for the negotiation of past militant practices with contemporary human rights economies.  
 The fourth chapter, “Emergency: Humanitarianism and the Life of Cinema,” is set in 
Gaza’s humanitarian crisis. It critically examines the epistemological roots of emergency and how 
this construct serves the establishment of regimes of humanitarian governance in the midst of 
continued Israeli assaults on Palestinian life and dignity. I argue that politics of mere life can be 
supplemented with politics of “more life” (Honig 2014) which consider the Palestinian film 
community as well as the Hamas government’s distinct endeavors to build a Gazan film industry. 
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These variegated, at times conflicting, initiatives engage with the humanitarian discourse of life to 
integrate the networks that can materially support the reviving of Palestinian film infrastructures 
and communities. Simultaneously, these efforts justify their own oddity in the context of a lack of 
basic needs by framing cinema and cinema infrastructures as, themselves, basic human rights. 
Situated in the larger context of Gaza’s humanitarian visual regime as well as governmental and 
civilian actions, the Red Carpet Human Rights Film Festival provides a key example of what 
“bringing cinema back to life” can look like in the Strip.  
 The fifth and final chapter, “Recognition Beyond the End of History,” examines the 
conditions of Palestinian appearance in transnational and domestic markets mediated by Israel’s 
diplomatic and governmental power. I investigate ways to theorize the relationship between 
Palestinian citizens and the colonial state through funding by using conceptualizations formulated 
by the Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. At the same time, I review the actual 
and practical debates concerning Palestinian interaction with colonial institutions which hold 
different consequences and meanings for Palestinians in Israel and the occupied territories. To that 
end, I explore how the transnational management of culture articulates around the diplomatic 
discourse of “dialogue,” possibilities for working together, as well as forms of co-optation, 
appropriation, and redistribution. Stemming from the paradox that Palestinian filmmakers’ 
international recognition, often propelled by Israeli funding, doubles their unrecognition in Israel 
itself, this chapter identifies several attempts to decolonize modes of film production.  
 
Methodology 
This dissertation identifies central elements around which the project of a Palestinian film industry 
crystallizes. I perform a discursive analysis of Palestine’s film festivals, their material and 
symbolic networks of exchange, transnational funding streams, and Palestinian films after the 
Second Intifada. To be sure, film festivals constitute a major focus of this research only insofar as 
they point to the specific mechanisms of a mutating Palestinian film economy. Furthermore, all 
these sites of analysis taken together are further extrapolated from built infrastructures such as film 
theatres, urbanism, and colonial architecture. I examine how Palestine’s film festivals, proto- film 
institutions, and Palestinian films result from negotiations between Palestinian cultural workers 
and their environment. At the same time, these initiatives uncover and aggregate debates about 
possible futures. Such a polymorph and transient object of study demands a multi-faceted 
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methodology that accounts for the convergence of film, developmental, human rights, and 
humanitarian economies.5 The goal is to evaluate overlapping imaginaries and immediate interests 
as well as financial exchanges, which contribute to shaping developing industrial projects in 
material and discursive terms, and across geopolitics and economies.  
Researching Palestine proves challenging due to its contested meaning as a political and 
social space as well as the legal and security repercussions of this indeterminacy. In particular, 
investigating the not-yet Palestinian film economy means engaging with institutions that are still 
in the process of being built. Media industries studies typically relies heavily on policy papers; 
official budgets; transnational economic, financial, and tax agreements; contracts and statutory 
regulations; box office data; national polls; and audience reports. More particularly, methods 
grounded in the field of media economics produce and elaborate on market analyses to review 
audience formations (Napoli 2009), while the political economy of media (here not as a general 
framework but a specific tendency within the study of media industries) draws from ratings as well 
as commercial and audience measurements in order to critique ownership structures and its impact 
on the masses (Meehan and Wasko 2013). However, a policy framework for cultural productions 
continues to be quasi-absent in Palestine. In Israel, official reports in English do not mention how 
funds, labor, and cinematic representations are distributed across ethnicities.  
As a result, research into Palestinian film economies can only sparsely follow the 
traditional paths trodden by the political economy of media (understood broadly). The projected 
industry unfolds in the few reports produced by the development economy, which gradually takes 
interest in cinema. For example, the European Union is a unique documenter of the audio-visual 
sector because it is currently expanding its partnership with both Palestine and Israel. Yet, as is 
symptomatic of not-yet practices that are often illegible, even EU official reports cite some 
untrustworthy information that their Commission admits they could not verify (Euromed 
Audiovisual 2013). Additional policy reports on cinema and culture are published by regional 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as Mawred al-Thaqafy and supra-national 
institutions like the UNESCO. More broadly, this material places cinema and culture within its 
institutional and economic context of development and colonization, alongside publications I 
                                                
5 For example, Lindiwe Dovey, Joshua McNamara and Federico Olivieri’s ethnographic study of the Slum 
Film Festival in Kenya place the emphasis on “the negotiation of culture, power, identity, and a certain kind 




consulted by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency (UNRWA), The United Nations High Committee for Refugees (UNHCR), the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations World Commission on 
Environment and Development (UNWCED), as well as local NGOs such as Adalah (the Legal 
Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel), ACRI (Association for Civil Rights in Israel), 
B’Tselem, Gisha, and others.  
 This research focuses instead on the industrial imaginaries that sustain the project of a 
structured Palestinian film economy and their relationship with the material networks I have begun 
to highlight. News stories on Palestinian cinema are slowly migrating from The Guardian’s 
cultural pages and to feature in trade journals such as Variety and Screen International. An active 
funder of Palestinian art, the British Council promoted a Ramallah-based industry event at the 
Days of Cinema in 2017 with the headline: “Palestine’s Dynamic Film Industry Comes Out for 
Days of Cinema” (British Council 2017). Celebrating new market opportunities, the bulletin 
mentions a list of European and Australian financial partners that came to network with Palestinian 
filmmakers. It also announces the creation of grants and awards supporting local film production. 
Acknowledging that the organizers’ efforts aim at building a film industry, the article concludes: 
“if this fourth edition of Days of Cinema is anything to go by, they are succeeding!” (British 
Council 2017) As Palestine emerges as a terrain for cinema investment, it also becomes a 
repository for narratives of success and recognition by both the international film industry and 
Palestinian cultural workers who seek to integrate those economic networks. This dissertation 
partly follows John T. Caldwell’s insight that “film and television today reflect obsessively back 
upon themselves and invest considerable energy in over-producing and distributing [their] self-
analysis to the public” (Caldwell 2008, 1). In addition to global discourses on the Palestinian film 
economy, I thus stem from practitioners’ representations of the industries they shape.  
Such discussions circulate in the trade journals aforementioned as well as Anglophone, 
Francophone, and Arabic press reviews covering festival news and film production, policies, 
infrastructures, and controversial reception.6 Throughout my study, I collected and examined films 
and festivals’ promotional material such as festival catalogues, flyers, posters, schedules, and 
                                                
6	I look at Francophone sources because France is very much involved in co-producing Palestinian cinema 
and has a strong presence in financing cultural initiatives in Palestine. Moreover, these sources were 
particularly accessible due to my native knowledge of French.  
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distributors’ press material. Facebook has proven a useful site where organizations can self-
promote and cultural workers debate, comment, or simply show appreciation and share news 
relevant to the field. These various materials altogether provide crucial information regarding 
films’ producers; festivals’ funders across the years; events’ hosting venues and how these, 
combined with allocated time-slots, uncover imagined audiences; and the names of organizers, 
technicians, and guests. All these elements help us draft networks of solidarity and influence. The 
study of entwined discourses and materiality points to distribution routes which are not only 
transnational and transregional, but also internal to Palestine-Israel and the occupied Palestinian 
territories. Chapter Three in particular examines circuits of outreach within the West Bank.  
The partial focus on distribution allows comparative approaches that challenge universal 
definitions of media or industries (Perren 2013, 169). The same way that Amanda Lotz examines 
the changing meaning of television with the advent of new platforms (Lotz 2007), Palestinian 
cultural workers interrogate what constitutes a film festival in Palestine when they are faced with 
models of a global reach, as I explore in Chapter Two. Shifting away from traditional audience 
studies which typically determines the effect of media on the masses, distribution studies instead 
explores issues of access and agency (Perren 2013, 168; Lobato 2011). Such concerns, central to 
my research, call for a bottom-up approach that benefits from ethnographic research. A form of 
distribution study, the field of film festivals studies has also emphasized methodologies from 
anthropology, as I will develop hereafter. A whole strand of media industries studies similarly 
mobilizes ethnographic strategies in order to analyze how circles of cultural production emerge as 
cultural entities organized around conventions, codes, and systems of meaning-making (Caldwell 
2008, Ganti 2014, Mayer et al. 2009, and Curtin and Sanson 2016).  
This dissertation modestly borrows isolated tools from ethnographic research in order to 
access some of the discourses that cultural workers produce as a way of “stabilizing an industry in 
flux” (Havens et al. 2009, 250). I conducted twenty interviews of Palestinian film festival 
organizers, filmmakers, producers, workshop participants, and cinema officials. These interviews 
took place in Ramallah, al-Bireh, Beit Sahour, East Jerusalem, Paris, and the border town of 
London, Ontario, as well as on Skype. I conducted another eleven interviews during the diasporic 
film festivals of Chicago and London (UK), which I do not include in this dissertation. Over the 
six years of my PhD, I travelled to Palestine twice and for a total duration of five months. During 
my first trip in the Summer 2013, I familiarized myself with the local context, took Arabic classes 
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at Birzeit, and conducted a study of the Franco-Arab Film Festival which became an article 
published in Transnational Cinemas (2014). This case study did not make its way to the 
dissertation. My second trip took place in the Fall 2015, during which I enrolled in Birzeit again, 
attended the Days of Cinema (the object of Chapter Two), and conducted research on the Shashat 
Women’s Film Festival (examined in Chapter Three).  
My fieldwork was, however, limited in time. Although I did travel around the West Bank’s 
largest cities; the smaller towns of Qalqilya, Tulkarem, Sebastia, Salfit; the villages of Nabi Saleh, 
Kufr Malik, Ein Qiniya; and the refugee camps of Al-Jalazun, Al-Amari, Dheisheh, Aida, and 
more, like most foreigners I remained based in Ramallah. In other words, I am aware that this 
study represents an instance of what Marwan Kraidy and Patrick Murphy label “a quasi-
ethnography” and “a textual and rhetorical usage of ethnography” (Murphy and Kraidy 2003, 3). 
A recurring concern for scholars of Palestine who are privileged enough to visit is whether they 
will be able to come back in when they renew their three-months tourist visa. Some anthropologists 
obtain a year-long multiple-entry visa because they choose to affiliate to Israeli universities – an 
option I did not consider. Others have successfully tried their luck, crossed out and come back in, 
but this speculative game makes it difficult to remain open to ethnographic “spontaneous 
encounters.” I am unfortunately unable to go back because of travelling restrictions, which cut 
short any long-term and deep ethnographic endeavor. In what follows, I examine how film festival 
studies has placed the emphasis on field work. In contrast, I could only attend one festival among 
my case studies. I analyze what this means for this dissertation.  
Film festival studies allocates great value to attending the events under study. The sub-field 
materialized around the practice of cinephilia, film criticism, and film festival “tourism.” This is 
evident in some of the early books that shaped the following scholarly debates, such as Kenneth 
Turan’s Sundance to Sarajevo: Film Festivals and the World They Made (2002), Marijke de 
Valck’s Film Festivals: From European Geopolitics to Global Cinephilia (2007) or Richard 
Porton’s edited collection Dekalog: On Film Festivals (2009). Moreover, film festivals constitute 
live events and their prestige stems from audiences’ desire to take part in them. For researchers, 
the impetus proves double, and the glamour of being there adds to the epistemological value of 
participant observation. In his 1988 book Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author, 




the ability of anthropologists to get us to take what they say seriously has less to do with 
factual look or an air of conceptual elegance than it has with their capacity to convince us 
that what they say is a result of their having penetrated (or, if you prefer, been penetrated 
by) another form of life, of having, one way or another, truly “been there” (Geertz 1988, 
4). 
 
Critical scholarship, especially when it succumbs to the lure of glamour, can suffer from too close 
a rapprochement with its object of study. While a sustained engagement with industrial actors may 
strengthen the field (Holt 2013), media industries studies scholars have also warned us against the 
risk of becoming an extension of industries’ interests where we end up promoting them (Wasko 
and Meehan 2013, 150). Caldwell reflects on the temptation “to go to the industry to ‘get it right.’” 
He writes: “even as I acknowledge the importance of valuing indigenous theorizing…, I resist 
deferring entirely to the local categories and aesthetic paradigms of producers, at least as final 
guarantors of authenticity or meaning” (Caldwell 2008, 14). Caldwell’s point is crucial to this 
study. It is almost cliché to reiterate such a worn-out point; yet, what proved most challenging 
during the fieldwork and beyond was to strike the right balance between respecting Palestinians’ 
narratives and finding a place for my own critical voice without recolonizing the discourse through 
interpretation. Indirectly, this study seeks to find paths of solidarity through academic research, at 
the same time as these bonds must be strengthened outside the university.   
One of the few scholars of film festivals to be trained as an anthropologist, Toby Lee 
reminds us of the methodological implications of using ethnography to study film festivals. She 
introduces this approach “on the ground and in real time” (Lee 2016, 122) as a counterpoint to 
dominant research that situates festivals in the realm of the global. In her own words, as an 
“exercise of the unexpected” (Behar, cited in Lee 2016, 126), “ethnographic research allows a real-
time understanding of how festivals themselves shift in response to changing contexts” (Lee 2016, 
125). This point proves particularly relevant to the context of the military occupation of Palestine, 
the siege of Gaza, and the continued discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel. “Being 
there” provides the advantage of inhabiting the contested geographies of Palestine at various 
levels: the temporality of travel across the territories, scattered with checkpoints and forbidden 
roads, and viewing infrastructures themselves. What does “watching a film in a cinema” mean in 
Palestine? Where and when does watching films happen? Brian Larkin poses similar questions in 
his investigation of the social spaces of theatres in Northern Nigeria after the introduction of 
Islamic law. What sparked his interest was “not the cinema theatre itself but the aura that hung 
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over it, not the just [sic] built space or the bright images shown there but the assemblage of these 
into a social event” (Larkin 2008, 2). The second edition of the Days of Cinema (now Palestine 
Cinema Days) took place during the so-called “Third Intifada” or “Knife Intifada” in October 
2015. Being there allowed me to examine the discrepancy between what was planned – the written 
material produced by the festival – and what actually happened – the event. I mapped out 
potentialities and failures – not what should have happened, but the active production of new 
temporalities of possibility.  
More generally, unpredictability organized much of my research. I had planned this second 
field trip around the Shashat Women’s Film Festival and did not know the existence of Days of 
Cinema. On the very morning I crossed the border from the Jordanian city of Aqaba to the Israeli 
resort town of Eilat, I was informed that the festival was cancelled. I would learn later that a major 
donor backed out. Although I could not attend the festival, I kept Shashat as a case study. The 
festival is predominantly funded by international organizations and must produce evidence of its 
success and good functioning. The festival director, Dr. Alia Arasoughly was extremely helpful 
and provided me with all the editions’ catalogues, promotional material, press reviews, pictures of 
the event, and audience studies. She granted me access to Shashat’s personal library and the 
seventy-seven films that the organization produced during its training workshops. Finally, she 
facilitated my communication with filmmakers involved in the various stages of the festival’s 
training workshops, either as participants, supervisors, or organizers. From a study of lived 
temporalities, my research shifted to reconstructing the timeline of the festival and its different 
waves of partnerships and donors. How does an economy embedded in the shifting geographies of 
aid promise sustainability to precarious structures like Palestinian film festivals over time? 
Simultaneously, I conducted interviews of filmmakers formerly involved in the festival, who were 
now committed to developing the Days of Cinema. That is how I started investigating this other 
event, whose second edition occurred during my stay. The debates emerging from this web of 
interviews suggested diverging networks of affinity that represent distinct visions of what a film 
festival in Palestine should be. “Being there” at the festival became secondary to attending to what 
Toby Lee calls “the peripheries” of the festival, where “the festival interacts with other institutions 
and businesses” (Lee 2016, 124) – where different economies converge.  
I also remained in the peripheries of the Karama Red Carpet Human Rights Film Festival 
in Gaza, my third case study. Very few people can access the Strip. Visitors are subjected to the 
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triple approval of the PA, Hamas, and Israel, who mostly restrict all but humanitarian workers. I 
heard about this event on Facebook, after a massive PR campaign that followed the 2014 Israeli 
attack on Gaza. The entangled issues of humanitarianism, access, and cinema formed the center of 
this research. I interviewed the festival director, Khalil Mozian, after he migrated to Canada, and 
relied on Arabic and Anglophone press reviews of the festival as well as promotional videos and 
photos posted on the festival’s Facebook page. Until late October 2018 upon the inauguration of 
the fourth edition, the festival did not have a functioning web platform other than social media. 
Pointing to how little academic literature exists on cinema in Gaza is an understatement. The press 
coverage of speeches and agreements made by Hamas officials around cinema and a film industry 
in Gaza, as well as the filmmakers’ stance towards Hamas over the years, became a major source 
of information. Significantly, Gaza always already lives in the news more than it does as an object 
of academic reflection. Concluding that access shapes knowledge is a truism. Surely, however, 
research methodologies also grapple with colonial temporalities, which reorganize possibilities for 
fieldwork, encounters, and “being there.”  
 
A Note on Terminology 
The colonial fragmentation of space emerges from and perpetuates multiple typologies and 
epistemological frameworks of reference designed to understand the geography of Palestine-Israel. 
The West Bank and Gaza are traditionally referred to as being part of the same entity of the 
occupied Palestinian territories (oPt), Palestinian territories, the proto-state of Palestine, or 
Palestine – despite the existence of two governments in conflict respectively based in the West 
Bank and Gaza. As for Israel, I refer to it as such when I examine its structure as a settler state 
with juridical, administrative, and legal consequences. I also use the appellation “historic 
Palestine” or “48,” which re-assert the history that precedes the creation of the state instead of 
normalizing its constitution. Finally, I often resort to the hyphenated Palestine-Israel to think 
beyond the arbitrary division into two states. Palestine-Israel also leaves open the possibility for a 
future geography in which the colonial structures have given way to a fair arrangement for both 




Chapter One – Paradoxical Economies 
 
Take me, for example. I don’t differentiate between optimism and pessimism and 
am quite at loss as to which of the two characterizes me. When I awake each 
morning, I thank the Lord he did not take my soul during the night. If harm befalls 
me during the day, I thank Him it was no worse. So, which am I, a pessimist or an 
optimist? 
Emile Habiby, The Secret Life of Saeed the Pessoptimist, 1974.  
 
Renouncing the choice between optimism and pessimism, Emile Habiby’s famous character Saeed 
the Pessoptimist settles for the paradoxical combination of the two. Saeed acclimates to life as a 
Palestinian in the newly established state of Israel after the Nakba – the catastrophe of the 1948 
war, the destruction of hundreds of Palestinian villages, and the mass exodus that ensued. The 
reader follows him until 1967, the date when Saeed sends the letters that compose the bulk of the 
novel to Habiby himself, who is charged with the task of sharing them with us readers. As the 
book’s title suggests, Saeed, whose name ironically means “happy,” carries many secrets. He 
spends a lifetime devising tricks necessary to conceal the misery of existing under a settler colonial 
regime that humiliates, dispossesses, and erases Palestinians, demanding their loyalty and 
submission in return. In the face of this daily tragedy, Palestinians in Israel resort to their “Oriental 
imagination,” which humorously brings Saeed to meet his extra-terrestrial friends in outer space. 
“And had it not been for their ‘Oriental imagination,’” Saeed asks his fictional reader Habiby, 
“would those Arabs of yours […] have been able to live one single day in this country?” (Habiby 
1974, 100) 
 Oriental imagination appears to be a quality of Saeed’s as much as his creator’s. Habiby’s 
satiric style, which contrasts with contemporary Palestinian resistance poetry like Mahmud 
Darwish’s, constitutes one example of his ingenuity. The role Habiby managed to play in Israel’s 
political scene despite being Palestinian – which until 1967 meant subjection to martial law – 
insured the wide reception of his seminal tale. A member of the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) 
after 1948, Habiby helped found Israel’s communist parties Maki in 1948 and Rakah in 1965.7 He 
first published Saeed the Pessoptimist in a serialized form between 1972 and 1974 in the 
                                                
7 The Rakah party emerged in 1965 out of the schism with Maki, an Israeli communist party that aligned 
with Zionist views. Rakah was formed as an anti-Zionist and largely Arab faction, and the Soviet Union 
recognized it as the official Israeli communist party. After 1989, Maki was dissolved, and Rakah adopted 
the name of the former party, Maki.   
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communist journal he also contributed to establishing, al-Ittihad (The Union). The publishing 
format inscribed the fiction in its own contemporary history. Saeed’s paradoxical pessoptimism 
largely inspired the ironic storytelling and allowed Habiby to render the complexity of Palestinian 
attitudes, which he observed as he was writing.  
 Two sides of the same coin, Oriental imagination and pessoptimism apprehend the 
absurdity of colonization. Attending to their paradoxical mechanisms proves useful on two distinct 
levels for this dissertation: First, these two notions help us uncover how Palestinian cultural 
practices articulate Palestinian agency in the face of Israel’s constant threats of erasure. Palestinian 
artists and organizers employ pessoptimism and Oriental imagination to navigate colonization’s 
contradictory temporalities of permanent subjection and hope for a better future. Second, paradox 
functions as a narrative device and a methodology to write in the present about contemporary 
cultural practices enmeshed in colonial times. Paradox keeps the contradictions of the 
contemporary alive, whereas inquiries into the past are expected to be shaped as full blown and 
coherent narratives. Exploring colonization’s paradoxical temporalities provides some 
introductory historical context for this dissertation’s study of Palestinian cinema. 
Arabic translator and poet Salma K. Jayyusi starts unearthing the paradoxical temporalities 
of colonization as she explains the term “pessoptimism.” With this oxymoron, Habiby “present[s] 
a refreshing formula for the reestablishment of faith in the possibility of freedom and liberty at the 
same time that he exposes the nature of the dilemma at whose core the tragedy of the Palestinians 
lie” (Jayyusi 2003, xvi). The contemporaneity of hope and despair resonates with the transitional 
times in which Habiby was writing. 1967 marks the beginning of the Israeli occupation of East 
Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip after the Six-Day War, which led to the second mass 
exodus of Palestinians after 1948. Commemorated as the Naksa (“setback” in Arabic), the Israeli 
army and its allies’ victory over Arab troops deeply affected the regional sense of Pan-Arab 
identity and consciousness, which was declared in crisis. This led to the reassessment of Arab 
liberation movements, which had failed to achieve their goals (Kassab 2010). Concurrently, 1967 
saw the re-organization and the strengthening of the Palestinian resistance, newly located in the 
diaspora successively in Jordan and Lebanon.  
Palestinian cultural practices are entangled with the unfolding of paradoxical times. 
Scholars Nurith Gertz and George Khleifi’s widely used chronology establishes a history of 
Palestinian cinema that starts with the documenting of Arab and Palestinian institutional powers 
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in Mandatory Palestine before 1948,8 disappears after the Nakba, re-emerges in force around the 
Palestinian resistance in exile after 1967, and continues with the return of the filmmakers who had 
studied abroad to present-day Israel in the 1980s (Gertz and Khleifi 2008). For Hamid Dabashi, 
this history determines “a sense of continuity that outlives the current political predicament of 
Palestinians and the disrupted course of their nationhood” (Dabashi 2006, 9). Liberation 
overcomes the paradoxical temporalities of colonization and constitutes its logical conclusion. In 
contrast, Gertz and Khleifi embed such a linear description in the circular, traumatic movement of 
Palestinians’ recurring dispossession. The “chronicle,” as they emphatically name this historical 
account, hints at Palestinian cinema’s inscription in a conflicting temporality. Here, the materiality 
and ideals of liberation prove in constant contradiction with the experience of exile and the 
persistence of colonization.  
This dissertation starts when this tension arguably reaches new heights with the so-called 
peace process, put in motion during the 1991 Madrid conference and legally framed through the 
1994 Oslo Accords (hereafter Oslo). The Accords established a Palestinian interim self-
government; yet the rise of unemployment and poverty that followed demonstrate Oslo’s failure 
to bring the promised economic and political stability to the West Bank and Gaza. The Second 
Intifada broke six years later. The policy framework that instituted the proto-state of Palestine 
emerged in actuality as the renunciation of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) political 
emancipation project since 1967. To many, the Accords also represented a complicit agreement 
between the newly appointed Palestinian Authority (PA) and the occupying power. Among the 
fiercest critics of Oslo at the time the Accords were signed, the prominent Palestinian American 
thinker Edward Said wrote in The Nation: “No other liberation movement in the twentieth century 
got so little – roughly five percent of its territory. And no other leaders of a liberation movement 
accepted what in effect is permanent subordination of their people” (Said 1995, 418). Twenty years 
later, political scientist Adam Hanieh confirmed: “The Oslo Accords weren’t a failure for Israel – 
they served as a fig leaf to consolidate and deepen its control over Palestinian life” (Hanieh 2013). 
The implementation of the peace process paradoxically made it impossible to imagine a future for 
Palestinian self-determination and a sustainable Palestinian economy.  
                                                




The Accords naturalized the fragmentation of both the Palestinian people and the 
Palestinian land. They agreed to marginalize the discussion around the potential return of 
Palestinian refugees (the families of those exiled in 1948 and 1967), the rapid growth of Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza (which started after 1967), and the status of East Jerusalem 
(which Israel illegally annexed in 1980). The Accords promised that further negotiations on a 
permanent status of statehood would be held, but these never took place (Declaration of Principles 
1993, Article V. 3). Furthermore, the Accords effectively restricted Palestinians’ freedom of 
movement and divided the territories into various zones of governance that transferred (partial and 
full) control over a total of 82% of the West Bank to Israel (Turner 2016, 34-35).9 At the same 
time, the 1993 Declaration of Principles and the 1994 Protocol for Economic Relations (PER) – 
all constitutive of the final Accords – defined the exchanges between the PA and the Israeli 
government as “cooperation.” In Israel, Palestinian citizens, branded as “Israeli Arabs,” did not 
gain better access to basic rights, jobs, or housing.  
In economic terms, Oslo allowed Israel to retain control over key Palestinian state-building 
resources including trade and fiscal revenue, while imposing a tariff structure that greatly limited 
Palestinian exports but encouraged Israeli imports in the territories (Turner 2016, 35). International 
donors, the UN, and other multilateral agencies filled in for Palestinians’ lack of control over their 
own financial resources. This turned the territories into a marketplace for local and international 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and humanitarian organizations. The PA entirely relies 
on external aid to this day, with an estimated US$15 billion budget according to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2013 (Turner 2016, 36). More than twenty years after Oslo, the 
“prolonged decay” of the Palestinian National Movement, as Tariq Dana describes it, is widely 
acknowledged (Dana 2017). The future of the proto-state of Palestine – what remains of the 
Palestinian dream of liberation – is now modeled around ever-stagnating developmental projects 
spearheaded by the World Bank and the IMF.   
Dubbed “economic peace,” Oslo marked an opportunity for Israel to normalize the 
relationship with its Arab neighbors, gradually expand its market in the Arab world, and facilitate 
                                                
9 The Oslo Accords institutionalized the division of the West Bank into a Zone A (under the full civilian 
and security control of the Palestinian Authority), a Zone B (under the security control of Israel and civilian 
control of the PA) and a zone C (under the full civilian and security control of Israel). The City of Hebron 
is also divided into two zones: H1 (under the full control of the PA) and H2 (under the full control of Israel). 
Gaza is divided into white and yellow areas of control.  
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its integration in the global economy. The Accords propelled a series of Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) Economic Summits that the IMF and the World Economic Forum chaperoned 
between 1994 and 1998. These fostered trade and investment between Israel and the Arab world. 
In 2003, the US government shared its strategic vision of a Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) 
running across the region and anchored in Israeli and Gulf capitals (Hanieh 2010, 89). The siege 
of Gaza after 2007 as well as the segregation wall and the permit system drastically limited the 
mobility of Palestinian workers from the occupied territories and increased their economic 
marginalization. At the same time, the privatizing efforts of Oslo strengthened the transnational 
Palestinian economic elite (Hanieh 2010). In his book Neoliberal Apartheid (2017), Andy Clarno 
foregrounds how Israel’s neoliberalism, racist economic policies, and settler-colonial practices are 
intertwined. Israel partially outsourced the occupation to the PA, which enforces counter-
insurgency strategies on behalf of the occupier. In the wake of the Second Intifada, the PA further 
cut its public spending in order to support plans of securitization that both reinforced racial 
segregation and attracted foreign investors. This budget redistribution also means, in the context 
of this dissertation, that Palestinian civil society and local and international NGOs now have to 
assume the responsibility of building cultural institutions, not considered a priority in security or 
economic terms.   
The paradox and dead end of Oslo materialized in the daily experience, especially since 
the Second Intifada (2000-2005). Significantly, the Palestinian films produced during the uprisings 
do not simply document the confrontations with the Israeli army that so often shape our imaginary 
of that period. These productions also reflect the constant interruption of Palestinian time instituted 
by checkpoints, roadblocks, and route changes. Gertz and Khleifi describe such a fragmented 
landscape as “arrested time and obstructed space” (Gertz and Khleifi 2008, 155), concluding that 
many of the films of this period seek to overcome the disintegration of space by advocating for 
“national unity and restoration of the past” (Gertz and Khleifi 2008, 147). In contrast, Kay 
Dickinson dwells on the everyday-ness of life under occupation that these productions convey. 
Against a vision of Palestinian time dictated by trauma, she examines how Palestinian filmmakers 
strategized around and responded to the unpredictability and surrealism of the occupation 
(Dickinson 2010). Both crossing the territories and filming under the occupation require tricks 
and, might I add, a certain dose of Oriental imagination, which expand our definition of resistance 
to a wider spectrum.  
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Similarly interested in Palestinian savviness, this dissertation is concerned with the 
practical and economic strategies that allow the formation of a Palestinian film economy after 
Oslo. More particularly, my investigation starts with the Second Intifada, during which the number 
of film productions and screening initiatives dramatically increased. As Saeed’s pessoptimism and 
Oriental imagination suggest, responses to the context of occupation do not always align with 
practices of outright resistance. Despite the sympathy he inspires in the reader, Saeed often 
survives by surrendering to the Israeli authorities. Resistance, Habiby seems to tell us, is better 
understood as a non-linear spectrum. Jayyusi clarifies this when she defines pessoptimism as a 
way “to uncover the various contradictions that crowd the distance between the extreme poles of 
Zionist colonialism and Palestinian resistance” (Jayyusi 2003, xiii). This complexity should also 
inform our observation of Palestinians’ cultural practices. Resistance may at times become a rigid 
concept which foreign researchers like me, who consider that they write in solidarity with the 
Palestinian struggle for self-determination, excessively mobilize and romanticize. Self-
determination remains an open category, subjected to much pressure from an environment defined 
not only by the occupation, but also by the overarching logic of apartheid and aggressive neoliberal 
politics (including of aid) established by the Oslo Accords and encouraged by Israel.  
Paradoxical times frame Palestinian cultural productions through what Reema Salha Fadda 
calls a “culture of violence” after anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod (Abu-Lughod 2010; Fadda 
2014). Israeli militarism has established an “infrastructure of unjust distribution” (Weizman 2007 
cited in Fadda 2014) which pre-determines im/possibilities for the production, circulation, and 
exhibition of Palestinian works locally and globally. Fadda argues that binaries of resistance and 
collaboration no longer make sense in this context:  
The notion that Palestinian works of art must act within the (ambiguously defined) political 
comfort zone of an art industry, or risk losing financial and developmental opportunities 
narrows Palestinian culture into a binary of rage (against the rules set by the occupation) 
and cooperation (within the rules set by the occupation) (Fadda 2014). 
 
We cannot divorce the study of Palestinian art (and film) economies from colonial and capitalist 
(neoliberal) structures of oppression. Taking cultures of violence as a point of departure to 
understand media industries bears at least three implications for this dissertation. First, we need to 
examine the multiple forms that Palestinian agency takes as a result. Second, attending to the 
conditions of possibility for a contemporary Palestinian economy and industry challenges 
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normative models of inquiry that take media industries for granted. Legitimacy, infrastructural 
development, and conditions of financial inclusion constitute primary axes of interest to this 
research project. Third, media industrial networks expand beyond cultural spheres and intersect 
with various political economies. This dissertation especially investigates the relationship between 
cinema, human rights, and humanitarian imaginaries as well as their financial and aesthetic 
circuits. These economies and the various developmental futures they advocate impact Palestinian 
lived temporalities. They generate conceptions of historical value that contribute to distributing 
power and agency. Rather than an isolated case, the Palestinian context sheds light on the 
formation of film economies in the Global South and minority media economies in the Global 
North at large.  
 This chapter begins by situating my dissertation project within the small field of Palestinian 
cinema studies. It asks what it means to talk about national cinemas as economic projects rather 
than identity-binding forms of representations. Oriented towards supporting a variety of 
Palestinian futures, the emerging Palestinian film economy proves as much a spatial object as a 
temporal one. The second part of this chapter coins the concept of “paradoxical economies” in 
order to analyze how Palestinian film practitioners negotiate the contradictory futures and 
imaginaries that colonial, developmental, human rights, and humanitarian economies shape. I 
inscribe this study in the fields of transnational cinemas and postcolonial studies, critical media 
industries studies, post-development theory, and critical media infrastructure studies. 
 
1. After National Cinema 
The convergence of the terms “Palestinian” and “cinema” often strikes foreigners, Palestinian 
audiences, and Palestinian film practitioners and scholars alike as an aberration. The absence of a 
fully-fledged Palestinian state and the dispersion of the Palestinian people across continents 
challenges traditional understandings of national cinema as the congruence of national identity – 
one that is changing and multiple – and state formation (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 
1990; Hayward 1993; Crofts 1993). Palestinian actor-director Mohamed Bakri declared to The 
Guardian in 2006: “Let me tell you about the Palestinian film industry. Very simply, we do not 
have one” (cited in Brooks 2006). George Khleifi reiterated that statement almost ten years later 
(interview with the author 2015). Yet, the appellation “Palestinian cinema” persists and has been 
the object of a growing scholarship since the mid-2000s, a moment that has figured a shift in 
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Palestinian filmmaking practices as a result of the changing economies of the Second Intifada. The 
conversations around the definition of Palestinian cinema and national cinema have thus 
contributed to shaping a small but lively field of Palestinian film studies. My own research is 
located “after national cinema” because it acknowledges the rich input but also the limitations of 
the term as it has been used to theorize Palestinian cinema. The epistemological complexity of 
Palestine as a space in a constant process of definition allows a reconceptualization of national 
cinema; however, I do not intend to reform that particular field of study. Instead, I stem from its 
restrictions to propose a different framework of analysis predicated on film economies. The shift 
I initiate from national identity to practice rests on a contextual analysis. For that reason, I articulate 
a review of scholarly debates on Palestinian cinema as national cinema at the same time as I 
provide a brief historical sketch of Palestinian productions.  
The first section of this chapter builds on three paradoxes to deconstruct the concept of 
national cinema. The first paradox, crucial to existing scholarly debates, questions the possibility 
of a national cinema in the absence of a nation-state. In this context, Palestinian cinema’s definition 
revolves around a Palestinian national identity based on the trauma of the 1948 Nakba. The second 
paradox asks how Palestinian cinema, deemed stateless and without a film industry, can be 
internationally successful. Here I propose a deviation from the focus on a deterritorialized identity 
that has dominated the field, thinking instead of Palestinian cinema as an economic practice of 
global networks. The third paradox introduces a geographical shift by re-grounding Palestinian 
cinema in the space of Palestine-Israel. In this context, I understand Palestinian cinema as an 
economic project not tied to a demarcated territory, but attached to a paradoxical future of Palestine 
as a space to-be-defined and predicated upon the simultaneous possibility and impossibility of 
Palestinian self-determination. This last paradox most closely informs my understanding of 
“paradoxical economies,” which the second part of this chapter elaborates.  
 
1.1. From Trauma to Practice 
Many scholars have described Palestinian cinema as a paradoxical national cinema. In his 
introduction to the reference book Dreams of a Nation (2006), Dabashi writes:  
 
The proposition [of Palestinian cinema as a promising national cinema] is paradoxical and 
it is through this paradox that it needs to be articulated and theorized: how exactly is it that 
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a stateless nation generates a national cinema – and once it does, what kind of national 
cinema is it? (Dabashi 2006, 7)  
 
Livia Alexander provides additional context to this paradox. Writing slightly before Dabashi in 
2005, Alexander casts doubt on the adequacy of the framework of “national cinema” to articulate 
the tension between state and nation so central to her post-Oslo focus. Facing the burden of 
defining an object then little studied, she successively asks over the course of the chapter: “Is there 
a Palestinian cinema?”, “Is it possible to speak of a ‘Palestinian cinema’ at all?”, and “What is 
Palestinian cinema?” (Alexander 2005) Instead of taking these questions at face value, Alexander 
places national discourses in perspective via the highly transnational reality of Palestinian 
productions and addresses postcolonial concerns, at the same time opening up the category of the 
national. On the one hand, she acknowledges that the dispersion of the Palestinian people within 
and outside Palestine has generated a multiplicity of national narratives of liberation. On the other, 
she writes, the absence of a state and the lack of interest of the growing Palestinian private sector 
in investing in cinema implies that the funding supporting Palestinian films mainly originates from 
a variety of European and American TV agencies, foreign national funds for global South film 
productions, and, more recently I shall add, tailored international festival grants. 
 Both Alexander and Dabashi grapple with stateless Palestinian cinema’s position in a 
theoretical context where the nation-state is assumed to primarily control the making of cinema. 
Their respective investigations echo debates formulated throughout the former decade around “the 
limiting imagination of national cinema,” to quote Andrew Higson’s seminal 2000 article. The 
category of national cinema started to be placed under scrutiny in the wake of the increased 
permeability of borders and the intensification of global trade, information, and demographic flows 
in the 1990s. Among the first in film studies, Higson highlights the inadequacy of Benedict 
Anderson’s concept of “imagined community,” which ties the idea of a shared sense of national 
belonging to a state’s defined territory. Higson argues that a transnational approach more 
appropriately explains processes of film production, distribution, and reception because these 
involve exchanges of financial resources, technical experience, and cultural values between 
various countries. Yet, the need for new theorizations that account for the transnational elasticity 
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of space does not completely invalidate the role played by eroding nation-states. Instead, Higson 
advocates for a refined focus on the state and re-asserts its role in policy-making (Higson 2000).10  
 Higson’s outline of the transnational only partially meets the conceptual needs of a 
Palestinian cinema described as stateless. Contemporary studies grounded in postcolonial theory 
have more suitably diverted their attention from state structures in order to both deconstruct the 
representations of racial minorities by dominant groups and provide tools to analyze the 
representations of minorities by themselves. This approach ultimately unveils the power relations 
at work in constructing identities and upsets fixed cultural and national configurations. In the 
intellectual tradition of Edward Said’s seminal book Orientalism (1978), Ella Shohat and Robert 
Stam’s Unthinking Eurocentrism (1994) examines the Eurocentric cinematic representations of 
race and non-European cultures that have served to establish and perpetuate hierarchies inherited 
from globalized histories of colonization. Shohat and Stam propose moving beyond the East/West 
binary and exploring interrelated and multicultural dynamics that complicate unidimensional 
understandings of cultural specificities. Mirroring this work of unmaking representations, Hamid 
Naficy coins the concept of “accented cinema” to address the cinematic formations that emerge 
from within the condition of exile and diaspora (Naficy 2001). Split between homeland and host 
country, exilic and diasporic films always already inscribe themselves in simultaneous but distinct 
local and global spaces, hence locating filmmaking in “the interstices of social formations and 
cinema practices” (Naficy 2001, 4). Postcolonial studies’ reconceptualization of the national 
around the complexities of identity formation has therefore allowed scholars of Palestinian cinema 
to avoid what Helga Tawil-Souri calls the “territorial trap” after John Agnew (Agnew 1994), the 
confusion of the nation with the territorial boundaries of the nation-state (Tawil-Souri 2014). 
Evading the territorial trap often resulted in defining the Palestinian nation through its 
geographic fragmentation and demographic dispersion. This distances issues of Palestinianness 
from the economic constraints Alexander timidly introduced. Typically, Dabashi’s paradox 
considers that there is no Palestinian state and this very absence signifies the deeper traumatic 
event of the Nakba in 1948 – the political and material dispossession of the Palestinians. The loss 
of the land and the historical trauma come to the fore as modes of organizing Palestinian identities, 
                                                
10 This article likely influenced Dabashi and Alexander’s understanding of national cinema. They both write 
at the very moment when studies in transnational cinemas start to further de-centralize mechanisms of 




geographies, and film styles. Dabashi argues that trauma dictates contemporary Palestinian 
aesthetic representations by way of a “traumatic realist” style that translates Palestinians’ 
“repressed anger.” He adds, “the central trauma of Palestine, the Nakba, is the defining moment 
of Palestinian cinema” (Dabashi 2006, 11). Joseph Massad similarly identifies the un-
representability of the Nakba as the episteme that structures the visual experiments of Palestinian 
cinema (Massad 2006, 43). The architecture of Gertz and Khleifi’s seminal book Palestinian 
Cinema: Landscape, Trauma, Memory (2008) is built around the permanence of trauma as it is 
interlocked with memory and landscape. Haim Bresheeth in turn describes Palestinian cinema as 
the process of turning the melancholia of loss into a work of mourning through the cinematic 
reconstruction of the Palestinian identity and memory (Bresheeth 2007). Trauma presides over 
definitions of the Palestinian nation because it is that which separates Palestinians from having a 
state. As a theoretical move, acknowledging trauma serves to counter the territorial trap. 
Furthermore, trauma functions as a unifying factor that connects all Palestinians, and sediments 
them as a people – as a nation. Trauma acts not only as a defining moment of Palestinian cinema 
but, to paraphrase Dabashi, it is a defining moment of Palestinian cinema as a national cinema.  
 Gertz and Khleifi insist that films made by Palestinians existed in Mandatory Palestine – 
before 1948. These were produced by various local companies, such as Ibrahim Hassan Sirhan’s 
Studio Palestine, and later the Arab Film Company, established by Sirhan with Ahmad Hilmi al-
Kilani who studied film in Cairo. However, cinema did not manage to achieve popularity in 
Palestinian communities at that period because of financial and infrastructural constraints. British 
colonial laws were also put into place to prevent the rise of a local film industry that would 
potentially perpetuate images contradicting Western representations (Euromed Audiovisual 2013, 
95). Contrary to theatre, cinema could not be appropriated from the bottom upwards. It only 
became central to constructing a Palestinian discourse of resistance against Zionism around Arab 
nationalism in the late 1960s (Gertz and Khleifi 2008, 16). Representations of Palestinians 
produced by European and American travelers dominated the early twentieth century. After 1948, 
humanitarian organizations such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) were 
responsible for shaping the image of Palestinians as refugees and victims that endures today. Gertz 
and Khleifi situate the birth of Palestinian cinema as a national cinema during its militant period 
after 1967, when units of Palestinian filmmakers in exile were integrated in the effort of the armed 
revolution and received the financial support of various political parties. For the first time, 
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Palestinians could represent themselves and claim the power to narrate. Militant films attempted 
to formulate a coherent national narrative and a shared sense of belonging – an “imagined 
community” sans state. This proved necessary in order to counter allegations that Palestinians did 
not exist as a people, as developed early on by Zionist discourses.  
Many decades after the first theorizations of the Zionist doctrine, in 1969, then-Israeli 
prime minister Golda Meir infamously stated in London’s Sunday Times: “There is no such thing 
as a Palestinian people...It is not as if we came and threw them out and took their country. They 
didn’t exist” (Meir 1969). Her attack specifically targeted the supposed absence of a Palestinian 
consciousness, assumption that she derived from the lack of a so-called “modern” political 
structure recognizable by Western standards such as the nation-state. Many historians have refuted 
Meir’s claim and supplied evidence substantiating that a Palestinian national identity developed 
long before the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and even before Zionism (Muslih 1988; 
Kimmerling and Migdal 1993; Khalidi 1997). The consolidation of a Palestinian state project, 
initiated as early as 1967 (Gresh 1988), strived to derail the Zionist narrative of colonial 
legitimation. Meir’s negation of the political formation of a Palestinian people worked closely with 
Israel’s prolonged campaign to eliminate the traces of a Palestinian culture and presence. Using a 
definition of “ethnic cleansing” grounded in international law, Israeli historian Ilan Pappe 
meticulously chronicles pre-state Zionists and Israel’s intent to “render an ethnically mixed 
country homogeneous by expelling a particular group of people and turning them into refugees 
while demolishing the homes they were driven out from” (Pappe 2006, 3).  
Ethnic cleansing includes the eradication of a region’s history (Pappe 2006, 2). Meir’s 1969 
quote operated as a self-fulfilling prophecy and carried crucial implications for the cinematic 
representation of Palestinians. Films like Bi-l Rawh Wal-Damm/With Soul, With Blood (Palestine 
Film Unit, 1971) and Lays Lahm Wujud/They Do Not Exist (Mustapha ‘Abu Ali, 1974) responded 
to Meir’s negation of Palestinian existence by documenting life in the refugee camps. These 
images expressed the “Palestinian national character, its historical and cultural identity as well as 
its fighting identity,” to transpose the words of PLO representative Ezzedine Kalak in the 1970s 
(Kalak 1977, 14, my translation from French). The formulation of a style suitable to convey the 
“Palestinian question” was integral to the broader internationalist goals of anti-imperialist and 
cultural liberation. The early works of the Palestine Film Unit, from 1968 to 1974 in Jordan and 
Lebanon, typically experimented around ways to render the political discourse of their patron 
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organization, Fateh (Denes 2014). As Guinean anti-colonialist Amilcar Cabral put it: “If 
imperialist domination is the vital need to practice cultural oppression, national liberation is 
necessarily an act of culture” (cited in Massad 2006, 31). By establishing visual evidence of the 
existence of a Palestinian nation and subordinating aesthetics to the goal of anti-colonial liberation, 
Palestinian militant cinema instituted itself as national.  
 Present-day Palestinian artists and communities continue to face the systematic erasure of 
their culture and history. The Palestinian nation remains predominantly defined through trauma 
and dispossession. Such focus importantly recognizes the plurality of the expressions and lived 
realities of trauma across a range of historical and contemporary displacements, either internal to 
Palestine-Israel or located in the diaspora in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, and beyond. 
Fragmentation lies at the heart of Palestinian history and geography, prompting us to adjust our 
theoretical tools. Edward Said commented on the inherent instability and elusiveness of 
Palestinianness in his introduction to the deliberately composite opus After the Last Sky (1986):  
 
Since the main features of our present existence are dispossession, dispersion and yet also 
a kind of power incommensurate with our stateless exile, I believe that essentially 
unconventional, hybrid, and fragmentary forms of expression should be used to represent 
us (Said 1986, 6). 
 
In addition to advocating for a new language to speak Palestine, Said operates a reversal whereby 
trauma and loss do not mark victimhood but signify “a kind of power,” the possibility of inner 
strength. Dickinson similarly reflects on the potentialities which the Palestinian condition 
paradoxically offers to filmmakers during the Second Intifada: “Few people would wish for the 
lack of a state to call their own, but could this ever work to revolutionary or at least artistic 
advantage?” (Dickinson 2010, 143) This shift proves crucial to this dissertation because it allows 
us to think of Palestinian cinema in the active mode, as a way of engaging oppressive contexts; as 
an open, necessarily multifarious, and undefined way of doing, rather than being. This requires a 
new definition of the Palestinian identity that transcends the potential passivity of trauma and loss, 
two terms that can de-responsibilize the perpetrators of dispossession by placing the emphasis on 
the victims.  
In his work on the utopian dimension of Palestinian film and media, Greg Burris takes on 
Alexander’s goading question “what is Palestinian cinema?” and argues that understanding 
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Palestinian identity through nationalist parameters risks essentializing it. He proposes to conceive 
of Palestinianness as “both an inherently contradictory and radically open enterprise” (Burris 2015, 
18). To that end, he formulates an anti-identitarian position – as opposed to being anti-identity – 
in which Palestinians do not exist. This is a provocative statement, which he immediately opposes 
to Golda Meir’s famous quote delegitimizing Palestinian claims. Burris highlights Zionism’s 
ambiguous position towards Palestinians: on the one hand, Palestinians have been denied 
existence; on the other, they have been turned into scapegoats to justify an ideology based on racial 
hierarchies. Building on Freud’s anti-Nazi stand on non-identitarian Jewishness, Burris contends: 
 
There is no ontological foundation to Palestinian identity, and therefore, for the 
Palestinians, nothing is impossible. If the Zionist negation of Palestinian being aims to shut 
down possibilities, the affirmation of Palestinian nonexistence opens them up (Burris 2015, 
95, his emphasis). 
 
This radical non-definition of Palestinianness casts Palestine as a heuristic device that de-
constructs and de-stabilizes fixed relationships of inequality.  
Contrary to Burris, Anna Ball and Tawil-Souri rescue the idea of a Palestinian ontology, 
only to sustain the tension at the core of its very instability and liminality. Both examine Palestinian 
cinema after the revolutionary years in exile. The new, art-focused Palestinian cinema is now often 
(but not only) produced within the land of Palestine-Israel and conveys the general distrust in the 
idea of Palestinian nationhood that followed the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982 and the 
weakening of the PLO displaced to Tunisia. The Oslo Accords in the 1990s and the Second Intifada 
in the 2000s, with their host of checkpoints, administrative restrictions, and military deployment, 
shattered the unity of a Palestinian nation whose fragmentation visually crystallized in the 
landscape division. For Ball, this destabilization of identity also disturbs the traditional distribution 
of gender roles, which Palestinian films explore as a symbol of the transitioning nation (Ball 2008). 
Tawil-Souri calls for “a more elastic, transgressive and encompassing understanding of Palestine 
and Palestinians” (Tawil-Souri 2014, 169) which takes into account the changing geographies and 
the trans-historical experience of Palestinianness: “[Palestinian films] collectively communicate 
that Palestine is the disappeared past/places, and the shrinking reality of the Territories, and the 
pan-territorialized experience of exile, and an uncertain future, and more” (Tawil-Souri 2014, 172, 
her emphasis). In other words, Palestinianness can be described as a “structure of feeling” after 
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Raymond Williams, and a “collective ontology” (Tawil-Souri 2014, 172). Williams’ concept 
posits a mode of social formation, an emerging “practical consciousness” based on lived 
experience (Williams 1977, 131). Palestinianness encompasses the constant negotiation of the 
tensions between mobility and immobility in the context of Palestinians’ global restrictions of 
movement.  
Like Burris, I am wary of reducing Palestinianness to an ontology, as fragmented and 
dynamic as this one might be. Completely rejecting Palestinian identity as a category proves 
inadequate, considering that Palestinian productions circulate as such in industrial networks. Burris 
characterizes such a view as “crudely materialistic” (Burris 2015, 79), yet it is central to this 
dissertation that infrastructural constraints do operate in tandem and in tension with Palestinian 
imaginaries and possible futures. Tawil-Souri’s approach suggests the scope for shifting our focus 
from a potentially reified lived experience taken to represent a collective, to “a mode of social 
formation,” to repeat Williams’ words. This dissertation thus considers Palestinianness – and by 
extension Palestinian cinema – as the practice and negotiation of multi-faceted environments in 
which Palestine holds a variety of meanings. In many ways, this practice brings us back to Emile 
Habiby’s Oriental imagination and his chronicling of the tricks Palestinians devise in order to 
survive and navigate the ever-present Israeli colonization in its global ramifications. In this 
context, in Naficy’s words, Palestinian cinema is a mode of production. It comprises “the totality 
of th[e] rhizomatic organism that produces and facilitates the conception of [Palestinian] films” 
(Naficy 2001, 44), which includes filmmakers, funders, exhibitors, technologies, and more largely 
the economies in which Palestinian cinema emerges. Establishing what Palestinianness means to 
this research constitutes a necessary step to situate Palestinian cinema within a paradox that 
exceeds reflections on spatial fragmentations and historical traumas.  
As a mode of social formation – a phrase on which I will dwell in the second part of this 
chapter – and a mode of production, Palestinian cinema unfolds at the intersection of settler 
colonialism and a series of broader global processes. John Collins coined this confluence “Global 
Palestine …a Palestine that is globalized and a globe that is becoming Palestinized” (Collins 2011, 
x). Palestine is both symptomatic of a global history of colonization and an active component of 
the global extension of permanent war across the globe. For example, the Israeli military regularly 
provides training to the same American police forces responsible for disciplining and oppressing 
Black populations and other racialized minorities in the US (Ho 2013; Speri 2017). Palestine has 
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become a laboratory for Israel to test out methods of securitization, military weapons, and 
strategies of spatial control destined to be exported (Collins 2011). A focus on the political 
economy of Palestine expands the stakes and range of Palestinianness, from an isolated experience 
of national catastrophe towards a practice of the deep structures of global and racial capitalism.11 
By opting for such a reading, this dissertation argues that Palestinian cinema is intertwined with 
various global economies outside culture, which have often remained unacknowledged. The 
following section starts examining what Palestinianness as a practice and negotiation might look 
like by once again deconstructing national cinema, but this time from the perspective of 
contemporary global film economies.  
 
1.2. Palestinian Cinema as the Negotiation of Global Economic Networks 
During the Second Intifada, Palestinian filmmaker Rashid Masharawi boasted: “we have the best 
international cinema in the world because we don’t have an industry” (Dickinson 2010, 143). This 
remark bolsters the paradox that Dabashi has identified. Not only does Palestinian cinema develop 
without a state or an industry, but this very fact guarantees its artists a global success. In 2009, the 
contemporary art biennale of Venice invited a Palestinian contingent for the first time. In her 
coverage of the event, Adila Laïdi-Hanieh celebrates the “contemporary Palestinian cultural 
paradox” (Laïdi-Hanieh 2008), following which Palestinian art earns international recognition 
against all odds. Oslo’s re-structuration of the West Bank and Gaza’s economy around 
international aid opened a market for foreign and mostly European investment, including in the 
arts and culture. Europe’s partial recognition of the proto-state prompted an increase in financial 
support for cinema, which facilitated Palestinian productions’ circulation the world over. From the 
1990s on, Palestinian filmmakers hailing from the diaspora, present-day Israel, or the occupied 
territories have gained visibility and received many prizes. Among these artists, we may find: Elia 
Suleiman, Hany Abu Assad, Rashid Masharawi, Sobhi al-Zobaidi, Annemarie Jacir, Najwa Najjar, 
Tawfiq Abu Wa’el, Larissa Sansour, Muayad Alayyan, Sameh Zoabi, Kamal Aljafari, Suha Arraf, 
                                                
11 Cedric Robinson theorizes racial capitalism as soon as 1983 in his book Black Marxism: The Making of 
The Black Radical Tradition. For him, racial capitalism extends the feudal system into the modern era, in 
which racialized minorities take the place of the antique “Barbarians” (Robinson 1983, 10). For more 
information on the articulation of racial capitalism and Palestine, see Andy Clarno’s comparison of 
contemporary Palestine and South Africa in Neoliberal Apartheid (Clarno 2017).  
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Cherien Dabis, Mahdi Fleifel, Jumana Manna, and Mai Masri. Every year sees a new crop of 
Palestinian talents in international film festivals.  
Yet, Palestinian cinema still exists in “the interstices of social formations and cinema 
practices,” to repeat Naficy’s phrase (Naficy 2001, 4). Rather than constituting an “alternative” 
and a “marginal” mode of production, interstitial diasporic, exilic, and stateless practices are 
interwoven into dominant film industries. These economic formations “operate both within and 
astride the cracks of the system, benefiting from its contradictions, anomalies and heterogeneity” 
(Naficy 2001, 46). As minor cinemas organized around minorities’ use of the major language 
(Deleuze et al. 1983, 16), interstitial economies destabilize fixed understandings of industrial 
models of production, circulation and consumption and concepts of national cinema (Naficy 2001, 
45). The history of Palestinian films’ trajectory at the Oscars illustrates this point well.  
Palestinian diasporic economic networks played a decisive part in Palestinian films’ 
successful navigation of the Oscars’ ambiguous regulations. An institution first meant to promote 
Hollywood and the American film industry at large, the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and 
Sciences (AMPAS) introduced the Academy Award for the Best Foreign Language Film in 1956. 
Any film produced outside the United States and featuring a predominantly non-English dialogue 
track could apply in this category. Often shortened to “Best Foreign Film,” the award maintains 
an ambiguous relationship with the framework of the nation-state. In addition to language 
constraints, competing films must follow rules regarding the country they represent. Submitted by 
a national committee (in Palestine, this includes officials in the Ministry of Culture), the 
contending production must have been released in its country of origin for seven consecutive days 
within a specific time period preceding the ceremony. According to AMPAS’ regulations, the 
submitting country “must certify that creative control of the motion picture was largely in the 
hands of citizens or residents of that country” (Oscars 2017). As a result, despite emphasizing the 
necessity for a state structure, the eligibility rules leave the nature and level of national involvement 
– in terms of technicians, equipment, funding, writing, acting, or location – largely undetermined 
and non-quantifiable. By including residents alongside citizens, the regulations also open a breach 
for interstitial subjects, a significant opportunity for West Bank and Gaza residents who do not 
benefit from citizenship.12 As of 2006, submissions for Best Foreign Language films are not 
                                                
12 No mention is made of refugee status.  
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required to display the official language of the country they represent, which similarly favors 
interstitial practices. 
Palestinian cinema’s first entry in the Best Foreign Language Film competition was Elia 
Suleiman’s Yadon Ilaheyyah/Divine Intervention (2002), right after it earned the Palme d’Or at 
Cannes. AMPAS, however, deemed the film ineligible because of Palestine’s lack of UN 
recognition. Protests arose when it was pointed out that many other countries which the United 
Nations did not recognize had been represented at the Oscars in the past, such as Taiwan, Wales, 
and Hong Kong (Doherty and Abunimah 2002). James Longley, the American director of the 
documentary Gaza Strip (2001), threatened to return the Student Academy Award he had received 
in 1994. Pressed to reconsider its decision, AMPAS finally allowed Divine Intervention to be 
submitted as Palestine’s first Oscar contender the next year. This set a precedent for Hany Abu 
Assad’s Paradise Now (2005) to compete for the same category in 2006. Despite its European 
funding, the film could meet the requirements due to its predominantly Palestinian cast and its 
shooting location in the West Bank. Yet, after the film won the Golden Globe for Best Foreign 
Language Film as a representative of “Palestine,” Israeli officials, including Consul General Ehud 
Danoch and Consul for Media and Public Affairs Gilad Millo (Eichner 2002), pressured AMPAS 
to replace “Palestine,” already announced on the Oscars’ website, with “Palestinian Authority.” 
Abu Assad contested that label, and the film was finally categorized under “Palestinian 
Territories.” These repeated negotiations permitted Hany Abu Assad’s following feature Omar 
(2013) to be submitted as the representative of Palestine in 2014.  
Officially, the Academy justified their decision to approve the category “Palestine” based 
on the proto-state’s new status as a non-member observer state at the United Nations in 2012. 
However, AMPAS’ first move to accept Paradise Now as a representative of Palestine in 2006 
suggests otherwise. The persistence and efforts of the Palestinian film community and its allies 
partook in pushing AMPAS to acknowledge the existence of Palestinian national cinema on its 
own terms. Moreover, Omar’s production was largely made possible by the transnational 
economic solidarity of diasporic Palestinians beyond the involvement of residents of the proto-
state. In press interviews, Abu Assad refers to Palestine not as a country or a state, but “a nation 
fighting for equality and freedom and justice,” a political project (Associated Press 2014). The 
first Palestinian film almost entirely funded by Palestinian money (none of it coming from the PA), 
Omar benefited largely from the support of rich investors from the diaspora. This included loans 
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from the family of Palestinian American actor Waleed Zuaiter, one of the leads in Omar and the 
producer of the film. The community provided 95 per cent of the necessary budget for the film 
while Enjaaz, the Dubai Film Festival’s post-production fund, supplied the remaining 5 per 
cent. Zuaiter managed to raise money from private Palestinian individuals by arguing that the film 
was structured for profit. The producer explained:  
 
The pitch was basically: This is something we can make Palestinians very proud of and 
make the investors equally proud of. If we can make their money back this will have a 
galvanizing effect. Our dream is to create a Palestinian film fund and a Palestinian film 
commission. Investing in film is very risky, but I showed them that the product could be 
something that would be great for everybody (Gachman 2014).  
 
The level of diasporic economic involvement in Omar is still an isolated case that does not permit 
us to draw fast conclusions about an operative transnational Palestinian film industry entirely based 
on diasporic solidarity – far from it. It suggests, however, that a nation can exist economically 
without a formal state, and that a national film economy can develop through interstitial forms of 
institutional legitimization. These interstitial forms are complex as they mobilize discourses of 
solidarity, family and community, and the materiality of private funds; and yet are not limited to 
an informal model of self-sufficiency. In fact, they are clearly directed at creating profit and future 
investments, but also formal industrial infrastructures in Palestine. In a 2008 op-ed published in 
the Ramallah-based monthly journal This Week in Palestine, British-Palestinian filmmaker and 
philanthropist Omar al-Qattan reminded us of the historical importance of the bond between 
Palestinians inside Palestine-Israel and those in exile. He stated the necessity of reviving those 
connections in economic terms: 
 
As after 1948, exile Palestinian economies continue to make significant contributions to 
the prosperity of Jordan, Lebanon, and the Gulf countries. How can these relatively vibrant 
economies serve the struggling economy at home? The answer is not through profit-driven 
speculation but through long-term, employment-generating and capacity-building 
investment (al-Qattan 2008). 
 
As I explain later, al-Qattan’s vision will be central to the argument and the geographic scope of 
this dissertation. For now, the example of Palestine at the Oscars, and Omar more particularly, 
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uncovers the inadequacy of the nation-state framework to accurately account for the deployment 
of a Palestinian practice of global film economic networks.  
At present, I examine how national cinema constitutes an industrial construct by 
investigating the many economic negotiations required to produce national narratives. While I just 
emphasized Palestinian cinema’s agile navigation of international networks, in what follows I 
focus on the challenges Palestinian filmmakers face. Marijke de Valck provides us with the context 
to deconstruct mechanisms of film funding and their impact on cinema making. She reminds us 
that leading A-list European international film festivals such as Cannes, Berlin, and Venice started 
facilitating the economic and aesthetic integration of world cinema (non-European national 
cinemas) in the late 1960s. This happened simultaneous to the re-structuration of these institutions. 
International festivals offered third world film productions great visibility in the European market, 
which proved more lucrative than distribution in third world networks (de Valck 2007, 94). In turn, 
from the 1980s onwards, film festivals systematically promoted third world film productions, the 
“discovery of new talents,” and national “new waves” in order to enhance their own prestige and 
distinguish themselves from other events, a process that was backed by the economy of prizes and 
awards (Chan 2011, 253). This new focus led some festivals and foreign organizations to become 
actively involved at the pre-production, production, and post-production level of what came to be 
renamed films from the Global South (Ross 2011). Festival funds,13 supranational organizations 
such as the European Union’s MEDIA, special funds supplied by national institutions like the 
French Centre National de la Cinématographie (CNC), and public-service television like the 
German ZDF assisted the formation of these new waves of art cinema. World cinema helped revive 
European film economies and consolidated a new transnational market.  
Palestinian cinema’s high dependence on foreign funding means that its productions 
organically penetrated such networks early on. Gertz and Khleifi situate the emergence of 
Palestinian art cinema in the 1980s, after the militant period, with the symptomatic return of self-
exiled filmmaker and citizen of Israel Michel Khleifi to historic Palestine. Khleifi shot his first 
film in the West Bank. Al Dhakira al Khasba/Fertile Memory (1980) is an intimate documentary 
about two Palestinian women of different generations and their struggle with both the occupation 
                                                
13 Among the most famous European film funds: the Hubert Bals Fund at the International Film Festival of 
Rotterdam (IFFR) since 1988; the Bertha Fund at the International Documentary Festival of Amsterdam 
(IDFA) since 1998; and the World Cinema Fund at the Berlinale since 2004.   
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and their place in Palestinian society. The film’s focus on individuals contrasts with the collective 
representations of the Palestinian nation that revolution cinema exacerbated. Gertz and Khleifi’s 
periodization coincides with the rise of co-produced world cinema in the A-list festival 
circuit. Significantly, Fertile Memory was financed with the help of the Belgian Ministry of the 
French-Speaking Community as well as the aforementioned German ZDF and French CNC. 
Khleifi’s next film, Urs al-jalil/Wedding in Galilee (1987), received similar financial support and 
was awarded the International Critics Prize in Cannes in 1987. The film describes a mukhtar’s 
(head of the village) attempt at celebrating his son’s wedding despite the Israeli military curfew 
and how the father diffuses the tension by inviting the Israeli military governor to join the feast. 
Not all Arab audiences were sympathetic to that plot resolution. The film received the prestigious 
Golden Tanit prize at the Carthage Festival but some critics claimed that the storyline normalized 
unconditional coexistence with the occupier (Gertz and Khleifi 2008, 38-39). Others reacted to the 
eloquent portrayal of gendered bodies (Ball 2008, 4). It is possible that the film’s relatable 
treatment of the Israelis, in addition to the exploration of both femininity and masculinity, precisely 
made it attractive for Western viewers. Such considerations, we will see, are necessary to 
understand the production and circulation of Palestinian films. 
As Waleed Zuaiter made clear when pitching Omar to potential funders, international 
awards such as those which promoted Khleifi’s work insure a good return on investment for 
financiers. Awards tend to determine the type of financial support a filmmaker can expect for 
future projects. The “auteur” label and the festival circuit’s demand for the brand “Palestinian 
cinema” also condition the sustainability of Palestinian filmmaking. Palestinian films typically 
respond to Randall Halle’s description of “quasi-national films.” The national narrative of these 
productions is legible to the global audiences of international film festivals but their transnational 
funding is kept unclear. The quasi-national film is symptomatic of Orientalist marketing strategies 
that rely on a film’s national branding to attain public success. The ultimate goal, however, is to 
establish transnational networks of influence around the film’s (generally European) coproducing 
countries (Halle 2010, 309). For example, the aforementioned Oscar-nominated Paradise Now 
(2005) represented the Palestinian Territories at the Academy Awards but constitutes a 
Dutch/German/French/Italian coproduction (Halle 2010, 309). The film provides a provocative 
and unusually humanist account of Palestinian suicide-bombers-to-be during the Second Intifada. 
Simultaneously, its representations play with stereotypes that situate Palestine within familiar 
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depictions perpetuated by the media. Palestinian cinema’s specific challenge precisely consists in 
responding to requirements of authenticity, yet without submitting to representations that would 
negate the legitimacy of a nationalist struggle castigated by the international community. 
Palestinian filmmakers with an Israeli citizenship, who can access Israeli funding, must 
particularly negotiate such muddy waters, as I explore in Chapter Five. 
A similar branding logic supports “festival films,” funded by and for film festivals – as is 
the case for many contemporary Palestinian films. Festival funds facilitate access to production 
but their regulations also impose constraints, restrictions, and obligations that influence depictions 
of national discourses. Tamara Falicov proposes a list of the various formal and informal pre-
requisites filmmakers and producers from the Global South should take into consideration before 
applying to these funds. Such provisions include eligibility in terms of national identity, the 
filmmaker’s track record, pre-existing arrangements with a co-producer, the language of 
application and production, the potential need for the donor’s approbation on the final stages, and 
the negotiation of distribution rights (Falicov 2016, 221). Following this, the Palestinian brand can 
either attract world cinema funds or impede the production of Palestinian films. For instance, while 
the Palestinian Authority has recently struck two co-production deals with countries that do not 
recognize Palestine as a state – with the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland in 2010 (UK 
Government 2010) and France in 2013 (Legifrance 2014) – the uncertainty around the legal 
existence of Palestine impacts the possibilities for international cooperation.  
The case of Palestinian animator Amer Shomali’s hybrid documentary The Wanted 18 
(2014) is typical of national branding’s consequences on film funding. The film is a satirical 
account of the Palestinian boycott of Israeli products in the West Bank during the First Intifada, 
told through the eyes of eighteen anthropomorphized cows. Internationally acclaimed, The Wanted 
18 circulated widely in human rights film festivals, museums of fine arts, cinematheques, Palestine 
film festivals in the West, festivals and universities in Palestine, and prestigious international film 
festivals such as the Toronto International Film Festival (TIFF) and Abu Dhabi, where it won Best 
Documentary from the Arab World Award before being Palestine’s pick for the 2015 Oscars. 
Despite the guise of success, financing the film was a “headache,” in Shomali’s own words (Sakr 
and Seikaly 2015). Among many setbacks, the French CNC pulled their support two years into the 
production process and a few months before the shooting upon realizing that Palestine was not 
recognized as a state by the United Nations. France’s contribution represented 30% of the film’s 
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total cost. The CNC then offered to replace Shomali with a French director as a prerequisite to 
keeping the funding, unaware that this suggestion was reproducing settler-colonial mechanisms of 
erasure. Ironically, the UN General Assembly recognized Palestine as a non-member observer 
state shortly after Shomali’s producer turned down the proposition in 2012. Eventually, the 
Canadian National Film Board (NFB) became involved in the production and documentary 
filmmaker Paul Cowan co-directed the film.  
Special national and festival funds are tailored to such politically unstable markets. When 
cooperation does happen, a great pressure is imposed, either directly or indirectly, through the 
funding selection process itself. Contenders are expected to formulate acceptable national 
narratives conforming with global audiences’ expectations. Securing funding can prove all the 
more challenging as donors’ various (and sometimes conflicting) requests risk inflecting not only 
the project’s national discourse, but also the film’s style and storytelling techniques. To turn once 
again to our example, The Wanted 18 recounts the victorious years of the Palestinian resistance 
during the First Intifada but ends with a reminder of the pitfalls of Oslo after the uprisings. The 
contrast between the two historical moments and the distinct propositions for a Palestinian future 
illuminates the peace process’ failure to prompt liberation. Shomali received generous funding 
offers in Palestine14 but these stipulated that the film should omit reference to Oslo and end after 
the triumph of the resistance (Sakr and Seikaly 2015). These offers were rejected.  
By no means less intrusive, the cooperation with the Canadian team supplied 
recommendations of a different sort. The film project was first meant to rely entirely on animation 
and focus exclusively on Palestinian anecdotes. However, independent Canadian producer Ina 
Fichman insisted that the Israeli side be included because she was, in her own words, “obsessed 
with getting [the] perspectives [of the military officials]” (Hays 2014). The documentary shifted 
from animation to “hybrid” (a word that also well describes the film’s funding strategy) by 
integrating real life talking-head interviews. The need for a “balanced” narrative when it comes to 
reporting the Palestinian struggle is a well-known feature of collaborating with Western cultural 
organizations. As Noura Erakat suggests in an interview with Shomali, stakeholders often require 
the Israeli perspective in order to enhance credibility, an opportunity that is frequently not granted 
to Palestinians even when they tell their own story (Erakat 2015). 
                                                
14 Shomali does not specify who specifically offered funding in Palestine. 
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Palestinian cinema’s circulation as a national cinema within global economic networks 
demands endurance and constant strategizing. After recounting his experience around The Wanted 
18, Shomali concluded that he would privilege modes of story-telling other than film: “If each 
story takes [me] five or six years to tell, I don’t think I’m going to live that long. I don’t have the 
energy to go all over the world to finance a film” (Sakr and Seikaly 2015). In the past decade, the 
category of national cinema has gradually lost dominance in the discourses of Palestinian 
filmmakers. Many of them are willing to circulate Palestinian stories but they no longer wish to 
claim the Palestinian brand which, they feel, can also affect their work’s circulation and 
commercial success in international networks because of political and representational bias. 
Moreover, international audiences and funders often place on Palestinian films and filmmakers the 
burden of being representatives and ambassadors of Palestine.15 Palestinian filmmakers do not 
negate their national identity but they articulate it with cosmopolitan understandings of their 
profession as artists and cultural makers. The identification with Palestinian cinema thus occurs 
on a case by case basis, depending on the festival or the award. More often than not, the Palestinian 
identity is also subsumed under the category of Arab cinema following the growing presence and 
success of the regional industry. Nick Denes has reflected on paralleling dynamics from his own 
perspective as the co-organizer of the London Palestine Film Festival. Many audience members 
and funders have mistakenly attributed the label of “Palestinian film festival” to the event, thus 
extending the logic of national cinema and reducing the project of political engagement to the 
endeavor of redressing pejorative representations of Palestinians (Denes 2014). In the wake of 
Palestinian filmmakers’ gradual reconfiguration of their positionality, what emerges is a vision 
where Palestine becomes the locus (as a brand but also geographically as we will see) for a 
professional and competitive film economy, rather than a place whose representation is always 
already articulated by a traumatic binary of victimhood and resistance. 
 
1.3. Palestinian Cinema as an Economic Project  
Palestinian American producer Waleed Zuaiter’s aforementioned suggestion to establish a 
Palestinian film fund and a film commission may at first seem insignificant. Around the same time 
in 2014, Palestinian citizen of Israel filmmaker and writer Suha Arraf also highlighted the necessity 
to create a film fund for Palestinian artists (Strickland 2014). These renewed efforts and calls for 
                                                
15 For a summary of debates around the burden of representation, see Branston 2000.  
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film institutionalization after the decline of militant cinema take root in the hopes and opportunities 
generated by the Oslo Accords. In 1993, British-Palestinian philanthropist Ahmed Mohsin Qattan 
registered a non-profit organization in his own name, which developed into a quasi-substitute for 
the proto-state’s Ministry of Culture. With 157 publications, 32 co-funding partners, and 97 
implementing partners in 2018, the A.M. Qattan Foundation (AMQF) inaugurated educational and 
development programs, a child center in Gaza, a culture and arts program, and exhibition spaces 
in the UK and Palestine (AMQF 2018). Two decades before Hany Abu Assad’s Omar, famous 
Egyptian critic Samir Farid described Rashid Masharawi’s Hatta Ishaar Akhar/Curfew (1993) as 
“the first truly Palestinian film” because it received the support of a Palestine-based production 
company (Gertz 2004, 24). In 1995, Masharawi founded the Cinema Production Center (CPC) and 
the Mobile Cinema for refugee camps. The CPC proposed workshops facilitated by internationally 
renowned Palestinian filmmakers living abroad. The center also fostered film culture by providing 
a screening space while the Mobile Cinema traveled from one refugee camp to another with a 
35mm projector and hosted a yearly festival dedicated to children.  
Such initiatives paved the way for more intensified organizing during the Second Intifada, 
where this research commences its investigation. From the mid-2000s on, individuals and groups 
of filmmakers started to found their own production companies in the occupied territories, such as 
Wejhat Nazar Productions, Black and White Film Productions (in Gaza), Idioms Film, Collage 
Productions, Odeh Films, Philistine Films, or Pal Cine productions (in the West Bank). As I 
examine in Chapter Two, these were interested in promoting art films contrasting with the news-
inspired documentaries that prevailed in the visual imaginary of Palestine locally and abroad. The 
First Intifada attracted a host of international news agencies in the late 1980s. As the confrontations 
with the Israeli armed forces grew more violent, foreign journalists began training Palestinian 
crews to film on their behalf. This contributed to forming local technicians but it also restricted 
the visual language of Palestinian productions. The international news economy, later followed by 
the PA’s vested interest in developing and facilitating a national broadcasting system, propelled 
the institution of local film training centers. The independent Institute of Modern Media at Al-
Quds University, created in 1996, yielded the introduction of audio-visual training in the 
department of media-journalism in the prestigious Birzeit University in the West Bank in 2002, 
the opening of a TV and journalism department at Al-Aqsa University in Gaza in 2003, the 
inauguration of Dar-El-Kalima’s film production program in Bethlehem in 2006, the establishment 
	
	 42 
of the Media Center at An-Najah University in Nablus (n/d), and the launch of a government-
supported film major at Gaza University in 2017. Until today, these educational spaces tend to be 
subordinated to the field of journalism while also fomenting a film culture in Palestine.  
In contrast, as this dissertation argues, from 2004 on, state-independent film festivals based 
in the West Bank and Gaza – often registered as NGOs, non-profit organizations, or associations 
– served as a catalyst for conceiving the possibility of a Palestinian art film economy. Palestine 
festivals’ varied interests have spanned from art cinema, human rights and women’s rights, to 
Franco-Arab relations and young filmmakers. In addition to film screenings, most festivals have 
included training workshops (scriptwriting, filming, editing, sound), roundtables, talks, and 
Q&As. At various levels and in many different ways, they have provided a platform for the meeting 
of local and international film communities, as well as a forum of exchange for the various actors 
of the film industry – film distributors, TV buyers, foreign cultural institution representatives, 
producers, filmmakers, actors, and critics. Festivals have built partnerships with other foreign 
events and local universities and provided a space for cinema under the occupation. The Israeli 
army forcibly closed most film theatres in the wake of the First and Second Intifada, leaving the 
territories with few venues to screen international and local films. Some commercial theatres, 
integrated into malls, have opened since the mid-2000s in the West Bank, but they tend to privilege 
mainstream American cinema – alongside, on rare but existing occasions, some Palestinian films 
as well. For instance, over the 95 films shown at the six-screen Palestine Tower Cinemas between 
August 2016 and August 2017 in Ramallah, only one was Palestinian and it played for one week.16 
Festivals have worked to systematize the circulation of Palestinian and international art cinema in 
the major cities of the West Bank and Gaza. Simultaneously, they attempted to reach out to remote 
audiences in the territories as well as in historic Palestine. As a result, these festivals have 
contributed to bridging the various communities necessary for the building of a film industry. 
 A new geography thus materializes, which apparently brackets Palestine within the borders 
of a proto-state that cannot adequately represent all Palestinians. Does engaging with this focus 
mean falling into the territorial trap? Can this nuance the de-territorialization that has dominated 
the study of Palestinian cinema without imposing further spatial confinement on its artists? This 
dissertation contends that the emphasis placed on statelessness has overlooked an important 
element for contextualizing contemporary Palestinian cinema. We should consider the proto-state 
                                                
16 I base this data on the Palestine Tower Cinema programs advertised on the theatre’s Facebook page.  
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of Palestine in its territorial, economic, infrastructural, and political materiality, as well as in its 
failed promises. In addressing the disjuncture between state and nation, studies of Palestinian 
national cinema have mostly asserted that the state was missing as opposed to non-sovereign and 
dysfunctional in its administrative structure, deliberately relinquishing its welfare responsibilities. 
The state-building process takes shape at the confluence of “external pressures exerted on the PA 
to prove its governing capabilities, while at the same time internal pressures by local groups 
demand open public space” (Jamal 2000, 45).  
In effect, the neoliberal policies of Oslo and the occupation combined have left the 
Palestinian civil society without strong state institutions to support cultural production. The 
ministries lack coherence due to numerous changes in personnel. They also suffer from poor 
coordination (within the government and with local governing entities and NGOs as well), which 
bears consequences for their ability to formulate and enforce long-term cultural policies (Farhat 
2010). While the Ramallah-based Palestinian government spends most of its budget on security, 
the Ministry of Culture disperses very little funds to back Palestinian films and events. In 2013, 
the money allocated to the cultural sector as a whole constituted 0.003% of the general budget 
(Med Culture Country Overview 2013). Head of the Cinema department Lina Bokhary in the West 
Bank estimated in 2015 that the Ministry’s resources for film oscillated between 100,000 and 
500,000 dollars, an amount that barely covers the pre-production, production or post-production 
costs of one single low-budget feature film. The Palestinian Ministry of Culture in the West Bank 
mainly works to facilitate the global movement for films, foreign guests, and Palestinian 
filmmakers, in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and through diplomatic 
agreements (interview with the author 2015). After the 2006 elections that saw the territories 
divided between a Hamas-led Gaza and a Fateh-ruled West Bank, it seems nonetheless difficult to 
conceptualize the proto-state’s relationship to cinema through the unique lens of its sheer absence. 
In Gaza since 2006, for instance, the Hamas government expressed the importance of cinema for 
the liberation struggle at the heart of the movement’s rhetoric (as opposed to the discourse held by 
Fateh in the West Bank). As developed in Chapter Four, the Gazan government has supported a 
variety of initiatives – albeit limited in scope and inflected by their own politics – such as film 
festivals, film infrastructures, and a couple of film productions.  
The West Bank PA’s lack of interest in supporting cinema proves significant in itself rather 
than a reason to ignore the proto-state altogether. For Tawil-Souri, the government holds very little 
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desire to leave space for art and oppositional cultural forms (Tawil-Souri 2005, 116). In contrast, 
Yasser Arafat demonstrated eagerness to develop a government-backed broadcasting network 
right after the Oslo Accords and despite Israeli pressure restricting such an initiative. The creation 
of the centralized system of the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation (PBC) in 1994 served to 
control a population that Arafat’s government, composed of elites from the diaspora, had little 
familiarity with (Jamal 2000; Tawil-Souri 2007, 5). Arafat’s dismissal of cinema as a useful tool 
for nation-building diverges from the PLO’s previous utilization of cinema as mass media for 
mobilizing Palestinians during the 1970s’ revolutionary period. In negotiations with Israel over 
the PBC, the PA prioritized the symbolic power that cultural institutions could procure over the 
conditions for their material implementation (Tawil-Souri 2007, 8).  
Similar dynamics can be observed in the domain of cinema. The West Bank Ministry of 
Culture’s limited influence only extends to film and filmmakers’ circulation in international 
networks of recognition. Culture appears divorced from its economic potential despite Oslo’s 
profit-oriented agenda. The state’s financial responsibilities are entirely directed at its interaction 
with highly privatized structures of foreign investment and its interconnection with the Israeli 
economy. In sum, we could interpret the PA’s disinterest in cinema as the desire to limit Palestinian 
artistic (and potentially critical) production, and the instrumentalization of cinema for symbolic 
legitimacy only. Moreover, the government undermines cinema’s potential contribution to engage 
with the masses for its own advantage and to stimulate an economy in an environment hindered 
by the conditions of occupation. As a result, contemporary film workers maintain an ambiguous 
relationship with a proto-state deemed dubious and authoritarian. Yet independent practitioners 
also engage with past and present forms of film institutionalization. Such ambivalence takes 
strength in the wider interdependence between the PA and NGOs after Oslo. While the PA has 
been relying on various kinds of associations in order to link to its constituencies and gain external 
credibility, Palestinian organizations have in turn depended on the PA for support, licensing, 
recognition, and legal protection (Brown 2003, 139). Addressing Palestinian cinema as an 
economic project means looking at civil society’s negotiation with the multifaceted forces of the 
Palestinian proto-state and global neoliberal economies, in addition to the more direct mechanisms 
of ongoing colonization.   
 The initial focus on the occupied territories highlights the paradoxes of Oslo as exposed in 
the introduction to this chapter. Such contradictions manifest themselves in the persistence of the 
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ideology of liberation and the seeming impossibility of its implementation; the erection of a 
postcolonial proto-state within growing colonization; and the thriving neoliberal politics of 
development concurrent to the active dismantling of Palestinian political and economic structures. 
This dissertation takes these paradoxes as foundational to the formation of a Palestinian film 
economy. In other words, I am concerned with the im/possibilities of building a Palestinian film 
economy within a context where ideas of futurity appear to be always already compromised by the 
continuous and protracted failure of Oslo. Yet, despite its institutional and infrastructural 
prevalence, Oslo does not constitute the only scenario for a future of Palestinian self-
determination. The unceasing debate between the one-state solution and the two-state solution 
seemingly opens up the territorial trap by projecting Palestine as a future space rather than one 
fixed in the geographical present. On the one hand, local and foreign proponents of a pragmatic 
two-state solution advocate that Oslo can be saved. Although many internationals in this camp 
agree on the necessity of ending the occupation of the West Bank and the siege of Gaza, Oslo’s 
predominant merit in this case is often to protect the demographic integrity of the Jewish state. On 
the other hand, the one-state solution encompasses distinct visions. The ultra-Zionist view defines 
the West Bank as the Biblical lands of Judea and Samaria, and Gaza similarly forms part of Eretz 
Israel. Others propose a bi-national state gathering two collective identities organized in one polity 
following federal-inspired models; or they consider the possibility of Palestine-Israel as a 
democratic state founded on the principle of equality in civil, political, social and cultural rights 
for all citizens.  
However, framing Palestinian futures as “solutions” proves problematic for two reasons. 
First, this repeats the rhetoric according to which the war waged on Palestinians is nothing but a 
“problem” and a deviance in a history that legitimizes settler-colonialism as a method of state-
building. Second, the term “solution” suggests an unequivocal and pre-determined ending to a 
process that is everything but predictable and certain. A coalition of Palestinian organizations has 
since the early 2000s proposed to reverse this chronological path to liberation. Instead of setting 
the geographical shape Palestinian self-determination should take, the Boycott, Divestment, 
Sanctions (BDS) campaign has focused on the strategic terms of Palestinian liberation, narrowing 
them down to three demands that address Palestinians’ rights across the world map: ending the 
occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall; recognizing Palestinian 
citizens of Israel’s fundamental rights to full equality; and respecting, protecting, and promoting 
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the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN 
Resolution 194 (BDS 2018). By expressing Palestinianness as a regime of rights, BDS also 
proposes a dynamic and transnational cartography of self-determination that maintains various 
understandings of Palestine-Israel at its center.  
The geographical scope of this dissertation is not confined to the proto-state of Palestine. 
Rather, it also includes the state of Israel where Palestinian citizens live, which Chapter Five 
examines in detail. Thinking of Palestine primarily in temporal terms, as a multiplicity of 
contradictory historical processes with open futures, maps out what one could call a “pessoptimist 
geography.” Unlike Edward Said’s “imaginative geography,” the point is not to understand the 
construction of difference and the power of representations. Nor is it to analyze how space 
“acquires emotional and even rational sense by a kind of poetic process, whereby the vacant or 
anonymous reaches of distance are converted into meaning for us here” (Said 1978, 76). The goal 
is to conceive a future political landscape produced through the paradoxical temporalities of 
Palestine’s im/possible liberation. Such cartography proves “elastic” (Weizman 2007, 6) because 
Israel has never officially declared its borders, keeping open the possibility of further colonial 
expansion. On the other hand, the flexibility of territorial delimitations also allows for a 
reformulation of Palestine-Israel. This geography preserves the fluidity of meaning that scholars 
of Palestinian cinema have established as crucial to the Palestinian experience.  
Although seemingly limited to a restricted understanding of where Palestinians live, this 
research’s focus on the space of Palestine-Israel is also inscribed in a variety of transnational logics 
that acknowledge the elasticity of the Palestinian geography. Palestinian film workers’ strategies 
of production and exhibition unfold in diverse networks of Israeli governance. Moreover, both the 
Palestinian and Israeli state economies are entangled with various supranational institutions 
(predominantly the World Bank and the IMF) as well as European programs like the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Euromed Audiovisual Project. Large foreign organizations 
such as the Ford Foundation manage the allocation of aid within these supranational frameworks. 
The distribution of transnational funding has further fragmented the geography of Palestine-Israel 
into zones of preferred investment that concentrate all donor wealth. These zones often parallel the 
colonial division of the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C, which determine the level of Israeli 
control over the territory and the population. 
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Palestinian films greatly depend on European financial support in particular. Randall 
Halle’s example of the quasi-national film, whereby a production’s national identity is played up 
against its funding’s origins, reveals the implications of aid politics as well as their historical 
structures. With a focus on Algeria, Halle reminds us that European influence in the region 
emanates from the free trade agreements the Union forced upon Mediterranean countries in 
collaboration with the World Bank and the IMF in the late 1980s. The implementation of 
devastating economic policies led to the collapse of national film industries in those very countries 
that European co-production treaties now seek to subsidize (Halle 2010, 311). The irony is not lost 
on Halle, who concludes: “The [Algerian] film industry, [which] once offered the world some of 
the most potent views into the process of decolonization and postcoloniality, now is forced to make 
co-productions with French partners” (Halle 2010, 311). Oslo constitutes one of the many ripples 
of the 1980s free trade agreements. Placing the Palestinian film economy in perspective with 
Algeria’s unsustainable decolonization in this particular instance proves all the more significant as 
Algeria’s struggle for independence largely influenced the PLO’s approach to liberation back in 
the 1960s. In many ways, Algeria’s fate prefigures the challenges which ongoing national 
liberation projects face in a neoliberal economy of dependence to the former/persisting colonizer 
and neo-colonizing countries.  
The transnational space of Palestine-Israel is also structured around the returns – 
metaphorical, potential, or temporary – of diasporic Palestinian people and capital after Oslo. The 
right of return (‘awda) figures prominently in projects of self-determination and, amongst all 
Palestinian demands, certainly appears as the most contested one because it challenges the ethnic 
integrity of the Zionist project. This is not to say that all Palestinian exiles long to live in Palestine. 
For example, Diana Allan’s exploration of everyday life in the Shatila refugee camp in Beirut 
convincingly challenges common assumptions about Palestinian refugees’ nationalist politics. 
Allan demonstrates that “return” holds various meanings for different generations of refugees. 
Immediate survival and the bettering of living conditions importantly drive the hopes of the 
community (Allan 2013). However, she makes clear, return should be a possible choice. Oslo did 
not settle on the status of Palestinian refugees, still barred from their ancestral land. Yet exiled 
Palestinians in possession of a foreign passport sometimes manage to visit Palestine on a 
temporary visa, although that right can also be revoked in times of increased confrontations on the 
ground. Palestinian filmmakers educated in the diaspora, and not only those with an Israeli 
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passport who had left the country, have come to shoot their films in Palestine-Israel in order to 
build local crews, technicians, talents, and film communities. For example, Annemarie Jacir co-
organized the film festival “Dreams of a Nation” with Hamid Dabashi at Columbia University in 
New York in 2003 and brought the event to Palestine the next year (Dreams of a Nation webpage). 
Jacir also insisted on producing her film Lamma Shoftak/When I Saw You (2012) with a Palestinian 
crew, despite the fact that they had little experience (Jacir 2008, 16). Upon returning to the West 
Bank to renew her visa, however, she was denied entry and had to finish shooting in Jordan.  
One thing Oslo did allow with certainty was the return of Palestinian capital, especially 
those accumulated by what Adam Hanieh identifies as the Palestinian capitalist class in the Gulf 
countries. The Palestinian holdings active in the West Bank and Gaza are interlocked with 
international investments by conglomerates based in the Gulf region, which control the large 
companies that compose the Palestinian local economy (Hanieh 2010, 96). The return of 
Palestinian capital was instrumental to the consolidation of the state-building project as a 
mechanism of mediating capital accumulation. This contributed to the larger normalization of 
Israeli colonization through trade, investment and development advocated by the MENA economic 
summits evoked earlier. Such contexts resonate with al-Qattan’s aforementioned call for wealthy 
diasporic Palestinians to be in economic solidarity with the West Bank and Gaza. He enjoined 
them to bring there the same prosperity they had created in their host countries. Al-Qattan 
highlights the necessity to transform the management of this diasporic capital from a profit-driven 
economy to one of capacity-building that would allow the establishment of a film industry in 
Palestine. Himself a wealthy British-Palestinian, Omar al-Qattan is the son of Abdel Mohsin al-
Qattan, founder of the aforementioned million-dollar-endowed philanthropy A.M. Qattan 
Foundation. The pessoptimist geography of Palestinian cinema does not built on fantasy or self-
representations alone, but by way of very material and transnational economies.  
What of the Palestinians in the diaspora, who are establishing their own platforms for 
Palestinian cinema in North America or Europe? Does this geography ignore them? Since the late 
1990s, a multiplicity of Palestine Film Festivals (PFF) have independently emerged from distinct 
solidarity groups. These were sometimes rooted in university campuses, including the London PFF 
in 1999, the Chicago PFF in 2001, Dreams of a Nation in 2003, the Toronto PFF in 2008, Ann 
Arbor PFF in 2008; or in the arts community, like the Boston PFF and the Houston PFF, both 
founded in 2007. Symptomatic of the militant spirit that animated the creation of most of these 
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festivals, Danya Qato, co-founder of the Chicago PFF, declared to the online journal The 
Electronic Intifada in 2011: “[The film festivals] are the starting point; the ending point is 
liberating Palestine” (The Electronic Intifada 2011). Over the years, most of these festivals have 
shifted identities, left campuses (sometimes forcefully so, as it was the case in Chicago), and taken 
up residence in artistic venues in their own right, like the Gene Siskel Center in Chicago, the TIFF 
Bell Lightbox in Toronto, and the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston. They have aimed to offer an 
alternative image of Palestinians in response to the stereotypes the media have constructed of them 
in these countries. They have provided a space for diasporic communities to gather and celebrate 
their identities with initiatives such as mentorship programs and the support of merchandising 
inspired by traditional arts. The London Palestine Film Festival has adopted a more political stance 
predicated on solidarity, including with its exhibition around Palestine Revolution Cinema in 2014. 
In turn, the Festival Ciné-Palestine in Paris inaugurated its first “Industry Days” in 2018, further 
enhancing the role diaspora and transnational platforms can play in the development of a 
Palestinian film economy (FCP Industry Days 2018). The PFFs have contributed to making 
Palestinian cinema “mainstream”17 alongside Palestinian films’ circulation in international 
festivals and award economies. From an economic standpoint, they partake in broad philanthropy 
networks at home, with a state-independent funding model resembling initiatives that have 
emerged in the Arab world and supported Palestinian cinema locally, like the Arab Fund for Art 
and Culture (AFAC).  
This dissertation does not devote to these diasporic festivals the time they deserve. 
Schedule and financial imperatives have constrained the scope of my research, although I did visit 
four of these festivals (London, Chicago, Toronto, and Paris). Apart from the Festival Ciné-
Palestine, PFFs also tend to operate as exhibition platforms separated from the process of 
production. These festivals’ emphasis on diasporic identity as well as the specific communities 
they target would have necessitated mobilizing different tools and engaging with a whole new set 
of contexts. This exceeded my focus on economic networks and a pessoptimist geography. 
Framing Palestinian cinema as an economic project does not claim to provide an exhaustive 
representation of Palestinian film initiatives. Nor does it signify that all Palestinian filmmakers 
from the occupied territories, historic Palestine, and the diaspora express the ambition to form a 
                                                
17 For a detailed study of the Boston Palestine Film Festival and the politics of the becoming mainstream 
of Palestinian cinema, see Cable 2016.  
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Palestinian film industry. Chapter Three will provide an example of how the model of a film 
industry based on transnational networks of art cinema can be contested. Similarly, Chapter Five 
examines the stakes of developing Palestinian cinema within Israel not necessarily as an 
independent industry, but as a negotiation of the cultural political economy of dialogue under 
apartheid and the re-appropriation of existing industrial colonial structures. This dissertation 
proposes to take seriously the project of building a Palestinian film industry that many filmmakers, 
producers, and festival organizers (who oftentimes wear the three hats) explicitly encourage, 
including in the West Bank and Gaza. This shared and multifaceted project provides us with a lens 
through which to examine the strategies of existence of Palestinian film productions and 
organizations in general in Palestine-Israel, and how they envision a future for Palestinian 
filmmaking. 
 
2. The Emergence of a Palestinian Film Economy  
This section explains my concept of paradoxical economy, which drives the dissertation as a 
whole. As a temporal concept, paradox informs my methodological approach to the present 
formation of a film economy; my theoretical interest in the capacity of contingency and processes 
to challenge fixed categories; and how I understand the very practices of Palestinian film workers 
at the center of my study. To that end, I situate this research in several inter-related fields of 
inquiry: transnational and postcolonial cinemas; media industries studies; post-development 
theory; and media infrastructure studies.  
 
2.1. Transnational and Postcolonial Cinemas 
Contemporary film and cultural historians and theorists have inscribed processes of economic and 
cultural formation in distinct temporalities. In what follows, I identify two theoretical propositions 
and how these differentially feed into this dissertation. The first temporality, comparative, places 
situated changes within a broader (both normative and plural) movement of history. The second 
one, dialectical, articulates separate interests at play in a given moment. In his 2014 eponymous 
book, Malte Hagener identifies the “emergence of film culture” as a set of processes of film 
institutionalization in the interwar period in Europe. He examines the temporality of cultural 
formation through a diffracted historiography following the tradition of histoire croisée. This 
approach privileges the multiplication of perspectives in order to make visible “the non-
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synchronicity of culture” as films circulate transnationally, and accounts for concomitant, 
sometimes delayed, and contradictory meanings of shared practices across the world map (Hagener 
2014, 4). In his historicization of world cinema, Dudley Andrew posits a similar “décalage” and 
“time-lag” both at the level of ontology (film as a medium built around the discrepancy between 
image production and image viewing), and at the level of the norms established in transnational 
exchanges. Andrew cites the example of Italians bemoaning their cinema in the 1930s for being 
“behind the times,” in contrast with Hollywood’s technological experimentations (Andrew 2010, 
66). 
The histories of film and modernity have evolved in parallel, following the development 
of cinema’s technology in an increasingly industrialized world. As a consequence, the 
advancement of a given film culture risks being assessed in relation to its historical and 
geographical proximity to the primal scene of the invention of cinema. In his study of the 
epistemological construct of time in the discipline of anthropology, Johannes Fabian reminds us 
that the framework supporting ideas of progress and development was built on nineteenth-century 
social theories of evolution (Fabian 1983). This doctrine spatialized time and conversely 
conceptualized travel as a temporalizing practice, describing cultures that unfold in the periphery 
of the supposed center as primitive. Such discourses may also inform understandings of one’s own 
positionality in the world, as Andrew’s example suggests. Both processes of spatialization of time 
and temporalizing of space have underpinned ethnographic studies and more generally what 
Walter Mignolo has called, after Aníbal Quijano, “the colonial matrix of power” (Mignolo 2011). 
In this modern epistemology, “there is no knowledge of the Other which is not also temporal, 
historical, a political act” (Fabian 1983, 1).  
Theories of “alternative modernities” grounded in postcolonial studies have responded to 
the problem identified by Fabian. In his introduction to a 1999 special issue in Public Culture, 
Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar opposes social modernization, driven by capitalism and positivism, 
to cultural modernity, described as a geographically situated attitude towards the present. As a 
result, modernity is always already multiple, even in the West where it emerged (Gaonkar 1999). 
Comparative frameworks such as Hagener’s and Andrew’s, inspired by transnational and 
postcolonial studies, have thus continuously located the formation of film cultures in modernities 
whose conceptions are vernacular, multiple, and potentially in friction with one another. In 
contrast, for Mignolo, and following Arturo Escobar, alternative modernities continue to take the 
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colonial matrix of power as their centers. Instead, Mignolo suggests looking for “decolonial 
options” that are alternatives to modernities by delinking knowledge production from Western 
epistemology (Mignolo 2011, xviii).  
The focus on alternative modernities, however, undergirds much of the work on 
transnational and world cinema. This provides a partially useful framework for thinking of the 
specificities of Palestine’s emerging film economy as well as film practitioners’ own 
understanding of it. The indeterminacy of Palestinian cinema has translated into various attempts 
at labelling its economic, temporal, and geographic existence throughout the years, which Gertz 
and Khleifi catalogue as follows: “‘Independent Cinema,’ ‘Palestinian Cinema from the Occupied 
Lands’ (Farid no date; Mdanat 1990), ‘Post-Revolution Cinema,’ or ‘Individualistic Cinema’ 
(Shafik, 2001)” (Gertz and Khleifi 2008, 33). More recently in 2008, filmmaker and scholar Sobhi 
al-Zobaidi settled for the term “independent cinema.” He further explains: “independent from the 
authorities of state, religion and commerce, […] which is best understood as individual cinema” 
(al-Zobaidi 2008). In turn, Berlinale’s World Cinema Fund, an important backer of contemporary 
Palestinian cinema, supports films whose directors hail from “countries with a weak production 
infrastructure” (WCF 2016).  
These diverse appellations sketch a reality attuned to the neoliberal, occupied, and elusive 
present of Palestine, wherein the absence of state supervision and thus control seemingly provides 
filmmakers with the freedom to operate without compromising their views. On the other hand, 
there is little legal, economic, and built infrastructure to support production and collaboration. 
Each cultural worker is individually competing for foreign funding, technical resources, and 
visibility. The apparent independence from the state implies further dependence on foreign 
funders, with the risk of diluting artists’ national and political agendas. The responsibility of filling 
in for, and/or building proto-institutions is additionally transferred onto both local and international 
NGOs and civil society, the latter being more vulnerable to the occupation’s policies and 
contingencies. Although the descriptions listed above exclude mention of Israel, Palestinian 
filmmakers who hold citizenship have also engaged with Israeli institutions. Highly discriminatory 
towards Arab minorities (both Palestinians and Jewish Mizrahim), the Israeli establishment has 
instrumentalized the distribution of its funding and national recognition as a tool for furthering 
cultural dispossession, often co-opting Palestinian films as Israeli. These co-dependent contexts 
uncover the indeterminate nature of Palestinian cinema and its infrastructures. 
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Taking stock of the various contexts of institutional absence in the Middle East and North 
Africa, especially in the aftermaths of the Arab uprisings, Anthony Downey asks in his 
introduction to the edited collection Future Imperfect: Contemporary Art Practices and Cultural 
Institutions in the Middle East (2016): “How […] will we ever be able to understand the 
institutional failings and crises we are now witnessing in any sense other than of reified loss, 
abandonment, and non-existence?” (Downey 2016, 33-34) In the context of this research, how can 
we understand the Palestinian present of cultural formations when institutionalization is defined 
by the driving force of state modernity? Theories of alternative modernities permit us to frame 
Palestine’s institutional predicament as a challenge to dominant understandings of film industries 
beyond characterizations of “weak infrastructures” or statelessness. World cinema theorists Dina 
Iordonova, David Martin-Jones and Belén Vidal’s edited volume on Cinema at the Periphery 
(2010) for example draws from postcolonial re-centerings of the margins and the deconstruction 
of Eurocentric norms (Shohat and Stam 1994, Chakrabarty 2000). The collection’s first impulse 
to fairly account for the shifting geographies of globalization is accompanied by an exploration of 
“the peripheral as a mode of practice, as a textual strategy, as a production infrastructure, and as a 
narrative encoded on the margins of the dominant modes of production, distribution, and 
consumption” (Iordanova et al. 2010, 9). This broader description of the peripheral encompasses 
the “cinema of small nations,” which Mette Hjort and Duncan Petrie mobilize in their investigation 
of the various subnational, national, international, transnational, and regional formations that 
complicate flat depictions of global flows. Set as a comparative framework, small nations are 
recognized to have an ecology of their own, defined by specific constraints and opportunities 
(Hjort and Petrie 2008).18 Yet, the peripheral shouldn’t introduce a counter-example or a claim for 
authenticity. World cinema is often defined in opposition to, rather than in positive terms (Nagib 
2007). As Iordanova et al. argue, the peripheral should lead us to think of the formation of localized 
film economies with respect to fluctuant relationships between center and periphery. In the 
Palestinian case, these include interstitial practices with dominant industries not only in the 
diaspora, but also in Palestine-Israel. 
The comparative and relational framework of alternative modernities compels us to 
examine situated attitudes towards the present in peripheral contexts. Gaonkar draws his definition 
of the present from Baudelaire’s conception of modernity, which opens “the paradoxical 
                                                
18 The term however continues to conflate nation and state. 
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possibility of going beyond the flow of history through the consciousness of historicity in its most 
concrete immediacy, in its presentness” (Calinescu cited in Gaonkar 1999, 6). The modernist 
present breaks “out of the continuum of history [and] is caught in an unceasing process of internal 
ruptures and fragmentations” (Gaonkar 1999, 6). Rather than an inherent characteristic of the 
modern however, a focus on presentness reveals the dialectics of history at work, rejects the 
discursive resolution of persisting power struggles, and suspends history in the continuous fight 
between unequal powers. George Ciccariello-Maher’s proposition to decolonize Hegel’s dialectics 
precisely advocates for saving the “dynamic movement of conflicting oppositions” from exclusive 
modernist narratives (Ciccariello-Maher 2017, 2). Instead of revering “false universals that portray 
the present as complete,” foregrounding the theoretical present of rupture resists “all teleology, 
determinism, linearity, refuse[s] all comforting promises of inherent progress, and defer[s] all 
premature declarations that history has indeed reached its conclusion. [The] horizon remains a 
horizon” (Ciccariello-Maher 2017, 7).  
This dissertation investigates the emergence of Palestinian film culture by locating it in the 
paradoxical present where the horizon remains a horizon. Rather than identifying a transitional 
moment that leads to a supposed fully-fledged film industry, I study how the Palestinian cultural 
and economic formation reveals the tensions within the neoliberal politics of development under 
the occupation in the West Bank, the siege in Gaza, and ongoing ethnic cleansing in Israel. The 
goal is not to immobilize the changing Palestinian project of a film industry as it unfolds.  The 
concept of “paradoxical economy” both constitutes a methodology to examine the present of 
formation, and analyzes the conditions of possibility for a Palestinian film economy in a 
contemporary history widely perceived as one of “permanent transition” (Miller 2014), as Chapter 
Two details. The term “paradoxical economy” describes the indecisive moment that sees the 
arrangement of multiple independent groups and enterprises, and the underlying aims of such 
groups to eventually consolidate a film industry, whose future shape is still to be determined. The 
paradoxical present constitutes a thick temporality akin to Barbara Adam’s “timescape.” It 
combines time-frames (or “time-units”); temporalities as processes of change; tempos (or pace of 
a process); timing as synchronization; time points of the now; time patterns that define periodic 
cycles; time sequences and serial movements; time extensions as duration; and the triad of the past, 
present and future, which organizes temporal horizons (Martineau 2015, 45). While these distinct 
time formations coexist, they always follow some hierarchy. For Jonathan Martineau, timescapes 
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represent “‘struggling entities’ in which different and often contradictory times are organized 
according to a logic of power, and take contested politico-institutional forms in social time 
regimes” (Martineau 2015, 46). Strategies, negotiations, uncertainties and failures all play 
significant roles in this open process.  
The Palestinian film economy emerges from within competing social orders, which 
compose the “mode of social formation.” Cultural theorist and one of the founding figures of 
cultural studies Raymond Williams developed that phrase in his protracted study of cultural 
changes, some of them spanning over centuries as in Culture and Society (1958) and The Long 
Revolution (1961) and others located in a “time of radical change” as in Marxism and Literature 
(Williams 1977, 1). In the latter, Williams advocates for studying the interlocking of present social 
experiences and formal institutions. This entwining produces a practical consciousness historically 
situated but always already emerging. Williams’ elucidation of such “structures of feeling” could 
just as well apply to the formation of a film economy in Palestine. The economic project unfolds 
at the very same time as many cautious or skeptical practitioners reduce the industrial enterprise 
to a vague individualism. Williams writes: 
 
[W]e are […] defining a social experience which is still in process, often indeed not yet 
recognized as social but taken to be private, idiosyncratic, and even isolating, but which in 
analysis, has its emergent, connecting, and dominant characteristics, indeed specific 
hierarchies (Williams 1977, 132, my emphasis). 
 
The process of emergence and the hierarchies it solidifies result from a negotiation with previous 
and co-existing social orders. Emergence arranges residual structures and persisting relations 
between cultural producers, markets, and institutions.   
Williams’ project of a “sociology of culture,” later developed in his book Culture (1981), 
articulates the inquiry of cultural change through the study of two interdependent relationships: 
between cultural producers with “recognizable social institutions,” and cultural producers’ internal 
organization in formations (Williams 1981, 35). The distinction between the two, admittedly a 
working hypothesis, opens up a space for identifying forms of cultural organization that are not 
institutional, thus refuting a determinism relying on achieved official recognition. In the British 
historical artistic sphere, these formations include guilds, academies, professional societies, and 
movements, and attend to the complexities of a social history that is constructed around informal 
groupings, associations, and tendencies. When studying these formations in relation to the 
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individuals that compose it on the one hand and general history on the other, the challenge is to 
avoid a metaphysical understanding of emergent cultural practices as well as a subjectivist one. 
Additionally, examining the emergence of a film economy must account for the lesser 
institutionalized formations, which also hold a central place in the formulation of new social 
experiences and structures of feeling. The focus on paradoxical economies requires a flexible 
understanding of organized modes of production and distribution that are not systematic (“not-yet 
recognized as social”). The paradoxical framework challenges formal definitions of institutions 
but acknowledges the prevalence of industry as a structuring discourse ordering hierarchies. In 
what follows, I examine how various strands of media industries studies may support my study of 
the emerging Palestinian film economy. 
 
2.2. Media Industries Studies 
Over the past twenty years, scholars of media industries have proposed approaches that combine 
political economy and cultural studies. The goal is to balance out “macro-level structural issues of 
regulatory regimes, concentration of media ownership, historical change, and their larger 
connection to capital interests,” with “micro-level practices” which pay attention to human agency 
(Havens et al., 2009, 234). These engagements range from critical political economy (Garnham 
1995; Wasko et al. 2011; Wasko and Meehan 2013, Wasko 2014); to critical media industries 
studies (Havens et al., 2009); to media anthropology as the study of the socio-cultural significance 
of media in our everyday lives (Ginsburg et al. 2002; Larkin 2008); and to production culture as 
the discourses and shared practices that organize workers’ relationships to media and between 
themselves, behind-the-scene (Caldwell 2008, Mayer et al. 2009, Ganti 2012 and 2014, Curtin and 
Sanson 2016). Despite a relatively recent surge of interdisciplinary scholarship on the topic, 
notably around the term “media industries studies,” the conversation about the relationship 
between political economy and cultural studies was already lively – or worn out, even – back in 
1995. In an issue of Critical Studies in Mass Communication, Lawrence Grossberg tellingly signed 
a piece entitled “Cultural Studies vs. Political Economy: Is Anybody Else Bored with This 
Debate?” (Grossberg 1995) Behind this provocative phrase, Grossberg was responding to Nicholas 
Garnham’s article in the same issue: “Political Economy and Cultural Studies: Reconciliation or 
Divorce?” (Garnham 1995).  
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These two contributions encapsulate one of the main points of contention in the field, which 
developed around cultural studies’ emphasis on popular culture as a resistance to capitalist 
structures. For Garnham, cultural studies’ alleged dissociation from (Marxist) political economy 
made it unsustainable as a political enterprise because it denied the determining power of 
economies and the foundational context set by the capitalist mode of production. As a result, 
cultural studies were said to undermine cultural production and issues of labor to the overwhelming 
benefit of consumption and “cultural practices of leisure” (Garnham 1995, 65). Garnham asked: 
“Where in the contemporary cultural studies literature or research program are examinations of the 
cultural producers and of the organizational sites and practices they inhabit and through which 
they exercise their power?” (Garnham 1995, 65) In turn, Grossberg reacted against Garnham’s 
conception of culture industries inspired by the Frankfurt School, wherein the commodification of 
culture is complete and human agency is dissolved. To Grossberg, cultural studies did not forsake 
political economy, nor did it ignore popular subordination to capitalism. Rather, it complicated the 
clear-cut boundary between consumption and production which Garnham allegedly drew: 
“Cultural studies emphasizes the complexity and contradictions, not only within culture, but in the 
relations between people, culture, and power” (Grossberg 1995, 76). Contemporary reformulations 
of media industries studies take seriously both arguments by examining the sites where culture is 
produced while acknowledging that these sites are themselves constructed.  
Various approaches differentially inform this dissertation, whose two primary concerns are 
to recognize the economic forces at work in the shaping of everyday lives, and cultural workers’ 
simultaneous cunning navigation of those networks. The spectrum of economic reductionism 
drives aforementioned interventions in the field. Garnham and Grossberg both warned us against 
it. In the lineage of the former, Janet Wasko, Graham Murdock, and Helena Sousa distinguish the 
project of a critical political economy of communication from “media economics.” Best 
epitomized by Douglas Gomery and Benjamin Compaine’s Who Owns the Media? (Gomery and 
Compaine 2000, 3rd edition), media economics “represents the application of neoclassical 
economics to media” and accepts the status quo (Wasko et al. 2011, 3). Taking stock of the rise of 
creative industries as a model to understand new structures of labor and modes of production, 
critical political economy always “starts from the prevailing distribution of power and inequality” 
(Wasko et al. 2011, 5). Social justice also importantly frames studies by David Hesmondalgh, who 
advocates that “media industries research requires a politics of cultural production informed by 
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social theory and by empirical work” (Hesmondalgh 2009, 246, his emphasis). In other words, the 
“critical” political economy of communications and culture investigates power relations, 
inequality, and injustice. “Grounded in an analysis of transformations, shifts, and contradictions 
that unfold over long loops of time” (Wasko et al. 2011, 2), critical political economy of media is 
useful to this dissertation because of its emphasis on the intertwining structures of power and media 
economies.  
This approach, predominantly emanating from communications studies, has often 
privileged the study of mass media, including news conglomerates and television. This is also the 
case for studies of media industries in the Arab world (Zayani 2005 and 2007; Jamal 2000 and 
2005; Lynch 2006; Tawil-Souri 2007; Sakr 2007; Khalil and Kraidy 2009; Sakr et al. 2015). Janet 
Wasko and Eileen R. Meehan argue that the field also touched upon film, video games, digital 
media, and the music industry (Wasko and Meehan 2013, 152). Yet, the works they cite suggest a 
continued focus on hegemonic industries inspired from residual culture industries studies, 
following which legitimate objects of research are implicitly determined by the reach of their 
media effect. Consequently, in this view, policy-making becomes an important locus for political 
activism and praxis, not only as an extension of academic work, but also as an object of study 
(Hesmondalgh 2009, Freedman 2014). The precarious and emerging nature of Palestine’s film 
economy quite drastically differs from these contexts. As explained in the introduction, the 
methodological and theoretical focus on policy might not be the most productive here, even in 
spite of Palestinian attempts at consolidating a legal framework for cultural production in the 
proto-state of Palestine, the pressure placed on film industries in Israel, and policy-making at the 
transnational level of co-production agreements. Moreover, policy-making delegates the 
responsibility of shaping political futures to state power and regulation frameworks. In his critique 
of development discourse in Lesotho, anthropologist James Ferguson explains that development 
agencies frame social and political histories so as to enable their own intervention. For example, 
they insist on contexts of national governmentality: “Because development agencies operate on a 
national basis and because they work through existing governments and not against them, they 
prize representations which exaggerate the power of national policy instruments” (Ferguson 1994, 
72). In the Global South, where state sovereignty is particularly subordinated to external political 
and economic powers, a focus on textual policy-making may implicitly rely on and promote the 
status quo of developmental economies and could potentially annihilate aforementioned critical 
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intentions. Yet, scholars have devised ethnographic methodologies (Freedman 2014) and renewed 
their engagement with cultural studies (Sabry 2012) in anticipation of such critique.  
Approaches inspired by anthropology situate themselves on the other side of the debate 
roughly (and arguably, reductively) sketched as political economy vs. cultural studies. In her 
contribution to the first issue of the new Media Industries Journal (initiated by proponents of 
“critical media industries studies”), anthropologist Tejaswini Ganti positions ethnography in 
opposition to studies of large media industries and the focus on mass media. She identifies three 
goals to her methodology, which all speak to this present research: 
 
to diversify the study of media industries; to take into account contestations over status and 
other forms of cultural and symbolic capital that characterize the “field” of media 
production; and to be able to critically examine discourses and quantitative data generated 
by media industries (Ganti 2014). 
 
Ganti reveals structures of power through a study of workers’ subjectivity by fully engaging with 
human agency and the norms and expectations that constitute labor relations. “Production studies” 
(Mayer et al. 2009) or “production culture” (Caldwell 2008) delineate the field of study which 
takes cultural production as an environment that is itself culturally produced. In his decade-long 
ethnography of Hollywood film workers, John T. Caldwell evaluates the industry’s mode of “self-
representation, self-critique, and self-reflection” (Caldwell 2008, 5), which he coins as “critical 
industrial practices.” Attending to meaning-making practices destabilizes the monolithic 
appellation “industry” and complicates its forms, appearances, and futures. Particularly, it is 
important to remember that  
 
film/TV production communities themselves are cultural expressions and entities 
involving all of the symbolic processes and collective practices that other culture use: to 
gain and reinforce identity, to forge consensus and order, [and] to perpetuate themselves 
and their interests (Caldwell 2008, 2).  
 
In their proposition for a critical media industries studies approach, Timothy Havens, Amanda 
Lotz, and Serra Tinic similarly advocate for an analysis of “the ways in which institutional 
discourses are internalized and acted upon by cultural workers” (Havens et al. 2009, 247). This 
argument crucially shapes the narrative of my dissertation as a whole. In Chapter Two, I examine 
how some Palestinian film workers and scholars assist in perpetuating the epistemological binary 
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of industry/no industry. They conceive the project of a film economy in accordance with the norms 
of global film festivals established in Europe – where the funding originates. The cultural value 
assigned to festivals constitutes one of the reasons why this industrial model predominates in the 
West Bank, Gaza, and the claims by Palestinian citizens of Israel. This dissertation thus retains the 
importance of considering industry as an epistemological system, but does not place as much 
emphasis on individual subjects and their critical industrial practices. Part of the reason is my own 
limited interactions with those workers in the long-term, as explained in the introduction. 
Moreover, maybe ambitiously, the endpoint of my investigation is not only the improved 
comprehension of labor conditions and organizations, but also more broadly the kind of political 
futures the multiple projects of a Palestinian film economy aim to produce.  
 In a move that resonates with Walter Mignolo’s aforementioned call for a decolonial 
epistemology of culture and economies (Mignolo 2011), I take inspiration from studies that 
examine the relationship between practices of meaning-making and material economies, which are 
oftentimes – and tellingly so – located in the Global South. Echoing Ganti’s proposition (Ganti 
2014), Nitin Govil contends that the term “industry” itself needs to be problematized beyond its 
emphasis on the structural and the regular; it should be understood as a construct (Govil 2013). He 
argues that the Mumbai film industry was not recognized by the Indian state as such before 1998 
although it had capacity for production and distribution as well as a division of cultural labor. The 
state recognition of an industry status to Bollywood operated a shift from informal transactions 
and unregulated structures to a rationalization of its financial operation and an official 
measurement of its capacity. The term “industry” thus becomes charged with more than a 
descriptive function and should be studied as an epistemic system that produces value, legitimacy, 
and modes of organization. Concomitant to this conclusion, Govil advocates for introducing 
indeterminacy to the study of media industries, so they are considered “not as a pre-existing 
structure of calculation but as a way of figuring things out” (Govil 2013, 176).  
Such an attention to contingency, discourse, and practitioners’ tactics also drives 
approaches to informal economies that take inspiration from media anthropology. Ramon Lobato’s 
seminal book The Shadow Economies of Cinema (2011) and the co-written The Informal Media 
Economy (Lobato and Julian 2015) account for the growing field of informal media studies. 
Stemming from the assessment that the international pirate economy exceeds the legal film 
industry in size, scale, and reach, Lobato’s 2011 book examines how practices that fall outside the 
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scope of the legal and the formal both challenge our assumptions about cultural value and reveal 
highly organized modes of production that adhere to fluctuant and ad hoc codes. Informal 
economies also maintain ambivalent relationships with regulated industries. The Nigeria-based 
film economy, for instance, grew out of piracy networks but is now increasingly pressured by 
copyright campaigns to embrace a more formal structure (Miller 2016, 93). The fact that practices 
can move in and out of industry status like in these two examples necessitates both taking seriously 
unrecognized economic processes and questioning the forces at play in their becoming legitimate 
and regulated. Finally, studies of media infrastructures, also emerging from media anthropology, 
evaluate how the construction of buildings, the training of personnel, or the elaboration of juridico-
legal frameworks organize the conditions of possibility for media formations and economies 
(Larkin 2004, 289). I will return to this crucial term in the following sub-section.  
Palestinian cinema acts as a challenge to fixed epistemes. Production culture, media 
anthropology, and maybe more broadly, critical media industries studies differentially provide 
theoretical and methodological tools to question this economic formation. Critical media industries 
studies, for instance, describes itself as “integral to analyzing an industry in flux and the struggles 
among competing social actors and institutions to stabilize new discourses to their own specific 
interests and advantages” (Havens et al. 2009, 250). Seemingly in a state of arrested development 
like the proto-state of Palestine and the mirage of self-determination, the Palestinian film economy 
sticks to a status of “not-yet-industry,” to repeat Govil’s words, and continues as an often 
contested, unachieved, and only maybe recognized, project. The lack of Palestinian national 
policies is substituted by international regulations, while these in turn reinforce the discourse of an 
absence of national structures. In parallel, the official Israeli rhetoric erases and swallows the 
Palestinian presence within its own industrial development, in a double logic of inclusive exclusion 
that facilitates the state’s claims of ownership over Palestinians’ success. The process of economic 
and social formation is thus inevitably intertwined with politics of recognition, which underlie 
material relations of production and distribution. This dissertation explores the ambiguous 
relationship between recognition as a form of meaning-making and economic formation through 
the awards economy, funding streams, and film festivals. These sites articulate civil society’s 
practices in Palestine-Israel, economic formations, and transnational networks. This chapter has 
already highlighted the stakes of studying funding streams and awards. I now turn to the industrial 
model of the film festival, which each one of my case studies takes as a major focus.  
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This dissertation argues that film festivals epitomize the articulation of legitimacy and 
materiality at play in the not-yet-industry in Palestine. In Chapter Two, I explain in detail how film 
festivals display an organizational flexibility that resonates with Govil’s “way of figuring things 
out.” Festivals present an adequate industrial model for navigating the waters of neoliberal 
economies that govern the proto-state of Palestine, the colonial regime of Israel, and the 
competitive networks of international film festivals. They constitute privileged sites for the growth 
of a local film economy because they attract external funding aligned with politics of urban 
regeneration, and ultimately function as proto-institutions that mirror the indeterminacy of the 
state-building project. Film festivals have been historically tied to the growth of nation-states’ 
legitimacy and power. Europe is often considered to be the “cradle of film festivals” (de Valck 
2007, 14), an appellation imbued with Eurocentric undertones that reflects the stakes of asserting 
national power in the fascist-ridden 1930s. The Venice Film Festival, inaugurated in 1932 by 
Mussolini, paved the way for further national iterations: the American-backed Cannes Film 
Festival in 1946 (the 1939 opening was interrupted by the beginning of the Second World War), 
the Czech Karlovy Vary the same year, the Berlinale in 1951, and the Moscow International Film 
Festival in 1959. The formation of film festivals became rapidly entangled with the Cold War 
efforts to enhance areas of ideological dominance (Moine 2014).  
Most relevant to our discussion, the emergence of film festivals in Latin America, North 
and sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East in the 1960s supported the third world’s struggle for 
decolonization and the creation of indigenous national and regional cultural institutions. The 
Journées Cinématographiques de Carthage (JCC), instituted in 1966 in Tunisia, and the 
FESPACO, instigated in 1969 in Upper Volta (now Burkina-Faso), aimed to foster Pan-African 
networks of film distribution. The goal was to consolidate national film industries inscribed in 
tight regional networks and relieve these countries from the imperialist economic influence of the 
former colonizers.19 Until then, foreign films overwhelmingly dominated national screens. Tahar 
Cheriaa, JCC’s initiator, defended the widespread idea that independence should come with the 
decolonization of culture in order to be fully effective. As early as 1949 – even before Tunisia’s 
independence in 1956 – Cheriaa started the Tunisian Federation of Cine-Clubs (FTCC), which 
served as a springboard for the creation of the Cinema Office at the Tunisian Ministry of Cultural 
Affairs in 1962. The JCC furthered these initial institutionalization efforts and supported the wider 
                                                
19 I provided some context for these festivals elsewhere (Saglier 2015).  
	
	 63 
distribution of Tunisian cinema locally. Similarly, the FESPACO primarily aimed to bring African 
cinema to African audiences as an integral part of the decolonization project. Three years after its 
creation, in 1972, a governmental decree formally recognized the festival as an institution. This 
testified to its centrality in national politics in addition to its regional influence (Dupré 2012). 
Third world film festivals teach us a lot about paradoxical Palestinian film economies. This 
history first points to film festivals’ role in solidifying nascent cultural institutions in contexts of 
decolonization and state-building. Palestine’s film festivals have not limited their mission to 
exhibiting Palestinian films. As discussed in Chapter Two of this dissertation, they contribute to 
training future generations of film technicians and screenwriters; they mobilize expertise to draft 
cultural policies for cinema production and distribution in collaboration with municipalities and 
various bodies of governance; they organize panels between Western funders and Arab distributors 
to strengthen transregional networks; and they function as a repository for the contemporary 
history of Palestinian cinema. In short, they have been “figuring things out” and followed the 
institutional needs of Palestinian cinema. The Burkinabé filmmaker Gaston Kaboré described the 
FESPACO in comparable terms: “Fespaco [sic] is a living organism at the service of African 
cinema. It acts and reacts in accordance with cinema on the continent” (Dupré 2012, 15).20  
Moreover, third world festivals highlight the primacy of outreach within the project of an 
independent and decolonized film industry. Palestine’s film festivals respond to the increased 
fragmentation of the territories after Oslo by distributing their screenings over the major cities in 
the West Bank and Gaza as well as refugee camps at the peripheries of these urban centers. Such 
a multi-sitedness and these festivals’ modest size propose a re-organization of the circuits of 
contemporary film festivals, often conflated with exchanges between global cities (Stringer 2011). 
By contrast, the strategy of outreach lies in decentralizing cultural capital and challenging the 
concentration of the economic resources allocated to its growth. Chapter Three more particularly 
examines how engaging with outreach poses broader questions about the shape a Palestinian film 
economy should take in negotiation with donors’ politics of development.  
Despite major points of comparison between Palestine’s film festivals and third world 
initiatives, the two contexts remain in tension. Contrary to African countries in the 1960s, Palestine 
has not achieved full independence and state-building continues in the midst of ongoing 
                                                
20 “Le Fespaco est un corps vivant au service du cinéma africain. Il agit et réagit en fonction du cinéma sur 
le continent.” My translation from French.	
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colonization. For Tariq Dana, the statehood project started to be implemented before the 
decolonization process because “the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s obsession with the very 
idea of statehood […] gradually eclipsed the struggle for liberation” (Dana 2017, 2). As a 
consequence, the proto-state becomes forged by the contradictions of the simultaneous interactions 
between colonialism, neo-colonialism, post-conflict state-building, and indirect colonial rule. At 
the same time, while Pan-Arabism and Pan-Africanism underwrote the economic and political 
enterprise of third world film festivals, Palestine’s contemporary politics of regional integration 
follow the map of European donors while also increasingly joining growing attempts at building 
parallel Arab capitalist networks. Contrary to third world film festivals, the emphasis of Palestine’s 
film festivals is not systematically placed on alternative or anti-imperialist cinemas and local films. 
The aesthetic communities that festivals shape, inspired by European and global art cinema or 
human rights networks, reflect the involvement of their economic partners. In turn, financial 
backers inflect the meanings of outreach. The choice between networks of art cinema or human 
rights sits within discourses of power that may perpetuate uneven relationships at the expense of 
Palestinians. Contemporary Palestinian cinema and its proto-institutions thus always already 
emerge from a material struggle with the conditions of possibility set by a project of liberation 
recuperated by development economies. 
 
2.3. Post-Development Theory, Human Agency, and Infrastructure Studies  
The paradoxical economies of Palestinian cinema unfold in a temporality of development under 
colonization. To repeat the words of the director of Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung (RLS)’s Palestinian 
regional office, Katja Hermann, “Is development possible under occupation? … Do the 
development and aid industries contradict the Palestinian struggle for liberation and sovereignty?” 
(Hermann 2015, 8) This section examines how Palestine-Israel’s specific present of social and 
economic formation produces political futures and imaginaries. Palestinian cinema is enmeshed 
within economic networks that exceed arts and cultural circuits. These include supra-national and 
international development agencies, as well as humanitarian agencies and human rights NGOs, all 
of which are ostensibly dedicated to bringing peace and financial growth while occupation and 
colonialism continue. These institutions contribute to structuring expectations about local political 
practices as well as modes and “standards of living” – an expression much in vogue in 
developmental talk. My research adds to the field of post-development theory, which has been 
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theorizing development as “an interpretive grid” (Ferguson 1994, xiii) for the past twenty-five 
years. Arturo Escobar, who would later join the ranks of decolonial thinkers next to Mignolo, 
describes development as a Eurocentric apparatus that produces knowledge about, and exercises 
power over, the third world (Escobar 1995, 9). In sum, discourse has material consequences. After 
World War Two and as the Cold War was settling in, the Truman doctrine aimed at gaining the 
ideological support of poorer countries in exchange for the United States’ economic input in local 
development. This ushered in a total restructuring of the so-called “under-developed” societies. 
Instead of helping economic growth in the third world, developmental strategies provided the 
conditions for massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, as well as exploitation and 
oppression. Discursive associations of economic development with civilizational progress, 
inspired by the Enlightenment, achieved the marginalization of third world populations from a 
historical point of view as well as in their own national narratives.  
Often deemed a failure – a term I have myself used earlier in this chapter – developmental 
politics could be better understood as an “authorless strategy that turns out to have a kind of 
political intelligibility” (Ferguson 1994, 20). In other words, the inaccuracies in developmental 
reports and politics do not uncover mistakes; rather, they serve their own logic and epitomize how 
capitalist forces of development constantly produce the conditions of possibility for their own 
reproduction and mutations. Echoing Adam Hanieh about Oslo as a success for Israeli policy, 
political economist Mandy Turner recognizes that the so-called failure of Palestine’s development 
actually constitutes an expression of successful politics of counter-insurgency, which I further 
explain in Chapter Two (Turner 2015). Development under occupation appears less as a paradox 
in the logical sense of the term than a productive contradiction for capitalist economies and the 
colonial project. On the one hand, settler colonialism physically erases polities; on the other, 
development acts as an “anti-politics machine, depoliticizing everything it touches, whisking 
political realities out of sight all the while performing, almost unnoticed, its own pre-eminently 
political operation of expanding bureaucratic state power” (Ferguson 1994, xv). The two systems 
of subordination reinforce each other. Inspired by the field of post-development theory, Palestine 
scholars and analysts Linda Tabar and Omar Jabar Salamanca argue that “development aid was 
used to conceal the absence of a real political process; and as such, development not only became 
complicit in the Israeli colonial project, it subsidized the occupation, sustained and reproduced 
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settler colonial structures of power and oppression” (Tabar and Salamanca 2015, 14-15). In this 
view, development constitutes colonization by other means.  
Paralleling Mignolo’s call for alternatives to modernity, Arturo Escobar and other post-
development scholars have advocated for alternatives to development as opposed to considering 
the multiplicity of forms that development can take (Rist 1990; Sachs 1992; Escobar 1995; 
Rahnema and Bawtree 1997). For Jan Nederveen Pieterse, who defends a developmental 
pluralism, post-development approaches vary between a rejection of development (or anti-
development), a vision of future directions beyond development (au-delà du développement), and 
a Foucauldian analysis of power, which risks homogenizing development (Pieterse 2000, 178). In 
spite of diverging views within the field, many scholars tend to equate development with 
westernization (Latouche 2005 [1989]; Escobar 1995), thus furthering older debates against 
modernization theory from the 1950s. Following critics, post-development theory could result in 
celebrating the myth of the “noble savage” and the romanticization of poverty. Such relative 
culturalism, at times sliding into claims of cultural imperialism (Petras 1997 [1994]), ends up 
promoting the dualist essentialisms between local (good) and foreign (bad) against which post-
development theory rose in the first place (Kiely 1999, 43). Pieterse identifies another internal 
contradiction to post-development theory by uncovering similarities with neoliberal discourses. 
He argues that both parties reject aid and the reliance on strong states, albeit for opposing reasons, 
and this puts into question post-development’s commitment to redistributive justice (Pieterse 2000, 
184). Armed with the theoretical tools of psychoanalysis, Ilan Kapoor pursues this provocative 
line of thinking and contends that the rejection of development signifies a libidinal engagement 
with it (Kapoor 2017). Aram Ziai goes as far as describing the most inflexible fringe of post-
development thinkers such as Majid Rahmena and Gustavo Esteva as models of “reactionary 
populism” (Ziai 2004, 1055). Yet by doing so, Ziai simultaneously saves the other half of the field 
which exercises skepticism vis-à-vis essentializing the local and non-Western cultures. Then, he 
acknowledges post-development’s emancipatory potential for a project of radical democracy (Ziai 
2004, 1056). Some of these arguments prove arguably very reductive or even flawed – surely, 
there are anti-capitalist scenarios that do not include states as an organizing principle without 
promoting neoliberalism? However, the ambivalence they put into light importantly reveals lines 
of convergence between post-developmental and neoliberal theories that are opposed 
ideologically, but may offer overlapping structural scenarios and practical engagements.  
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This dissertation builds on moments of convergence and divergence precisely in order to 
explore such unwitting and/or intended affinities. Post-development theory importantly insists on 
the decentralization of power by introducing a critique of systems of political representation. The 
reformulation of distributive power matches the need for an epistemological decentralization 
which challenges universalisms (Ziai 2004, 1056-7, Mignolo and Escobar 2016). My own 
investigation analyzes how industrial standards impact Palestinian film economic practices and 
attempts to decentralize through outreach. This also means that local actions reinterpret foreign 
interventions, against post-development binaries. As Pietersen rightfully points out, “the South 
also owns development” (Pieterse 2000, 178) – and not only the elites. Upon writing the preface 
to the 2010 re-edition of his staple 1992 Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power 
(2010), Wolfgang Sachs accepts Pietersen’s counter-argument:  
 
[Development] certainly was an invention of the West…but not just an imposition on the 
rest. On the contrary, as the desire for recognition and equity is framed in terms of the 
civilizational model of the powerful nations, the South has emerged as the staunchest 
defender of development. [Countries]…long to achieve industrial modernity (Sachs 2010, 
viii-xix).  
 
Here it becomes necessary to distinguish my theoretical engagement with post-development; the 
prescriptive and critical engagement of Palestinian theoreticians like Tabar, Salamanca, and Tariq 
Dana cited earlier; and the reality on the terrain. Among cultural workers, a common view of 
Palestinian political future combines an approach of instrumental development (not alternative to 
development) and a reference to the ideals of the past Palestinian struggle for liberation. As a 
result, this dissertation analyzes strategies of engagement with economies of development. This is 
not limited to the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza. Israel is subject to a similar 
ideology of development due to its Eurocentric politics (which oppose a supposedly democratic 
Israel to a so-called chaotic Middle East) and its integration in the European and global frameworks 
of exchange that encourage “dialogue” with Palestinian citizens of Israel.  
 The ambivalence of Palestinian cultural workers’ attitude vis-à-vis development guides this 
study. The simultaneous subscription to specific standards of industrial progress, which structure 
the project of the Palestinian film economy, and the reliance on the Revolution’s history of 
liberation, contributes to validating the human rights framework. As Ziai reminds us in the 2017 
special issue of the Third World Quarterly dedicated to post-development theory, the discourse of 
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development could also be read as a discourse of rights (Ziai 2017, 2550). The human rights 
discourse, as the dominant political ideology of capitalist democracies since the fall of 
Communism, has picked up where development left off, in the historical view that sees the 
discourse of development wither away after the end of the Cold War (Moyn 2010, Meister 2011). 
At the same moment, the human rights discourse also replaces the decolonial struggle for liberation 
with a potentially depoliticizing and moralizing vision which sometimes supports, and often 
accommodates, the NGO-ization of Palestine. Palestinian anthropologist Khalil Nakhleh expresses 
his own ambivalence in the preface to his sharp critique of development, Globalized Palestine: 
The National Sell-Out of a Homeland (Nakhleh 2012). His commitment to proving that 
“development doesn’t work” emerged after years working for the European Commission and the 
Palestinian philanthropy and humanitarian organization Welfare Association. In contrast, Nakhleh 
promotes a “People-Centered Liberationist Development” (PLCD), which conjugates the desire 
for radical alternatives to development with the subscription to the human rights discourse 
(Nakhleh 2012, xviii). Informed by terms such as “empowerment,” “resilience,” and 
“sustainability,” the view resonates with both the decolonial option and the neoliberal ideology of 
human development. As Asef Bayat puts it when dissecting the Arab Human Development Report, 
it often happens that “radical tones are merged into neoliberal imagery of economy, polity, elites, 
and change” (Bayat 2010, 33). I further examine the extreme intimacy and ambiguous convergence 
of human rights, human development, and the liberation struggle in Chapter Three.  
 In this context, Palestinian agency is often framed through the action of the “civil society.” 
This dissertation also uses that term, to a certain extent and with caution. In other words, I move 
away from debates that remain located in the space of the Habermasian public sphere, which tend 
to normalize liberal democracy. “Civil society” here encapsulates the various economic and 
political forces that provide the context for fragmented and unequal Palestinian actions: the market 
economy, development-as-growth, human development, the neoliberal NGO-ization of the 
Palestinian economy, and more generally, politics of recognition and the human rights discourse 
as a framework for Palestinian claims to self-determination. Amr Hamzawy describes how the 
term gained prominence in the 1980s in the Arab world due to multiple factors: the generalized 
rise of neoliberalism and the changing role of nation-states worldwide; Arab states’ increased 
distance from democratic discourses and the necessity for other political spheres of action; and the 
rise of political Islam in its moderate and radical forms (Hamzawy 2003). Arab thinkers have 
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debated the utility of the term “civil society” for the region. While some see the possibility of 
translating this formation from Western history into the Arab world because of the universality of 
oppression, others recognize the ideological implications of the term. For example, Egyptian 
lawyer and politician Hussam ‘Isa contends that civil society “is an instrumental construct of 
modern, Western, liberal thought that, together with the classical categories individualism, 
political freedom, democracy, human rights, public welfare, and market economy serves as a 
legitimating paradigm for the capitalist system” (Hamzawy 2003, 21, my emphasis). Importantly, 
the term has been mobilized by Islamic formations such as Hamas (Roy 2011), as I demonstrate 
in Chapter Four. Hamzawy isolates two fundamental questions from these historical debates: First, 
what is the place of religious organizations and movements in the model of civil society? Second, 
is civil society always external to the state or can it aspire to political power? (Hamzawy 2003, 
32) The latter observation, in particular, crystallizes many threads in this dissertation. For example, 
festival projects in the West Bank and Gaza, but also some of the propositions formulated by 
Palestinian citizens of Israel, hold an institutionalizing function despite being organized by 
independent individuals.  
 This dissertation describes the project of a Palestinian film economy as a strategy of 
engagement with developmental and neoliberal economies. These strategies resonate with 
Abourahme’s inquiry into Palestinian subjectivity in the political disjuncture between colonization 
and the normalizing political imaginary of the state process. He asks: “How do we interpret the 
colonial subject that is neither in revolt, nor in open crisis? ...What kind of time is this curious 
present?” (Abourahme 2011, 455) Abourahme relocates the political in quotidian practices that are 
not always legible (Abourahme 2011, 459), echoing Lori Allen’s suggestion that this present is 
one of tactical habits – of getting by (Allen 2008). My definition of “strategy” sits at the crossroads 
of the distinction that Michel de Certeau makes between strategy and tactics. On the one hand, just 
like de Certeau’s tactics, Palestinian strategies function as “making do” and react to opportunities. 
They  
 
play on and with a terrain imposed on [them] and organized by the law of a foreign power. 
[They] do not have the means to keep to [themselves], at a distance, in a position of 
withdrawal, foresight, and self-collection: [they are] maneuver[s] ‘within the enemy’s field 




Unlike de Certeau’s strategy, the mode of action I analyze does not “master time through the 
foundation of an autonomous place” (de Certeau 1984, 36). In fact, my understanding of strategy 
represents the very process and effort of using opportunities and instrumentalizing surroundings 
in order to reach institutionalization and industrialization. Strategy is oriented yet not teleological; 
it is located in the paradoxical present but emerges at the juncture of politics of recognition and 
hopes for decolonization. Strategy is a temporal concept, one that reflects the open possibilities of 
the Palestinian political and industrial project and the lived experience of practitioners and 
audiences. The term maintains the ambiguity and paradox between radical politics and neoliberal 
futures. Its semantic field extends from the “strategic goals” identified by development agencies’ 
planning, to the activist movement of BDS, which takes its strength from representing a means 
rather than an end. Akin to “endurance,” the mode of political engagement of the unrecognized 
indigenous populations in Australia’s neoliberal settler-colonialism, strategy is grounded in the 
“temporality of continuance” and persistence (Povinelli 2011, 32). In sum, strategy forms the 
temporality of Palestinian workers’ agency as they devise the industrial project in-becoming.  
 Finally, this research examines relationship between materiality and imaginaries, and how 
conditions of possibility are enacted through strategy. For that reason, infrastructure studies 
bridges my study of a not-yet film industry with concerns of development, lived temporalities, and 
political imaginaries. The field of (critical) media infrastructure studies emerged about fifteen 
years ago at the juncture of anthropology, media studies, architecture, geography, and science and 
technology studies (STS). In their introduction to the edited volume Signal Traffic: Critical Studies 
of Media Infrastructure (2015), Lisa Parks and Nicole Starosielski define infrastructures as both 
“material forms and discursive constructions” which are used to “reorganize territories and 
temporal relations” (2015, 5). For Shannon Mattern, they constitute a “structure that undergirds 
communication and communion” (Mattern 2015, 95). Brian Larkin also points to the articulation 
of materiality, affect, and discourse: “as physical forms they shape the nature of a network, the 
speed and direction of its movement, its temporalities, and its vulnerability to breakdown” (Larkin 
2013, 328). Similarly, Eyal Weizman’s study of the architecture of Israeli occupation identifies 
built spaces “as a conceptual way of understanding political issues as constructed realities” 
(Weizman 2007, 6). An underlying organizing principle which is conducive to imaginaries and 
politics, infrastructures “generate the ambient environment of everyday life” (Larkin 2013, 328). 
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Infrastructures thus emerge as structuring modes of sociality and power through physical spaces 
and affective relationalities (Parks and Starosielski 2015, 9). 
 This dissertation considers film festivals through the lens of critical media infrastructure 
studies and examines how they emerge from changing, contingent, and constructed environments. 
In other words, I do not identify film festivals with infrastructures. I argue that, as symptoms of 
the project of a Palestinian film economy, festivals result from and mediate an engagement of 
industrial imaginaries with the possibilities set by built spaces, financial networks, and political 
structures under occupation, colonization, and the humanitarian regime. It is significant that 
precisely those built spaces, networks and structures are major targets for Israeli control over 
Palestinian cultural production. Film festivals partake in the material construction of lived 
temporalities and future imaginaries in a context where the impossibility of hope is always already 
re-asserted. In her book In the Meantime: Temporality and Cultural Politics (2014), Sara Sharma 
argues that the study of lived temporalities has been undermined to the benefit of universalist speed 
theories,21 which emphasize issues of time-space compression with the advent of real-time 
communications technologies. As a result, scant attention has been paid to multiple, differential, 
and uneven lived temporalities, wherein “experience of time depends on where [subjects] are 
positioned within a larger economy of temporal worth” determined by global capitalism (Sharma 
2014, 8). As ephemeral and flexible structures, film festivals form temporal experiments in 
materializing film industry in the interstices and at the margins of global economic and political 
networks. Equally concerned with the uneven implementation of infrastructures across 
industrialized and developed regions, Parks and Starosielski emphasize the need to provincialize 
the study of cultural engagements with built spaces (Parks and Starosielski 2015, 11). 
Infrastructure as a concept first emerged in the Enlightenment idea of progress, since it was that 
which allowed industrial development. As a political address, they “come to represent the 
possibility of being modern, of having a future, or the foreclosing of that possibility and a resulting 
experience of abjection” (Larkin 2013, 333). Infrastructures thus crystallize fantasies of 
development. Critical media infrastructure studies, post-development theory, and the concept of 
                                                
21 She cites Paul Virilio, 24/7 capitalism (Jonathan Crary), the chronoscopic society (Robert Hassan), fast 
capital (Ben Agger), the new temporalities of biopolitical production (Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri), 
the culture of acceleration (John Tomlinson), chronodystopia (John Armitage and Joanne Roberts), 
hypermodern times (Gilles Lipovetsky), and liquid times (Zygmunt Bauman). 
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strategy allow me to start conceptualizing the making of a Palestinian film economy as it is 
embedded in transnational networks of cinema, developmental, and human rights economies.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter situates my investigation of Palestinian cinema after national cinema, in a theoretical 
landscape that privileges affective relations and strategic negotiations with global economies over 
dynamics of identity-formation. The point is not to deny the rallying force of cinema for 
Palestinians and solidarity groups around the world, but to shift the focus from representational 
practices and narratives of trauma towards the complexity of the present and formulations of 
political and economic futures. Doing so points to im/possible geographies of liberation, which I 
call “pessoptimistic.” Similarly paradoxical, the not-yet Palestinian film industry represents an 
open field of practice entangled with pre-determining colonial, developmental, and humanitarian 
economies. Film festivals, which are pivotal to circulating Palestinian films in Palestine and 
globally, play a crucial role in the formation of this economy. The next chapter examines how 
festivals act as unstable institutions and may become the vehicles for imaginaries of peaceful and 
stable political futures. As such, they mirror the state-building process and its paradoxical 
engagement with institutionalization and development, at the same time as the structures of 











time is a place  
put in its place. 
Under siege, 
place is a time 
out of time. 
Mahmoud Darwish, A State of Siege, 2002. 
 
 
In 2014, the Ramallah-based film production company Idioms Film released an anthology of nine 
shorts to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Oslo Accords (hereafter Oslo). Entitled Zaman 
Muaalaq/Suspended Time, the collection both assesses the promises of the peace process and 
lingers on its failure to engineer a sustainable peace and economy in Palestine. In Ayman Azraq’s 
contribution Oslo Syndrome, Oslo stands for the exponentially fragmented, militarized, and 
constricting geography of Palestine following the Accords. Oslo also represents the physical and 
legal space of Norway where Palestinians are still officially considered stateless despite the 
negotiations that the country’s capital hosted. The title’s reference to Stockholm syndrome 
ultimately points to Palestinians’ unwarranted – and now withering – attachment to a peace process 
that has denied them a decent future. The film visualizes the paradox of the stalled peace process 
by showcasing blurred images of Palestinian streets, travelling shots figuring impossible travels, 
and an editing that alternates between the spaces where Palestinian movement is restricted, 
Palestine and the city of Oslo. In this chapter, I borrow the term “suspended time” to signify the 
contradictory Palestinian future of continued occupation after the peace process, that is to say, a 
future that promises the political stability of statehood, and yet perpetually re-affirms the instability 
of statelessness.  
Suspended time generates its own aesthetics. In Mahdi Fleifel’s Twenty Handshakes for 
Peace, another short in the anthology, the Accords similarly produce nothing but the re-assertion 
of an empty promise: the TV footage of the famous handshake between Israeli Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat, which marked 
the official beginning of the so-called peace process, is repeated in a loop – twenty times, for the 
twenty years that have passed since the signing of the Accords. In this video art piece, the 
reiteration of the news images undoes the liveness of TV and reveals the discrepancy between 
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information and experience, and between promises and actualization of political agendas. 
Remediation, or “the representation of one medium in another” (Bolter and Grusin 2000, 45), here 
accentuates the discontinuities between TV and art video and their respective modes of production 
and exhibition. The suspended time of post-Oslo Palestine denies the evolution from conflict to 
peace, from political and economic instability to stability, and this sense of indeterminate deferral 
also translates into media forms and economies.  
What is at stake in this chapter is the creation of a Palestinian economy of images that can 
adjust to both the development economy ushered in by the Peace Accords and the ongoing military 
colonization of the Palestinian territories. In other words, how can we imagine a stable economy 
of images in a context of “de-development” that threatens Palestinian futures? Another term for 
“suspended time,” de-development, for Sara Roy, occurs  
 
when normal economic relations are impaired or abandoned, preventing any logical or 
rational arrangement of the economy and its constituent parts, diminishing productive 
capacity and precluding sustainable growth. […] Over time, de-development represents 
nothing less than the denial of economic potential (Roy 2014, x).22 
 
The economy and political structure of state-building are stagnant but not stable. The Oslo Accords 
established an interim self-government body, the Palestinian Authority (PA), valid for five years. 
Presently and well past this period, the pursuit of a stable legal framework remains suspended and 
no further negotiations have been conducted to formalize a sovereign power. Managed by the 
occupying Israeli Civil Administration before Oslo, the Palestinian economy has similarly since 
the Accords remained “stuck in a period of indefinite transition” (Taghdisi-Rad 2014, 28). Under 
the cover of planning economic growth, the Paris Protocol of Economic Regulations (PER), the 
economic pendant to Oslo, institutionalized the subordination of the Palestinian Territories’ 
clearance revenues and exports to Israeli policies, rules, and regulations, while tethering the 
Palestinian national budget to foreign aid. On the other hand, the PA’s poor management of its 
funding has forced a focus on immediate emergencies, which prevents robust long-term 
development priorities and planning. Palestinian and international NGOs and human rights 
organizations, privileged recipients of foreign investments, have consequently replaced the quasi-
non-existing national institutions, conforming to “the expectation that institutions of assistance 
                                                
22 The concept was initially coined in relation to Gaza in 1995, but Sara Roy acknowledges in this more 
recent chapter that it can apply to Palestine as a whole. 
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will be situated in civil society rather than governments” typical to the broader neoliberal logic 
around developmental and colonial economies (Yúdice 2004, 6). Finally, the local economy has 
been obstructed by the increased fragmentation of the Palestinian territory, with the neo-colonial 
division of the West Bank in three areas of control since the Oslo Accords; the construction of the 
Separation Wall isolating the city of Jerusalem and the holy site of the Dome of the Rock since 
2002; the multiplication of checkpoints during the Second Intifada; and the blockade of Gaza after 
2007, which cut off the Strip from the West Bank and historic Palestine. 
Within the unstable context of de-development and colonization, thinking of a stable 
economy of images summons a complex entanglement of narratives. Stability forms a key 
discourse that underlies international donors’ policies of “war-to-peace” transition. The concept of 
stability drives the developmental efforts to support the reconstruction of Palestinian 
infrastructures and the building of institutions (Brynen 2000, 7). Yet, economic development at 
the service of “post-conflict” Palestinian sovereignty is bound to fail if the occupation, and thus 
the “conflict,” persists. In this confusing chain of events, stability becomes both the necessary 
condition for, and the desired result of, peacebuilding, thus pointing to a contradicting causality 
that denies the possibility for peace. For Mandy Turner, promoting the stability of Palestinian 
governance structures at the same time as that discourse is embedded in the framework of colonial 
practices proves paradoxical only in appearance. The impossibility to achieve stability and peace 
does not constitute a failure of the development economy. Rather, it should be conceived as a 
successful form of counterinsurgency in the interest of the leading Western donors and their 
strategic cooperation with Israel. At the same time, this cements the hegemony of the PA, bound 
by the Oslo Accords to guarantee the security of Israel. In Turner’s own words, “there is a deep 
structural symbiosis in the philosophy and methods of counterinsurgency and peacebuilding that 
lies in securing population against unrest through the implementation of governance, development 
and security strategies that instill acquiescence and ensure control” (Turner 2015, 97). More 
precisely, as Turner puts it, the international community’s processes of stabilization intend to 
“manage and suppress the instability that results from manifestations of inequality and repression, 
to control it and not resolve it – because to do so would require a reconfiguration of global power 
to allow local populations to decide their own developmental and political futures” (Turner 2015, 
74-75). If stability implies population control through a domestication of instability by way of the 
development economy, how can we figure the population’s own grasp on their unstable 
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environment? What can stability mean for the future of Palestinian media economies, cultural 
workers, and their attempts at building cultural proto-institutions?  
This chapter examines the implementation of different forms of economic and political 
stability through media economies in post-Oslo Palestine. In particular, it analyzes the 
convergence between, on the one hand, the emergence of a film industry based on cinephilia and 
devised by local film practitioners; and on the other, the consolidation of the news’ mode of 
production of images in Palestine pushed by international agencies, starting during the Second 
Intifada (2000-2005). I understand cinephilia as a normative discourse on spectatorship and love 
for cinema, which is supplemented by a specific technological apparatus and an industrial mode 
of production, distribution, and exhibition established by major film festivals such as Cannes or 
Venice. What of cinephilia’s convergence with the news? Lisa Parks defines convergence as a 
discursive, economic, and institutional interdependence between technologies, which informs their 
respective processes of emergence. She writes that “a genealogy of convergence does not celebrate 
the newness of combined technological forms so much as it emphasizes the paths of contradiction 
and ambivalence elicited by their mutual interactions” (Parks 2005, 77). In the Palestinian context, 
the news and cinephilia reflect and manufacture conflicting media environments that articulate 
various geopolitical interests, technological apparati, epistemological relations to time, and 
broader economies of images. The news and cinephilia put forward two discourses of stability 
which translate into lived temporalities and understandings of present time. As the aforementioned 
example of Mahdi Fleifel’s Twenty Handshakes for Peace suggests, the “nowness” of the news 
seems to restrict Palestinian futures to an ineluctable and recurring crisis, while cinephilia’s 
ideology of film appreciation and its material demands for theatrical live screenings offer the 
potentiality for duration and reflexivity. By proposing competing experiences of present time 
embedded in differential material conditions, the news and cinephilia shape two forms of stability 
and control over the viewing environment carried by their own respective institutions.  
Many film theatres were shut down in the wake of the First Intifada in the late 1980s, 
leaving the West Bank and Gaza with limited access to Palestinian and international cinematic 
images. The arrival of international news crews and agencies during the First Intifada started to 
reconfigure the local economy of images, and the subsequent uprisings in the 2000s solidified the 
agencies’ presence. Yet concomitantly during the Second Intifada, film festivals started to emerge 
in Palestine. Some of them effectively proposed an alternative to news coverage via international 
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art cinema and initiated a discourse of film institutionalization and industrialization through 
cinephilia that did not exist in this form prior to that period. The notion of suspended time thus 
does not intend to seal the fate of Palestine and its potentially nascent film institutions, but rather 
describes how a future is being imagined from within development, despite instability, despite the 
dysfunctional proto-state, and despite the occupation.23 Nowadays, cinema in the West Bank is 
mainly mediated through cable TV (and mostly through big Arab channels like the Dubai-based 
MBC), legal and illegal streaming websites, and a small number of commercial theatres, all of 
which mostly run American and Egyptian blockbusters. Video stores sell pirated DVDs of 
Palestinian films, but these are not advertised and do not find their audience easily. Film festivals 
in Palestine can consequently help promote Palestinian films and global art cinema, rehabilitate 
spaces where films can be watched, and fashion the possibility of film spectatorship in the midst 
of the emergency of conflict and news watching.  
Cinephilia functions as a strategy to implement political and economic stability which 
Palestinian film practitioners devise as an alternative to news production. Cinephilia is crucial to 
the fragmented and contested project of a Palestinian film industry that has focused on art cinema 
in the West Bank from the Second Intifada (2000-2005) until today. I argue that this projected 
stability paradoxically relies on the unstable institution of the film festival. The history of 
Palestinian film institutionalization can be traced back to several decades before the Second 
Intifada, in the 1960s, as explored in Chapter Three. The end of the revolution and the PLO’s 
forced departure from Lebanon in 1982 then marked a rupture in Palestinian governance. This 
historical break is reflected in the shift in Palestinian films’ mode of production and the place of 
cinema within the Palestinian imaginary and social formation. Following this rupture, new forms 
of transnational film institutionalization have emerged, embedded in global art film festivals and 
economies of cinephilia. Michel Khleifi’s emblematic art cinema in the 1980s and 1990s 
anticipates Palestinian cinema’s wider integration into the international circuits of world cinema 
and global cinephilia, while national productions are still rarely shown in the territories. The 
dominant standards of global cinephilia stand in stark contrast to the limited or nonexistent 
infrastructures available in Palestine. This paradox, typical of discussions on world cinema, has 
                                                
23 Similarly, Julien Salingue proposes the term “despite” (malgré) to articulate the strategies of resistance 
based on perpetual negotiations after Oslo, as opposed to direct actions taken against the occupation before 




cemented a monolithic vision in which there can be no economic formation of Palestinian cinema 
because there is no working state and no established industry. As we will see, film festivals provide 
an institutional and industrial model that adapts to minimal infrastructures and partially 
accommodates a stable viewing experience required for film appreciation.  
Often short-lived, sometimes interrupted for a few years, festivals have nonetheless 
contributed to shaping a local film community, and some have openly suggested the possibility of 
a future film industry in Palestine. The projects are diverse but have been consistently dedicated 
to connecting international filmmakers and films to Palestine, while advertising Palestinian 
productions abroad by developing partnerships with foreign festivals and film institutions. Their 
names are often a testament to this global reach: Ramallah International Film Festival (2004); the 
Jericho International Film Festival (2005); the Shashat Women’s Film Festival (2005-today, 
interrupted in 2014 and 2015); the Al-Kasaba International Film Festival (2006-2010); the 
Palestine Human Rights Film Festivals (2010); the International Young Filmmakers Festival 
(2011-today); the Franco-Arab Film Festival (2011-today); and the Days of Cinema (2014-today). 
Also embedded in local communities, festivals have coordinated with Palestinian universities and 
reached out to remote audiences in refugee camps and villages, thus prolonging the isolated work 
of a few mobile cinema initiatives and audiovisual programs in development. Particular emphasis 
has been placed on training workshops (scriptwriting, filming, editing, sound), round tables and 
Q&As. Pedagogy, industry, and human rights have differentially organized these initiatives. 
 This chapter concentrates on a constellation of festivals that have engaged with global art 
cinema as an enduring and stable framework for future Palestinian film industrial structures. In 
effect, what does it mean for cinephilia to be conceived as a dominant imaginary, a suitable 
economy and aesthetic, and a necessary infrastructure for the project of a film industry in unstable 
post-Oslo Palestine? What temporality does cinephilia produce to address this instability? Within 
this constellation, the Days of Cinema, which I attended in the Fall 2015, stands out as an 
exemplary effort of capacity-building. However, a broader attention to the Ramallah International 
Film Festival, the Al-Kasaba International Film Festival, and the revival project of the Jericho 
International Film Festival further reveals how the media environment of cinephilia negotiates 
politics and economics of development as well as the event structure of the news temporality in 
order to create stable spaces of spectatorship. I start by establishing how the news’ expression of 
present time (which I refer to as “real-time”) threatens the stable development of other media 
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environments. The news’ real-time produces a status quo of crisis, soon to be challenged by 
Palestinian cinema experiments during the Second Intifada. The transnational and regional 
economies of global art cinema assist in furthering these cinematic visual experiments and support 
the emergence of film festivals that act as proto-institutions for cinema. I then question festivals’ 
establishment of their own real-time, which is envisioned to sustain and stabilize a film culture in 
the long term through the media environment and the mode of spectatorship they foster.  
 
 
News Time Versus Film Time 
The convergence of news and cinephiliac economies reveals the formation of conflicting 
temporalities of experience and political futures of stability.  In what follows, I introduce the news’ 
mode of production and the tension between what I call news time and film time. In the wake of 
the Oslo peace process in 1994, the international conversation on Palestine revolved around issues 
of democratization. With the advent of the Second Intifada, then followed by the US’ “war on 
terror” which placed additional suspicion on Arab populations world-wide, Palestine returned to 
its status of “conflict zone” earned during the First Intifada and was increasingly framed as a 
“cradle of terrorism.” This identified political crisis (which by contrast denied the ongoing crisis 
of the occupation) made Palestine a news item again. Media coverage became “routine” and the 
temporality of the news pervaded daily life (Bishara 2013, 210). Importantly, permanent 
broadcasting contributed to managing the discourse of political instability through the status quo 
of crisis. The production of news coverage organized labor and media practices, structured around 
the anticipation of catastrophes. As Peter Golding and Philip Elliot state, “if news is about the 
unpredictable, its production is about prediction” (Golding and Eliott 1999, 113). The demands of 
global news work mediated relationships between the proto-state, its people and audiences, and 
the logic of anticipation was sometimes used to control Palestinian populations. As anthropologist 
Amahl Bishara reported during Yasser Arafat’s funeral in 2004, PA officials invoked Palestine’s 
international image and the global television coverage of the event to keep order at home. This 
translated into disciplining the sizeable crowd populating all accessible high points over the 
Muqata‘a (the presidential palace) where Arafat was to be buried (Bishara 2013, 215). The 
Palestinian “masses” were doubly marshalled by the news media and their geopolitical positioning 
in its global networks.  
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The management of unpredictability that sustains media events, as well as the endless 
repetition of the 24 hour-news cycle, materializes in the news’ expression of the present as “real-
time.” Communications scholars coined the concept of real-time with respect to the time-space 
compression resulting from the acceleration of the circulation of capital, information, and ever-
faster technologies of communication (Harvey 1989). Real-time refers to the ways in which the 
new technologies embedded in economies of globalization have fashioned new standards of 
instantaneity and simultaneity. In other words, real-time signifies the disappearance of time as a 
process (Leccardi 2007, 30; Hope 2016, 7). For Lisa Parks, news coverage does not only 
encompass the content of the news program but also stands for “a particular kind of televisual 
practice, one that structures the way viewers see and know the world from a distance” (Parks 2005, 
88). The televisual epistemology of real-time however does not affect the remote viewers alone. 
We should also consider how it is embedded in the environment in which the televisual is 
materially produced. In the case that concerns us here, what Parks calls the discursive “fantasy of 
liveness” of the televisual (Parks 2005, 38) both emerges from the material conditions of the 
continuous military operations in occupied Palestine that perpetually produce live content about 
political instability, and informs Palestinian audiences’ fixed and stereotyped representations of 
themselves and their future. In other words, the news produces two distinct global discourses on 
the present: on the one hand, real-time results from new technologies’ augmented capacity to share 
the news in the context of global viewership; on the other, the very economies that allow high-
speed communications profit from, structure, and sustain grounded epistemologies of stagnation, 
immobility, and repetition in post-Oslo Palestine.  
At the time of the Second Intifada, the quotidian in crisis constantly provided material for 
news coverage and disrupted the temporalities of other forms of media. During “Operation 
Defensive Shield,” which resulted in the Israeli invasion of Ramallah and other municipalities of 
the West Bank in March-April 2002, the drones that hovered over the city interrupted TV signals, 
thus disturbing the airing of musalsalat, TV serials scheduled during Ramadan (Bishara 2013, 
209). The lived reality of the occupation functioned similarly to the news. For Mary Ann Doane, 
television organizes its time around various modes of apprehending the event, including 
catastrophe – a variant of information. If, as she contends, “the measure of catastrophe [is] the 
extent to which it interrupts television’s regular daily programming, disrupting normal 
expectations about what can be seen and heard at a particular time,” then the event of the Israeli 
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drone literally acted as breaking news (Doane 2006, 258). The material logic of “breaking” news 
extended to other aspects of the invasion and other forms of media. The Israeli troops conducted 
lootings and numerous arrests, but also ransacked the offices of cultural organizations such as the 
Sakakini Center and the Institute of Modern Media at Al-Quds University. Earlier in December 
2000, the Israeli military (IDF) bombed the Palestine Broadcasting Corporation (PBC) 
headquarters and transmission tower in Ramallah, in the interest of “Israeli national security” 
(Tawil-Souri 2007), pitting one news time against the other. Filmmaking practices were also 
affected. The shooting of Hany Abu-Assad’s award-winning Paradise Now (2005) was first set 
for Nablus, but had to be moved to Nazareth after the location manager was kidnapped by a 
suspicious Palestinian group and a land mine exploded near the shooting location (Garcia 2005). 
Media shutdowns could also originate from the Palestinian Authority itself in double attempts to 
circumscribe political opposition and secure the satisfaction and generosity of foreign donors. In 
1998, eight private television stations were sanctioned to cover pro-Iraqi demonstrations that could 
potentially offend American donors, a censoring practice which Matt Sienkiewicz argues 
continued well into the years of the Intifada (Sienkiewicz 2013, 23). 
As John Fiske and Lisa Parks have argued, in the information society where the news is 
broadcast, it has become difficult to separate events from their mediation as media events (Fiske 
1996, 1; Parks 2005, 88). On the other hand, there is an even higher risk of everyday life coalescing 
with the media event in locations where the news is produced. The Al-Jazeera documentary The 
Gaza Fixer: A Chronicle of Survival (George Azar, 2007), makes this claim evident as the 
journalist’s camera drifts away from the daily news to redirect its focus on daily lives. The war 
reporter’s fixer, Raed, becomes the topic of the film. Working as a fixer allows Raed to feed his 
family, and the family in return develops into news material when many of its members are killed 
by an Israeli shelling. Caught in a cycle of violence, Raed remarks that “there is no future for this 
life,” while showing the extent of the destruction around him. “The drama of the instantaneous” 
(Doane 2006, 251) interrupted the continuity of life, and the attempt at making a film fell back 
into making news. According to the catalogue of the Days of Cinema’s 2015 edition, the confusion 
between life and media event establishes Palestinians as “the victims, the stateless, and the broken” 
(Days of Cinema catalogue 2015, 1). Days of Cinema artistic director and filmmaker Hanna 
Atallah laments that these categories have also influenced Palestinian artists and led to the 
“predictability of the art work.” He continues: “there is an urgent need to develop the language or 
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artistic discourse and technical elements in order to build specialties in local art production” 
(catalogue 2015, 1). Golding and Elliot’s phrase cited earlier takes on a new meaning: the 
newsmakers’ labor of “producing the prediction” in anticipation of the unpredictable becomes 
facilitated by the pre-constructed category of the victim. Producing the prediction also means, in 
that context, a repetition of the same. In other words, the news’ political discourse of instability 
both constructs and feeds off of the stability of crisis. 
The coverage of the Second Intifada thus produced its own temporality of real-time and 
the stability of crisis, one in compliance with a regime of images fashioned by the “global now” 
of the international news economy and its satellite developments (Parks 2005). International news 
agencies like the American Associated Press (AP), the British Reuters and the French Agence 
France-Presse (AFP) among others sent journalists and crews to document the uprisings. The news 
sphere in Palestine in the early 2000s was also composed of fifty Palestinian TV and radio stations, 
private and government-owned (Allen 2009, 170). These included the Palestinian Broadcasting 
Corporation (PBC), established as a preferential, highly centralized, and supervised news outlet 
by Yasser Arafat right after Oslo. The PA, whose legitimacy was threatened during the uprisings 
due to its occasional coordinated efforts to repress Palestinian demonstrations, could also profit 
from a management of the discourse of instability. In the early 2000s, in a generally fragmented 
mediascape mirroring the land partitions of the West Bank and Gaza, small and localized stations 
like the Bethlehem-based Ma’an News started to emerge as producers of counter-discourses. These 
soon benefited from Danish, Dutch, British and American financial support. International 
investments converted these modest stations into providers working under Western standards of 
professionalism (Sienkiewicz 2011, 11). Further professionalization of Palestinian journalists 
occurred with the intensification of the uprisings that led international news agencies to 
increasingly rely on locals. Palestinians became central to the production of international news 
because of their “embodied” knowledge of the society and political context, as well as their human 
connections and the fact that they spoke Arabic (Bishara 2013). As camera operators, Palestinians 
were sent to places deemed too dangerous for foreign reporters. Moreover, their contracts were 
cheaper for the agencies, who could avoid flying in more crew members.  
Due to the limited amount of film schools at the time, film production training was largely 
acquired through news coverage. The news’ mode of production conditioned the emergence of the 
Palestinian film economy locally, and the very understanding of cinema became subordinated to 
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standards developed for TV. By the end of the Second Intifada, news had shaped both the 
Palestinians’ relation to representations of themselves, and the production of these representations 
by themselves (Arasoughly 2013). Institutions like Al Quds University’s Institute of Modern 
Media (1996) and Birzeit University (2002) have also perpetuated this logic by including audio-
visual training within departments of media-journalism. As a result,  
 
what these young filmmakers learnt was news; that is, shooting for news stories. Having 
apprenticed in the manner just described, the first generation of post-Oslo filmmakers 
began making documentaries in a documentary style consistent with typical news stories 
(Arasoughly 2013, 106). 
 
Anticipating Atallah’s call to heighten Palestinian creativity and oppose the victimization of 
Palestinians ten years later, Palestinian filmmakers experimented with the medium of cinema to 
create different representations during the Second Intifada. Films by Rashid Masharawi (Ticket to 
Jerusalem, 2002; Attente/Waiting, 2005), Hany Abu-Assad (Al-Quds fi Yaoum Akhar/Rana’s 
Wedding, 2002; Ford Transit, 2003; Paradise Now, 2005) or Annemarie Jacir (Ka’inana ‘Ashrun 
Mustakheel/Like Twenty Impossibles, 2003) all reflect on what it means to make films during the 
Intifada. Turning news against itself, these “road (block) movies” explored the fragmentation of 
the Palestinian nation (Gertz and Khleifi, 2008) and the daily strategies of existence for 
Palestinians (Dickinson, 2010) at a time of increased roadblocks, checkpoints, and military 
presence.   
Some films have directly questioned the relationships between news and film modes of 
production. In her self-reflexive documentary Zaman Al-Akhbar/News Time (2002), Azza El-
Hassan oscillates between her initial project to record private life and the necessity to represent the 
collective experience of the struggle against the occupation. Pondering the very possibility of 
making cinema during the Intifada, she laments the difficulty of gathering a crew in a context 
where all technicians are busy working with news agencies. She concludes: “This is not the time 
to be doing films. This is news time.” By opposing film time and news time, El-Hassan points to 
systems of representation as well as modes of production. Her film itself playfully articulates the 
two and subverts the genre of reportage in order to negotiate images of disaster produced by news 
time. For instance, the TV footage of a martyr’s funeral procession is juxtaposed with an interview 
of four children who have lost their friends in confrontations with the Israeli army. For Nadia 
Yaqub, by “refusing to show images of atrocity,” El-Hassan “choos[es] instead to photograph the 
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eyes that have witnessed atrocity” (Yaqub 2012, 155). Yet the figure of the eyewitness forms 
another trope of war reportage that highlights the on-site presence of the journalist and the 
immediacy of communication with the viewers (Doane 2006, 258). El-Hassan finally attempts to 
escape news time by befriending her interviewees, thus altering the social relations governing the 
film’s mode of production. The four children move out of their status of news informants and 
(literally) poster children for the conflict – pictures of martyrs are made into posters and pasted all 
over cities as reminders of the dead. They become full members of El-Hassan’s film crew, carrying 
around the filmmaking equipment. This improbable team faces yet another army, that of 
international journalists whose presence is felt everywhere. El-Hassan ironically states: “They say 
we make good news.” The film’s sarcastic tone becomes a strategy to enter film time.  
 A mise-en-abyme, Sobhi al-Zobaidi’s Hawal/Looking Awry (2001)24 similarly illustrates 
the struggle of making a film during the “static, stagnant time” of the Intifada (Gertz and Khleifi 
2008, 144), yet from a mirroring perspective. Having received funding from American producers 
to complete a documentary on peace, love, and harmony in Jerusalem after Oslo, Sobhi al-Zobaidi 
(playing himself) embarks on a mission to picture the city’s diversity (and potential conflicts) 
within one frame. The “one frame policy,” a demand from the producers, aims to materialize the 
end of the conflict and the supposed unity of the Israeli and Palestinian people, in the city that 
ironically most epitomizes opposing land claims. The film becomes a succession of shot/reverse 
shots despite itself, as each element comprising the image points to the reality of the occupation 
the sponsors so desperately wanted out of the picture. On the one hand, a shot zooming in on the 
Old City’s Damascus Gate reveals the presence of IDF soldiers surveilling the entrance, which 
calls for the reverse shot of a soldier shooting at Palestinian kids, unveiling the military nature of 
the camera’s viewfinder (Fig. 1). On the other, a friend of the director who dreamed of acting in 
the documentary ends up literally framed as a martyr in a poster in the streets. The Intifada offered 
him the glory he hoped to obtain from cinema. Oslo’s suspended time of development under 
occupation thus crystallizes in the reversal of genres that the film operates. Commissioned for a 
documentary, the director is forbidden by donors to show what constitutes the lived reality of 
Jerusalem and is reduced to making what he understands as a (science) fiction. Contrary to El-
Hassan, Zobaidi yearns to engage with news time, but the ambiguity of the documentary, which 
                                                




negotiates the representation of the real in cinema rather than in the news, is constantly re-asserted. 
Ultimately, the character of Zobaidi abandons the production to make his own film, arguably 
resulting in Looking Awry. Like in News Time, self-reflexivity and fiction contravene the 
temporality of the news by a work of remediation of news images into cinema. 
 
   
Figure 1: Shot and reverse short in Looking Awry (Again) (screenshots).  
 
The materiality of, and the discourses shaped by, news production during the Second 
Intifada have allowed the colonial and neocolonial control of political instability through the 
narrative of the status quo of crisis. This grounded narrative consolidates Palestinians’ status as 
victims and terrorists and disrupts the possibility for other media productions. In this context, the 
internalization of news narratives and modes of making by Palestinian practitioners risks 
functioning as a form of counterinsurgency. Conversely, the filmmaking experiments of the 
Second Intifada have fueled a conversation around film genres and their capacity to shape 
alternative visual regimes and economies that continues today. For collectives like Idioms Film, 
founded during the Second Intifada and now an established production and distribution company, 
it has become necessary to create distance from the news aesthetic in order to experiment with film 
forms. At its foundation, Idioms Film refused to be funded by news agencies and raised money for 
creative film productions by producing promotional videos for institutions and businesses. Over 
the years, this has allowed them to support experimental cinema (Mohanad Yaqubi’s Exit, 2009 
and No Exit, 2014; Omar Robert Hamilton’s Though I Know the River is Dry, 2013; Basma 
Alsharif’s Ourobouros, 2017); parodies of the news genre (Ihab Jadallah’s El-Takheekh/The 
Shooter, 2007); and short action films (Rami Hazboun’s El-Rasasa El-Wardia/Pink Bullet, 2014). 
More generally, genre experimentations have renewed opportunities for film production and 
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expanded the networks of circulation for Palestinian films, including in global art cinema festival 
circuits. Cinephilia offers a distinct discourse of stability which somehow overlaps with that of 
counterinsurgency because of its investment in state and peace-building as a practical 
consideration. In the sections that follow, I will discuss how the global networks of art cinema and 
cinephilia have allowed Palestinian practitioners to engage with an understanding of stability 
which could serve as the basis for attempts at institutionalizing cinema in Palestine.  
 
Unstable Film Institutions 
What kind of film institution can be established in post-Oslo Palestine? The occupation has left an 
institutional void that the promises of Oslo have not filled. The Palestinian Authority’s unilateral 
support of a news broadcasting network in 1994 and its lack of interest in funding cinema has 
proven consistent with the proto-state’s economic dependence on international and humanitarian 
aid. News agencies relay information gathered by human rights organization reports and the pool 
of international and Palestinian NGOs that have come to replace the dysfunctional ministries in 
various economic and social sectors. In turn, for Lori Allen, hobbled political parties have ceded 
dominance to a “news-mediated public sphere” (Allen 2009, 162) further enforced by the news’ 
pervasive real-time. The politics of privatization and de-regulation in Palestine after Oslo allowed 
the flourishing of the Information Technology (IT) industry but did not extend to cinema. The 
private sector – including major sponsors like the telecommunications companies Jawwal and 
Wataniya – and the national television channels have shown very limited interest in investing in 
local film productions. The government’s disengagement from Palestinian cultural life is even 
reflected in more recent budgets. For example, in 2014, expenses related to security were estimated 
at between 28 and 35 percent of the total yearly budget both in the West Bank and Gaza (Abu 
Amer 2015). By contrast, the funds allocated to culture in 2013 represented 0.003% of the total 
budget (Euromed Audiovisual).25 From 2011 to 2016, the government’s bi-annual strategic plan 
for the cultural and heritage sectors did not realistically account for the lack of cultural funding 
and could not be implemented. Consequently, as Sabreen Abdulrahman puts it, “the Palestinian 
cultural policy model can be described as an unorganized model that tends mainly to replace the 
official authority with the nonprofit sector” (Abdulrahman 2015, 3). Not unified by a national legal 
                                                
25 The researchers who established the report could however not verify the validity of the figures provided 
by the Ministry of Culture.  
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and strategic framework, the cultural sector is fragmented into civil, official and semi-official 
cultural institutions as well as individual initiatives that maintain their own separate missions and 
identities. It is no surprise, then, that a few years after making a film about the ordeal of 
international funding and his refusal to abide by it in Looking Awry, Sobhi al-Zobaidi described 
Palestinian cinema’s mode of production as “independent from the authorities of state, religion 
and commerce.” He further continues:  
 
Independent filmmaking in Palestine is better understood as individual filmmaking because 
of the absence of the institutional base such as foundations, film collectives, film schools, 
groups, and most important censorship. In fact, Palestinian filmmakers act competitively, 
most often incompatible with each other (al-Zobaidi 2008). 
 
Al-Zobaidi provides a good sense of the non-centralized, non-institutionalized and 
fragmented film community in Palestine’s suspended time. However, this period of the late 2000s 
also saw the creation of various film production companies, film collectives, film festivals, film 
courses and diplomas within universities, and an increased visibility of Palestinian films 
internationally, which suggests that a transnational film community was organizing despite the 
absence of state policy strategies. As early as 2004, festivals with global reach and established by 
Palestinians started to emerge in the West Bank and Gaza. Most of them adopted a multi-sited 
model that covered the largest cities in Palestine and in the 1948 area now known as Israel 
(especially Haifa and Nazareth, which host large Palestinian populations) as well as adjacent 
refugee camps, and many also explicitly promoted art cinema. Primarily invested in film 
exhibition, these festivals have gradually come to complement the film training offered by the 
developing university audiovisual programs and have built networking opportunities with 
international filmmakers, TV buyers and festival directors. The Ramallah International Film 
Festival, the first initiative of the type, was established in 2004 – for one year. Faten Farhat, its co-
director, explains that the festival ambitioned “to develop the Palestinian audiovisual sector, to 
give the opportunities to Palestinian directors, to allow them to develop and to become known to 
the guests of the festival” (cited in Dickinson 2005, 268). Over the years, festival organizers have 
elevated the role of film festivals to incubators of a film industry. In his introductory letter to the 
fourth edition of the Al-Kasaba International Film Festival in 2009, Al-Kasaba theatre director 
George Ibrahim stated that the festival’s “aim[…] [was to] contribute to the development of [a] 
cinema industry besides it being a space for knowledge sharing and entertainment” (Ibrahim 2009). 
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This translated, for example, into inviting Cannes Film Festival director Thierry Frémeaux, who 
offered advice to emerging Palestinian filmmakers. More recently in 2014, the organization 
FilmLab: Palestine launched the program “Days of Cinema” as part of its plan to “effectively 
promote film art and film culture in Palestine with the greater aspiration of creating a productive 
and dynamic film industry” (catalogue 2015, 3). Finally, film producer and director May Odeh and 
her team have worked to revive the Jericho International Film Festival. Last held in 2005 as an 
attempt to relocate the ephemeral Ramallah International Film Festival, the project did not endure. 
The new international platform was tentatively scheduled for March 2017.26 
Several factors have contributed to the expansion of global art cinema festivals in Palestine 
in the early 2000s, which directly converge with the developmental logic of foreign investment as 
a means of infrastructure- and institution-building in post-conflict areas. First and foremost, the 
festival circuits of art cinema constitute the privileged networks where Palestinian cinema, until 
then produced mainly in the diaspora, has circulated since the 1980s. Palestinian filmmakers such 
as Michel Khleifi, Elia Suleiman, Hany Abu-Assad or Annemarie Jacir have received many awards 
and built their fame through this economy, thus opening a market for future investors that bank on 
the Palestine “brand.” Since the 1980s, the development of co-productions between Palestinian 
filmmakers and European TV networks (mainly French and German) have been increasingly 
mediated by global festival markets and industry meetings featuring pitching sessions, including 
at the International Documentary Festival of Amsterdam (IDFA) and the Berlinale. On the other 
hand, international film festivals, foreign institutions, and supranational organizations like 
Euromed Audiovisual have intensified investments in countries of the Global South through 
various means: the development of film grants tailored for “countries with a weak infrastructure” 
(the Berlinale’s World Cinema Fund, 2016), specialized training workshops, exchange and 
scholarships, consultation about film funding or festival organizing, or direct financial support for 
festivals themselves. As Tamara Falicov reminds us, most European film funds were historically 
established “as a former colonial power’s legacy to dispense development aid through the form of 
cultural funding to the developing world,” from the 1920s on, and through the Cold War era until 
today (Falicov 2016, 215). These funds are now often funneled through Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs and take part in governments’ international policies. Finally, festivals follow an economic 
model familiar to the NGO-ization of the Palestinian economy and the government’s neoliberal 
                                                
26 As of November 2018, there is no indication that the festival has yet been established.  
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policies of social disengagement. Like NGOs, festivals are initiated by Palestinian civil society, 
and their organization is contingent upon the support of foreign institutions, international 
foundations, and European programs.  
For Palestinian organizers, film festivals have represented a practical option for accessing 
available funding, but also one anchored in a discourse of futurity that appealed to their vision of 
cinema. Despite the ephemerality of many of these events in Palestine, being connected to global 
art cinema festivals abroad has grown to be a priority in Palestine and in the Arab world as a whole. 
Not only do festivals offer the potential for industrial development, but they also build 
communities dedicated to a type of film appreciation. For the regional NGO Network of Arab 
Alternative Screens (NAAS), with which some Palestinian organizations such as FilmLab: 
Palestine (FLP) collaborate, a “vibrant and sustainable cinema culture” can be achieved through 
the establishment of non-governmental cinema spaces “with the aim of developing audiences 
engaging with films” (NAAS Facebook page). FLP equally contends that “Cinema [sic] culture 
can remarkably contribute to set the foundation for long-term cultural change” (website 2017). 
Finally, the project of the Jericho International Film Festival hinges on the notion that the 
integration of viewing infrastructures in a film economy is central to its steady growth and places 
the rehabilitation of the Bauhaus-style Rivoli cinema at the center of the festival’s re-opening.  The 
combination of industry and film appreciation is seen to provide a sustainable future for cinema 
and society in these contexts, in ways that comply with development’s articulation of foreign 
investment, institution-building, and cultural strengthening as a factor for peace and stability.  
This specific form of cinephilia attached to film festivals acts as more than a mere mode of 
film reception fixating on an ontological form of the medium of cinema for aesthetic purposes and 
exceeds discourses around the impact of new technologies on spectatorial practices (De Valck and 
Hagener 2005). Instead, cinephilia in Palestine expresses an industrial imaginary as a whole, where 
the theatre holds an economic dimension, as well as an affective one. Contrary to canonical 
narratives on the emergence of cinephilia, the Palestinian phenomenon did not rise from a matrix 
of film criticism, journals and active ciné-clubs – apart from a few exceptional mobile cinemas – 
primarily dedicated to elevating cinema to the status of art. Rather, it materialized almost right 
away with the establishment of film festivals pertaining to an economy of development and 
prestige that gives the “cinema space” a particular meaning, as I will argue later on in the chapter. 
Cinephilia and discourses of regeneration, the latter having often contextualized post-war film 
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festivals, must be thought together here. The initiation of the Berlinale, for example, was heavily 
supervised and supported by the American forces stationed in West Germany during the Cold War, 
under the cover of re-building a German industry in crisis (de Valck 2007, 50). This becomes all 
the more significant as the imaginary of the reconstruction of post-War Europe has largely 
informed developmental involvement in the third world as well (Escobar 1994, 56). Long term 
cultural change, here advocated by Palestinian festival organizers, is also inscribed in economic 
understandings of development that encompass the economy of tourism and the service industry 
(Harbord 2002, 60). It is revealing that the Ramallah Municipality has for example been 
particularly involved in the Days of Cinema, the Head of the Department of Culture leading the 
Lab’s policy Cultural Observatory. The event’s catalogue also includes a list of cafés and 
restaurants, partners of the festival, that movie-goers are encouraged to visit. More broadly, the 
industry of (war) tourism has spiked after the Second Intifada, with some infamous examples such 
as the graffiti tours of the Apartheid Wall in Bethlehem, or the most recent “Walled Off Hotel” 
opened by Banksy. 
The instability of film festivals’ status in Palestine first lies in the role they are understood 
to play in the Palestinian filmmaking community. In effect, not everyone recognizes the central 
position of film festivals in the building of a film industry in Palestine – this goal being itself quite 
distant. The prominent Palestinian cinema scholar and producer George Khleifi acknowledges that 
festivals are key to the exhibition of Palestinian films but suggests film schools are more likely to 
instigate structural change (interview with the author 2015). Similarly prudent, the former director 
of the now discontinued Al-Kasaba International Film Festival Khaled Alayyan modestly 
conceives of his own project as a mediation between artists and films (interview with the author 
2015) – as opposed to the theatre director’s emphasis on a film industry. Finally, filmmaker and 
initiator of the production company Collage Film Dima Abu Ghoush identifies the support of local 
television stations, presently reluctant to invest in Palestinian cinema, as a great priority (interview 
with the author 2015). In these perspectives, festivals cannot alone fulfill the needs of a nascent 
industry. The uneven articulation of the cinephiliac and the industrial, common to most discourses 
on film festivals, thus sketches the possibility for various complementary considerations of the 
futures carried by Palestine’s cultural events. Concurrently, May Odeh’s confident claim that 
“Palestinian cinema has managed to create a Palestinian state where politicians have failed” 
(Berlinale Talent 2015) refers to the diplomatic strength of an art cinema that has circulated the 
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name of Palestine in prestigious film festivals worldwide. In her view, the industrial ambitions of 
her own project of the Jericho International Film Festival (JIFF) relay and supplement this political 
success. Alayyan assesses the limitations of the proto-state as well but suggests we could think of 
film festivals as institutions, rather than industrial structures, foundational to the building of the 
future state: “When we talk about Palestine, for me it’s not the ministers, it is the institutions. The 
film institutions started before the state: the institutions make the state, not the state makes the 
institutions” (interview with the author 2015). The Kasaba theatre (also called Cinémathèque) 
fulfilled this function for instance by acting as an intermediary between European institutions in 
search of Palestinian films and the artists. These exchanges between Kasaba and the international 
network of movie theatres Europa Cinemas prompted the Al Kasaba European Film weeks before 
the festival itself was instituted.  
 Film festivals constitute a paradoxical institution, one that is epistemologically and 
logistically unstable and easy to disrupt. Cancellation, postponement, make-up screenings, change 
of location, volunteering are only a few of many characteristics that make film festivals both 
precarious and flexible events par excellence. Due to this structural precariousness, they are in turn 
particularly adapted to the hostile environment of the occupation in Palestine, where checkpoints, 
curfews, interruptions of screenings, confiscation of film material, and denial of guests’ entry, 
among other things, destabilize pre-set programs and constantly threaten events with their 
impermanence. They can be described, in the way Reema Salha Fadda frames the context of 
contemporary art in Palestine, as “institutional sites of impermanence that temporarily disrupt the 
spatial order.” Festivals thus participate in “the cultural turn towards ‘biennalization’ and 
‘eventicization’ that has emerged in Palestine over the past decade or so, [which] insist[s] on 
institutionalizing cultural continuity in a sociopolitical context that is constantly in flux” (Fadda 
2016, 156). The contradiction embedded in the festival’s perennial temporariness, as well as its 
simultaneous engagement with the synchronicity of real-time screening events and the 
diachronicity of its yearly implementation, translate into the capacity to “transform structures into 
events” (Harbord 2016, 70), and vice versa. This ambiguity of festivals’ institutional status 
explains why so many, among which we may count Khleifi, question their actual impact. The film 
festivals under review engage with economic and discursive dynamics of post-conflict 
reconstruction and institution-building dear to peace-building’s rhetoric of stability, through the 
promotion of cinephilia. Festivals’ instability both stems from their adaptation to the environment 
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of suspended time, which they mimic; and their incapacity to fit in the dominant conceptions of a 
film industry. Much of the imaginary around film institutions and film industries emerges from 
ideals of stability that do not reflect Palestine’s conditions of possibility. The next section thus 
elaborates on Palestine’s film festivals’ unstable nature by examining how the Days of Cinema 
imagines itself in comparison to the “models” of European art cinema festivals, whose material 
stability is further enforced ideologically by the cultural norms cinephilia reproduces.   
 
Negotiating the Global Imaginary of Stable Film Festivals 
 
We must now further attend to what “film festival” entails in the Palestinian environment. The 
term was first defined with respect to specific dominant European practices, and is now embedded 
in an academic enterprise to essentialize its industrial features based on the historical assumption 
of European primacy. For Christel Taillibert and John Wäfler, the denomination “film festival” 
only acquired stability in the late 1940s, following a gradual cultural incorporation of such events 
in European society of the time. After a series of cinephiliac events inspired by the ciné-club model 
in 1930s France, the term then crystallized around the now canonical model of annual international 
events organized around a film competition (Taillibert and Wäfler 2016, 17). Because of the 
worldwide reproduction of the festival model, the term has come to be normalized, and its study 
divorced from a critical apparatus that could appreciate the instability of festivals’ structure and 
epistemology both historically and geographically. Film festivals are now included into a 
teleological narrative of success retrospectively justified by historical inquiries. One of the 
founders of the emerging field of film festival studies, Marijke de Valck explains the emergence 
and continuity of the film festival network in opposition to the “failure” of the cinematic avant-
garde in those terms: 
 
If one wants to explain the contemporary “success” of film festivals it is imperative that 
we include a historical perspective. History will help us to understand why film festivals 
succeeded in developing into a successful network whereas the cinematic avant-garde, 
which originated during roughly the same period and was subjected to the same field of 
antagonistic forces, failed to do so (de Valck 2007, 19, my emphases). 
 
This view places contemporary film festivals outside of time, not in the way orientalist 
representations of “under-development” and colonized people would be, but rather as the 
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successful endpoint of a teleological journey. Significantly, a leading theoretician in the field, Dina 
Iordanova recently defined the stakes of film festival studies as follows: 
 
What is important today is to ensure that the film festival is studied as a phenomenon 
complete in itself, emptied of specific content (the films remain intrinsic, but they can be 
any films), independent of particular national cinema frameworks (though admitting of 
their and other cultural concerns), and separate from film industry considerations (as 
industry is just one of a festival’s many stakeholders) (Iordanova 2016, xii, her emphasis). 
 
The film festival (singular) becomes an unquestionable and abstract product of European 
modernity, and “complete in itself.” Such fixed definitions generate cultural norms and economic 
standards that organize the global map of festivals according to their conceptual proximity to the 
ur-film festival. This is further encouraged by festivals’ canonical function of instituting cultural 
value to films and distributing prestige as an aspect of their institutionalization of cinephilia. Fixed 
definitions similarly guide discourses of development – which can be compared to, and extend, 
colonial discourses – as they foster forms of subjectivities through which people come to recognize 
themselves, by contrast, as under-developed (Escobar 1995, 10).   
 Considering this epistemological dominance, added to the fact of Palestinian cinema 
gaining strength through those very influential networks, it is unsurprising that the global 
imaginary of film festivals and cinephilia provides the blueprint for the Days of Cinema (hereafter 
DoC). This imaginary must simultaneously be negotiated according to the specific institutional 
context of Palestinian filmmaking. Created in 2014, the DoC was initiated by the local non-profit 
organization FilmLab: Palestine (FLP) started in 2011. The event engages with the five areas of 
action identified by FLP as follows: “elevating film as an art form in Palestine,” “strengthening 
the creative-cultural industry,” “facilitating dialogue among the film industry,” “creating a hub for 
filmmaking in Palestine,” and “enhancing capacities and creating jobs for youth” (website 2015). 
FilmLab and DoC have concomitantly worked to expand their international network and re-
centralize the dispersed local community. FLP plans to further develop training workshops 
(dedicated to scriptwriting, storytelling, videography, production, and sound mixing), residencies, 
and co-productions meant to both send Palestinians abroad and bring foreigners to Palestine. The 
Days of Cinema 2015 pursued these goals by formalizing partnerships with foreign cultural 
institutes and Ramallah Doc’s pitching sessions, which introduce Palestinian film projects to 
international TV buyers. In the vein of Ramallah Doc, the Palestine Film Meetings (PFM) were 
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launched as a “cutting-edge industry networking platform for local and international film 
professionals” at the 2017 edition (website 2017). In 2016, the DoC introduced the Sunbird Award 
for feature-length documentaries and narrative shorts about or taking place in Palestine, delivered 
by an international jury. The same year, the Sunbird Production Award was also instituted in order 
to support the shooting, post-production, and distribution of one Palestinian short film project in 
cooperation with the Danish Aarhus Film Workshop and MAD Solutions, a Cairo and Abu Dhabi-
based Pan-Arab studio providing marketing and creative consultancy for “the Arab film and 
Entertainment Industry” (website MAD Solutions 2017).  
The integration of the DoC in this matrix of initiatives mirrors the expansion of global film 
festivals’ prerogatives and their increased institutional role the world over, from providing film 
grants (Falicov 2016) to playing the role of brokers (Dickinson 2016) by helping directors secure 
pre-buy deals as well as post-production grants. The broadening of festivals’ areas of intervention 
particularly meets the needs of Palestine’s under-institutionalized context. More generally, FLP’s 
partnerships reveal a double engagement with European economies of development and various 
actors, self-described as “independent,” in the rising creative industries in the region. The models 
of global film festivals and the creative industry also translate into the visual identity of the Days 
of Cinema, from the iconic photocall set at the exit of the opening and closing films in the imposing 
hall of the Ramallah Cultural Palace, to the event’s trailer, playing before the screenings, which 
during the 2015 edition featured glossy images of the team at work in their offices.  
On the other hand, FilmLab also acts as an institution by centralizing the information 
necessary to develop labor and legal infrastructures. In association with the Department of Culture 
at the Ramallah Municipality in 2015, the FLP unit of the “Palestinian Cultural Observatory 
Project” gathered data about Palestinian institutions and current policies in order to assess new 
modes of operation within the possibilities set by the limited framework of Palestinian law. In 
2016, the FilmLab website inaugurated a database of the Palestinian labor force in the film industry 
ranging from filmmakers, film researchers and critics to the wardrobe and the transportation 
departments. Although describing itself as a relatively small event, the DoC expanded 
considerably from one year to the next. In 2014, it featured 17 short films, 8 feature films, and 5 
master classes and workshops. In 2015, with 14 shorts, 23 features, 18 documentaries, 7 children’s 
films, and 5 panels, the event diversified its pool of productions and brought in more than double 
the number of films, which were carefully selected and screened over seven different cities 
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(Bethlehem, Gaza, Haifa, Jenin, Jerusalem, Nazareth and Ramallah). Although unevenly attended, 
the event introduced more international art films than all of Palestine’s theatres combined show in 
their regular programming in one year. The 2017 edition included an even greater number of shorts 
(48 across sections), ballooning the total number of films to 77, including 15 that listed Palestine 
as a country of production. This edition’s emphasis on short films, a consequence of FLP’s 
development of various programs of co-production and awards dedicated to that format, is also 
manifest in the debates set to animate the industry meetings that year. Featuring discussions around 
“filmmaking without infrastructure,” finding an audience for short films, and distribution strategies 
for low-budget film production (catalogue 2017), the DoC tailored the edition for the specific 
needs of local producers and the possibilities for them to shine and learn, while investigating what 
place Palestinian productions could carve in the global market on their own terms.  
Similar negotiations with the global imaginary of film festivals can be observed in the 
selection of the 2015 edition. Among the 62 films, 12 were Palestinian, including the opening and 
closing films (Tarzan and Arab Nasser’s Dégradé, 2015; and Muayad Alayyan’s Al-Hob wa al-
Sariqa wa Masahkel Ukhra/Love, Theft and Other Entanglements, 2015). A majority hailed from 
the Arab world, including Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunis, Syria, and Yemen, with 
special programs dedicated to shorts from Iraq and the Gulf. Other countries from the Global South 
were also represented such as Argentina, Iran, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. The themes of these non-
Palestinian films ranged from the struggle for national independence (Damien Ounouri, Fidai, 
2012; Dania Al Kury, Peshmerga, 2014) and the return to the homeland (Nadine Naous, Home 
Sweet Home, 2011, Mohamed Al-Daradji, In the Sands of Babylon, 2013) to the place of women 
in society (Zeina Daccache, Yawmiyat Scheherazade/Scheherazade’s Diary, 2013; Khadija al 
Salami, Ana Nujoom, Bent al-Asherah wa Motalagah/I am Nujoom, 10, and Divorced, 2014; 
Saodat Ismailova, Chilla, 2014; Kaouther Ben Hania, Challat Tunes/Le Challat de Tunis, 2013), 
which all hit a familiar nerve in Palestine. The project to build a Palestinian film industry and the 
formation of a broader cosmopolitan film culture cannot be separated. Yet, by underrepresenting 
productions from the Global North, DoC proposes its own interpretation of what art cinema means 
and who its main actors are. Moreover, many of these films, produced two to four years before 
DoC’s 2015 edition, had already completed their round in the international festival circuit. No 
longer qualifying as “discoveries,” they had already been released in regular arthouse cinema 
networks worldwide. By including them in its selection, DoC both re-asserts its interest in marginal 
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productions, and functions as a replacement for limited local distribution networks. The 
programming ultimately reflects an attempt to extend global networks to Palestine and further in 
a gesture of South-South solidarity that has been imperiled by the conditions of possibility set by 
the occupation, as I will explain later.  
 Much like the event itself, the mother organization FilmLab constitutes a site of 
impermanence specific not only to the contexts of development and occupation but also to the 
deregulated economies of global creative industries. Inspired by the model of the Aarhus film 
workshop in Denmark, the FilmLab received financial support from a number of Danish 
institutions established in Palestine such as the Danish House in Palestine (DHiP) and the Danish 
Ministry of Affairs’ Center for Culture and Development (CKU), both an expression of the 
country’s active interest in developing its presence in the Middle East through pedagogical and 
economic means (Hjort 2013). In return, DoC featured a presentation on the Aarhus film workshop 
in 2014 as well as a Danish film program in 2015. The collaboration with Danish institutions went 
beyond mere funding. The three-year-plan that launched FLP in 2011 was crafted in consultation 
with the Danish Film Institute (DFI), whose representative Charlotte Giese provided similar 
advisory work in other sites such as Uganda. Atallah explains: “She goes to countries like us where 
there is no film industry, and she knows how we can begin” (interview with the author 2015). The 
Film Lab functions here as a “format” that can be repackaged from North to South – albeit always 
with Northern funding. In the context of television, Sharon Shahaf defines format as a “concept 
rather than finished text [that] opens up new opportunities for players from previously hopelessly 
marginalized markets, which can now compete on the home turf of the world’s most influential 
industry” (Shahaf 2012). In this conception, the FilmLab’s structure, with its major reliance on 
year-long training workshops that require minimal infrastructure, is presumably applicable to all 
places, as an “easily relocatable ‘generating formula[…],’ into which local cultural content gets 
infused as afterthought” (Shahaf 2012). The lab accommodates both the flexibility of global 
neoliberal economies and unstable contexts of political unrest, while homogenizing the systems of 
film production via grant systems that secure further dependence on established film economies. 
Yet, the Sunbird Production Award cited earlier, instituted in 2017, highlights both the dependence 
on Danish infrastructures where Palestinian filmmakers are sent for post-production, and the 
attempt at reconfiguring the geography of world cinema’s typical distribution in European 
networks of arthouse cinemas, by including a Pan-Arab distribution partnership. 
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 The myth of the global format, also applied to the festival model, has forged a standard by 
which Palestinian events are expected to be measured. The Palestinian festival’s non-conformity 
to the global definition has effectively placed doubt on the local iteration’s contribution rather than 
unveiling the epistemological instability of the term “film festival.” The Palestinian event is 
consequently suspended in a status of “not-yet” festival. In 2015, before the Sunbird awards and 
the industry meetings were implemented, Atallah stated that the DoC could not qualify as a 
festival. According to his definition, 
 
filmmakers, distributors, and producers apply to […] festival[s]. A festival has a jury; a 
festival has awards. A festival has the capacity to screen in always good situations. A 
festival allows you to welcome people whose films you chose. In Palestine […] we are not 
ready for it (interview with the author 2015).  
 
This understanding permeates the Palestinian filmmakers’ community beyond the organizers of 
Palestine’s film festivals alone, informed as it is by examples of “successful” Palestinian directors 
“who have made it” to the international (European) circuits. In this context, Palestine becomes one 
of many sites where “Cinema” cannot be carried through, according to unchallenged norms of 
stable exhibition and spectatorship. The practices of cinephilia standardized by European global 
art cinema festivals are thus here articulated with the material possibilities for proper film 
infrastructures. Invited to introduce his latest film The Mountain between Us at the opening of the 
2017 Cairo International Film Festival, the renowned Palestinian filmmaker Hany Abu-Assad 
interrupted and cancelled the screening because of the “low” quality of the projection and after 
spectators left the theater in the middle of the film to head out to the buffet (Egyptian Streets 2017). 
The Egyptian filmmaker Mohamed Diab sympathized with Abu-Assad in a public Facebook post 
in which he fustigates the lack of professionalism not only of the festival, but of the Egyptian 
industry as a whole, for not supporting its own Arab filmmakers (Diab 2017).27 The interruption 
and the outrage on display reveal more than a prejudice; rather, they suggest that a given festival 
film is produced with a specific environment and spectatorship in mind, without which it cannot 
be shown. In this discourse, the film becomes inseparable from, and inherent to, the very 
infrastructures of viewership. This begs the question of which films are left to be shown in spaces 
that do not fit the needs of conventional European cinephilia. Furthermore, in this view, how can 
                                                
27 Translated with the help of Farah Atoui.  
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a film made within the framework of Northern infrastructures be transferred to the context of the 
South?  
 The Days of Cinema emerges from within politics of development, enmeshed in 
possibilities set by the occupation, which mediate the event’s possible stability. During the 2015 
edition, the discrepancy between the imagined event – informed both by the requirements of global 
cinephilia and the project of a regional network – and its actual realization amid the contingencies 
of the uprisings, was locked down in the printed material. The catalogue presents an ideal and 
stabilized version of an event and functions as a record of a time that has not happened yet. 
Oftentimes – and not only in Palestine – it is in fact inaccurate. In 2015, echoing Atallah’s claim 
that the Days of Cinema could not be considered a festival, many panels and screenings announced 
in the catalogue had to be cancelled because films could not get through, or guests were denied 
entry at the Israeli border. These guests and films hailed from the surrounding Arab countries as 
well as Turkey and Iran, and the panels that could in fact take place reflected a global geography 
of the cultural discourses that are authorized by the occupier, and those that are not. By contrast, 
the guests’ absence drew a map of potential and unrealized regional alliances and solidarities.  
The panels’ topics revolved around the present and future of the potential film industry in 
Palestine, and their cancellation or reconfiguration uncovered the options left to Palestinian 
imaginations. For example, the panel dedicated to “the status of independent cinema in Palestine” 
was cancelled altogether because four out of five speakers – from Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Sudan 
– were stopped at the border controlled by Israel. Scheduled to discuss “What are the main 
obstacles preventing the development of a strong independent cinema sector in Palestine?,” the 
panel’s very impossibility spoke for itself. In a second panel on “the value of cinematic critique in 
the development of cinema culture and industry,” Berlinale project manager Vincenzo Bugno 
conducted the discussion alone because Turkish film critic and producer Alin Tasciyan had been 
denied entry. Instead of addressing film criticism in Palestine – a sector much in need of support 
– the conversation shifted towards Bugno’s expertise as an advisor for the Berlinale’s grant 
provider World Cinema Fund (WCF), and the strategies Palestinian artists could mobilize to obtain 
subsidies. Structural questions about the possibility of a film industry were replaced by individual 
concerns that highlighted the competition between cultural workers. Forced to limit the discussions 
to interlocutors whose presence was approved by Israel, these panels could only reinforce the status 
quo of crisis rather than open up the possibility for collaborations with new international actors. 
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In the light of these disruptions typical of news time, what stability can festivals actually provide? 
In what follows, I will reflect on the real-time produced by festivals in suspended Palestine, and 




In her report on the Ramallah International Film Festival (RIFF, 2004), Kay Dickinson points to 
the incongruity of holding an international film event in Ramallah in the midst of the Second 
Intifada. The destination hardly fits the common imaginary of a touristic site, and local as well as 
international audiences had to cross checkpoints and take diverted routes in order to access the 
screenings. For Palestinians, she adds, watching the local news at home would have seemed a more 
sensible option under these circumstances. TV occupied a central position during those times, and 
the repetition of the news also served to build a sense of solidarity and support in a context of 
fragmentation. Yet Dickinson remarks,  
 
Lengthy, supportive articles in The Guardian, The Independent and Le Monde appeared, 
and, by the end of the festival, there was a web presence that ran into hundreds of 
references. The common thread joining all these reports seemed to be their objective of 
restoring esteem to Ramallah’s vibrant art scene within foreign opinion, and deflecting 
attention, if only momentarily, from the constant reports about suicide bombers, and so on, 
elsewhere in these newspapers. There is also a distinct possibility that the festival’s 
multicultural guest list (including members of the press) may have provided a protective 
umbrella over Ramallah for this very brief time (Dickinson 2005, 270).  
 
The RIFF, both discursively through its coverage and by crushing the habit of watching the news 
at home (for the Palestinians who attended), trumped news time for a short duration. In that 
instance, the festival itself worked as a moment of disruption, marginalizing the effect of the 
occupation to a consistent murmur. 
  Media and cultural theorists of festivals have pushed such carefully contextualized 
observation to a point of definition, supporting the view that festivals produce their own separate 
temporality. In the following theorizations, largely European-based, both festivals and cinephilia 
reflect ideals of stability by securing the space and time of screening and spectatorship away from 
the context external to the theater. Contrary to the example exposed above, these 
conceptualizations also tend to evacuate the political context. In 1987, structuralist anthropologist 
Alessandro Falassi introduced the edited volume Time Out of Time: Essays on the Festival, by 
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pointing to folk festivals’ modification of the daily functions and meanings of time and space 
through its four imperatives of reversal, intensification, trespassing, and abstinence. Ger Zielinski 
prolongs the carnivalesque exceptionality of the film festival’s time and space with Michel 
Foucault’s concept of heterotopia. Here he seeks to capture the heterogeneity of time, space, and 
norms at play in the cultural formation of queer, gay and lesbian film festivals, which by his own 
account also apply to festivals more generally. Festivals form spaces of difference, but also rely 
on “a break in traditional time” (Zielinski 2012, 2). Finally, Janet Harbord extends the shaping of 
a privileged social space to economic considerations. “Traditional time” in that context refers to 
the economy of late capitalism. Festivals’ synchronic creation of “real-time,” she argues, runs 
counter to the deregulated environment that dominates the era of globalization (Harbord 2016, 69). 
Harbord’s argument, partly drawing from Mary Ann Doane’s reflection on early cinema’s role as 
a distraction for the masses, opposes the spectacle of film to the temporality of daily work. She 
elaborates:  
 
the festival model has built into its form a managed contingency whose function it is to 
produce a moment of real time, a time that cannot be harnessed for productive-labor, nor 
for the ethos of a deregulated time of deferral and displacement, but can only be an affective 
and emphatic ‘now’ (Harbord 2016, 72).  
 
These accounts echo very closely Marijke de Valck’s and Malte Hagener’s (also festival scholars) 
description of the experience of cinephilia with respect to history: “On a temporal level, past, 
present, and future, are fused into a media time that is increasingly disconnected from the 
traditional historical time” (De Valck and Hagener 2005, 15). While the discourse of news time’s 
real-time emerged from, and re-organized, historical and political contexts, on the contrary film 
festivals and cinephilia as the mode of spectatorship most commonly associated with these events 
distance themselves from the context in order to focus on the nostalgia produced by cinema’s 
medium specificity. The “global now” of news time makes space for the labor-less “affective and 
emphatic now” of film festivals. In this conception, film festival can become “one of the last 
refuges for the cinephile” (Czach 2010, 140).  
In film festival studies, the live space of the festival materializes the creation of real-time. 
For Dina Iordanova building on Benedict Anderson, the act of watching films together in the live 
space of the festival “practically suspend[s] the ‘imagined’ element of […] communit[ies] by 
substituting it to a very real one” (Iordanova 2010, 13). At first sight, Palestinian practitioners and 
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festival organizers make similar remarks. The catalogue of the 2015 edition of the DoC opens with 
a welcoming word by its artistic director Hanna Atallah. There, he emphasizes the importance of 
cinema as a space of “control” to develop “our personal story,” one of “freedom,” for the audience 
to reflect “on their personal experiences in response to what they feel from observing a film” 
(catalogue 2015, 1). Such a statement may not stand out as particularly original. However, if we 
extend the “space of cinema” from its metaphorical meaning to the materiality of the theatre, 
Atallah’s introduction importantly sets the stakes for cinema during suspended time, and more 
generally in a context where all levels of cultural productions are conditioned to some level by the 
occupation. 
A space favored by cinephiles (a “refuge”!), theatres prove integral to film festivals, which 
sell not only films but a total experience. In her famous New York Times article on “The Decay of 
Cinema” held to mark the revival of a discussion around cinephilia in the 1990s (De Valck 2010, 
33), Susan Sontag mourned the death of cinephilia and the ritual of “going to the movies,” picking 
the right seat, and “being kidnapped by the movie” (Sontag 1996). The attachment Palestinian 
festival organizers express for cinema as an art form – tangible in Atallah’s words cited above and 
in the FLP’s project as a whole – also derives from giving films “the respect they are due,” in the 
spirit of Sontag. Filmmaker, producer and festival organizer May Odeh similarly laments that the 
new screening venues established after the Second Intifada, located in malls, are not conducive to 
film appreciation (Cattenoz 2016). Yet achieving the “perfect conditions” for film viewing has 
much greater implications in Palestine’s context of occupation. Sontag’s kidnapping metaphor 
proves most unfortunate in an environment where Israeli soldiers regularly raid private homes and 
arbitrarily arrest Palestinians. The stakes of cinephilia in Palestine exceed the quasi-religious 
experience of enjoying art. In Palestine, fully engaging with cinephilia means, purely materially, 
not being interrupted, not being captured, and keeping control over the viewing space. It thus 
implicitly falls under film festivals’ responsibility to create a safe space outside of the 
militarization of daily life. In other words, what is at stake is festivals’ capacity to produce a film 
time. Film time can thus be defined as an environment organized around the possibility to watch 
films in “perfect conditions,” which hinge on contexts of viewership pre-defined by the films’ 
global economies.  
Film theatres and their discursive capacity to create a real-time that would protect or divert 
its audience from the context of military occupation supply an implicit ideological basis for the 
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economic project of a festival-centered Palestinian film industry, which aligns with developmental 
discourses of peacebuilding and human security. Film festivals’ cinephilia cannot be limited to a 
global imaginary that produces legitimacy and artistic value. In the context of Palestine, 
cinephilia’s promise of relative financial and experiential stability justifies and encourages an 
economic strategy based on the film theatre, which proves compatible with the logics of the 
developmental structures that organize lives and futures in the proto-state. Visible infrastructures 
such as roads and buildings rank first as recipients of international aid because they can be easily 
advertised as tangible proofs of assistance, and they figure highly in peacebuilding’s discourses of 
post-conflict reconstruction. Similarly, a look at the venues used by the different film festivals 
over the years hints at the deep entanglements between screening spaces and aid economy. Many 
foreign cultural institutes (like the French Institute in Ramallah and Nablus, and the Danish House 
in Ramallah) have hosted screenings as partners of the events; but on other occasions, the centers 
were involved because they were among the few to provide the necessary infrastructure, such as 
the Korean center in Hebron. In Jenin, the arthouse theatre Cinema Jenin, one of the largest in 
Palestine when it was established in 1958 before closing during the First Intifada, has often 
partnered with festivals since it re-opened in 2010, after implementing renovations initiated by 
German filmmaker Marcus Vitter and funded by the German Foreign Ministry. Dubbed “Cinema 
for Peace,” the theatre was promoted in German newspapers as a way to resolve the “conflict” by 
overcoming the supposed terrorist inclinations of the inhabitants of Jenin, a center of Palestinian 
resistance to the occupation (Neidhardt 2015). Similarly, Vitter’s film Heart of Jenin (2008), 
meant to publicized the theatre by depicting the generosity of a Palestinian father who donated his 
dead son’s organs to an Israeli child, conceives of peacebuilding through a symbolic reconciliation 
that fails to challenge the structures of continuous colonization. The promotional campaign 
succeeded in bringing on board a number of German officials and became a national model for 
German involvement in peacebuilding in Palestine (Neidhardt 2015).  
Film festival screenings have also been held at prestigious locations entirely funded by 
foreign aid to the point of becoming emblematic of Palestine’s post-Oslo economy. Among these, 
the Ramallah Cultural Palace, a privileged venue for the opening and closing ceremonies of 
Palestine’s film festivals, was erected by the end of the Second Intifada, at the same time film 
events started to multiply. Funded with the support of the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) and the Japanese government, the Cultural Palace’s status as a product of Oslo’s politics 
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of dependency is clearly reflected in its interior design (Fig. 2). The hall opens onto a fresco of 
Jerusalem oriented to overlap with the real location of the city, the type of representation of the 
symbolic capital of Palestine that can be found everywhere in Ramallah and other Palestinian cities 
and villages. However, the upper right corner of the mosaic displays the logos of the palace’s 
international funders as a reminder of the subordination of the national liberation struggle to state 
politics inflected by global interests. Similarly, the palace’s wooden walls point to the import of a 
material present only sparsely in Palestine and deemed too precious to be used as an architectonic 
device at a time when olive trees are regularly uprooted by the Israeli army. 
 
 
Figure 2: The lobby of the Ramallah Cultural Palace (photo by the author).  
 
Despite its ornaments, the RCP is however not completely adapted for film time, lacking 
for example a Digital Cinema Package (DCP) projector, the predominant format for global art 
films and a guarantee of optimal screening conditions. In 2015, the DoC crew had to borrow one 
of the two only DCP projectors in Palestine, both funded by the German Foreign Ministry and 
assigned to the Cinema Jenin (which has also been gifted one 35mm and one 3D projector). That 
Jenin, deemed to be quite conservative and maybe more reticent than other cities to encourage film 
culture, be better endowed than Ramallah, can be surprising. The cartography of aid however 
produces its own paradoxical logic, which speaks to the uneven distribution of resources and 
donors’ situated goals, including those, as described before, motivated by bigoted understandings 
of Palestinian resistance as terrorism. In 2016, the Cinema Jenin closed permanently after losing 
their main financial support, the Protestant church in Frankfurt. Neither the Palestinian Authority 
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nor the German Representative Office in Ramallah made an offer to buy the cinema, and the theatre 
was sold to an urban developer planning a new shopping mall (Cinema Jenin website 2017).  
Film festivals’ real-time thus proves endangered by unstable developmental economies. 
The shopping centers compete with film festivals and their theatres for space in the center of cities, 
but also in the creation of an immersive real-time. As commercial venues, they benefit from a 
greater stability than spaces relying on aid. Theatres integrated into malls, such as Cinema City, 
established in Nablus in 2009, and the six-screen Palestine Tower Cinema, which opened in 
Ramallah in 2014, have been steadily screening American blockbusters. Palestine Tower Cinema 
promoted the venue as favorable to featuring Palestinian and Arabic productions during the 
opening ceremony. They invited Rashid Masharawi to present his latest film Falasteen 
Stereo/Palestine Stereo (2013), whose storyline by contrast reflects informal practices of 
organizing events in the streets (Wattan News Agency video 2014). Despite the promise of better 
inclusion of Palestinian productions, only a handful of Palestinian films have been screened in the 
Palestine Tower cinema since the opening, and for a couple of weeks at the most.  
What does it mean, then, economically, to think about cinephilia’s love for the theatre as a 
basis for a Palestinian film industry? Cinema Jenin conceived its own space as “setting the seed 
for a local film industry” by emulating a sense of community around cinema. In order to be 
inclusive, the official ticket price was set at 5 Shekel (approximately US $1.45), a fee that did not 
allow the space to build its own financial autonomy. Similarly, the DoC do not charge for any of 
their screenings, none of which are hosted by commercial theatres. Yet, a central task the DoC 
identified for themselves was to “revitalize” cinema culture in Palestine by bringing people back 
to the theatres (catalogue 2015). In turn, May Odeh explains that the Jericho International Film 
Festival project relies on the site of the theatre as the cornerstone of a potential film industry in 
Palestine. Here she articulates the cinephiliac ideal of film quality and its inclusion within 
commercial networks: 
 
I don’t think you can create a cinema industry with just good films. It is not enough. You 
have to have the whole circle, with good films, a good team, good productions, and good 
infrastructures to screen locally and to distribute it. For this you need theatres (interview 
with the author 2015). 
 
In this view, a margin of the profits made on the screenings’ entrance fees would be allocated back 
to the local distributors. In countries like in France, where theatres (and film festivals) are central 
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to the whole film economy, the box office is also redistributed to the films’ producers, the 
exhibitors, and a national fund that supports future productions. In this context, film festivals are 
fully integrated in the local film economy, but their access is conditioned by the audience’s 
finances. This contrasts with the current slow and very partial integration of cinema within 
accepted networks of aid that mediate Palestinians’ free access to culture.  
Contrary to Harbord’s claim then, film festivals’ real-time and affective now is constantly 
“harnessed […] for the ethos of a deregulated time of deferral and displacement.” Fueled by 
cinephilia’s norms, developmental projects around the Palestinian film economy and film theatres 
in particular function as promises that establish sets of expectations of stability for infrastructures 
and their global integration. Arturo Escobar articulates development’s discourse of futurity in 
teleological terms: “the fact of development itself, the need for it, could not be doubted. 
Development had achieved the status of a certainty in the social imaginary” (Escobar 1995, 5). 
Yet, the certainty of real-time is rarely achieved in Palestine, and often circumscribed by the 
temporality of the “not-yet.” This deferral comes together with a type of displacement Harbord 
might not have anticipated, one relying on the discrepancy between what development sets as 
valuable and the local needs and possibilities of Palestine’s media environment. The certainty on 
which developmental discourses dwell becomes the condition for cinephilia instead of a promise 
it can realistically keep in any given context. To echo earlier reflection on spectatorial immersion, 
the real-time of festival screening does not produce safety or stability; rather, safety and stability 
are necessary for cinephilia’s real-time. This is nowhere more obvious than in the convergence of 
the real-times of film time and news time in the institutionalizing space of the theatre, to which I 
now turn.  
 
The Institutionalization of Film Time 
 
The second edition of the DoC took place between October 12 and October 20, 2015. On October 
1, the media identified the beginning of the “Third Intifada” or “Knife Intifada” following the 
execution of eighteen-year-old Hadeel al-Hashlamoun by Israeli soldiers at a Hebron checkpoint 
the week before. An attack on two Israeli settlers on that day in October led to an escalation of the 
military violence towards Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank over the following 
few months. Assigning a start to a period embedded in an all-encompassing system of oppression 
established decades earlier constitutes a difficult exercise of historicization, one that demands that 
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we constantly question who controls the narrative. Whether the Intifada commences with the 
primal injustice, the Palestinian response to it, or the Israeli crackdown that follows produces 
distinct timelines and networks of causalities. Similarly, identifying one particular outburst of 
resistance as an Intifada is inevitably informed by the model of the First Intifada, the point of origin 
of a chronology that excludes much earlier uprisings like the 1936-39 Arab Revolt. As Palestinian 
writer Ramzy Baroud points out, “these scenarios have been in constant replay since [the 1930s], 
and with each Intifada, the price paid in blood seems to be constantly increasing” (Baroud 2015). 
What matters might be less the name or the numbering of Intifadas than the very fact of cyclical 
violence and enduring self-defense. That Oslo has maintained the possibility of this recurrence 
points once again to the suspension of Palestinian futurities. 
While Baroud insists on calling the October uprisings “Intifada,” many people in Ramallah 
were more cautious and referred to it in vague terms such as “what is happening now”: in other 
words, as events. Significantly, in 2015, the organizers did not describe Days of Cinema as a 
festival, reducing it by default to the status of event as well. The double epistemological instability 
of the temporality in which DoC took place materialized in the competing real-times of viewing 
practices. I identify two modes of viewership that correspond to the conflicting and converging 
environments of news time and film time as they unfolded during DoC. I argue that the film event 
challenges news time in order to establish a setting favorable to art cinema spectatorship. How can 
festivals’ institutionalizing attempts stabilize news time to that effect? To echo El-Hassan, what 
are the possibilities for watching films during an Intifada? By contrast, I choose the ubiquitous 
term “witnessing” to discuss the viewing practices that institutionalize news time and re-assert 
periods of unrest as numbered Intifadas dominated by contingency.  
Practices of witnessing emerge from within the saturation of human rights discourses in 
Palestinian society after Oslo, which has provided the context for an economy of images based on 
suffering. Visual proofs of damaged Palestinian bodies or house demolitions have been used to 
affectively interpellate the international community (Allen 2009). These representations have 
extended to Palestinian TV as well, and supported political debates around the efficacy of 
Palestinian victimhood to reclaim human rights under attack. In 2015, the “necessity to bear 
witness” also mobilized Palestinian (non-)citizen journalists who reported human rights violations. 
Videos of the confrontations between the youths and the Israeli army circulated widely and 
structured modes of viewing during the ten days of DoC. These were posted and shared on 
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Whatsapp, Twitter, and Facebook through local popular pages like “Ramallah News” (Ramallah 
al-Ikhbari, 1.5 million followers). The same events would be captured by multiple cameras and 
filmed from various angles. Friends would replay them together and comment on them. Witnessing 
would organize modes of sociality embedded in instability.  
While it contributes to consolidating news time’s status quo of crisis, witnessing is also 
criminalized by the Israeli authorities as being a source of political instability itself rather than its 
mere expression. To the many already existing monikers, newspapers added those of “Internet 
Intifada,” “Facebook Intifada,” or “Smartphone Intifada” modelled on the rhetoric used to report 
on the Arab uprisings. For cultural anthropologist Rebecca Stein, these appellations were “not only 
erroneous but outdated, as [they] presume we should be surprised by the presence of social media 
in the political theatre. But in fact, this is the new normal” (cited in Poucher Harbin 2015). These 
appellations simultaneously revealed Israel’s attempt at controlling the Palestinian cyber space as 
well as the territories. Faced with the popularity of these videos, the Israeli government released 
statements arguing that these images ignited tensions and constituted a threat to political stability. 
This justified more than 400 Palestinian arrests between 2015 and 2016 for content circulated on 
Facebook, which were conducted with the complicity of the company (Nashif 2017). In turn, Israel 
put in place a campaign discrediting the videos, exploiting the narrative of “Pallywood” according 
to which Palestinians fabricate images of Israeli military violence in order to pose as victims.28 
Within this framework, 
 
the story of the fake Palestinian death figured digital fraudulence, rather than military 
violence, as the chief offense to which the image testified. In other words, Israeli and pro-
Israeli readers understood the suspicious images as violent ones. But the violence they 
identified rested in neither Israeli strikes nor the broader regime of military occupation. 
Rather, it took shape in the act of image manipulation in its various guises. In the process, 
wartime atrocities were refigured as pixels under scrutiny. In this way, a new field of 
warfare was being introduced. In the estimation of suspicious readers, image manipulation 
became the real war crime, and social media became the court in which the crime was tried 
(Kunstman and Stein 2015, 70). 
 
The fiction of Pallywood transformed basic empathy towards human suffering into a dramatic ploy 
to extract unwarranted emotions, and Palestinian image-making into a crime. This discourse 
                                                
28 The term was coined after the controversy surrounding the video coverage of the death of the Gazan 
teenager Mohammed al-Durrah in 2000 at the beginning of the Second Intifada. 
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responded to the rhetoric of witnessing by displacing the location of violence from physical 
military attacks to practices of visualization. The epistemology of witnessing was additionally 
placed under suspicion because of its (metaphorical and fantasized) association with Hollywood 
cinema’s mode of production (with “special effects”). The mobilizing power of witnessing posed 
a threat to Israeli control because of its adaptability to instability.  
Embedded in news time and Oslo’s human rights economy, witnessing hints at 
institutionalizing practices of viewership strengthened by instability. Witnessing takes on an even 
deeper meaning if we think about it together with the term istishhadi, the martyrdom operator, or 
more commonly used, shaheed, the one who dies because of the violence of the occupation 
(whether involved in the armed resistance struggle or not).29 The two words share a similar root 
with the verb to watch (also used for films): shahada. Literally, the verb istishhada, to become a 
martyr, can be translated as “to become a witness” of violence. This embodied mode of viewership 
structures the constitution of Palestinian collectivity. The different meanings of witnessing parallel 
Esmail Nashif’s “three defining and intertwined forms or phases of death [present in every 
Palestinian], namely the victim, the martyr, and the martyrdom operator.” Nashif continues: “Each 
of these forms may be described as an active socio-historical form of presence with its own 
particular mode of action. [They are] mechanisms [of labor] that regulate the relations of the 
Palestinian collective with itself” (Nashif 2013, 175). In other words, martyrs act as mediators 
between the social body and the physical violence of the occupation evidenced on their own corpse. 
By becoming news, these deaths effectively become symbols of structural oppression that 
recognize Palestinians as a common suffering people.  
Nashif suggests that these various Palestinian deaths work in similar ways to what Lori 
Allen identifies as public spheres. In an early article, Allen argues that martyr posters create a 
public sphere because they start a conversation about the construction of national subjects through 
the act of martyrdom and its instrumentalization by various interest groups (Allen 2006). Later on, 
she describes this public sphere as “mediated” and contends that the news replaces “a coherent 
national project” (Allen 2009, 170). Nashif however complicates this account of the public sphere 
by grounding the social relations emerging from martyrdom within biopolitical regimes of colonial 
                                                
29 Shaheed designated the freedom fighter (fida’i) in the 1960s and 70s, and evolved to meet the horizon of 
the rising human rights economy in the 1980s. NGOs then started to cast the unintentional martyr as the 
archetypal Palestinian victim (Khalili 2007, 114). 
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administration, carried by the PLO and later the PA (Nashif 2013, 179). The collective labor of 
martyrdom became translated into a symbolic and exchangeable value when statehood supplanted 
liberation as the primary goal of the First Intifada in the years preceding Oslo. Martyr death no 
longer produced a future of Palestinian return, nor did it act as the unmaking of the Nakba. The 
value of the act of martyrdom was transposed into its commemoration. It is with that context in 
mind that the news, as the institutionalized practice of witnessing and commemorating these 
deaths, can be understood as “replacing a coherent national project.” 
What of cinema’s competing institutionalization of a gaze capable of consolidating the 
national project? What relationship does cinema spectatorship entertain with martyrs and the PA’s 
administration of Palestinian deaths? And what is cinephilia’s capacity to control instability? On 
October 12, the opening day of the Days of Cinema in Ramallah, the city was overshadowed by 
yet another martyr death that prompted all the shops downtown to close in solidarity. During 
uprisings, public parties in bars are deemed indecent and shut down by political parties and 
movements – Fateh, Hamas, or Islamic Jihad alike. Celebrations of all kind are toned down in 
respect for the daily casualties. It was then surprising to many that the festival would still take 
place, a testament to the exceptional status of culture. Whether or not the DoC should be held was 
debated internally with the advisory board, and it was ultimately decided that the event would be 
maintained in the name of countering colonial forces of cultural erasure. The Ramallah 
International Film Festival had followed a similar logic eleven years prior, during the Second 
Intifada (Dickinson 2005, 269).   
Street commemoration was thus mirrored by more institutional and cinematic forms, and 
the opening night used Palestinian nationalist symbols in order to position the film event in 
alignment with the mourning nation. With the last-minute reconfiguration of the ceremony around 
events that fell outside of the organizers’ purview, the festival attempted to challenge news time 
and remediate martyrdom through film time. Before the opening film was introduced, public 
relations and event coordinator Maya Abu Alhayyat presented an homage to the shaheed Ahmed 
Sharaka, a fourteen-year-old boy from the nearby refugee camp of Al-Jalazun. The audience rose 
to the sound of the national anthem and a film clip was played, which functioned as a response to 
the videos of military violence and the daily news reports on shuhada.30 The excerpt, taken from 
acclaimed Greek auteur Theo Angelopoulos’ To Livadi Pou Dakrizei/The Weeping Meadow 
                                                
30 Shuhada is the plural of shaheed.  
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(2004), an example of the director’s aestheticized treatment of political history and an epic about 
refugees, re-instated martyrdom within the individual detachment and emotional involvement of 
film time. This curatorial choice was embedded both in the universalization of individual suffering 
through global art cinema, and the national celebration aiming to reclaim these deaths as part of a 
larger struggle. In this sense, global art cinema can participate in “the nearly universal experience 
of loss and communal remembrances of martyrs, [which] create an imagined community of 
resistance or suffering and translate the private loss into a national narrative of meaningful and 
purposeful self-sacrifice” (Khalili 2007, 149).  
The translation into film time was eased in by the fictionalization of the space of 
commemoration as the opening film began. Despite having been selected months prior to the 
screening, the opening film was a direct comment on the current “events.” Set in Gaza where the 
directors hail from, Arab and Tarzan Nasser’s Dégradé (2015)31 features women trapped in a hair 
salon while clashes between political parties make the streets of Gaza City unsafe. The film’s 
scenario, a story behind closed doors, ironically resonated with the dichotomy between the “safe” 
space of the theatre constructed by the legitimization of the cultural event in Ramallah, and the 
streets outside, where boys were being killed. This discrepancy is however absent in the reception 
environments to which the film commercially addresses itself. The violence of the outside was not 
a concern, for example, in the guarded theatres of Cannes, where the film premiered at the Critic’s 
Week. The stereotyping of the characters (each woman filled one particular function) and the 
explicit references to daily life in Gaza displayed for pedagogical purposes revealed the processes 
of fictionalization for foreign audiences.  
In other words, the film was composed for a safe space. In her book The Emergence of 
Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, the Archive (2002), Mary Ann Doane traces the 
epistemological changes that occurred in the domain of the sciences accompanying distinct and 
transformed relationships to time. These parallel the transition from the cinema of actuality, the 
first experiments in non-fiction cinema before 1907, towards classical cinema, one that is 
organized around an edited narrative. These two modes’ differential approaches to contingency 
translated into the viewing spaces. While cinema of actuality celebrated the unexpected quality of 
the event in film form as well as in the social interaction of the audience, classical cinema required 
                                                
31 The French title reflects the primary French funding of the film. “Dégradé” is a type of layered haircut. 
It also means “deteriorated.” 
	
	 111 
a space that reflected a sense of control, order and safety in order to attract middle and upper-
middle classes. She concludes: 
 
the time of classical cinema, clearly manufactured for the desires of the spectator seated in 
the timeless space of the theatre, is disconcertingly familiar insofar as it consistently 
reaffirms the plausibility, the probability, the irreversibility, and the fundamental 
recognizability of “real time.” Classical form in the cinema has functioned to restabilize a 
time subject to multiple disruptions in the nineteenth century’s confrontation with the 
epistemological implications of the loss of determinism and law (Doane 2002, 138, my 
emphasis). 
 
Similarly, Dégradé’s focus on Gaza’s internal conflicts presented a “dramatization of control and 
its loss” (Doane 2002, 135) emphasized by the mimicking of real-time proper to the “behind closed 
doors” genre. Narrative cinema and the theatre space together ensured the control over 
environmental contingency. 
As established earlier, transforming the witnessing gaze into a spectatorial one hinges on a 
broader film experience of safety produced by the film theatre itself. As it was the case for the 
RIFF and other festivals, the opening film was hosted by the prestigious Ramallah Cultural Palace, 
a venue that concretizes the PA’s post-Oslo cultural politics dictated by international donors and 
the NGO-ization of the economy. The safe space of the Palace was exceptionally protected by its 
international aura and its location in Ramallah’s embassy quarter. The context of the Intifada 
reveals cinephilia as an inherently privileged and elitist experience. The same safety could not be 
guaranteed for all screenings. On October 14, the screening of Salim Abu Jabal’s documentary 
Roshmia (2014) at the Dheisheh refugee camp in Bethlehem was interrupted “due to the murder 
of Mutaz Zawahreh (twenty-seven-year-old football player at [sic] Ibda’ Football Team) by the 
Israeli occupation forces” during a protest (FilmLab Facebook page 2015). The announcement was 
shared on the FilmLab’s Facebook page, resulting in the event’s promotional tool working in spite 
of itself as a news outlet. The army’s metaphorical (and yet very material) incursion into the 
emotional space of the camp threatened “the irreversibility” of film time and re-asserted the 
impossibility of watching films during the Intifada.  
In the Dheisheh refugee camp, cinema spectatorship was once again supplanted by news 
time’s reversibility, military violence and the uncoordinated efforts at work in the streets. The 
space of cinema spectatorship, although unable to provide safety as a new national project, 
adjusted to the news by playing with the elasticity of the festival event. Where news time is 
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instantaneous and viral, film time can be extendable. Without entrance fees, the Days of Cinema 
was free of commercial obligations and could schedule films by prioritizing access rather than 
profit. The film’s director, Salim Abu Jabal, a member of the organizing team, facilitated access 
to the film. As a result, Roshmia was rescheduled at the Ibda’ Center a few days later after the 
mourning period had passed – after commemoration. Similarly, all the events scheduled for 
Jerusalem were postponed until the end of January 2016 because the city was the site of the highest 




This chapter has investigated cinephilia through Palestinian attempts at developing an art film 
economy mainly supported by European funders and relying on the real-time produced by film 
festivals and cinephiliac spectatorship. Cinephilia manufactures a fantasized “affective now” that 
ideally constructs the space of the theatre as a refuge disembedded from global capitalist 
economies – a discourse that reveals its privileged European origins. In Palestine however, the 
pervasive threat of the occupation, whether direct or mediated by the news, constantly jeopardizes 
the stability offered by cinephilia’s discourse and economy. The contingence of stability, as well 
as its imbrication within the elitist, neocolonial, and uneven framework of the developmental 
economy, thus become evident. In this context, film festivals emerge as flexible structures that 
allow Palestinian practitioners to navigate political and economic instability and negotiate their 
own interests in the face of international donors’ pressure.  
 Days of Cinema’s unstable identity as a “not-yet” festival exposed the structural tensions 
between cinephilia and news’ competing real-times and their respective strategies to achieve 
stability. Yet, in 2017, after a controversy around the closing film, Ziad Doueiri’s Qadiat Raqm 
23/The Insult (2016), which some Palestinian groups called to boycott, Days of Cinema issued a 
statement in which they identified themselves as a “festival.” Since 2016, the event has grown to 
include awards for the shooting, post-production, and distribution of Palestinian projects, as well 
as a local industry meeting opened onto the regional market. Days of Cinema, renamed Palestine 
Cinema Days in 2017, has thus quickly evolved from its first edition in 2014 until the latest in 
2018, where the event has discursively overcome its unachieved status. This suggests that 
Palestinian cinema and cinema in Palestine are gaining traction among international, regional, but 
also local funders, with exceptional support coming from the telecommunications company 
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Jawwal for example. We can thus see the development of a model that diversifies funding sources 
by cultivating European support and slowly integrating the regional creative industries. These are 
consolidating around the multiplication of Arab film funds (the now defunct SANAD in Abu 
Dhabi and Enjaaz at the Dubai International Film Festival, as well as the growing Arab Fund for 
Arts and Culture - AFAC), film markets (formerly at DIFF), and regional awards (such as the 
projected 2018 Pan-Arab Oscar ceremony organized by the Dubai-based Arab Film Institute, 
where six Palestinian productions are to be presented).  
What does it mean then, almost ten years after Zobaidi’s assessment of Palestinian 
cinema’s mode of production as individual, “independent from the authorities of state, religion and 
commerce,” to talk about a Palestinian “independent” cinema? The gradual regionalization of 
Palestinian cinema’s funding does not necessarily suggest a whole new economy, nor does it imply 
more independence, despite the discourse of Arab partners. Rather, examining those developing 
networks should direct our attention towards the complex imbrication of Palestinian cinema’s 
economy with various forms of international aid that exceed film-centered organizations, or 
complicate the ways these are expected to function. In the next chapter, I focus on the work of a 
Palestinian cinema non-governmental organization in the West Bank, Shashat Women’s Cinema, 
(also present in Gaza), in order to start disentangling the relationships between local practitioners 







Chapter Three – Sustainability and the Politics of Cinema Outreach 
 
It’s when life has been put in a more or less serious survival threaten [sic] 
that we begin, or has sense [sic], to speak about sustainability. It’s a sort of 
negative, reversal of meaning. It takes relevance when the destructive 
outcomes start to dangerously get closer to the line of regeneration.  
Diego Segatto, Campus in Camps: Collective Dictionary, 2013 
 
This statement followed on from a workshop conducted at the Dheisheh refugee camp-based 
educational program Campus in Camps near Bethlehem. Attendees were asked to reflect on the 
term “sustainability” (el-Istidama االستدامة) and its fundamental meaning for life in the camps. The 
participants reported the discussions held during the workshop in the Collective Dictionary, a 
booklet that illustrates the educational program’s own pursuit of sustainability. Unitedly defined 
as “something that enables the society to run by itself in an on-going process” (Al-Jaffarri 2013, 
9), sustainability equally applies to knowledge and culture as well as material goods and 
infrastructures. Weddings, for example, are said to articulate elements of familial and friendly 
relationships, economic investments, and material exchanges in a movement of balancing social 
life (Abu Baker et al. 2013, 10). How does this relate to cinema? I argue that we should consider 
Palestine’s contemporary cinema culture to be largely embedded in the complex imbrication of 
macro- and micro-economies that strive to create sustainable economic, cultural, political, and 
social forms.  
 In this chapter, I am interested in how Palestinian cinema Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGO) situate their actions in and take inspiration from a multi-layered 
understanding of sustainability rooted in Palestinian history and economic futures. Locating 
regeneration as emerging from within destruction, as the opening quote from the Collective 
Dictionary suggests, strangely echoes the World Bank’s poverty-focused development plan for 
Palestine entitled “Towards Economic Sustainability of a Future Palestinian State: Promoting 
Private Sector-Led Growth” (World Bank, 2012). The report identifies a fiscal crisis due to the 
decline of international financial assistance, the main source of revenue for the Palestinian 
Authority (PA). In response, the study prescribes an intensification of the privatization process 
already in place in Palestine since the 1994 Oslo Peace Accords. It advocates for the consolidation 
of local trade policies and infrastructures as well as a new legal and regulatory environment meant 
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to attract foreign investors. As Cheryl Payer puts it in her pioneering analysis, “clearly, the Bank 
equates good economic management with policies favorable to foreign investment” (Payer 1982, 
44). Since the 1980s, the Bank’s traditional doctrine of growth-led development has gradually 
incorporated the discourse of environmental sustainability to produce a vision of economic 
sustainability that projects the market as the guarantor for the basic needs of both individuals and 
the biosphere (Reid 2013). The United Nations’ Brundtland Report on sustainability most 
famously translates the stakes of a multilateral conversation as follows: “What is needed now is a 
new era of economic growth – growth that is forceful and at the same time socially and 
environmentally sustainable” (UNWCED 1987, 7). 
 Both the World Bank and the residents of the camp mobilize the practice and discourse of 
sustainability in moments of crisis – however protracted those are – albeit with distinct and 
divergent meanings. The World Bank’s recommendations prolong twenty years of policy-making 
around development in Palestine, which have maintained the political conditions for the PA’s 
double dependence on donors and Israeli control (Tartir and Wildeman 2012). Donors recognize 
that the greatest impediment to reducing poverty is Israel’s control of the borders and restriction 
on the movement of Palestinian people and goods. Yet, the Bank’s policies remain unchanged, 
primarily aiming to “compensate” for the economic and humanitarian effects of Israeli closure (Le 
More 2008, 125). Ultimately, international aid has relieved Israel from its economic responsibility 
of providing humanitarian assistance to the people under its occupying rule as formulated in the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, thus allowing Israel to focus on financing expansionist colonial 
policies instead (Le More 2008, 128). Economic sustainability as conceived by the World Bank 
perpetuates Palestine’s institutional crisis at the very moment it acknowledges it, formulating new 
programs that both accommodate Israel’s colonial structures and the Bank’s own systemic need to 
generate more loans in order to survive (Payer 1982, 50). On the contrary, the participants of 
Campus in Camps regard sustainability as the strengthening of social life in the camp. Partaking 
in community-grounded activities such as weddings or food-sharing simultaneously opposes the 
temporary nature of grants-led projects and substitutes the status quo of the aid economy with the 
permanence of Palestinian culture.  
 This chapter continues my investigation of a Palestinian film economy emerging from 
within foreign development under colonization. In Chapter Two, we saw that the Palestinian 
project of an economy of global art cinema and cinephilia could converge with ideals of stability 
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central to developmental rhetoric under occupation. I established foreign funding’s ascendency 
within cultural projects, one very challenging to circumvent and which has become an accepted 
compromise to what is often perceived as a lack of institutional alternatives. Art cinema festivals’ 
dependency appeared lessened because of their investment in constructing an industry increasingly 
embedded in regional networks, and a system that could ultimately foster some independence 
through profit-making. In the present chapter, I analyze the ways in which paralleling non-
cinephiliac attempts at film institutionalization are entrenched in the NGO-ization of the West 
Bank’s economy and work fully within the framework of international aid. Cinema NGOs’ 
operations are in tension but remain compatible, and even oftentimes overlap, with cinephiliac 
projects. NGOs’ dominance as a model of economy as well as governance largely informs both 
imaginaries of, and possibilities for, a sustainable Palestinian film economy.  
 At the same time, the structure of the Palestinian NGO32 constitutes a site of convergence 
for the World Bank’s and communities’ (such as the refugees of Campus in Camps) conflicting 
understandings of permanence, regeneration, and sustainable present. The World Bank has insisted 
a model, generalized in the late 1980s and 90s, by which most bilateral and multilateral 
development agencies must frame and coordinate donors’ intervention in so-called developing 
countries through project-tied grants and loans. Seen as a key strategy for achieving economic 
sustainability, grants follow a planning process33 that encourages the specialization of local 
organizations as well as their professionalization, subjecting them to Western standards that 
maximize the agencies’ implantation. On the one hand, NGOs function as a vehicle for civil 
societies’ supposed natural aspiration for democracy as defined by donors, and have been criticized 
for their role in de-radicalizing Palestinian politics of resistance (Hanafi and Tabar 2003; Nabulsi 
2005). On the other, Palestine’s long history of social organizing dates back to the late Ottoman 
era and most recently came to a head in the 1970s and 80s – in the occupied West Bank as well as 
                                                
32 To avoid any confusion, I use the acronym Palestinian “NGO” as opposed to “PNGO” (Palestinian 
NGO), which refers to Palestinian organizations that have joined the eponymous network. Not all 
Palestinian NGOs have joined the PNGO network. I have been unable to access a comprehensive list of 
NGOs registered in the network. For that reason, in what follows, I characterize all named local 
organizations as Palestinian NGOs rather than PNGOs. 
33 Cheryl Payer describes the various stages of the project cycle as follows: the identification of suitable 
projects, the examination of the possible assistance available, the appraisal of the project, the negotiations 
with the aid recipient, the supervised implementation and the evaluation of the project (Payer 1982, 72-86).	
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around the Palestine Liberation Organization in exile – with the implementation of new strategies 
of mass mobilization and grassroots activism.  
 In the West Bank in the 1980s, Palestinian associations took a variety of shapes, from trade 
unions to women’s groups, from cultural centers to voluntary committees, and formed a de-
centralized network that attended to the construction of national resistance as well as health 
services and agricultural needs which had all suffered under Israeli rule (Dana 2014a, 128). A 
proxy for political parties, the grassroots model for collective action sustained the First Intifada 
(1987-1993) with some degree of autonomy and self-sufficiency that served as a basis for 
Palestinians’ empowerment and struggle for social justice. The large increase of Western aid in 
the 1990s, heightened by the nature of the Oslo Accords and the involvement of the World Bank 
as of 1992, incorporated these various groups into the aid paradigm. This shift isolated Palestinian 
organizations from one another by spurring competition for funding, and enforced the necessity to 
comply with the donors’ re-definition of “rights” and “social justice” (Dana 2014a, 124). 
Palestinian NGOs are thus now located at the crux of two assemblages of historically situated 
economies, social imaginaries, and power structures: one that establishes civil society as a sphere 
of pluralism and democracy sustained by, and expressed through, foreign investment; the other 
that envisions civil society by way of a grassroots model for collective organizing. Both models 
have informed Palestinian means of film institutionalization over the years, and continue to do so.  
 The NGO economy is closely tied to cinema in Palestine. Contemporary international and 
local NGOs do not only provide partnerships for individual film events. NGOs also constitute one 
important source of income for multi-talented filmmakers or producers through the creation of 
temporary jobs, including documenting NGO meetings or shooting advocacy videos promoting 
the work of these organizations. These assignments contribute to gaining recognizable skills 
transferrable to the film industry, as envisioned and formulated by the cinephiliac approach as well 
as the more news-oriented one (see Chapter Two). The A.M. Qattan Foundation, a multi-million 
dollar Palestinian NGO financed by a wealthy British-Palestinian family and a major policy maker 
and charity actor in Palestine, is even sometimes said to fulfill the function of the Ministry of 
Culture (Fadda 2016, 164). More broadly, the NGO-ization of the Palestinian economy has 
enforced the habit of free access to some forms of culture – which are largely defined by foreign 
funding. In a similar play between local needs and macro-economic and political benefits, NGOs’ 
cartography of aid distribution tends to emphasize urban centers that concentrate capital and render 
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foreign investment more visible. At the same time, the mapping of foreign funding discursively – 
if not necessarily effectively – highlights the importance of catering to marginal populations 
further isolated by Israel’s continuous fragmentation of the Palestinian landscape. These balanced 
observations do not intend to neutralize the oppressive nature of the NGO economy, but rather to 
identify opportunities around which Palestinian organizations can mobilize and have already 
strategized.  
 The semantic instability of key terms like “sustainability” or “participation,” which cross 
the grassroots historical tradition as well as the current developmental economy, points to how the 
aid industry has re-purposed vocabularies of resistance in order to settle its own influence. This 
also suggests, however, that these terms’ radical meaning can be re-activated. Following Tariq 
Dana’s assessment that contemporary NGOs have “disconnect[ed] civil society from [their] 
historical extension” (Dana 2014a, 117), can we conversely identify some ways in which 
Palestinian filmmakers may re-connect with their grassroots (and revolutionary) past through 
cinema organization? The local NGOs of the 1970s and 80s do not alone exemplify the Palestinian 
history of collective organizing. The Palestinian fedayeen (freedom fighters) in exile in Jordan and 
then Lebanon from 1967 to 1982 also formulated their own modes of sociality. These translated 
into the film units attached to the various political parties under the PLO, such as Fateh, the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (DFLP). The Palestine Cinema Institute (PCI) founded in early 1970s Beirut under the 
auspices of the PLO is widely considered to represent the first form of institutionalization of 
Palestinian cinema (Gertz and Khleifi 2008). The PCI’s organizational structure as well as the 
militant films it produced and archived have become increasingly inspirational to the new 
generations of Palestinian filmmakers in Palestine and beyond. 
 In her assessment of the contemporary Palestinian context from the historical perspective 
of the militant period, Nadia Yaqub asserts that, “there is [currently] little space for Palestinians to 
imagine any sort of collective political solution” (Yaqub 2018, 198). This chapter focuses on the 
politics of outreach as one locus for the re-formulation of a sustainable film economy in Palestine. 
This economic project exists in tension with the structures of development and film 
industrialization on the one hand, and Palestinian histories of militant and grassroots institutions 
on the other.  
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 Outreach, or the “effort to bring services or information to people where they live or spend 
time” (Cambridge Dictionary 2018), is essential to the varying strategies of sustainability of 
Palestinian cinephiliac and NGO-based film festivals, training workshops, and exhibition 
practices. The fragmentation of the Palestinian territory into various zones of governance after 
Oslo and the many restrictions on travelling and access due to checkpoints, segregated roads and 
military violence highlight the importance of de-centralizing cultural projects. This martial 
geography has further enforced economic and socio-cultural differences. Sustainable cultural 
practices devoted to creating social connections have thus entailed addressing distinct “niche” 
sensibilities with targeted programs of outreach. For that reason, most film festivals in Palestine 
have adopted a polycentric organization, distributing their presence over the major cities in the 
West Bank and Gaza. Furthermore, the mobility implied by de-centralizing efforts grounds the 
sustainability of outreach in the permanence of Palestinian life. Establishing a circuit, “bringing” 
cinema to its audience and makers, imprints Palestinian trajectories into the increasingly 
inaccessible territories. Outreach similarly drives donors’ interest for capacity-building and “[has] 
enable[d] the society to run by itself in an on-going process” – to repeat Campus in Camps’ 
Collective Dictionary – similar to the distribution of services during the First Intifada.  
 As the latter analogy suggests, the rhetoric of outreach tends to posit cinema as a type of 
service. The very “useful” nature of cinema here emphasized (Acland and Wasson 2011)34 thus 
calls for a re-qualification of the function of Palestinian film production and exhibition. Is the aim 
of cinema production and exhibition in Palestine to build a national image-based industry, or is it 
to promote cinema as a pedagogical tool supporting “personal emancipation” and inclusive 
professional practices in the already existing local image economy? To a certain extent, this 
question reformulates widespread concerns around Global South films (World Cinema)’s lack of 
circulation in their countries of provenance and the postcolonial structures of cinema funding that 
sustain them. In other words, what are Palestinian films meant to do (what is their use) in Palestine, 
in a context where most of these productions are predominantly addressed to international 
audiences? Commitments to both cinema as an end and cinema as an instrument co-habit in the 
various Palestinian projects of film institutionalization. These two views, however, carry different 
                                                
34 Charles Acland and Haidee Wasson define useful cinema in opposition to commercial cinema and by its 
“ability to transform unlikely spaces, convey ideas, convince individuals, and produce subjects in the 
service of public and private aims” (Acland and Wasson 2011, 2).    
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implications for a politics of outreach and the distribution of audiences and producers’ roles – of 
who can do what. In his study of indigenous film practices in urban Bolivia, Jeff Himpele insists 
on the political ramifications of self-representation and the “indigenization” of the film distribution 
circuit. If, as he suggests, “practices of assembly and circulation are related to self-determination” 
(Himpele 2008, xvii), how do Palestinian practices of cinema outreach negotiate the various micro- 
and macro-economies as well as imaginaries of sustainability that organize their present and 
future?  
 This chapter addresses the re-formulation of Palestine’s film economy through politics of 
outreach by focusing on the conceptual convergence around the term “sustainability.” The 
multiplicity of its meanings has bridged various contemporary institutional engagements and 
economies, but also different historical projects. I borrow the term “conceptual convergence” from 
Karen Ferguson’s study of the reinvention of racial liberalism through the collaboration between 
Black Power and the Ford Foundation in the 1970s (Ferguson 2013, 10). Ferguson shows that the 
philanthropic organization directly engaged Black activists’ call for separation and self-
determination in order to push a seemingly common agenda: that of a Black leadership, which 
could be re-integrated into the Foundation’s elite model of US pluralism (Ferguson 2013, 7). Here 
I similarly interrogate the articulation of the aid economy’s structure of outreach with Palestinian 
organizations’ commitment to unity and inclusion of the margins of their society. However, I 
privilege the work of re-contextualization over chronology-building in order to escape teleological 
temptations, focus on the fluidity of meanings, and identify potential collective re-organizations.  
 To that end, I concentrate my study on one cinema NGO with multiple functions, Shashat 
Women’s Cinema, which I situate within the larger pool of the West Bank’s human rights and 
cinema crossovers, and in contrast with the cinephiliac initiatives developed in Chapter Two. I 
start by identifying two competing yet overlapping modes of outreach and their respective 
economies of sustainability. These reveal differential scales of outreach, attached to diverging film 
aesthetics as well as industrial models. The convergence around sustainability and outreach 
becomes the site of competing visions for a future film industry grounded in historical debates 
around unity and inclusion in Palestine. Lastly, I release sustainability’s historical meanings in the 
Palestinian context to open up the possibilities for collective cinema outreach.  
 
Outreach as Sustainability 
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As highlighted in Chapter Two, the climate of institutional instability in Palestine demands cultural 
structures that can endure the shortage of national financial support and political tensions. While 
the cinephiliac approach embraced the art film festival and its economy as an engine for global 
partnerships through international film funds, other initiatives – also partially taking the shape of 
festivals – have relied on their status as NGOs to claim and perpetuate their institutional and social 
durability and consistency. Despite this apparent divergence, however, outreach and the promotion 
of cinema access and educational rights in remote communities have played considerable roles in 
defining the sustainability of all of these diverse institutional projects alike. Moreover, it often 
happens that Palestinian filmmakers and organizers are involved in both types of projects, be they 
supervising NGO trainings while serving on the jury of art-oriented festivals’ awards; or serving 
on the board of one, while exhibiting their own productions in the competition of the other. These 
crossovers speak to both the mobility of workers in a small community, and the converging 
ideologies around the necessity of outreach – of bringing Palestinian cinema to Palestinians. Early 
initiatives like Rashid Masharawi’s Cinema Production Center (CPC) and its Mobile Cinema for 
refugee camps, established in 1996, heralded future organizations’ dual focus on centralizing 
production and de-centralizing training and exhibition. The Center proposed workshops facilitated 
by internationally-known Palestinian filmmakers and became a space for watching movies. The 
mobile cinema in turn travelled to refugee camps with a 35mm projector to screen films and 
culminated with a yearly festival dedicated to children. Outreach, as a strategy for achieving 
cultural, but also economic, sustainability has thus broadly configured local understandings of 
cinema as an agent of social change in Palestine as well as the institutional structures that could 
support it in the long term. 
This is the case, for instance, in cinephiliac projects. The production company Odeh Films, 
also invested in the revival of the Jericho International Film Festival cited in Chapter Two, received 
the support of Danish partners and the PanArab distributor Mad Solutions for its “Area C mobile 
cinema.” The itinerant film screening caters to the “marginalized and culturally isolated” (DHiP 
2016) of the most militarized zone of the West Bank, and “hopes to grant cultural and educational 
rights to the youth [by] spreading cinematic lights as it is driving through the Jordan valley” (Mad 
Solutions website 2018). In turn, the Palestinian nonprofit FilmLab situates its own origins in the 
UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency)-affiliated “Palestinian Memory 
Documentation Project” filmmaking workshops led by Hanna Atallah in the Talbieh Refugee 
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Camp in Jordan in 2008-9. The Lab was founded a few years later in order “to empower Palestinian 
youth through providing them with the resources and equipment needed to tell their own personal 
histories and document their collective memory” (Days of Cinema catalogue 2015, 3).  
Practically, this has meant introducing the youth to new technologies such as iPad tablets. 
This accessible device allows experimentation with digital approaches to images that are both more 
familiar to the newer generations and in accordance with competitive film industries’ imperative 
of innovation. In addition to workshops, Days of Cinema, the Lab’s exhibition arm, systematically 
offers a special program of children’s films dubbed in Arabic. The integration of marginal 
populations and groups that most evidently symbolize a society’s future reproduction is thus 
approached as a key component of the broader project of “spreading cinematic lights” and building 
an arts and cinema scene in Palestine for “long-term cultural change” (FilmLab website). The 
combination of digital technologies with analog metaphors (the dominant imaginary of the 
cinematic light being the beam of the film projector) places the intergenerational work of training 
within the historical continuity of “technological progress” sanctioned by the market.  
Dynamics of global and European film funding also utilize the vocabulary of outreach to 
expand their markets to so-called peripheral economies. Hanan Toukan reminds us of the ways in 
which the pervasive NGO-ization of cultural production and the concomitant neo-liberalization of 
the art scene in the Arab world have cemented around reconstruction economies and the promotion 
of intercultural dialogue between the West and “the Orient” since the Oslo accords and 9/11 
(Toukan 2010). For instance, the prestigious IDFA Bertha Fund, embedded in the International 
Documentary Festival of Amsterdam, supports non-European films, including from the Arab 
world, which are innovative and uphold cinematic quality and market potential, but also advocate 
for social and economic justice, freedom of expression, human rights and education (Film Daily 
TV 2018). Another example, the Beirut-based Arab Fund for Arts and Culture (AFAC), 
established in 2007 in order to boost regional cultural productions through collaborations with 
European festivals and leading Euro-western philanthropy organizations, promotes art cinema as 
integral to its own institutional apparatus of transparent governance.  
In AFAC’s discourse, art cinema’s aesthetic requirements are modelled onto good politics 
implicitly defined by the international art cinema market (Dickinson and Saglier forthcoming). 
Film funds thus contribute to articulating visions of art cinema through discourses of human rights 
as an aesthetic requirement for the “developing” regions. In other words, not only does framing 
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the sustainability of art cinema through outreach mean subordinating “good art” to “good politics,” 
it also conversely suggests that outreach partakes in the strategy to expand art cinema and its 
markets outside of Euro-western countries, oftentimes via a discourse of democratization. In this 
context, outreach becomes an agent of economic sustainability for Palestinian art cinema through 
foreign investment in a way that is entirely compatible with the World Bank’s plan of action 
exposed in the introduction.  
The cinephiliac understanding of sustainability is seen to support the development of 
cinema in Palestine. Outreach here designates the encouragement of art education and access to 
cinema culture both in the periphery of Palestinian cities, like Area C Mobile Cinema as well as 
FilmLab’s screenings in refugee camps, and within the Palestinian cities as peripheries to industrial 
centers in Europe and in the Arab region. In a project where the sustainability of cinema itself is 
the end goal of outreach, the centralization of resources becomes just as important as its de-
centralization. The training workshops produce talents, whose work is later introduced to industry 
meetings such as the PFM or Ramallah Docs, while residencies (organized by FilmLab, but also, 
in the paralleling art circle, Atlal in Jericho) intend to attract foreign artists to Palestine’s cities. 
Michael Curtin explains that “clustering engenders a growth spiral, as creative labor migrates to 
the region in search of work, further enhancing its attraction to other talents (Curtin 2011, 548). 
The cinephiliac concentration of talent aims to build the Ramallah-Bethlehem-Jerusalem axis as 
yet another node in the international “festival circuit,” here understood as the “contact zone for the 
working-through of unevenly differentiated power relationships” modelled around global cities 
(Stringer 2001, 138).  
Although some of their objectives and discourses intersect with those of industrializing 
projects, Palestinian NGOs’ efforts of outreach have prioritized the de-centralization of cinema 
structures within Palestine over the centripetal force of clustering talents and resources in emerging 
peripheral media centers. Rather than constituting one aspect of a multi-faceted plan to foster a 
film culture in Palestine, the primary mandate of Palestinian cinema NGOs is to address marginal 
or niche communities such as the youth but also women, disadvantaged social classes, and 
populations residing in refugee camps and remote villages. These Palestinian NGOs include 
Shashat Women’s Cinema and the Shashat Women’s Film Festival; the ephemeral Palestine 
Human Rights Film Festival (2010); the Palestinian Social Cinema Arts Association (2008-today) 
and its two main projects, the Palestine Mobile Cinema and the (Insan) Human Rights Film 
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International Film Festival (2012); as well as the Young Palestinian Filmmakers Society (2009- 
present) and its two offshoots, the International Young Filmmakers Festival (2011-present) and 
the Nordic Youth Film Days (2016). 
Outreach fulfills sustainability’s goal of cultural permanence and continuity by including 
marginal populations central to the reproduction of society (the youth as well as women). This 
inclusion is implemented through active professionalization in order to refashion these groups’ 
place and involvement in the existing image-based economy in Palestine, rather than aiming to 
develop the latter separately. This focus also practically conforms to the aid industry’s (orientalist) 
idea that these groups exist outside of politics. In this view, outreach educates communities 
positioned “outside of democracy” so they “learn” to participate in processes of decision-making 
at the societal level. Outreach also targets communities whom international donors believe revolve 
around potential indoctrination by local political parties. For instance, it is significant that Shashat 
held screenings in universities during the hours informally dedicated to activities with these parties 
on campus (Arasoughly, interview with the author 2015). In that sense, the educational outreach 
provided by Shashat literally replaces the political work of parties, yet at a time when these reflect 
the division of Post-Oslo’s political landscape more than a hopeful engagement with collective 
action. Palestinian organizations’ outreach thus both carves a sustainable social project for 
minorities and accommodates donors’ demands for targeted interventions and one particular type 
of political engagement defined as civic as opposed to party-oriented. The convergence of interests 
between Palestinian NGOs and international donors finally guarantees the sustainability of foreign 
financial injections into Palestinian projects. “Outreach as sustainability,” as the title of this section 
suggests, indicates the various long-term social and economic benefits of focusing on outreach. 
NGO status has procured a certain security and stability for informal initiatives of outreach. 
The Young Palestinian Filmmakers Society NGO presents a typical trajectory: almost ten years 
before registering in 2009, its instigator Anis Barghouti and his team conducted yearly filmmaking 
workshops for the youth in camps, villages and towns, with the practical – if not so much financial 
– support of established organizations such as the Qattan Foundation, the German Heinrich Böll 
Foundation, and the Ma’an Development Center, self-described as a “pioneer community 
development and capacity building organization” (Ma’an website 2017). The workshops’ lack of 
official status hindered access to training facilities and funding requests to donors. Registering as 
an NGO invested the Society with the legitimacy to approach the Palestinian Cultural Fund and 
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the Palestinian Ministry of Culture for a minimal budget. This proved pivotal in allowing the first 
edition of the International Young Filmmaker Festival (IYFF) in 2011, and in building a 
partnership with the Norway-based Nordic Youth Film Festival (NUFF) (Barghouti, interview 
with the author 2015).  
Not only does a greater – although far from absolute – financial sustainability emerge as a 
perk of the NGO status, but this economic state of affairs also functions as a symbolic currency in 
the competition between the various organizations, in which one’s sustainability further attracts 
donors, and begets sustainability. Created at the end of the Second Intifada in 2005, Shashat has 
built its entire identity around the sustainability of its grassroots model. Shashat registered as an 
NGO in a context in which these organizations were under heavy criticism for their lack of support 
of the popular uprisings and their dissociation from the people’s actual needs. At the same time, 
NGO registration represented the most practical solution for local independent groups to become 
official and receive international funding.  
Shashat supports the production of women’s cinema and addresses the social and cultural 
implications of women’s representation. In order “to provide sustainability and continuity to these 
objectives” (Shashat 2017), Shashat has diversified its intervention by inaugurating a media center 
profiting the whole film sector; the women’s film festival and its larger outreach program “Films 
for Everyone;” and training workshops whose formula morphed over time to eventually focus on 
film production. Shashat celebrated its tenth anniversary in 2016 after a brief two-year interruption, 
thus enforcing its own promotional claim that it stands as the longest-running film festival in 
Palestine and the longest-running women’s film festival in the Arab world. Sustainability has been 
a goal established since the organization’s first year in activity. The local press praised the success 
of the festival’s first edition and its unique promises of long-term commitment. For the Palestinian 
feminist newspaper Sawt al-Niswa, Shashat was a response to “the long-term negligence and lack 
of sustainable institutional accountability in dealing with women’s representation in cinema” 
(Hamdan 2005) while Al-Ayyam, one of the major newspapers in the West Bank, cited filmmaker 
Ghada Terawi (now president of Shashat’s board) asserting that “now we Palestinian women 
filmmakers have a base” (al-Shayeb 2005).  
Launched with seed money from the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), 
Shashat has secured funding from UNESCO, the Ford Foundation, and the European Union over 
the years, in amounts that the Palestinian Cultural Fund and the Ministry of Culture could never 
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have dreamt to match.35 Yet, the Ministry’s official recognition of both the organization itself and 
its executive director, materialized in the form of Shashat’s 2010 “Award for Excellence in 
Cinema” and Alia Arasoughly’s 2012 “Outstanding Cultural Woman Leader Award,” legitimizes 
the project as worthy of international support. Shashat has internalized the vocabulary of grant 
writing and donors whereby gender equity grants democratic development. The organization also 
asserts its allegiance to principles outlined by the United Nations’ project of the Millennium 
Development Goals and the European Neighbor Policy. Shashat’s grassroots model is thus one 
fully embedded in the project logic of Palestine’s NGO-ization, in which the sustainable work of 
maintaining ties with the community is mediated by a professional class rather than through mass-
mobilization (Jad 2008, 2).  
 Shashat’s grassroots focus on sustainability through outreach and de-centralization has 
however guided its transformation over the years, as well as its position in the film communities 
in Palestine. In a context where many of the emerging local NGOs proved largely ephemeral, the 
sustainability of Shashat was sometimes in dispute. Shashat Executive Director Alia Arasoughly 
recounts some of the responses they received after the festival’s first edition, and she 
simultaneously confirms outreach as the crucial avenue for the organization’s long-term plan:  
 
 We were told it would be impossible for us to go all over, and that we would be restricted 
to cultural elites and big cities. We said we didn’t want to stop here and we wanted to go 
all over. We want women cinema to be central to Palestinian film culture (interview with 
the author 2015).  
 
Shashat’s outreach strategy has relied on its readiness to negotiate with all its partners in the West 
Bank and Gaza, which included, in the 2016 festival edition alone, eight universities, one school, 
two refugee camps, fourteen organizations, one satellite TV program, and a hundred community 
associations. For example, in 2011, when some screening sites refused to show Fadya Salah-
Aldeen’s short film Mamnou’ u Bas/Just Forbidden (2011) because it displayed a girl’s menstrual 
blood, the organization offered to replace the film with another piece from their collection, which 
                                                
35 For example, Shashat’s project “I am a Woman” (2011-2012), organized in collaboration with the 
Women’s Center for Legal Aid & Counselling and Al Aqsa University, was granted $570,425 by the 
European Union’s “Investing in People Programme” alone (EU Investing in People Programme 2007-
2013). By contrast, the total PA governmental funding allocated to non-governmental cultural initiatives in 




showcased incest – and it was accepted (Arasoughly 2013, 121). For Arasoughly, the festival 
“really think[s] on the long term and on the cumulative.” She adds, “values on women were formed 
over hundreds of years, we don’t think we can change them with one film. So, we’re willing to 
work year after year to build dialogue and build trust with our partners” (interview with the author 
2015). As suggested by anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod’s study of the circuits of women’s rights 
in Egypt, accommodating institutions that are more conservative distinguishes Shashat from 
Western NGOs that carry a secular agenda (Abu-Lughod 2010) and re-asserts the grassroots nature 
of the organization’s outreach. This trust has allowed Shashat to circulate surveys during its 
screenings. These revealed that the spectators in the universities, towns, and refugee camps wanted 
more inclusion in the films’ representations. The surveys also shed light on the university media 
classes’ failure to train women with the same focus as men. These two aspects led Shashat to 
reconsider the means they had mobilized in order to reach their mandate and prompted an ever-
stronger focus on women’s film production training. 
 While Shashat festival’s first edition highlighted the screening of women’s films from 
Palestine, the Arab world, and beyond, as well as workshops open to male and female participants 
where foreign and local women academics and film professionals were invited to speak, the second 
edition re-asserted its focus around film exhibition in marginal areas.36 The 2006 festival lasted 
three months so as to cover a growing number of cities and villages in the West Bank and Gaza, 
thus explicitly enacting Shashat’s driving goal to privilege audiences considered to be peripheral. 
As of 2007, the workshops stopped catering to experienced male and female filmmakers, but rather 
addressed young women filmmakers freshly graduated from Palestine’s own media programs and 
coming from modest backgrounds. Production-centered workshops were established in cycles of 
three years that followed annual themes, in order to introduce the trainees to, and consolidate their 
knowledge of, scriptwriting, planning a shooting schedule, filmmaking, and editing. From 2008 
on, although international, Arab, and Palestinian women’s films continued to be screened, the short 
films resulting from the workshops came to constitute a major part of the festival’s programming. 
The films would eventually circulate as themed series all year long through Shashat’s outreach 
program “Films for Everyone” in coordination with the Palestinian universities and community 
centers partners to the festival, but also in foreign, Arab and Palestinian women’s and human rights 
film festivals. In the West Bank and Gaza only, “Films for Everyone” has counted, in the past, 
                                                
36 The following chronology is a historical reconstitution based on the catalogues and the website.  
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over 160 screenings a year (a peak reached in 2009), counting the festival events (Shashat 2018). 
In 2016, the festival reached 6,000 audience members (Shahat 2018). The coverage of the festival’s 
opening ceremonies at the Ramallah Cultural Palace and some Q&A periods by Palestinian and 
Arab TV networks (Al Jazeera, MBC, al-Arabiya, and Palestinian satellite television) has 
expanded Shashat’s outreach to the Palestinian diaspora beyond the local territorial fragmentation.  
 By promoting the professionalization of women filmmakers from the center to the 
peripheries of Palestine, Shashat has positioned itself at the intersection of a circle of film 
professionals and people-centric practices most evidently exemplified by its slogan: “culture is a 
human right.” A similar combination of discourses around developing “talent” through training 
workshops with targeted groups and enhancing human rights through inter-cultural dialogue have 
animated the (Insan) Human Rights Film International Film Festival (PSCAA 2018), the IYFF, 
and the NUFF (alternately set in Palestine and in the Nordic countries) (interview with Anis 
Barghouti 2015). These concerns, also present in the cinephiliac festivals, are here highlighted 
with respect to the priority of de-centralizing outreach. Beyond economic sustainability, the 
primary end goal of these organizations thus pertains to human development.  
 In 1990, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) laid the foundation for a new 
system of measurement, planning, and monitoring of sustainability in its Human Development 
Report, a follow-up to the 1987 Brundtland Report cited in the introduction to this chapter. This 
approach, which has informed the most liberal inclinations of leading multilateral agencies such 
as the World Bank, expressively places “people” rather than economic growth at its center and 
identifies NGOs as crucial to strategies of human development and paralleling processes of 
democratization. Defined as “a process of enlarging people’s choices” (UNDP 10, 1990), human 
development promotes both “the formation of human capabilities” and “the productive use” of 
these capabilities through education, participation and capacity-building.  
 Palestinian cinema NGOs’ grassroots approach to sustainable outreach here echoes the all-
encompassing theory of “development as freedom” coined by famous economist Amartya Sen, a 
consultant on the UNDP report. In his eponymous book, Sen argues that “development can be 
seen…as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy” (Sen 1999, 3), aiming at 
“advanc[ing] the general capability of a person” (Sen 1999, 10). NGOs variously place emphasis 
on developing trainees’ “leadership skills” (Shashat 2018), “creat[ing] skilled, educated and 
reliable young leaders” (IYFF catalogue 2011), and bettering the youth’s peaceful integration into 
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society by “spread[ing] the culture of non-violence, tolerance and reconciliation” assumed to go 
against Palestinian youth’s natural tendencies (PSCAA 2018). Thus, NGOs’ outreach strategies 
conceive of cinema as a tool for individual education and self-accomplishment as a stepping-stone 
for building a stronger society. We observe a similar interest in “talents” in cinephiliac initiatives, 
although these consider cinema itself as another end goal. 
 In his critique of Sen’s argumentation from a biopolitical perspective, David Chandler 
contends that human development dis-locates development from the material world. Instead, he 
continues, “the subject becomes the object of transformative practices of governance as 
development rather than the subject of development as external transformation” (Chandler 2013, 
73). In other words, as Chandler further explains, “for Sen, the individual is the only agent of 
development but the individual is a vulnerable subject needing the enabling or empowering of 
external agency; the individual is thereby both the ends and the means of development as freedom” 
(Chandler 2013, 73). Choice is something which institutions can “educate” and “improve” by 
providing the “proper” tools for “better” choice-making. In conceptions of human development, 
under-development is thus not caused by a lack of will but by individuals’ incapacity to make 
savvy decisions, which can be rectified by a person’s participation in “rational” public discussions. 
Sen comments on the fate of local cultures in the face of external global pressures in those terms: 
“ways of life can be preserved if the society decides to do just that, and it is a question of balancing 
the costs of such preservation with the value that the society attaches to the objects and lifestyles 
preserved” (Sen 1999, 241; my emphasis). The direct tension between choice capability and 
Palestine’s colonial context of cultural erasure highlights development’s conciliation with larger 
conceptions of freedom pushed by the market rather than recognizing how local context is 
determining. It is significant that Sen, although balancing out economic growth with human 
development, evokes the iconic liberal economist Adam Smith to evaluate “freedom of exchange 
and transaction [as being itself] part and parcel of the basic liberties people have reason to value” 
(Sen 1999, 6).   
 Chandler’s critique, coming from a radical perspective, points to the inevitable 
commercialization of rights that follows neoliberal development politics and economics, and the 
subsequent inflection of definitions of freedom. With the Palestinian context in mind however, we 
can speculate on possibilities for remaining sympathetic to this radical critique at the same time as 
we consider how Chandler’s very argument locks the functioning of local NGOs in their historical 
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present. Chandler here ironically “disconnect[s] civil society from [its] historical extension,” for 
which Dana, cited in the introduction to this chapter, has blamed neoliberal politics. This 
theoretical tension is most visible in the context of women’s rights, on which I elaborate further 
later in this chapter, and which defines Shashat’s field of action. More often than not, Palestinian 
NGOs prove aware of this academic critique and experience first-hand the complicated 
compromises that dealing with transnational organizations imply, including concessions around 
what “women’s rights” means. Abu-Lughod has described how international reports ascribe the 
violence imposed on Palestinian women to Palestine’s patriarchal culture alone while local 
organizations document both domestic violence and other forms due to the military occupation 
(Abu-Lughod 2010, 22).  
 Contrary to what Chandler’s argument of de-contextualization suggests, “Palestinian 
NGOs and projects…may be funded by the Scandinavians, the Germans, the Ford Foundation, the 
Open Society, WHO, and UNIFEM, […] but at the core of their efforts are the inescapable realities 
of occupation and militarization” (Abu-Lughod 2010, 17-18). For example, Shashat’s 2011 
partnership with the European Union allowed it to smuggle film equipment and hard drives in and 
out of besieged Gaza through diplomatic cars (Arasoughly 2013, 122). The relationship of the 
Palestinian women’s movement – and local cinema NGOs in our case – to politics of resistance 
needs to be historicized to allow the “un-locking” of key terms such as “choice” and “participation” 
that the ideology of human development has effectively colonized.  
 I delve into the political opportunities of an encounter with the aid economy and the 
possibilities for re-formulating Palestinian sustainable film economies later in the chapter. In the 
next section, I examine what the emphasis on decision-making and choice means for diverging 
contemporary visions of outreach and film economies in Palestine. As a vehicle for stories, self-
expression, collective memory, and representation of minorities (including Palestinians as 
minorities in global circuits), cinema-making revels in structures that emphasize choice as artistic 
empowerment, a means of becoming visible, and a re-assertion of Palestinian women, youths and 
artists against both intra-societal discrimination and colonial practices of cultural erasure and 
political annihilation. However, the issue of scale, which differentiates understandings of who 
constitutes the periphery that outreach projects must first address, also produces competing views 
on the goals and meanings of empowerment through inclusion for a Palestinian film economy. I 
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argue that these tensions are embedded in the competing circuits of film circulation and the 
historical re-organization of NGOs after Oslo.  
 
Outreach and Fragmentation 
While the previous section established the various ways in which outreach is construed as a key 
strategy for a sustainable film economy in Palestine, I am here interested in examining how 
competing visions of “periphery” imply distinct understandings, and distinct economic and 
aesthetic norms and standards, for cinema.  Here, considering outreach’s relation to distribution 
clarifies certain stakes. Sean Cubitt usefully illuminates the articulation of time and space that 
structures distribution practices when he writes that “modern distribution is characterized by its 
commodity form; contemporary exchange by its readiness to rework time as a raw material for the 
construction of markets, to play stasis against change, and to organize space hierarchically.” He 
concludes: “distribution is the construction of difference” (Cubitt 2005, 194). The market segments 
populations into differentiated audiences through strategies such as “windowing,” which consists 
in establishing primary and secondary zones of access to culture through distribution. In his study 
of film distribution in 1990s Bolivia, Jeff Himpele remarks that the movement of 35mm copies 
from the elite center to the periphery of the social classes was impressed into the very physical 
deterioration of the film’s materiality. After total destruction, movies could eventually claim an 
afterlife through pirated video replicas. As a result, distribution itineraries produced maps of social 
differences, and “the value of circulatory materials corresponded to their sites of extraction and so 
too the social status of their associated publics” (Himpele 2008, 46).  
 Conversely, we can approach outreach as a response to distribution’s construction of the 
periphery. As mostly evidenced by Shashat’s slogan that culture is a human right, outreach 
functions as a corrective to uneven differentiated access, which is, in Palestine, embedded in class 
and gender differences, histories of forced displacement, developmental cartographies, and the 
military fragmentation of the Palestinian territory carried through direct attacks on human rights. 
The choice of strategies and modes of inclusion to implement that corrective is, however, where 
Palestinian organizations differ, thus revealing tensions in the way in which minority groups are 
envisioned to relate to the production of Palestinian cinema and film culture, as well as the very 
meaning and goal of a film economy in Palestine. These diverse views, I argue, are not just typical 
of discussions about festival circuits, but also enmeshed within the historical role played by local 
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NGOs in furthering the national struggle, and the re-organization of these political groups after 
Oslo.  
My argument stems from two interconnected critiques addressed to Shashat by some 
members of the film community in order to disentangle the stakes of these differentiated views on 
outreach. The goal is evidently not to distribute blame or approval, but rather to identify points of 
disagreement symptomatic of structural questions about what it means to build a film economy in 
Palestine. The most striking difference in strategies was highlighted in an interview with a male 
filmmaker involved in the Palestinian cinephiliac community. He recognized the value of 
Shashat’s impact on a targeted population, but pointed to how he himself gradually stopped 
attending the festival after the focus started being primarily placed on the films produced during 
the training workshops, which he categorized as “amateur” (interview with the author 2015).  
Shashat’s outreach relies on the circulation of films made by the community into the 
community, outside of the centers of Ramallah, Bethlehem and Jerusalem, where art cinema 
projects predominantly operate. The films are meant to stimulate debates around the place of 
women in society and the freedoms they can claim, as introduced by the interested party 
themselves. The International Young Filmmaker Festival (IYFF) similarly privileges showing 
films made by youth (albeit predominantly international) to the youth, in order to highlight the 
varied experiences of growing up.  
This major self-referential focus inflects the films’ aesthetics because the audience and 
their expectations, codes and desires are considered to differ from what a cinema within the reach 
of international markets, even when produced by Palestinians, can offer. In that view, the 
audience’s identification with the narrative appears subordinated to its relatability to the means of 
production, in which technical skills reflect “genuine” self-expression, as opposed to a supposedly 
slick orientalist authenticity directed at a foreign audience exterior to the Palestinian experience. 
In addition, self-expression also requires a negotiation of the films’ content, and what it means to 
address a Palestinian audience about their own culture. In Shashat’s workshops, the tension 
between the expectations of international audiences accustomed to watching art cinema and that 
of Palestinian spectators has materialized in collaboration with foreign trainers. Here “trainees 
were effectively encouraged to develop negative aspects or the downsides of their culture in the 
projects, [and] given the feeling that this was what ‘success’ required” (Arasoughly 2013, 111). 
This point of contention spurred discussions about for whom the films were made. The ideal of 
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“self-expression” thus articulates artistic visions, technical skills, and content-making in very 
situated ways.  
In her study of a modular indigenous film festival circuit in the Americas, Amalia Córdova 
describes how grassroots productions can display a “distinctive” look, “as indigenous festivals 
often screen works developed in training workshops where the appearance has the rough feel of 
an exercise, as opposed to a more ‘polished’ aesthetic” (Córdova 2012, 67). Yet, Shashat’s films 
are not welcomed in such terms by their primary audience in the “peripheries,” nor is the 
production value undermined or subordinated to women’s empowerment in the organization’s 
discourse itself. Shashat’s website displays an account of the 2016 festival opening in Gaza by 
Palestinian NGO worker Amal Shanty, who describes the films as “artistic,” “expressive,” and 
“capturing the social, political, and economic dynamics of the Palestinian society” (Shanty 2016). 
Besides this festival-sanctioned discourse, an article published online by independent newspaper 
Ma’an News reported on Shashat’s screening at the Arab American University in Jenin. The 
reviewer lauded Areej Abu Eid’s short Seif Har Jiddan/A Very Hot Summer (2016) and its 
depiction of the 2014 war on Gaza. A testimony of a “mature cinematic experience,” the film was 
said to distinguish itself from the usual news reports and documentaries about the Strip by its 
“artistic choices” and technical achievements (Abu Maala 2016).  
Although the appreciative terms employed by the reviewers of Shashat’s screenings may 
coincide with cinephiles’ descriptions of their own cinematic preferences, “artistic,” “expressive,” 
“experience” and “choice” hold specific implications in the context of human development 
unraveled earlier. As Arasoughly emphasized in her interview with cinema scholar Patricia Caillé, 
the goal of the training workshops was to empower women as much as to invest them with the 
“decision making role of the director” (her emphasis, Caillé 2015). Choosing (the angle from 
which to shoot, the lighting, which shots should be kept in the final editing, or the narrative 
structure of the editing itself) becomes, in itself, an artistic gesture, because it constitutes an act of 
self-expression. The new role women take on is further celebrated in a separate press document 
published by Shashat every year in addition to the edition’s catalogue. The leaflets each feature 
one female director, and include a still, a description, and the full credits of the film she directed 
that year as well as her own picture and a biography recounting her achievements within and 
beyond Shashat. This material anticipates the constitution of future portfolios, thus ensuring the 
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professionalization of the women’s profiles at the same time as it enhances their capacity to make 
decision, direct, and create.  
The founder of the Young Palestinian Filmmakers Society similarly placed the emphasis 
on self-expression when I asked him what constituted a “successful” training workshop to them:  
 
In the workshops, we consider two things: first, which is more important to me, the process. 
It is being together, from different areas, and working together as a team, so they start to 
realize what team work is...The other thing is the development of their personalities. It’s 
not a big thing, but it is very important. I want to bring an example here. One of the groups 
was from a village. They were girls, and when they started coming here, at the beginning 
they were shy, and they would speak slowly and in a very hesitant voice. At the end of the 
workshop, they talked differently. The workshop allowed them to express their thoughts, 
to express themselves more, to give them more confidence. This is not something to please 
the other, this is a film to please yourself. This is your film, your thoughts, your ideas, and 
you have to make it as you think is right, not as I think, or your father, or your mother 
(Barghouti, interview with the author 2015, my emphasis).  
 
For Anis Barghouti, the focus on self-accomplishment and self-development impacts how we 
conceive of the film productions coming out of the workshops, what their function, goal, and utility 
is, which challenges cinephiliac definitions of art cinema: 
 
There is the process and then the result. Usually the result is not perfect. It doesn’t have to 
be perfect, it has to have something different. And that’s why in the editing process we 
work with them and we explain to them how things are made, but we leave the decision to 
them: how to name their film, how to put it together. Although sometimes there are some 
shots that work better for the film, but if they say we want this [other] shot, then we let 
them have the freedom. It will be their film, so it has the sense of youth. It’s their own 
atmosphere, their own taste. That’s it (interview with the author 2015, my emphasis).  
 
In this view, the sound may be mixed inappropriately, the zoom-ins a bit hasty, or the close-ups 
omnipresent, but this does not take away from the films’ intimate look. In Shashat’s productions, 
the young filmmakers’ sincerity when faced with desires that upset society’s norms and the 
military occupation’s legitimacy is not diminished. Shashat films for example convey the intimate 
relationship between siblings, even within a disagreement, in El-Ukht u Akhuha/The Sister and 
Her Brother (Omaima Hamouri and Michael Krotkiewski, 2010); the strength it takes to study 
abroad and announce it to your loving but disapproving family in El-Qarar/The Decision (Lialy 
Kilani, Anna Persson, Dara Khader, Ina Holmqvist, 2010); the poetic ode to the Gazan sea, prey 
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to garbage and Israeli fishing restrictions in Shaklu Helu…Bas/It Looks Pretty… But! (Rana 
Mattar, 2013); or the double lamentation over the pollution of Hebron’s countryside by the fumes 
of local metal scrappers and the latter’s tragic lasting unemployment in Reef bil 
Asswad/Countryside in Black (Fida’ Naser, 2013).  
This is not to say that achieving technical skills is secondary in this view: this capacity 
works hand-in-hand with self-expression. Good technicians, like good artists, are those who can 
convey ideas, emotions, and a message that resonates with its intended audience. Faye Ginsburg’s 
concept of “embedded aesthetics” can usefully redirect our attention away from artistic value. In 
the context of Aboriginal media, she argues, “the quality of work is judged by its capacity to 
embody, sustain, and revive or create certain social relations, although the social bases for coming 
to this position may be very different for remote and urban people” (Ginsburg 1994, 368). As the 
Ma’an journalist emphasized in his review of A Very Hot Summer’s depiction of the Gaza war 
cited earlier, the film’s account of suffering echoed the audience’s loss of family members during 
the Israeli invasion of the Jenin refugee camp in 2001. The post-screening discussion revealed that 
“suffering is one” (المعاناة واحدة) and a unifying factor of the Palestinian experience (Abu Maala 
2016). Capacity-building, thus, addresses both technical skills, and how these serve the community 
needs of self-representation.  
  However, as the film selection of Shashat’s “Film for Everyone” reveals, art cinema in 
general, and Palestinian art cinema in particular, is not completely evacuated from the 
organization’s vision of outreach. International films by Andreï Tarkovski, Krzysztof Kieślowski, 
Abbas Kiarostami, Theo Angelopoulos, and Guillermo del Toro, or internationally successful 
Palestinian films by Cherien Daebis, Elia Suleiman, and Tawfik Abu Wael were screened between 
2007 and 2009.37 Some of Shashat’s programs thus very much resemble Area C mobile cinema’s 
programming of Annemarie Jacir’s Lamma Shoftak/When I Saw You (2012) or Mai Masri’s 3000 
Layla/3000 Nights (2015). In the last section of this chapter, I’ll expand on ways to think of the 
crossovers between cinephiliac and grassroots outreach projects. Of interest to us here is how the 
inversion of priorities between art cinema and community-driven productions in the two visions 
points to more than a mere ideological stance on aesthetics. It signifies the differential placement 
of peripheral audiences (in terms of age, gender, class and geography) identified as such in the 
production mechanisms of the emerging Palestinian film economy. In other words, the rift goes 
                                                
37 Data is missing for the years following 2009.  
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beyond film appreciation and the need to personally relate to the stories told. The divide is 
importantly industrial and includes the economic models in which the competing aesthetics are 
embedded.  
Shashat’s grassroots workshops have successfully produced eleven film collections38 and 
seventy-seven films from 2008 to 2016. Yet, some members of the film community at large, 
including women, have criticized the organization’s choice of demographics for conforming to the 
demands of the aid economy rather than addressing the needs of the local industry and laborers. 
After acknowledging how much she had benefited from Shashat’s work of festival organizing and 
film production training in the early years of the project, a mid-career female filmmaker in an 
interview spoke to the changes instituted over the years. In particular, she articulated how the shift 
towards featuring young women and the products of their workshops has ascended to the detriment 
of a whole category of mid-career film workers who need the infrastructures made available by 
Shashat in a context where opportunities are scarce:  
 
There is a lot for young filmmakers but not for the ones stuck in the middle. In Palestine, 
in general, with the funds, there is an interest in youth. That is why a lot of projects revolve 
around youth. When young people want to start working independently they are stuck. 
They can’t find funds, expertise. You need to learn from your mistakes, we don’t have that. 
Only a few people succeed to make it easy for them to get funds to make their films and 
get them distributed abroad (interview with the author, 2015).  
 
Others, including women, observed in informal conversations that men and women filmmakers 
alike were subjected to the hardship of the Occupation, thus the focus on gender would not be 
conducive to solidifying the filmmaking community. Shashat itself conceived of its own 
intervention as a response to the competition and exclusiveness imposed on girls from the 
periphery (Arasoughly 2013, 102). However, the organization has effectively leaned towards 
partnerships with international festivals and institutions (Göteborg International Film festival in 
2008, Jan Vrijman Fund in 2009, the Stockholm Dramatiska Institutet in 2010) as well as women’s 
and diplomatic organizations (Goethe Institute in 2008; Ford Foundation, European Union, and 
the Heinrich Böll Foundation in 2010, the Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Counselling in 2011; 
                                                
38 The film series are the following: “Confessions” (2008), “Masarat” (2009), “A Day in Palestine” (2009), 
“Jerusalem, so Near… so Far” (2009), “Palestine Summer” (2010), “Crossroads” (2010), “I am a Woman 
from Palestine, part 1” (2011), “Worlds” (2011), “I am a Woman from Palestine, part 2” (2012), 
“Remnants” (2013), “What is Tomorrow” (2016). 
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the European Endowment for Democracy in 2016) rather than engaging with other local film 
associations. The films produced by Shashat predominantly travel in very defined networks of 
women’s rights, human rights, youth or identity-based film festivals.39 These occasionally also 
procure visibility for Palestinian art cinema as a secondary network, after the films have circulated 
in the competitive festivals that guarantee them artistic and international legitimacy as well as the 
promise of more funding. The primary focus on human rights and its variations may be seen as 
potentially burying Palestinian cinema in a new niche, one less profitable to the sustainability of 
art cinema. This, even as human rights festivals are also increasingly serving as brokers in order 
to solidify their own networks. Human rights film grants have for now focused on exhibition and 
outreach rather than film production (Movies That Matter website 2018; Human Rights Film 
Network 2018). Yet, in 2018, Shashat announced its new cycle “I am Palestinian” (Ana 
Falastiniyyah) set to support the production of another ten films. In addition, the project is to 
dispense sixty sub-grants over three years, for an amount of 5,500 euros each. In exchange, 
recipients must commit to twenty community screenings and discussion activities throughout the 
year (Shashat newsletter 2018).  
 Palestinian films’ divided distribution between competing – yet also to a certain extent 
complementary – networks of circulation is symptomatic of what Marijke de Valck has called “the 
rise of the thematic film festival” in 1960s Europe, which has also organized global circuits since 
then (de Valck 2007, 178). On the one hand, de Valck historicizes the shift towards specialized 
festivals with the need to create alternative platforms for the new left-leaning and anti-government 
cinematic movements. On the other, specialized programing has allowed festivals to distinguish 
themselves from one another and “carve a niche into the global cultural agenda of cinema” (de 
                                                
39 The list of international festivals include but is not restricted to: “Women and Freedom,” Bordeaux, 
France, 2015; “CinemAmbiente 18th Environmental Film Festival,” Torino, 2015; “Hakaya 8th Film 
Festival,” Amman, 2015; “Aegean Docs International Film Festival,” Greece, 2015; “UNRWA-Spain” 
Basque Country 4-city tour of the following films, 2015; “Bristolian Mediterranean Film Festival,” UK, 
2015;  “FiSahara International Film Festival,” Algeria, 2015; “UN 3rd Women Film Festival,” Jordan, 2015; 
“Rencontres Cinématographiques – Palestine: Filmer c’est exister,” Geneva, 2014; LECCE European Film 
Festival, Italy, 2014; Goldsmith University, 2014, as part of the Jean Mohr and Edward Said "After the Last 
Sky" exhibition; NUFF@TIFF, Tromso, Norway, 2014; Arab Film Festival in the Netherlands “Women 
Making a Difference,” 2013;  Cineffable Film Festival, Paris, 2013; “Ciné-Palestine, dans les pas de 
cinéastes,” Toulouse 2013, UNESCO, Palestine Permanent Delegation to UNESCO, Paris, 2013; 
NUFF@TIFF 2013; Algerian Ministry of Culture, “Committed Cinema Film Festival,” 2013; Malmö Arab 
Film Festival, 2012; NUFF (Nordic Youth International Film Festival), 2012; London Palestine Film 
Festival, 2010; Boston Palestine Film Festival, 2010. 
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Valck 2007, 179). The proliferation of events in the 1980s rendered specialization indispensable 
to the viability of the film market. Gender-oriented film festivals as well as human rights festivals 
emerged during that period, the most iconic of them being the San Francisco Gay and Lesbian 
Film Festival established in 1977. Typically, 1970s women’s, gay and lesbian, and more generally 
queer film festivals were instrumental to community-building and their organization was 
subordinated to the situated movements of sexual liberation in which they were respectively 
inscribed.  
 However, these festivals evolved to either promote the commercialization of a new gender-
based film aesthetics (see how new queer cinema has shaped a niche within the markets of global 
art cinema) or focus on human rights, especially in the South and ex-Soviet countries that are 
dependent on European funding (Armatage 2009, Barlow 2003, Loist and Zielinski 2012, Rhyne 
2007). The formation of “niches” was thus meant to both reach out to specific communities and 
for (predominantly European) producers and funders to invest in low-risk and predictable markets. 
Fragmentation, in that context, constitutes an industrial tool to manage an expanding market, 
where A list film festivals such as Cannes, Venice and Berlin are still considered to be both the 
center and the norm. The tension between cinephiliac and NGO modes of outreach and their 
respective industrial as well as community strategies thus relies, once again, on the prioritization 
of certain circuits over others. This prioritization determines the branding of Palestinian films 
according to these circuits and the success of their circulation within them, but it also dictates 
which market will penetrate Palestine to support the emerging film economy, the types of jobs that 
are available to film workers, and who can be a film worker.  
 These tensions around the competition between (and within) diverse groups of film workers 
reflect larger debates around issues of “unity” in the Palestinian National Movement, which 
emerged as part of the reconfiguration of the NGOs’ roles and institutional structure after Oslo. 
Although not directly voiced in terms of politics of resistance by the film community, the critique 
of “fragmentation” that underlies the insecurity felt by Palestinian film workers on both sides 
points to diverging principles of outreach symptomatic of nationalist debates: one that professes a 
unity centralized around a group of educated filmmakers and nodes in the global network of film 
festivals with local ramifications; the other that defends the local inclusion of specific marginalized 
groups in order to redress internal inequality. The latter’s specialization in women’s or youth issues 
challenges the former’s idea of a pre-existing national unity in the face of both the occupation and 
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global economies (which would materialize with the recognition of Palestinian cinema abroad). 
On the other hand, NGOs’ detractors also identify the demographic focus as a symptom of the 
professionalization and de-radicalization of civil society.  
 Asef Bayat addresses NGOs’ “politics of fragmentation” in his critical analysis of the social 
transformations carried out by subaltern populations in the Middle East. He argues that the division 
of activist collectives into various interest groups mirrors, and has been responsible for, a shift in 
resistance politics whereby principles of rights and accountability have replaced charity, and 
insider lobbying has superseded street politics (Bayat 2010). This tendency can be observed in the 
history of women’s rights advocacy in Palestine, from which Shashat has inherited. In the 1970s, 
the women’s movement was embedded in the nationalist struggle, and committed to the 
challenging task of “identify[ing] with nationalism while also reconstructing it, through their 
activism, in an attempt to subvert its gender boundaries” (Jad 2008, 4). The various feminist 
organizations (uttor nassaweyya), traditionally affiliated to political parties under the umbrella of 
the PLO, redistributed foreign aid at the grassroots level, and consequently acquired a significant 
mass base (Jad 2008, 3). These Palestinian organizations were however confronted with a new 
configuration of power when the negotiations between the PLO and Israel started at the 1991 
Madrid Conference. The women’s movement suffered from the internal split of their institutional 
base (the various parties) in disagreement over whether or not to condone the Palestinian 
representatives’ decision to engage in a dialogue with the colonizer. The restructuration of the 
parties’ leadership undermined women’s positions, thus de-mobilizing them.  
Following the more general decline of the politics of parties and unions, the feminist 
organizations themselves also faced internal conflicts over their diverging opinions on the peace 
process. The gradual dissociation of the feminist agenda from nationalist politics, as well as the 
failure to establish a common women’s front, led to the specialization of women’s centers into 
separate entities. The split of the parties left these newly independent organizations penniless, and 
in need of funding that international aid agencies were ready to supply. The integration into the 
networks of the Western aid economy further encouraged the specialization of women’s 
organizations as well as their focus on professionalization and the “legal understanding of 
women’s oppression,” as opposed to party politics relying on mass mobilization that addressed 
integrated structures of nation, class, and gender (Jad 2008, 13). In other words, for Islah Jad, 
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professional NGOs have directed their energy inwards, into the fabric of Palestinian society and 
governmental structures, instead of addressing colonization’s overarching structure of oppression. 
As Rabab Abdulhadi remarks however, the critique according to which feminist groups 
engaging with the legal status of women bolster certain colonial structures of oppression obscures 
the “paradigm of difference” that situates women at different intersections of systems of 
oppression. She argues that “the diversity of women’s expressions can be understood by 
recognizing that windows of opportunity and the changing political context affect different 
categories of Palestinian women differently, thus producing different manifestations of the 
movement” (Abdulhadi 1998, 665). Here, like in the various scenarios of cinema outreach I have 
uncovered, the rhetoric of unity can also be deconstructed as a form of prioritization. The Women’s 
Center for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC), identified by Jad as emblematic of the turn 
towards NGO-ization and a privileged partner of Shashat, exposes its position with respect to the 
nationalist movement in those terms in Shashat’s 2011 catalogue: 
 
The protracted military occupation of Palestinian lands limits women’s safety, 
independence, self-determination, and blocks women’s citizenship in a Palestinian nation-
state. In addition, national resistance against the occupation can be a factor limiting 
women’s development as it treats women’s needs as being of secondary importance 
(Shashat catalogue 2011). 
 
Shashat’s films have in fact engaged with both aspects from a critical perspective, thus testifying 
of the wide range of feminisms the organization supports. Fadya Salah Aldeen’s short 
documentary Heik el-Qanun!/This is the Law! (2012) follows a Palestinian (Muslim) woman 
judge’s attempt at defending women’s right to ask for divorce in the context of the West Bank 
PA’s dismissal of women’s issues after the establishment of Oslo. The film implicitly supports 
feminist associations’ “Model Parliament” meant to propose legal reforms, an initiative whose 
campaign focused on revising the “Personal Status Law” that denies women many domestic and 
private rights (Jamal 2001). Laila Abbas’ Khams Fanajeen u Fanajan/5 Cups & a Cup (2011) 
takes on a different approach to the same issue, and uses the opportunity of a fictional meeting 
between the representatives of the women’s movement in preparation for their encounter with the 
president about the Personal Status Law in order to show the movement’s elitist tendencies. The 
women’s discussion foregrounds their condescension towards other Arab countries and their 
admiration for the West. Their concerns betray the movement’s total dissociation from the 
	
	 141 
women’s base incarnated by Um Mohamad (or Um Ahmad, as the representatives can’t remember 
her real name), the coffee lady who is mistreated and shown outside the conversation. Other films 
directly address the occupation: Lialy Kilani’s Lew Akhdhuh/If They Take it! (2012) documents an 
elderly woman’s steadfastness as she holds on to her house despite the violent attacks of nearby 
settlers; Ghada Terawi’s ‘Aleahu/On Air (2011) starts with the fictional TV announcement of 
elections for a one-state solution soon to be interrupted by the Israeli army’s invasion of Ramallah, 
thus evoking the Second Intifada as the marker of the end of the Peace Process and a direct threat 
to political imagination; finally, Alaa Desoki’s Daja/Noise! (2012) stems from Gaza cities’ 
constant rumble to evaluate the political use of noise in popular demonstrations. 
 The objective here is neither to confine Shashat’s position to the spectrum of feminist 
nationalist politics, nor is it to transfer women’s groups’ internal disagreements onto cinema 
organizations in Palestine. I am merely attempting to extract how the issues of fragmentation that 
have animated the debates around the re-organization of women’s groups after Oslo can illuminate 
some dynamics at work in the contemporary Palestinian film economy. Diverging politics of 
outreach reveal the climate of competition between Palestinian film workers due to both 
developmental economies’ re-organization of civil society and the mirroring of a global formation 
of niche and hierarchical circuits that allow differential penetrations of the human rights and the 
art cinema economies. In this context, a consideration of the competing modes of organization 
based on unity and inclusion leads us to question what forms of solidarity can underlie the 
contemporary formation of a film economy in Palestine. In the next and last section of this chapter, 
I argue that both conceptions of outreach are struggling to find ways to address their common 
legacy of militant cinema and its forms of organization. The different politics of outreach all 
conceive of sustainability as a necessity inspired by a historical model of futurity (one of liberation 
formulated in the militant period from 1968 to 1982) in need of re-negotiation at a moment of 
partial statehood under continuing colonization. They all ask: What does it mean to build 
Palestinian film institutions for Palestinians in post-Oslo Palestine? 
  
Outreach, Sustainability, and Sumud 
In this section, I propose, as announced earlier, to unlock the meanings around sustainability that 
have been colonized by the aid economy. What happens if we expand our contextualization of 
outreach – defined as a way to produce sustainable Palestinian film institutions – to the period 
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preceding the “de-radicalization” of civil society, the latter’s subjection to a regime of neoliberal 
economics of human rights, and its dissociation from the mass base? The purpose is not only to 
replace these organizations’ various addresses to marginalized Palestinians in a larger history of 
sustainability. I also want to understand how Palestinian film workers’ relationships with their 
own militant history can serve to productively re-think the place of outreach in the contemporary 
Palestinian film economy. In other words, how can contemporary proto-film institutions support a 
“popular cinema in which people find themselves in the process of making history,” in the same 
way that the PLO and its film units in exile advocated for through the liberation movement and its 
associated aesthetics from 1968 to 1982 (‘Adnan Mdeinat, cited in Matar 2018)? Furthermore, 
how can we conceptually approach this temporal dissonance? 
First, some historicization is in order. As Nadia Yaqub notices in the most extensive study 
of Palestinian cinema of that period to date, both popular and foreign outreach were central not 
only to the revolutionary project of Palestinian militant cinema as of 1968, but also to its 
institutionalization by the overarching Palestinian Liberation Organization. This dynamic 
followed the formation of a centralized state power in exile, which gained strength in the second 
half of the 1970s (Yaqub 2018, 125) after the recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of 
the Palestinian people at the 1974 Arab League Summit in Rabat. Among the many institution-
building initiatives, Yaqub mentions that the Palestinian Cinema Institute (formed under the 
auspices of the PLO), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (the PFLP; one of the three 
major parties under the PLO), and the Samid (the PLO’s economic development wing) continued 
the mobile cinema scheme initiated in the late 1960s by Fateh’s Palestine Film Unit, and organized 
film screenings in military bases, refugee camps, and villages. The films included productions by 
the various PLO-affiliated groups as well as reels from the Russian, Chinese, and Cuban allies.  
From 1968 until the mid 1970s, the party-produced films were decidedly addressed to the 
sensibility of Palestinian audiences, and questionnaires were distributed to the spectators in order 
to collect feedback on their aesthetic preferences and what visual strategies would best mobilize 
them (Massad 2006, 36). The parties also regularly curated film nights in ciné-clubs in Beirut and 
Damascus, which would showcase art and political cinema from Europe and the third world. The 
screenings were followed by discussions that were later reported in the cultural columns of the 
PFLP’s magazine al-Hadaf (Yaqub 2018, 127). Interestingly, strategies of outreach extended 
beyond participative exhibition, and included professional development in photography. The Iraqi 
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PFLP filmmaker Kassem Hawal trained Palestinian fighters who had been wounded and even 
traveled to South Yemen in order to provide equipment and expertise to the local cinematographers 
documenting the revolution there. Similarly, the pedagogical impulse of Fateh’s early PFU 
materialized in Hany Jawhariyyeh’s draft of a technical syllabus, left unachieved after the famous 
revolutionary cinematographer’s death in 1976 (Yaqub 2018, 133).  
This popular outreach to Palestinian audiences was combined with the necessity to 
communicate the Palestinian struggle for liberation to the rest of the third world in the spirit of 
transnational discussions around a third world cinema movement carried out in Algiers and Buenos 
Aires in 1973 and 1974 (Mestman 2002). The Palestinian Cinema Group, an ephemeral 
collaboration between the PLO’s various film units, symptomatically advocated for international 
outreach in its 1973 founding manifesto. As part of its mandate, the group assigned to itself the 
tasks of “cooperation: to strengthen relationships with revolutionary and progressive film groups 
around the world, to represent Palestine in film festivals, and to provide available film facilities to 
all allies working in the interests of the Palestinian revolution.” (cited in Dickinson 2019, 94). 
International outreach eventually occupied a central place in the PLO’s agenda, and its network 
expanded from the Baghdad Film Festival, the Damascus Film Festival and the Journées 
Cinématographiques de Carthage to allied film festivals in the West, including the Leipzig 
Documentary Festival where Palestine was distinguished with a prize in 1974. In the second half 
of the 1970s, the increased circulation of Palestinian cinema abroad, combined with its gradual 
institutionalization within the PLO, meant that the films’ aesthetics of liberation were increasingly 
subjected to the diplomatic project of state-building in exile rather than embedded in a 
revolutionary movement (Denes 2014, 238).  
Palestinian revolutionary cinema’s evolving forms of institutionalization have nonetheless 
marked the imaginary of Palestinian film workers. In October 2009, the Ramallah-based Al-
Kasaba International Film Festival dedicated its fourth annual edition to then-recently deceased 
Mustapha Abu ‘Ali, widely considered to be the founder of Palestinian revolutionary cinema in 
1968. In his welcoming letter, al-Kasaba festival director Khaled Alayyan remembered how Abu 
‘Ali had refused to be honored at the opening of the first edition in 2006. The filmmaker had 
allegedly claimed that such a celebration would be meaningless unless “[Palestinian] officials 
ke[pt] their promise to support Palestinian cinema” (cited in Alayyan 2009). Building on Abu 
‘Ali’s statement three years later, Alayyan took this opportunity to point towards the PA’s under-
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funded budget for culture and reminded the officials that “culture cannot remain a future project 
waiting for political and economic stabilization,” but rather, “is part of development and state-
building” (Alayyan 2009).  
Abu ‘Ali’s complaint is testament to a change in the regime of images, in which cinema no 
longer plays a role in official discourses.40 In response, Alayyan’s statement first re-asserts 
Palestinian cinema’s embeddedness in the formation of a political and economic project of 
liberation central to the spirit of the revolution, of which Abu ‘Ali is reminiscent. On the other 
hand, however, Alayyan positions this imperative within the framework of state-building both 
sketched in the second period of the revolution and at the core of today’s context, in which 
“stabilization” is impossibly construed as both the means and the end of self-determination (see 
Chapter Two). In other words, the symbolic reference to Abu ‘Ali appeals to a past where the PLO 
is imagined to integrate cinema as an organ of its political machine. Yet, state-building in the 
current context of the two-state solution is here framed as the only possible outcome for liberation 
despite the shortcomings of Oslo. How can the militant period speak to a present of development, 
then? And how can the contemporary imaginary and implementation of outreach take root in 
revolutionary grassroots practices?  
Nadia Yaqub suggests that the Palestinian Revolution, when it is represented at all in 
Palestine’s official discourse today, is incorporated into a teleology that leads to the PA and Yasser 
Arafat as its president and ultimate martyr (Yaqub 2018, 218). In this chapter, I am upsetting the 
linear historical chronology from the 1960s until today in order to avoid such teleological 
temptations, whether they end with the PA or contemporary attempts to negotiate the militant 
legacy. Instead, I propose that one way of understanding the historical rephrasing of practices of 
outreach in the present includes focusing on slippery concepts such as sumud (صمود, steadfastness). 
Lena Meari insists that sumud has no fixed meaning and incarnates a multiplicity of significations 
and practices which resist the normalization of colonial power relations (Meari 2014). I argue that 
beyond those, the multiplicity of meanings that have aggregated around the philosophy of sumud 
further point to a convergence of interests and, importantly, the sustainability of the concept itself. 
In self-referential prowess, sustainability has perpetually regenerated to adjust to new historical 
                                                
40 The PLO and its various parties did not actively support film initiatives with funding; neither did they 
call for the establishment of the various film units, which were initiated by the filmmakers. However, films 
took part in the PLO’s broader “cultural activism” (Matar 2018) and as such were deemed useful.  
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times. The term has given way to linguistic translations firmly rooted in sustainable aid economies 
such as “resilience,” as I will explain. Sumud both articulates the transition from revolution to 
developmental economy in its historical practice and allows the potentially discursive and 
hopefully material and economic re-activation of collective meanings in the current Palestinian 
film economy. Finally, sumud’s conjoint approach to the marginal identity of Palestinians and the 
marginal populations within the Palestinian nation provides an entry point to further engage with 
contemporary politics of outreach and their possible re-organization into collective economies. 
The convergence around and the sustainability of sumud designate it as a hinge to understanding 
the organizational articulation of collective Palestinian futures, in which Palestinian cinema has 
been historically engaged. In that sense, sumud could procure the historical continuity to produce 
a “popular cinema in which people find themselves in the process of making history,” as enounced 
earlier by ‘Adnan Mdeinat.  
The reliance of liberation revolutions on foreign aid is a major axiom of the Cold War and 
the dispute of the two super powers through the proxy of the third world. South-South and Pan-
Arab solidarity movements have similarly been pervious to imbalances of power in the distribution 
of financial support. Here I delve into this history to question how sumud both proposes a vision 
for a sustainable militant economy and intersects with the aid economy’s definition of 
sustainability. The debate around aid in and for Palestine can be traced back to the late 1970s and 
parallels the re-conceptualization of sumud as a philosophy of resistance. In the 1960s, sumud was 
primarily employed to describe the refugee condition and the daily struggle for survival in the 
Palestinian consciousness. It was repurposed by the PLO over the years to address the revised 
image of the Palestinian as a freedom fighter – including women – which transpires in the political 
posters designed until the mid-1980s (Palestine Poster Project Archives 2018; Fig. 3). In the 1970s, 
the word’s meaning broadened to also designate Palestinian life in the occupied West Bank, Gaza 
and East Jerusalem. Finally, the term gradually encompassed the economic strategies deployed to 
maintain a large population of Palestinians on the land in the face of growing Israeli expansion 
(Rijke and van Teeffelen 2014). As of 1978, this effort was greatly supported by the Palestinian-
Jordanian joint committee’s creation of Amwal es-sumud, a fund meant to succor Palestinians and 
“combat the collapse of [their] social and economic fabric caused by the Israeli colonization of 
[the] land” (Shehadeh 1982). The Fund primarily allocated resources to municipalities, education, 
agriculture, and housing. However, it managed large amounts of money and its administration 
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soon became corrupt, thus tainting Palestinians’ attachment to the term sumud altogether. 
Moreover, the Fund began to be seen as creating dependency rather fostering resistance. For 
famous architect and activist Ibrahim Dakkak, “steadfastness and resistance were replaced with a 
conventional philosophy of financial support. Political divisions flourished and dependency and 
social polarization increased” (Dakkak 1988, 290).  
 
 
Figure 3: Militant poster representing sumud in the context of the armed struggle. The poster was 
designed by Kamal Nicola circa 1980 for the Palestine Red Crescent Society (the Palestine Poster 
Project Archive website). 
  
Sumud thus underpinned the establishment of enduring and sustainable Palestinian 
grassroots institutions autonomous from the Israeli Civil Administration before any official 
formulation of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories in the early 1980s. As it evolved, the 
concept constituted a basis for developing an economy reliant on foreign aid partly emanating from 
the Arab countries, which challenged Palestinian independence in the process of economy-
building in the territories. In addition to being corrupt, the aid money represented the “official 
Arab ‘guilt money’ for abandoning the confrontation with Israel” (Tamari 1991, 61). The Fund 
finally became increasingly suspicious to leftist parties in the territories, which they saw as an 
attempt by both Fateh and Jordan to assert their political influence (Sayigh 1997, 479). A 
conference on “Development in the Service of Steadfastness” was held in 1981 in the West Bank, 
which discussed ways to articulate two options. In his assessment of the event, Dakkak describes 
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sumud muqawim (resistance through steadfastness) as a possible alternative to the static conception 
of sumud. The latter, in his view, simply advocated for maintaining the physical presence of 
Palestinians in the occupied territories and served a politics of development that aimed to reduce 
Palestinian emigration rather than actively struggle for more rights. 
Until today, this form of “static sumud” (Dakkak 1988, 288) is very gendered and transpires 
within popular representations of women protecting olive trees threatened to be uprooted. For 
Dakkak, static sumud also emanated from the vision of an exiled leadership disconnected from the 
grassroots and materialized the institutionalization of the revolution (Dakkak 1988, 289). The 
alternative of sumud muqawim sought to formulate a plan rooted in the Palestinian context against 
“the imposition of ‘standard priorities’ developed by the ‘outside’ [here the PLO in exile] or 
strategies developed by ‘futuristic’ studies [which] could lead to misleading conclusions” (Dakkak 
1988, 295). In other words, in 1981, Dakkak opposed the unsustainability of external input, which 
also prefigures the project logic so fundamental to NGOs’ intervention a few years later. In 
contrast, Dakkak advocated for a complete cohesion of social and political needs in the face of 
possible normalization of the relationship with Israel. He concludes: “sumud is a pre-requisite for 
any just and durable solution to the conflict. This sumud must be sumud muqawim” (Dakkak 1988, 
307). Similar arguments can be found today, including in the Campus in Camps booklet that 
opened this chapter. Tariq Dana’s formulation of a “resistance economy” also inscribes itself 
within sumud muqawim and proposes an “institutionalized form of economic struggle that 
envisages a transitional reorganization of the economy and social relations to be in harmony with 
the political requirements and objectives of the Palestinian national liberation process” (Dana 
2014b.).  
Sumud muqawim highlights the necessity for an “indigenous strategy” championing local 
employment as well as import substitution in order to foster independence from the Israeli 
economy.  It also promoted the control of foreign aid distribution (Dakkak 1988, 297). This 
resonates with Shashat and other organizations and festivals’ work of outreach. In fact, Shashat’s 
desire to “have an impact on Palestine,” to repeat Alia Arasoughly’s words (interview with the 
author 2015), not only translates the necessity of taking action within the confines of the 
Palestinian territories, but also amounts to increasing self-reliance through programs of “capacity 
building” closely associated with distribution strategies. The participatory aspect of Shashat’s 
screenings strives to include Palestinian needs as a foundation to its own mode of operation. In 
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addition to the discussions following the films, we saw that Shashat circulated surveys that 
inflected the direction of the organization. These closely echo the questionnaires distributed by the 
militant Palestine Film Unit and other parties such as the PFLP at screenings and in schools with 
the aim of “canvassing the Palestinian audience.” For Joseph Massad, the PFU’s strategy relied on 
a form of “instrumentalism wherein film [wa]s seen as a pedagogical tool to incite people to 
politics, [which] became prominent, as did audience tastes and desires” (Massad 2006, 36). 
Furthermore, the “popular consultations” were integral to the process of militant filmmaking, in 
which the relationship between the concerned masses and the filmmaker should always be at the 
forefront (Abu Ghânima 1977, 38).  
 Shashat’s surveys have similarly evaluated audiences’ preferences around the length of 
the screening and the discussion, the film selection’s fit with the audience, the films’ clarity and 
choice of topic, the mediation of the discussion, whether the activity achieved the desired goals, 
whether the discussion contributed to improving the audience’s knowledge on women’s issues, 
and the general appreciation for the activity (Nazzal 2013, 117). Furthermore, the PFU’s interest 
in “the audience tastes and desires” re-contextualizes Shashat and the IYFF’s emphasis on self-
emancipation in the creative process as a return to a collective understanding of Palestinian youth 
and women’s desired representations of themselves as a collective category. Both the PFU’s 
questionnaires and Shashat’s early surveys, which were decisive in the shift towards in-house 
productions, emphasized the need to represent the community itself. As Colleen Jankovic points 
out, “not only [does Shashat] make space for a supposed non-existent audience, they also aim to 
expand the parameters of that audience, or rather the kind of society that can be fostered and 
envisioned via that spectatorial space” (Jankovic 2014, 19).  
Despite the individual promotion of the filmmakers through leaflets separate from the 
catalogue, the productions resulting from the workshops are meant to circulate as a bundle rather 
than individually. In other words, the film series travel as a collective effort to which everyone has 
contributed at various levels by occupying different functions in turn, and not only for the benefit 
of one artist’s reputation. Can we, maybe, address this epistemological shift as enacting the 
singular-collective mode that Lena Meari assigns to Palestinians-in-sumud? Can we think of 
outreach as contributing to the “continuous process of reorganization of social relations,” to quote 
Meari’s qualification of sumud’s potential (Meari 2014, 555)? Local NGOs instrumentalize 
cinema in the name of minorities’ self-expression and as a priority over building infrastructures 
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for cinema’s sake. Shashat has implemented a geographical coherence between production and 
distribution that challenges other festivals’ practices, which is formally (and to a certain extent 
ideologically) reminiscent of PLO’s “Samid”41 productions in the Studio Sakhrah, its outreach 
projects, and its professional development workshops dedicated to Palestinians’ control of their 
own image.  
While Shashat’s initiatives are largely embedded within aid economies and require 
planning capacities for writing grants and establishing multiple year plans in advance, they may 
also fall of under the temporality of “getting by” as coined per Lori Allen – that is to say, they are 
the result of constant strategies of adaptation (Allen 2008). In their examination of the various and 
multiple understandings of sumud over the years, Alexandra Rijke and Toine van Teeffelen point 
to how the term has also been used in order to humanize Palestinians in the eyes of a foreign 
audience. For these authors, this was one of the consequences of the focus on non-violent 
resistance in Raja Shehadeh’s seminal book The Third Way (1982), which contributed to re-
popularizing the term sumud in the 1980s. The imperative of humanization functions very closely 
with the goals formulated by Human Development (which describes itself in opposition to 
economic growth) and its integration within biosphere-oriented sustainable development. In his 
study of the neoliberal biopolitics of sustainable development, Julian Reid explores the “surface 
of contact” between sustainable development and neoliberalism, which “ought to make for a tense 
and political field of contestation but has instead made for a strategically manipulative relation 
between the two doctrines” (Reid 2013, 108). This contact materializes in a new form of 
governance that he calls the “sustainable development-resilience nexus,” inspired by the UN’s 
definition of resilience as “the capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to 
hazard, to adapt by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of 
functioning and structure” (cited in Reid 2013, 108). Just like Human Development, this meaning 
of resilience locates political action in the preservation of life rather than in mobilizations that 
challenge power structures. Sustainable development naturalizes resilience as a “capacity of life 
itself” rather than one of states and populations, thus subordinating it to the most resilient form of 
institution: that of the market (Reid 2013, 114-6).  
The ambiguous relationship of sumud to the aid economy, partly a result of the 
appropriation of such a popular term to push very different agendas, similarly transpired more 
                                                
41 “Samid” means “the one who performs sumud.”  
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recently in former prime minister Salam Fayyad’s instrumentalization of sumud to defend his plan 
for a neoliberal Palestinian state (Rijke and van Teeffelen 2014). Appropriating the title of 
Shehadeh’s book, Fayyad created the Third Way party in order to offer an alternative to Hamas 
and Fateh in the 2006 elections. For Itiraf Remawi, coordinator for the Bisan Center for Research 
and Development, Fayyad’s economic plan stands far from promoting a form of sustainable 
development under the occupation. Instead, “with Fayyad’s neo-liberal policies, our collective 
rights, our economical and societal rights under these policies have been affected, our steadfastness 
has been damaged’” (cited in Malik 2013, 13).  
What to make, then, of cinema NGOs genuinely dedicated to grassroots and collective 
outreach but relying on the hierarchized structures of the aid economy and the management of 
elected boards? What are the avenues for the Palestinian films circulated both by cinema NGOs 
and cinephiliac mobile cinemas to become popular despite their embeddedness in international 
markets of human rights and art cinema? How can Palestinian film practices of outreach “make 
for a tense and political field of contestation”? Despite the entanglements in neoliberal and 
developmental politics, philosophies of sumud primarily propose a thinking of cultural 
permanence, historical continuity and popular regeneration throughout, in ways that engage with 
Palestinians’ histories of marginality. In 2003 during the Second Intifada, Palestinian American 
filmmaker Annemarie Jacir co-organized the Dreams of a Nation Film Festival in Jerusalem 
mentioned in this dissertation’s introduction, which showcased two films from the revolutionary 
period: Kassem Hawal’s ‘A’id ila Hayfa/Return to Haifa (1982) and Mustapha Abu ‘Ali’s Laysa 
Lahum Wujud/They Do Not Exist (1974). The organizers even succeeded in smuggling in the 
latter’s director (Yaqub 2018, 200). Mimicking, in the cultural realm, the steadfastness of claiming 
the land for continuing Palestinian presence, the festival constituted for Jacir “a matter of survival, 
of resisting [Palestinian] culture’s disappearance” by promoting images of Palestinians by 
Palestinians in Palestine (Jacir 2006, 29).  
From the late militant period, Return to Haifa is an adaptation of famous Palestinian writer 
Ghassan Kanafani’s eponymous book, in which a Palestinian family forcibly driven out of Haifa 
in 1948 returns in 1967 to reunite with the son they had to leave behind, only to see him adopted 
by the Israeli family that now occupies their home. The first and only feature fiction made under 
the auspices of the PFLP, Return to Haifa involved a large cast of volunteers from Lebanon’s 
refugee camps of Nahr el-Barid and Badawi in reenactments of the Nakba. Not only did the film 
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address the Palestinian masses then, it also directly represented and enrolled the very populations 
who had been dispossessed. Envisioned as a model for “alternative cinema in the Arab world” by 
Hawal (Yaqub 2018, 158), the film opens with an epic reproduction of the 1948 Palestinian exodus 
from Haifa realized with little financial means. The scene combines the aerial view from the 
Zionist military planes and the point of view of the crowd itself. As they reach to boats to escape, 
Palestinians become gradually individualized with close-ups reminiscent of UNRWA footage 
from that period (Fig. 4). The rest of the film ambitiously alternates between different time periods 
(figured with the differential use of black and white and color) and geographies (Poland, Ramallah, 
Haifa). In turn, They Do Not Exist offers a counter-testimony to former Israeli Prime Minister 
Golda Meir’s denial of Palestinian existence by documenting life in refugee camps and the 
Fedayeen’s training. A pillar of Palestinian militant history, the film clearly illustrated the goal of 
the Dream of a Nation Film Festival. 
 
  
Figure 4: Aerial views from the military planes and point of view of the refugees in the opening 
sequence of Return to Haifa (screenshots).  
 
Both Return to Haifa and They Do Not Exist resurface in Annemarie Jacir’s When I Saw 
You (2012). A romanticized portrayal of the revolution mediated by the point of view of a young 
Palestinian refugee boy, Tareq, yearning to return, the film includes direct citations of militant 
productions. The scenes of collective life in the 1960s refugee and Fedayeen camps reference 
historical details on point from They Do Not Exist: the towel as an object of value that refugees 
would gift the Fedayeen, the letters sent in support of the Freedom fighters, as well as the very 
setting of their camp. The parallel even extends to the uncanny physical resemblance of Jacir’s 
feda’i, played by the famous Palestinian actor Saleh Bakri, with the feda’i featured in Abu ‘Ali’s 
film (Fig. 5). Similarly, Qais al-Zubaidi’s Far from the Homeland (1969) inspired the shot of 
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children playing in the infrastructures of the UNWRA camp (Yaqub 2018, 200-1), and the guerilla 
training sessions depicted in Bi-al-Ruh, bi-al-Dam/With Soul, With Blood (1971) are faithfully 
reproduced (Fig. 6). Shot in Jordan where Jacir was stranded, unable to enter Palestine, the film’s 
topic thus also duplicates the filmmaker’s own life at the time of its making.  
 
   
Figure 5: The setting of the fedayeen’s camp in They Do Not Exist and When I Saw You (screenshots). 
 
 
Figure 6: Guerilla training in With Soul, With Blood and When I Saw You (screenshots). 
 
On the other hand, the similarities with Return to Haifa can be found in the production 
methods employed and the formulation of an “alternative cinema from the Arab world” 
reminiscent of sumud muqawim. In an interview with Guy Hennebelle about the militant film Kafr 
Kassem (1974), a fictionalization and reenactment of the Israeli massacre that occurred in 1948, 
Lebanese filmmaker Borhan Alaouié similarly reflected on the necessity of addressing his 
audience in a dramatic manner, while avoiding the registers of dominant European and Egyptian 
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canons. Whereas the shooting of Return to Haifa mobilized a relatively spectacular mise-en-scène, 
cumulating a large number of volunteers as well as a variety of locations, Kafr Qasim/Kafr Kassem 
aimed to be, in Alaouié’s own words, “commercial, in the right sense of the term,” and part and 
parcel of the quest to find “a new aesthetic typical of the Arab world” (Alaouié 1977, 155-6, my 
translation from French).  
Sympathetic to these views which have found a new life in the past ten years with the 
emergence of strong regional support for the arts, Jacir has insisted on relying extensively on Arab 
grants in order “to break the reliance on European funding [and] have a strong and independent 
film community” (Jacir AFAC website 2013). Her project effectively gained the financial support 
of the Jordan-based Khalid Shoman Foundation, the (now-defunct) Abu Dhabi fund SANAD, and 
the regional Arab Fund for Arts and Culture (AFAC). Hiring and working locally was also central 
to the enterprise, and the film’s cast and crew all hailed from the region. Finally, the extras 
populating the fictional refugee camp proved to be the very children of refugees and Fedayeen 
portrayed in the film, thus embodying Palestinians’ historical continuity and cultural persistence 
through cinematic reenactment in the same manner Ginsburg’s “embedded aesthetic” cited earlier 
could “sustain, and even revive or create certain social relations” (Ginsburg 1994, 368). Yet these 
relations also survived the inflections necessary for the film to circulate internationally. The point 
of view of the child introduces humor and drives the narrative away from depictions of violence 
or partisanship that would have hampered the film’s possibility for funding. Simultaneously, this 
form of address places the storyline within the intergenerational network that supported the film’s 
production. After a first circulation in festivals in Europe, the Arab world, Brazil, Turkey, Greece, 
and India, When I Saw You was also screened in Palestine’s villages and refugee camps, including 
as part of Area C mobile cinema’s outreach project.  
When I Saw You is symptomatic of contemporary Palestinian films’ broader tendency to 
engage with militant history as testified by Azza El-Hassan’s quest for the supposed lost archive 
in Muluk wa Kumpars/Kings and Extras (2004); Basma Alsharif’s experimental restoration of 
Kassem Hawal’s Buyutuna al-Saghirah/Our Small Houses (1974) in O, Persecuted (2014); Hind 
Shoufani’s tracking of her father’s past in the PLO in Trip Along Exodus (2014); and the search 
for a people’s self-image in Mohanad Yaqubi’s Kharij al-Itar: Thawra Hatta al-Nasr/Off Frame 
aka Revolution Until Victory (2012-2017). The nine projects pitched at Ramallah Doc in 2017 
similarly dealt with past issues instead of representing the present of news time despite foreign 
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funders’ preferences.42 Among some examples: Mahasen Nasser-Eldin’s We Carve Words in the 
Earth proposed to explore the history of Palestinian feminism in 1930s Egypt, and how it 
intersected with the anti-colonial struggle; Mariam Shahin projected to fictionalize the discovery 
of Palestinian archives in a settler’s house in Stolen Archives; Talal Jabari’s Tantura meant to 
unveil the vanishing history of the Galilean city destroyed in 1948; finally, May Marei’s Cima 
intended to portray the history of Cinema Jenin in the 1950s.  
Sumud muqawim might thus entail working within the constraints of the broader economies 
that create distance from the Palestinian margins and collective action. The prizes awarded by the 
international film festivals, but also Days of Cinema, all encourage the transnational circulation of 
Palestinian cinema, its reputation and the promise of new capital for future productions. While 
filmmakers have devised solutions to turn the requirements for art cinema into opportunities to 
speak to the Palestinian margins and the Palestinians as marginal, there still lacks proper 
engagement with outreach in terms of institution-building, as a means of inscribing the 
embodiment, sustainability and revival of social relations into lasting collective structures. In 
addition to production and distribution, Shashat has fashioned its own prize dedicated to Sulaffa 
Jadallah, who filmed and fought alongside Mustapha Abu ‘Ali and Hani Jawhariyyeh without ever 
obtaining the same recognition and legacy. Although very little advertised, the prize constituted 
an attempt to intervene in the field of cultural legitimization by re-repositioning women 
filmmakers at its center, and as makers of history.  
This objective was also sought by screening women’s insights into and contributions to 
revolutionary cinema. Shashat thus complicated the gendered association of static sumud with 
women’s passive defense of the land, but also offered a counterpoint to a male-defined form of 
grassroots organization. A Palestine Cinema Institute and General Union of the Palestinian Women 
film, Nabeeha Lotfi’s Li-Anna al-Judhur lan Tamut/Because Roots Do Not Die (1975-77) 
documents the life of Palestinian women and children in Tal al-Zaatar refugee camp in Lebanon, 
before, during, and after it falls prey to a destructive siege by Lebanese Christian militias in August 
1976, which ended in the massacre of the camp’s population. Partly constructed around local 
memories collected before the destruction of the camp, the film’s editing shows women alternating 
between their various domestic tasks, from kneading the dough and hanging the laundry to 
assembling their guns in anticipation of the battle. Following the evacuation of the camp, the 
                                                
42 I owe this remark to Mohanad Yaqubi.  
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women narrate the loss of their sons and daughters, as well as their own sacrifices. Dahna 
Abourahme’s The Kingdom of Women (2010) similarly focuses on women’s labor and their 
reconstruction of the Ein el-Helweh refugee camp after Israeli attacks in 1982 and in the wake of 
the PLO’s departure. Finally, Heiny Srour’s Layla wa al-Ziap/Leila and the Wolves (1984) 
playfully re-tells the history of Palestinian women’s resistance whose multiple forms of heroism – 
from smuggling weapons under the nose of the occupying British army and throwing boiling water 
onto soldiers to turning their guns against the Irgun terrorist group during the infamous 1948 Deir 
el-Yassin massacre – have consistently been denied and dismissed by their male comrades starting 
from the 1936 revolt until the Lebanese Civil War.  
Addressing the refugee, even if this meant refashioning the Palestinian identity as freedom 
fighter, has provided the impulse for outreach in the militant era. After Oslo, this became an ethical 
imperative because the Palestinian Authority ceased to represent Palestinians outside of Palestine 
in what has been widely perceived as an utter betrayal. The positionalities of refugees and women, 
epitomes of marginality, encapsulate the stakes of Palestinian self-determination and collective 
projects, including of film representation and organization. It is significant that Mohanad Yaqubi’s 
Off Frame, a protracted project on “a people in search of an image,” follows this transformation 
of the marginal par excellence, thus turning the filmmaker himself into a researcher of what and 
who is always already excluded. The never-ending quest for a social relation of the Palestinian 
collective that translates into a style (an independent Arab cinema?) necessarily poses the question 
of inclusion as opposed to unity – the question of outreach.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the conceptual convergence of distinct film and political historical 
projects devised around “sustainability.” The goal has been to map out the frictions, overlap, 
contradictions and negotiations between the multifarious meanings of sustainability which coexist 
in the contemporary formations of collective and economic futures for cinema in Palestine. A 
discourse simultaneously, yet differentially, rooted in 1960s Palestinian steadfastness, 1970s 
militant politics, 1980s grassroots organizations, as well as contemporary neoliberal resilience and 
aid economies, sustainability organizes current Palestinian efforts in expanding their networks of 
film production and exhibition towards marginalized populations and isolated areas. The multi-
layering of sustainability both constrains film workers to performing a constant adjustment to 
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economies of aid and human development and opens up possibilities for infusing current 
formulations of economic futures with militant strategies inherited from earlier periods of 
resistance to colonization. The conceptual convergence builds a bridge between histories and 
potentially re-ignites the militant potential of narratives of sustainability, modes of collective work, 
as well as the integration of audiences.  
I first argued that a commitment to economic sustainability and values of empowerment 
and capacity-building conditions the possibility for financial viability of Palestinian film projects 
in the contemporary West Bank. In cinephiliac economies, this translates into a hierarchized 
network of media centers and peripheries. By contrast, Palestinian cinema NGOs dedicate their 
resources to canvasing the territories in order to rally more audience members. These two projects 
sketch competing yet complementary maps of outreach, film aesthetics, and ideologies of popular 
access. Despite these divergences, the cinephiliac and NGO initiatives both locate their industrial 
and institutional models in the specter of Palestinian militant cinema. By examining the 
acknowledged and unwitting resonances between historical modes of filmmaking and cultural 
formations, this chapter has located the political future of sustainability at the crossroads of its 







Chapter Four – Emergency: Humanitarianism and the Life of Cinema 
 
In my family, we love the sun. We decided to sit 
outside and watch the F16s bombing Rafah.  
Fida Qishta, The Guardian, 2009. 
 
 
Mohamed Jabaly’s documentary Isa’af/Ambulance (2015) begins with a series of statistics 
assessing the human and material damage caused by the murderous Israeli bombings on Gaza 
during the Summer 2014. The noise of urban life, suddenly interrupted by the fall of a missile, 
provides the soundtrack to those measurements. When the film’s image finally emerges from the 
dark screen, it does so from the rubble. The handheld camera traces the panic of the 
cinematographer’s body as he runs, panting, towards the scene where the attack has taken place. 
Here the film edits together two complementary points of view: one that accompanies paramedics 
in the midst of the house’s debris in search of trapped dwellers; the other, a drone-generated bird’s 
eye view, which situates the filmmaker’s camera among the many reporters and rescuers on site 
(Fig. 7). The film thus makes evident the inextricable articulation of recording technologies and 
destruction (particularly manifest with the use of the drone), but also the convergence between 
economies of filming and saving lives. Jabaly shot Ambulance as he toured with Abu Mazrouq’s 
medical team from one explosion to the other. Upon their return to the hospital’s Emergency 
Room, the ambulance would be welcomed by a crowd of reporters, photographers, and camera 
operators intent on following the paramedics to the surgery ward. The movement of sewing bodies 
together was therefore entwined with its very documentation at every given moment. During the 
bombings, hospitals formed a new public sphere, both as a forum where the public opinion would 
get shaped through news documentation, and a shelter where dispossessed injured and non-injured 
families alike would feel safe. Under Jabaly’s camera and sutured through a collective effort of 
reportage, hospitals operated as guarantors of Gazans’ physical and social life. They would also, 
for that very reason, become a privileged target for Israel’s attacks.43  
  
                                                
43 In an opinion piece in The Guardian, Helena Kennedy mentions that 17 hospitals, 56 primary healthcare 
facilities, and 45 ambulances were damaged or destroyed, and that the total cost of the conflict to Gaza’s 
healthcare system is estimated at $50m. Helena Kennedy, “The 2014 Conflict Left Gaza’s Healthcare 








Figure 7: Two complementary points of view in Mohammed Jabaly’s Ambulance (screenshots). 
 
In this analysis, Ambulance does not provide a comment on the power of witnessing. I take 
seriously Pooja Rangan’s critique of documentaries’ exploitative involvement with endangered 
and dehumanized lives (Rangan 2017, 1). Similarly, the aforementioned interconnection of filming 
and saving lives does not infer a link of causality between the two. In Ambulance, camera operators 
would often obstruct the way to the surgery room, or reporters would pressure a patient in need of 
breathing space. Instead, this interconnection points to a material, aesthetic, and political 
convergence between humanitarian economies and the metaphorical and material revival (the 
bringing back to life) of cinema in Gaza, of which the making of Ambulance and its successful 
circulation in international human rights, news media, and documentary festivals are also 
testament.44 I have touched upon two different types of convergence earlier. Chapter Two 
                                                
44 Ambulance received the One World Media award and won several other prizes, including at the BBC 
Arabic Festival, Festival International de Programmes Audiovisuels (FIPA), and Days of Cinema. The film 
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examined the convergence between the news and the cinephiliac film economies as a site of 
competition between two divergent visions of institutional development. In turn, Chapter Three 
engaged with the conceptual convergence around the term “sustainability.” This convergence 
highlights both the paralleling interests of human development and community outreach film 
projects on the one hand, and the possibility of reactivating revolutionary meanings in tension with 
aid and human rights’ futurities on the other. In Chapter Four, I am theorizing the convergence 
between film economies and humanitarianism in Gaza as an example of what Lila Abu-Lughod 
calls “the cultural life of human rights.” 
In her study of women’s rights in Egypt and Palestine, Abu-Lughod offers an alternative 
to the “moral posturing that traffics in judgements of the work of women’s rights as either a form 
of collusion with imperialism (to be denounced) or a hopeful sign of universal emancipation and 
progress (to be celebrated)” (Abu Lughod 2010, 32). In other words, these are two visions of rights 
as ontological (Douzinas 2007, 7). Instead, she argues, we should track how human rights are 
themselves organizing discourses that both shape and get shaped by local practices and social and 
political fields. As a result, in this chapter, I examine how the cultural life of human rights and 
humanitarianism effectively constitutes the very material and discursive framework that allows 
practitioners to articulate various strategies for developing a Gazan film economy, whose life, 
expressed in almost biological terms, needs regenerating. In other words, the multiple projects 
involved in making cinema possible in the Strip situate their intervention within the realms of 
humanitarianism and human rights by differentially locating cinema as both essential to Gazans’ 
social cohesion and resistance, and as an infrastructure itself endowed with a life that is threatened 
by Israeli and/or Islamist aggressions.  
Although human rights and humanitarian discourses and economies are necessarily 
interconnected, their temporalities, aims, and modes of action differ. For Costas Douzinas, one of 
the complexities of human rights rhetoric dwells in the confusion between legal and moral 
discourses, and their respective characteristics as real and ideal (Douzinas 2007, 8). As such, 
human rights remain an open horizon: as either a principle to defend in a court of law, or one to 
uphold in the face of injustice. On the contrary, humanitarianism subordinates human rights 
                                                
was also selected at prestigious documentary festivals such as Sheffield Doc, International Documentary 
Festival of Amsterdam (IDFA), or CPH:DOX in Denmark. The film also screened in Palestine at Days of 
Cinema and opened the Red Carpet Human Rights Film Festival in Gaza.  
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discourses to the calculations of emergency’s immediate present. Craig Calhoun draws a clear 
distinction between humanitarianism and human rights in his study of emergency as a social 
imaginary in global affairs: 
Humanitarianism is … kept distinct from several other projects. It is not the long-term 
agenda of economic development. It is not the promotion of democracy. It is not the 
advocacy for human rights. It is the focus on immediate response suggested by the 
emergency imaginary, with its emphasis on apparently sudden, unpredictable, short-term 
explosion of suffering (Calhoun 2010, 49). 
 
These differential temporalities and economies do not form two separate logics that operate in 
parallel. Instead, humanitarianism reconfigures human rights to the service of humanitarian 
politics in which all disasters, whether of natural origins or not, are mediated by planned regimes 
of governance that are all but “sudden” and “unpredictable.” In The Least of All Possible Evils: 
Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza (2012), Eyal Weizman coins the term “humanitarian 
present” to describe how, since the 2000s, humanitarian management has come to replace regular 
modes of political governance in contexts where the collusion of humanitarianism, human rights 
and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is abused by state, supra-state and military action 
(Weizman 2012, 18). This regime of crisis management is articulated around risk assessment and 
the testing and calculation of acceptable thresholds of destruction and deaths, with the oppressive 
states’ objective to maintain a certain degree of legitimacy in front of the International Community 
while enforcing maximum control on the ground. As Weizman explains elsewhere, such a focus 
“creates an extended present without a conception of history and future, and thus without politics” 
(cited in Manfredi 2013, 170).  
Gaza proves an epitome of the humanitarian present, one that is protracted, continuous, 
and almost permanent, and which has crept in with increased restrictions to movement since 1991 
and the building of the barrier in 1994. The process has worsened since the 2006 legislative 
elections that brought Hamas to power, in reaction to which Israel enclosed the Strip and unleashed 
a cycle of bombings on its inhabitants. Food aid dependency, unemployment, as well as the lack 
of access to basic services and medical supplies all constitute facets of Israel’s “‘humanitarian 
management,’ exercised as the calibration of life-sustaining flows of resources through the 
physical enclosure, one meant to keep the entire population close to the minimum limit of physical 
existence” (Weizman 2012, 210). In this scenario of “almost humanitarian crisis, but not quite,” 
the catastrophe is always imminent. In 2012, a UN report asked: “Gaza in 2020, A Liveable 
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Place?” It established that 90% of the water was unfit for drinking and expected the aquifer to be 
unusable by 2016, while the water’s contamination by salinization and sewage would prove 
irreversible by 2020 (UNCT 2012, 3). Yet, it seems hardly necessary to wait for the 100% 
landmark to assume that infrastructural issues and the limited access to basic resources such as 
water already threaten livelihood in Gaza and make it unlivable as it is. Adi Ophir calls this 
“catastrophization,” the discursive interval “that makes possible both moral urgency and political 
manipulation” (Ophir 2010, 57). “Catastrophic suspension” ultimately encourages the 
collaboration of forces of catastrophization and those that attempt to prevent it, uniting them in 
their shared interest to keep catastrophe at a distance (Ophir 2010, 62). Gaza’s repeated destruction 
thus sheds light on the failures of humanitarianism as a coping mechanism only addressing the 
immediate present and complicit in maintaining the state of imminent disaster. For Head of the 
UN Work and Relief Agency (UNWRA) Karen Koning Abu Ziad, Gaza is “on the threshold of 
becoming the first territory to be intentionally reduced to a state of abject destitution, with the 
knowledge, acquiescence and – some would say – encouragement of the international community” 
(cited in Amnesty International et al. 2008).  
Questioning the livability of Gaza is prompted by the obvious and urgent facts on the 
ground, but this focus also risks perpetuating a humanitarian discourse on futurity. Weizman’s 
discussion of the “humanitarian minimum” cannot but evoke Agamben’s concept of “bare life.” 
Widely used in the literature about the various forms of occupation enacted on Palestine, it situates 
Palestinian bodies as those “who may be killed, and yet not sacrificed,” those on which (Israeli) 
sovereignty builds its power by excluding them through their very inclusion (Agamben 1998, 8). 
The generalization of bare life as the permanent state of exception provides a seminal framework 
for thinking of Palestine’s fragmented space and refugee camps (Hanafi and Long 2010, Hanafi 
2012). Yet, one can wonder to what extent the discourse of state of exception contributes to 
supporting the social imaginary of emergency and its material translation into humanitarian 
management. In Bonnie Honig’s words, what would it mean to “democratize” and “de-
exceptionalize emergency” (Honig 2014, 48)? How can we displace the focus on sovereignty as a 
trait of executive power and relocate it as a potential trait of popular power? In an earlier piece, 
Honig proposes a politics of care for the self, as a synecdoche for the system, which protects the 
integrity of democracy under emergency by focusing on the process of survival rather the moment 
of decision that justifies the state of exception. This survival is re-named “sur-vivance” after 
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Derrida and identified as “a surplus life” combined with “mere life.” Drawing from classical 
philosophy, the term adapts the concept of “overliving,” which applies “to those who ought to have 
died but go on to more life.” Sur-vivance thus signals “both the needs of life and the call to 
overlife” (Honig 2009, 10). This double signification fundamentally addresses the permanence of 
emergency and the simultaneous possibility for building Palestinian futures inherent to popular 
and populist resistance.  
This present chapter embraces Honig’s opening towards a politics of “more life” that 
coexists with the imperative of “mere life.” It examines how multi-directional efforts, whether top-
down (Hamas) or bottom-up (Palestinian film practitioners themselves), utilize the construction of 
emergency, humanitarian management, and economies of aid to revive a film culture in Gaza. 
Significantly, Helga Tawil-Souri claims that Gaza is larger than life because “its genius, its 
largeness is that despite conditions of a near-impossible normal life, [arts] continue and are 
generated anew” (Tawil-Souri 2016, 17, my emphasis). Revival thus both functions as a metaphor 
celebrating the ingenuity and resistance of Gazans and proposes very concrete ways of inhabiting 
the humanitarian present. Like Tawil-Souri and Dina Matar’s edited collection on Gaza, I take 
metaphor as a driving methodology for this chapter’s investigation (Matar and Tawil-Souri 2016). 
The rationale is here twofold. First, Gaza and its future emerge at the confluence of a multiplicity 
of humanitarian imaginaries formulated by various aid agencies, Hamas, Palestinian filmmakers, 
but also myself, a Western researcher who could access neither the Strip nor the festivals that 
constitute this study. More importantly here, a focus on metaphor engages the widespread 
discourses on revival that are commonly applied to infrastructures and economies in the Gazan 
context, and explores what it means to think about these literally. What does considering life and 
economies of cinema together reveal about the agency of Palestinians? In other words, I argue that, 
on the one hand, the metaphor operates as a descriptive tool of expanded contextualization that 
subjects all sectors of society to a broader semantic field (here: life, survival, and revival); on the 
other, it addresses the very material underpinnings of specific sur-vivance mechanisms and their 
reliance on various forms of humanitarianism.  
 Gaza’s cinema life is embedded in the local humanitarian history. The first movie theatres 
opened in the mid-1940s. These were followed by mobile screenings organized by UNRWA that 
traveled around refugee camps as early as 1948. The waves of openings and closures of the 
cinemas reflected the political tensions and the rise of political Islam. Gaza cinema historian 
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Mahmoud al-Roqa estimates that over ten movie theatres emerged over four decades (cited in 
Othman 2015). After a first interruption at the beginning of the Israeli colonization in 1967, the 
cinemas continued to operate until the First Intifada, when the Israelis shut them down again. The 
few later attempts at re-opening certain theatres at the time of Oslo, with the establishment of the 
Palestinian Authority in the Strip in the mid-1990s, failed, because the venues were immediately 
subjected to vandalism. This resulted from tensions between various social groups, and the arsons 
were attributed to Hamas and the other Islamic movements who accused theatres of screening 
pornographic content (Euromed Audiovisual 2013, 99; Othman 2015). After the 2006 
Parliamentary elections and the subsequent domination of Hamas over the Strip, the Islamic 
movement formulated new policies towards cinema, which it considered could be part of the 
project of resistance, independence, and reconstruction. Maybe surprisingly then, Gaza has been 
home to several film festivals recently, among which many are encouraged by Hamas itself. The 
EU-funded program Euromed Audiovisual’s 2013 report on Palestine identified four festivals in 
Gaza: The Gaza International Film Festival, the Gaza Documentary Film Festival and Through 
Women’s Eyes Film Festival,45 whose starting dates are not indicated, and the Gaza Palestine 
International Festival of Films announced by Hamas in January 2013 (Euromed Audiovisual 2013, 
104). To these must be added the 2009 International Al Quds Film Festival and the Red Carpet 
Karama Human Rights Film Festival initiated in 2015, as well as the Gaza antennae of festivals 
that are primarily based in the West Bank like the Shashat Women’s Film Festival, the Franco-
Arab Film Festival, the Young International Filmmakers Festival, and Days of Cinema, discussed 
in earlier chapters. This chapter focuses on the period spanning from 2007 until today.  
In order to lay out the mechanisms of convergence between the humanitarian and cinema 
economies in Gaza, I begin by examining the Strip’s contemporary visual regimes under 
emergency. I retrace how the representational trope of victimhood is engrained in histories of 
humanitarianism that has informed current modes of image-making and spectatorship in Gaza. I 
look at a series of film examples that problematize what type of filmmaking can emerge from 
within emergency, and question what conceptual framework can adequately address the conditions 
of possibility for cinema in the Strip. Secondly, I argue that local film festivals pragmatically 
                                                
45 I couldn’t find much information on these. Palestinian festivals’ names as well as their English 
translations tend to be very much in flux. Moreover, many of them sound similar and it can be hard to tell 
them apart, or sometimes even be sure that they are not one and the same.  
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operate at the intersection of human rights, humanitarianism, and cinema networks that make 
possible international and regional alliances for Hamas and independent Palestinian filmmakers 
alike. I build on the metaphor of the humanitarian space to understand how Hamas and filmmakers 
differentially utilize human rights discourse in order to financially support film festivals. However, 
divergently, this metaphorical figure reveals the actual material ramifications underlying the 
organization of these events. Finally, the metaphor of the humanitarian space points to the broader 
semantic field of “revival” and “bringing back to life,” which pervades descriptions of 
reconstruction economies in Gaza during emergency. Following the intersections and divergences 
of Hamas and independent endeavors, I focus on film infrastructures and the project of an art 
cinema industry as the locus for the reconstruction of Gaza through film. The visual regime of art 
cinema, claimed in varied extents by the different actors, also proposes a new mode of image-
making and self-representation in tense compatibility with the humanitarian present of witnessing.  
 
Humanitarian Present’s Visual Regime 
The convergence of humanitarianism and film economies pertains to a long history of media 
representations and infrastructures’ involvement in human rights struggles and humanitarian 
crises, with its own specificity in Gaza and Palestine. The concomitance of the 1948 Nakba with 
the expansion of UN’s humanitarian mission is no coincidence. For Vijay Prashad and Karim 
Makdisi, “many of the early UN agencies were born of the conflict over Palestine, and many others 
would find themselves embroiled in it… The struggle over Palestine produced the institutions of 
‘peace-keeping’ and of the ‘UN mediator’” (Makdisi and Prashad 2017, 1-2). However, 
paradoxically, the UN itself sanctioned the Partition Plan that would allow the forced displacement 
of more than 750,000 Palestinians. This double history tends to be effaced by the presentist logics 
of emergency. While Weizman’s theory of the humanitarian present relies on a suspended 
temporality of risk calculation, anthropologist Ilana Feldman insists on the present of crisis, whose 
narrative of immediacy and exceptionality forges new thresholds of historical acceptability. More 
particularly, the rhetoric of “return to normalcy” after the “crisis” creates new standards of living 
conditions based on the context directly preceding the “disaster,” which was itself the consequence 
of a previous crisis left unresolved. As a result, “if crisis has the effect of lowering the floor for 
‘normal’ conditions, another effect of crisis language is the loss of history” (Feldman 2009, 30). 
In contrast to this erasure of time, Feldman argues that humanitarianism in fact constitutes the 
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most consistent aspect of Palestinian life since the Nakba. Early humanitarian interventions have 
had long-lasting consequences on the very fabric of Palestinian society. For example, the division 
between “native” Palestinians and “refugees” meant to facilitate the distribution of relief after 1948 
in Gaza has continuously structured how Gazans position themselves. In Feldman’s own words, 
humanitarianism thus “helps shape a political field of identity and action” (Feldman 2009, 27), 
which is also particularly manifest in visual representations of Palestinians as victims. 
 Since the early days of the colonization of Palestine, Zionism has undertaken to conceal 
the existence of the Palestinian people physically through ethnic cleansing. This occurs visually as 
well through the creation of a visual apparatus that denies Palestinians a history on the land (more 
on this in Chapter Five), with which humanitarian regimes have been to a certain extent complicit. 
In 1948, the UN tasked the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the American 
Friends Service Committee (AFSC, Quakers) with the responsibility of providing assistance to the 
refugees, before the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) took over the duties of 
coordination in 1950. In the general context of active Zionist concealment, these humanitarian 
organizations46 gained control over the representation of the so-called “Arab refugees,” producing 
a vision that intersected with a common Western and colonial imaginary of the Holy Land stuck 
in a mythical past, within which Palestinians constituted a mere folkloric addition. The ICRC’s 
film The Wanderers of Palestine (1950) as well as UNRWA’s productions Sands of Sorrow (1950) 
and Beneath the Bells of Bethlehem (1960s, n/d) established Palestinians as a passive mass of 
people victim to a timeless natural disaster. These representations de-contextualized Palestinians’ 
exile and connection to the land and reduced them to the poetic and universal category of refugees 
as wanderers (Latte Abdallah 2007, 69).  
The UN’s discourse shifted after 1967, when it recognized that the “Arab refugees” 
pertained to the dispossessed Palestinian people. UNRWA’s 1968 film The Aftermath thus 
provides a very different imagery of Palestinians’ daily life in the camps reminiscent of certain 
passages of Mustapha Abu ‘Ali’s 1974 militant film Laysa Lahum Wujud/They Do Not Exist. Here 
                                                
46 The United Nations Relief for Palestinian Refugees (UNRPR), in charge of coordinating the Quakers in 
Gaza, defended a vision very different from the ICRC. For the Quakers, the activity of relief was not to be 
dissociated from the role of mediators and conciliators, thus involving political stakes that were absent in 
the ICRC’s mandate. Their visual documentation reflected this stance, and it established a continuity 
between the pre- and post-exodus period by showing life in Gaza before 1948. However, these 
representations were minor (Latte Abdallah 2007, 66).  
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exile is historicized through a cartography of Palestine’s fragmentation. The documentation of 
refugees’ schools, daily chores, medical visits, and multiple job activities is combined with 
interviews about Palestinians’ hope to return home. Yet, The Aftermath is no revolutionary film. 
Its rendering of Palestine’s history is told with a passive voice that obscures the responsibility of 
colonial powers. The film parades the names of the donors involved in assisting refugees’ 
education, care, and daily supplies through oral mentions, intertitles superimposed on the image, 
and visual quotes of the organizations’ logos on advertising boards.47 It ends with a tirade about 
the importance of knowledge as a tool for self-improvement (rather than struggle) illustrated with 
footage of children at school, who evoke future discourses of human development, as studied in 
Chapter Three.  
In contrast with the popular call for the budding liberation struggle, the film’s voice-over 
concludes that it remains for the international community as a whole to secure a just peace 
settlement as a condition for the region’s political stability. That the protagonists and the voice-
over all express themselves in English with an Arabic accent suggests that the film was intended 
for an international audience and the donors upon which UNRWA’s work of assistance greatly 
depends. Moreover, it reveals the involvement of local populations in the making of the film.48 
Sociologist Riccardo Bocco reminds us that the Agency’s employee base (which excludes the 
managing class) has historically been composed of more than 99% Palestinian refugees and host 
country nationals. As a result, he argues that “the history of UNRWA and the history of Palestinian 
refugees are … inseparable” (Bocco 2010, 236).  
In a dynamic comparable with the training of Palestinian filmmakers by international news 
agencies during the Second Intifada (evoked in Chapter Two), one can wonder what kind of impact 
the growing culture of human rights has had on crafting a Palestinian visual language about their 
own suffering. This, as always, raises the question of the different ways used to prevent 
Palestinians from narrating their story (Said 1984), and whether humanitarian images play a role 
in censoring their voice by confining it to pre-established forms of representation. Most recently 
under Gaza’s bombing in 2008, 2012, and 2014, international documenting crews retreated like 
they did during the Second Intifada, leaving Palestinians with the dangerous task of recording the 
                                                
47 These include the Lutheran World Federation, the Norwegian Refugee Council, the British Save the 
Children Fund, the Near East Christian Council Committee for Refugee Work, and the UNRWA.  
48 Samir Hissen is cited in the credits as one of the film’s narrators, and Salim Fakhoury as responsible for 
the sound work.  
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explosions assumed to be already part of their quotidian life. The devolution of reporting 
responsibilities resembles the turn towards “remote management” in humanitarian organizations. 
This expression designates the techniques international humanitarian agencies have been 
implementing in the past fifteen to twenty years in response to an increased perception of risk in 
the countries where they intervene. The technique consists of evacuating humanitarian workers in 
order to keep them safe, while continuing to control rescue operations from afar by relying on local 
organizations (Smirl 2015, 75). The Palestinian images produced under emergency tend to both 
relay international humanitarian imaginaries and, by the same token, materialize the global 
hierarchy of the lives that can be spared, and those that can be wasted.  
One could establish a continuity between films like The Aftermath and Fida Qishta’s Where 
Should the Birds Fly? (2013). A former wedding photographer documenting life in Gaza and its 
promise of future reproduction (literally, the “surplus life”!), Qishta started documenting the 
violence and destruction brought about by the siege as part of her involvement with international 
human rights observers and the International Solidarity Movement. Where Should the Birds Fly is 
narrated in English by the journalist filmmaker and follows Mona, a young girl who witnessed 
first-hand the 2008 bombings and recounts her trauma in the midst of the cities’ rubble (Fig. 8). 
Replacing words with images in support of a supposedly international language, the film proposes 
“a visual documentation of the Goldstone Report”49 according to the promotional website, while 
also revealing “the strength and hope, the humanity and humor that flourishes among the people 
of Gaza” (Where Should The Birds Fly, 2018). Seemingly a rather simple promotional gesture and 
a discursive metaphor, the parallel with the UN report discloses the convergence of imaginaries 
assembled around an ethics of legal and humanitarian witnessing that also guides the making of 
the film. The UN fact-finding mission suggested that the Israeli army and the Palestinian armed 
groups bore equal responsibility in war crimes and possible crimes against humanity (Goldstone 
2009, 419, par. 1950). Exposing themselves to bullets and bombs, Palestinian filmmakers’ 
testimonies, as opposed to fighters, embody a significant, legitimate resistance in the eyes of the 
international community. As Qishta herself argues on the film’s website: “I feel safe behind the 
                                                
49 The Goldstone Report, also known as the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, was 
a team formed by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) set to investigate the violations of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law after the so-called Operation Cast Lead 
in 2008-9.  
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Figure 8: Where Should the Birds Fly described as the visual documentation of the Goldstone Report 
(screenshots). 
 
Celebrating life and resilience in Gaza, both of which allowed the making of the film itself, 
Where Should the Birds Fly also conveys the renewed possibility for Palestinians to produce 
images of their own plight and humanity under the imagined auspices of the UN and international 
law. Significantly, the promotional discourse surrounding the film presents it as the first production 
documenting the Gaza attacks directed by Palestinians themselves. This unique point of view adds 
value to the authenticity of the testimony at the moment when global solidarity groups advertise 
the film’s world-wide screenings in community centers and film festivals for documentaries, 
human rights, and emerging talents. Moreover, the humanitarian discourse is here combined with 
one about the emergence of a certain kind of Palestinian filmmaking in the Strip, thus supplanting 
historical precedents of fiction films such as Rashid Masharawi’s Gaza-based Hatta Ishaar 
Akhar/Curfew (1993), itself considered the first film produced by a Palestinian company. Predating 
the siege by almost fifteen years (yet a couple of years after 1991’s early restrictions on 
movement), Curfew introduces the consequences of Israel’s military occupation through a closed 
drama unfolding in the backyard of a Gazan family confined to their house. These stylistic and 
narrative choices directly oppose the logics of witnessing and its wide landscapes of misery. The 
broad discourse that situates Qishta’s production at the start of one genealogy of Gazan filmmaking 
thus effectively places contemporary Palestinian cinema and its economy within a temporality of 
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crisis, one that rewrites new beginnings as a counter to destruction by the very act of erasing a 
non-humanitarian past. Ultimately, Where Should the Birds Fly’s promotional discourse points to 
the crafting of a new niche assisting the distribution of Palestinian cinema: that of the Palestinian 
human rights film, which relies on a certain image of Palestinians as victims.  
This brief historical census of humanitarian images of Palestine illustrates the complex 
articulation of the concealment of Palestinians’ existence and rights through processes of 
delegitimization put in place by Zionist media, and the hypervisibility of Palestinian suffering 
enhanced by the human rights and humanitarian economy. There is no Palestinian or Palestine-
oriented NGO or humanitarian organization that has not engaged with posters and video campaigns 
exposing the sufferings of men, women, and children under occupation or the bombs. As Feldman 
remarks after Luc Boltanski and others, “the global circulation of images of suffering becomes a 
necessity for ‘transforming emotion into donations’” (Feldman 2009, 25; Boltanski 1999). This 
has thus materialized as a central strategy for human rights organizations to collect funds. John 
Collins famously remarked that Palestinians’ double-edged visibility both supports the 
development of a global consciousness and has facilitated the control of Palestinian representation 
by their opponents (Collins 2011, 6), contributing to what Gil Hochberg has called “a pre-existing, 
saturated, overdetermined field of representation” (Hochberg 2015, 125). In addition to being a 
currency, victimhood becomes something that can be proportionally measured and utilized by both 
the oppressor and those who side with the oppressed. The necessary calculation of what counts as 
proper victimhood makes it a very versatile weapon, since victims always run the risk of losing 
their status. The 2014 war on Gaza has proved that the value of the casualties could be appropriated 
in various ways. The discourse around the injured and killed could quickly shift from victims to 
“human shields,” that is to say from being the recipient of a colonial attack to being more or less 
willing combatants thus responsible for their own death – while Palestinian men are always already 
considered guilty (Mikdashi 2014).  
Other Palestinian filmmakers and artists have reflected on the kind of image that can be 
produced and circulated from within humanitarian disasters. In her five-minute video made in 
response to the 2014 bombings, Shuja’yiah, Land of the Brave (2014), Hadeel Assali subscribes 
to the humanitarian visual regime to the extent that she highlights Gazans’ denied humanity. The 
film responds to the moral obligation of sharing the Palestinian people’s humanity as a gesture of 
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assistance50 and as a means of pressuring higher authorities into actively sending humanitarian 
help. Similar to a home movie, the video features footage of Assali’s own family and daily life in 
Gaza during the relatively peaceful Summer of 2013, thus aiming to attract the detached spectator 
into a personal commitment towards the lives that would be destroyed in 2014. However, the film’s 
tension emanates from the images’ contrast with the voice-over, a passionate speech by journalist 
Samer Zaneed accusing the ICRC in particular of having abandoned Palestinians during the 
bombings by refusing their calls to provide assistance. Assali here recognizes the limitations of 
witnessing images of violence and its translation into humanitarian action. Instead, she relies on 
the power of everyday images to keep humanitarian organizations accountable in front of the 
international community of viewers, and points to the losses these agencies could have prevented.  
In his rigorous study of the politics of human rights “after evil,” Robert Meister examines 
how these have developed as “a new political discourse of global power that claims to supersede 
the cruelties perpetrated by both revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries” during the Cold War 
(Meister 2011, 2). This shift has informed conceptions of victims, perpetrators, beneficiaries, and 
bystanders, in which bystanders are reconfigured from being indifferent onlookers to 
compassionate witnesses. This recasting of moral responsibility also redeems past and present 
beneficiaries and absolves indifference through affective expression. As a result, the spectator-
witness identifies with the victim, feeling and performing common humanity, and refusing to 
recognize oneself in the bystander who has not experienced the same feeling of compassion. In 
this case, Meister argues, “the fantasmatic ‘we’ … is the transtemporal union of the consumer of 
today’s visual culture of human rights and the past bystander whom they are not” (Meister 2011, 
214).  
To return to Shuja’yiah, Land of the Brave, Assali’s refusal to show images of violence 
and immediate victimhood privileges dignity over compassion in order to reshape the fantasmatic 
“we” in positive terms. Moreover, Assali’s gesture exposes the ICRC as bystanders who failed to 
recognize Palestinians’ humanity. She gives the organization no opportunity to express the 
compassion necessary to redeem themselves as witnesses by denying them the spectacle of 
Palestinian suffering. The film thus uses specific mechanisms of counter-witnessing that reassert 
                                                
50 Luc Boltanski argues that “speaking up” in its different forms (including through film) is necessary for 
the spectator (here Hadeel Assali) to maintain their integrity when direct action is impossible (Boltanski 
1999, 20).  
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humanitarian organizations’ responsibility during the bombings. Assali charges the ICRC with 
choosing to respect the military zone established by Israel instead of fulfilling their moral and 
professional duty of assistance. For her, this makes the Red Cross both bystanders and perpetrators, 
in a reversal that reinstates the duality of perpetrator/victim which the status of the witness has 
effaced. In a regretful yet unapologetic response to Palestinians’ widespread anger at the ICRC in 
The Guardian, Head of the Red Cross Delegation in Israel and the Occupied Territories Jacques 
de Maio considered that the ICRC “cannot end the conflict. As ever, humanitarian organizations 
are a sticking plaster, not the solution” (de Maio 2014). Yet simultaneously, pro-Palestinian 
investigative journalists have reported the ICRC’s collusion with Israeli military think tanks,51 thus 
broadening the scope of the organization’s involvement with the occupying regime and sustaining 
the ambiguity of a position that is not “neutral” despite its own claims.52   
If Shuja’yiah, Land of the Brave does foreground dignified images of Palestinians that 
circumvent the visual language of victimhood, the objective of re-humanizing these othered bodies 
continues to hold a testimonial function. As a result, Palestinians’ victimhood is still implied at the 
same moment we are denied a view of their suffering (Fig. 9). Victimhood, or the celebration, on 
screen, of the lives which we presume have been lost, remains that which guarantees and reveals 
Palestinians’ humanity – as well as the ICRC’s culpability. The risk might then be that the film 
reproduces the exclusion of Palestinians through their very participation, by marking them “as 
others … through the seemingly inclusive gesture of inviting them to perform their humanity” 
(Rangan 2017, 6). This, Pooja Rangan argues, is conveyed through documentary’s trope of 
“immediation,” which promises an unmediated truth while reinventing “the very disenfranchised 
humanity that it claims to redeem” (Rangan 2017, 1). As such, the discourse of dignity, which 
surrounds many humanitarian films (including Where Should the Birds Fly) and festivals like the 
                                                
51 In her article “Why is the ICRC helping defend Israeli war crimes?,” The Electronic Intifada writer	
Charlotte Silver reports that the Red Cross co-sponsored a conference planned with an Israeli military 
strategy think tank, the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), during which allegations of war crime 
on behalf of Israel were indemnified (Silver 2014).  
52 “Neutrality” is invoked as a humanitarian principle in International Law. However, various humanitarian 
organizations position themselves differently with respect to it. While Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has 
historically opposed neutrality (and defended interventionism), ICRC primarily describes its own neutrality 
as deriving from its legal status as a neutral body, in which neutrality represents “the duty to abstain from 
any act which, in a conflict situation, might be interpreted as furthering the interests of one party to the 
conflict or jeopardizing those of the other” (ICRC website).   
	
	 172 
Karama53 Film Festival (in Jordan, Palestine, and beyond) that choose to foreground Palestinian 
empowerment, supports the re-shaping of a humanity that can apply to Palestinians at the same 




Figure 9: Humanizing Palestinians in Shuja’yiah, Land of the Brave (screenshots). 
 
In contrast, Gil Hochberg contends that Basma Alsharif’s We Began by Measuring 
Distance (2008) “interrogates the limits of visual images of violence and suffering to solicit any 
meaningful ethical and/or political reaction from their spectators by the way of their pleasing 
aesthetic effects” (Hochberg 2015, 120). Produced before and during so-called Operation Cast 
Lead, the film combines archival news footage and shots of natural life (jellyfish, forests, seagrass) 
reminiscent of Jean Painlevé’s surrealistic depiction of seahorses. By reframing representations of 
Israeli bombings and women in distress with spectacles of natural beauty, We Began by Measuring 
Distance points to the fetishization of the war on Gaza – as well as its naturalization – and reveals 
                                                
53 “Karama” means “dignity” in Arabic.  
	
	 173 
the status of these images qua images. As Alsharif puts it vis-à-vis the impossibility of making 
sense of the news coverage, “Gaza became a cluster of digital pixels” (cited in Hochberg 2015, 
129). This description provides a fuller meaning to Alsharif’s later video Home Movies Gaza 
(2013), in which images of daily life disclose the quotidian political violence of the siege. The film 
shows a similar fascination for the capture mechanisms of the natural realm by technologies of 
recording and measurement. In Home Movies Gaza, a National Geographic documentary airs on 
the TV of Alsharif’s family house in Gaza City, depicting the slow death of an elephant under the 
attack of a pack of lions. The image twitches and blurs – a “signal” of Palestinians’ waning control 
over their own satellite space – until the killing is made indistinguishable. The television’s pixels 
become then directly transferred onto the body of animals outside of the documentary. Blue bolts 
of lightning travel along a fly’s chest as it dwells on a tablecloth; the blue color gradually invades 
turkeys’ bodies in the yard, turning them into the photographic negative of their own image (Fig. 
10). At the very moment pixels take over what Agamben would call zoe (bare life, the non-
qualified life for which animals here seem to stand), the camera’s time code appears. Imaging 
functions as a measurement of the time of life, following the logic of the humanitarian calculation 
of risks and thresholds of acceptable catastrophe.  
 
 
Figure 10: Basma Alsharif, Home Movies Gaza (screenshots) 
 
In We Began… (2008), measurement was able to grasp one meaning of the war on Gaza – 
on the condition, however, that measurement itself be subverted. The playful calculation of 
obvious physical distances (“we measured a 360-degree circle and found it to be 360 degrees”) 
transitions into absurd translations (the dimensions of an apple are “an orange”) and political 
measurements between emblematic Palestinian cities and historical colonial landmarks (Fig. 11a). 
The Madrid agreements and the Oslo Accords were supposed to bring Gaza and Jerusalem closer, 
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but the distance of 78 km, seemingly unattainable after the construction of the wall, remains 
dictated by the 1916 Balfour Declaration, the 1948 Nakba, and the 1967 Naksa. In both videos, 
Alsharif transports her belief from images onto the poetry of language itself and places a visual 
emphasis on the English subtitling of the Arabic narration. Rather than a retrospective addition to 
the video aimed at widening its audience, the subtitles appear in bright yellow across the image 
and replace the objective translation of measurement with the poetic translation of words. For 
example, the growing feeling of being “unsettled” (in both senses of being ill at ease and 
dispossessed from their land) expressed by the voice-over through the long repetition of “more” is 
inscribed as a glowing banner over the landscape (Fig. 11b). The relationship between words and 
images, and between Arabic and English, might provide a better starting point for a critical 
engagement with the effects of persisting colonization. With their disbelief in the image as 
testimony, We Began and Home Movies Gaza follow critical theory’s approach to humanitarian 
visual regimes, which the films treat as inherently de-humanizing and unable to forge solidarities 
(Chouliaraki 2013, 42).   
 
 




Conversely, twin artists Arab and Tarzan Nasser’s approach to images from within 
emergency differs much from Alsharif’s intellectualizing take. The two brothers, who gained 
notoriety when their short Condom Lead (2013) and feature Dégradé (2015) were selected at 
Cannes, started as visual artists in Gaza and protégés of filmmaker and festival director-to-be 
Khalil Mozian. To them, Hollywood and auteur cinema represented visual reference points much 
more than news reportage ever did. In their series of posters and DVD covers entitled Gazawood 
(2010), they unlock the cinematic potential of the contemporary and historical code names of 
Israel’s military operations in Gaza. The series features imagery from imaginary films that can 
never be produced due to the local lack of film infrastructures. The posters for Autumn Clouds, 
Cast Lead, Defensive Shield, and Wooden Leg among others all feature the two brothers in the 
process of reenacting tropes of Hollywood genres such as action films and Westerns – whose 
colonial foundations are particularly appropriate in this context (Fig. 12). The series’ title, which 
evidently evokes Hollywood, could also constitute a grassroots and artistic response to the 2009 
announcement of “Hamaswood,” the Islamic movement’s institutional and self-proclaimed effort 
at building a film industry, which I discuss later on in the chapter. However, “Gazawood” mostly 
re-asserts Gaza as a cinematic site, a place where cinema’s drama and storytelling is inherent to 
life in the humanitarian and military present. The “surplus life” of entertainment here replaces 
witnessing as “mere life”’s mode of image-making and spectatorship, and as a source of 
imagination for future filmmaking infrastructures.  
  
Figure 12: Arab and Tarzan Nasser, Gazawood series (Palestine Poster Project Archives) 
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Scholars of humanitarian visual studies have differentially attempted to rescue 
humanitarian visual regimes and their testimonial function, including by investigating their use in 
a variety of activist contexts. A landmark in the field, Lilie Chouliaraki’s 2013 book The Ironic 
Spectator: Solidarity in the Age of Post-Humanitarianism acknowledges the increasing reliance of 
humanitarian campaigns on the marketing logic of the corporate world. Yet, Chouliaraki proposes 
that the theatrical foundations of humanitarian communications can be salvaged if we focus on 
theatre’s classical potential for pedagogy. The collapse of grand narratives of solidarity (formerly 
spearheaded by Marxism for example) and the technologization of communications, should open 
us up to a reconfiguration of solidarity by way of new communicative practices that support a 
restored humanitarian imaginary (Chouliaraki 2013, 45). Similarly, Sonia Tascón and Tyson Wils 
consider humanitarian visual regimes as part of a broader structure that circulates images and 
which can further their potential for social change. For them, activist film festivals and the space 
they create for discussion and organizing can provide a context for countering the unequal 
dynamics of spectatorship between the viewer and those who suffer on screen (Tascón and Wils 
2017).  
However, by consistently relying on the theatrical structure, these theories might 
unwittingly further a vision entirely based on the binary of testimony, seeing the West as a 
repository for the hope of social change in the Global South. In contrast to their own experience 
in the Netherlands, Movies That Matter festival organizers Matthea de Jong and Daan Bronkhorst 
point to the differences that emerge when we think of Human Rights Film Festivals located in the 
Global South and which reflect on their own issues. They write: “where we work [in the 
Netherlands], one hardly feels the urge to make people aware of their own rights [as it is the case 
with the Ciné Droit Libre festival in Burkina Faso] – it’s more about the rights of others, those 
oppressed and marginalized by repressive regimes, and it is about being critical and knowledgeable 
about complex issues” (De Jong and Bronkhorst 2017, 107). More than reminding locals of their 
own suffering (which, surely, they know better than anyone), the aim of Global South human rights 
film festivals seems rather to be about “convinc[ing] the target audience to adopt human rights as 
political values because human rights are the best possible legal and political standards that can 
rule a society” (de Jong and Bronkhorst 2017, 114). The authors also identify this (moral) objective 
as central to their own organization Movies That Matter, which provides funding to other human 
rights film festivals worldwide, including in Gaza. It is thus important to think about visual regimes 
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in accordance with the legal and political futures that they push forward. The humanitarian mode 
of image production in the Global South (as a source for witnessing in the Global North) relies on 
a legal and political system illustrated by specific moral values modelled on Western liberal 
democracies yet considered universal, which maintains the world order’s hierarchy between 
“civilizations.”  
On a very practical level, and beyond the “white savior complex” narrative that justifies 
Western interventions based on its supposedly welcomed propagation of human rights values, I 
am interested in how human rights film festivals have more access to zones of intense conflict 
because they belong to networks that already operate there. As Dina Iordanova observes, most 
“activist film festivals are affiliated to overarching NGOs such as Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch, or supra-national bodies such as the United Nations” (Iordanova 2012, 13). 
Iordanova notes that parent organizations have a vested interest in using these film events because 
“film supplies the human face and the story and provides the much-needed narrative background 
for activist work” (Iordanova 2012, 14). This line of thought should be pushed even further to 
include a reflection on how human rights film festivals work from within the normalization of 
humanitarian networks as providers of political futures. In other words, we need to account for the 
economic structure of the Human Rights Industry, which Lori Allen defines as “the complex of 
activities and its institutions that function under the label of human rights, the formulas that they 
have learnt in order to write reports and grant applications, and the funding streams that this 
industry generates and depends on” (Allen 2013, 4). 
The universalist moral stand inherent to the testimonial framework fails to provide us with 
useful tools to understand how human rights film festivals function when they are set within the 
humanitarian crisis. We must keep in mind the power relations inherent in the human rights 
economy discussed in Chapter Three and intend to avoid reproducing them in our analysis. In what 
follows, I take inspiration from Margaret McLagan’s pioneering 2005 study of human rights 
communications infrastructures. Building on the example of the international activist video 
training organization WITNESS, McLagan examines the appropriation of the human rights 
discourse by stateless, diasporic, and minority actors. More particularly, she discusses activists’ 
needs to fit into pre-existing media protocols and generic storytelling conventions in order to 
successfully circulate their human rights videos (McLagan 2005, 225). As she puts it, “WITNESS’ 
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actual work consists of constructing issues as ‘rights issues’ and assisting in the 
internationalization process through strategic use of video” (McLagan 2005, 226, my emphases). 
 My theoretical focus shifts from the dominant examination of the power of images, 
towards studying the strategic aim and the logistical implementation of image-making in Gaza. I 
am interested in Palestinians’ instrumentalization of human rights to the service of local 
populations’ needs – as opposed to the corporate instrumentalization of images of suffering. I focus 
on the Red Carpet Karama Human Rights Film festival and Hamas’ involvement in cinema, which 
mobilize the testimonial function of film largely engrained in Palestinians’ practices of 
humanitarian images – Where Should the Birds Fly was a case on point. This serves Palestinians’ 
strategic inclusion in humanitarian economies, wherein local ideals around the necessity to 
“narrate” Palestinians’ stories in their own terms converge with cinema’s ability to both augment 
life in the Strip and strengthen the nationalist movement for independence.  
 
Film Festivals’ Humanitarian Space 
In 1991, Israel started enforcing restrictions on Palestinians travelling from Gaza to Israel and the 
West Bank by retracting the general exit permit, requesting that individuals apply for case-by-case 
authorizations instead. The construction of a separation barrier enclosing the Strip began soon after 
in 1994 and was condoned by the Oslo Accords. Israel has further isolated Hamas and the 
inhabitants of the Strip since the Islamic movement won the 2006 Parliamentary Elections and 
gained control over the Strip after an open conflict with Fateh in 2007.54  Gaza was then declared 
“hostile territory,” and subjected to a systematic and uncompromising siege (or blockade, in the 
words of the UN) organized with the direct collaboration of neighboring Egypt. In addition to 
controlling the Gazan airspace, sea access and digital infrastructures, the Israeli army implemented 
ever harsher restrictions on the circulation of people, basic goods such as food, medical supplies, 
construction material – which became increasingly crucial in order to rebuild Gaza after Israel’s 
                                                
54 Narratives sympathetic to Hamas emphasize how Fateh, armed by the US and with the complicity of 
Israel, tried to curtail Hamas’ legitimate exercise of power after the elections. Fateh also requested that the 
movement recognize Israel’s right to exist – thus putting a stop to this dimension of the anti-colonial 
struggle. Moreover, it demanded that Hamas consider the Fateh-led PLO as the “sole representative of the 
Palestinian people,” a claim Hamas sees as undeserved after the compromises of Oslo and in the face of 
their own popularity (Tamimi 2007, 229).  
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multiple bombings – and fuel, necessary to keep hospitals’ services and the manufacturing and 
agriculture sectors afloat.  
One solution Palestinians have found to circumvent those essential limitations is to dig 
tunnels under the barrier and smuggle items that are denied entry into the Strip. However, the vast 
majority of provisions’ imports are carried out by foreign donors, international aid agencies, and 
NGOs that include UNRWA, the World Health Organization, the World Food Programme-led 
inter-agency Logistic Cluster, and the ICRC. In worldwide contexts of disaster, these operations 
also increasingly involve Logistics Service Providers (LSPs) like UPS or DHL to which 
international agencies outsource the work of procuring, warehousing, transporting, and 
distributing supplies (Vega and Roussat 2015, 353). Lisa Smirl similarly argues that studies of 
“humanitarian interventions,” defined as “the full spectrum of international responses following a 
large-scale disaster, from emergency relief to long-term development programmes,” should 
additionally account for private security contractors (some would say mercenaries) like DynCorp 
that are entrusted with the implementation of some UN missions (Smirl 2015, 14-15). In other 
words, highly securitized humanitarian wagons have tended to become the only entities allowed 
in and out of Gaza by the Israeli authorities. The logistical role humanitarian organizations play 
goes well beyond channeling donations into supplies. Instead, they are embedded in complex 
mechanisms of supply chain management, that is to say, the management of materials, information, 
and financial flows in a network consisting of suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, and customers 
(Hau Lee, cited in Logistic Cluster website 2018).  
 Given the almost total dependency of Gazan life on humanitarian aid, we can wonder to 
what extent the logics and logistics of humanitarianism also affect the conditions of possibility for 
film festivals in the Strip in a situation of permanent emergency. As indicated by the Euromed 
Audiovisual Report cited earlier, all the festivals set in Gaza must first be approved by the Hamas 
government (Euromed Audiovisual 2013, 104), which also scrutinizes the film selection and the 
festival’s choice of venue. Gaza’s festivals must then negotiate between what one could assume 
are the conflicting ideological and economic realities of the humanitarian present, and the moral 
and political obligations set by Hamas. This tension particularly arises with respect to financial 
assistance, largely jeopardized by the international political and economic boycott of the Islamic 
movement that also impacts cultural projects in Gaza more generally. Either because they consider 
Hamas a terrorist organization or dealing with the Islamic movement can prove a liability on the 
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international scene, most foreign and Arab donors55 demand that the funds be channeled through 
Fateh and the Ramallah branch of the Palestinian Authority in order to bypass Hamas, with the 
help of NGOs and UN groups (Feldman 2009, 23). Moreover, the Israeli authorities only accept 
consignees approved by the Fateh-led Palestinian Authority and refuse to send cargos to Hamas 
and its affiliates (Gaza Logistics Cluster, n/d).  
However, it would be a mistake to radically oppose humanitarian and human rights 
principles with the values publicly upheld by Hamas. In her rigorous and provocative study of 
humanitarianism in Palestine, The Rise and Fall of Human Rights: Cynicism and Politics in 
Occupied Palestine (2013), Lori Allen demonstrates the centrality of human rights to Hamas’ own 
conception of governance. She asserts that the movement has actively developed charity structures 
to provide social and economic support largely responsible for the movement’s wide popularity. 
It has also been deeply engaging with human rights organizations, “providing human rights 
training and submitting reports to UN bodies” as part of their own state-making efforts (Allen 
2013, 157). The dialogue around human rights also reflects the political-ethical approach around 
ideals of sincerity, transparency, and national solidarity pushed forward by Hamas as the basis for 
its Islamic nationalism. For Allen, the movement has tried to produce a form of government that 
can engage the international community on these bases, in order “to find points of political 
intersection and bases of mutual recognition” (Allen 2013, 158). Similarly, Sara Roy rejects the 
argument that Hamas’ charity organizations are illegitimate, re-directing assistance funds towards 
the movement’s military wing, and indoctrinating the youth through education. Instead, she 
contends that Hamas’ discourse has shifted from political and military action to social and civil 
development since 1995. The movement has put forward values of civility and tolerance and 
supported the unfolding of a civil society into independent entities compensating for the 
deficiencies of the “State” (Roy 2011, 51). After a brief review of the movement’s formation since 
its break away from the Muslim Brothers in 1987, Roy concludes: “Hamas remains not only open 
to sharing power, it also has a history of non-violent accommodation and political adaptation, 
ideological reflexivity and transformation, and political pragmatism that the West should 
welcome” (Roy 2011, 49-50).  
                                                
55 Hamas officials however suggested in 2013 that Qatar could be willing to directly support the 
movement’s artistic projects (al-Ghoul 2013b) 
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Understanding the convergence between human rights organizations’ values and Hamas’ 
nationalist politics provides one thread of contextualization for the emergence of film festivals 
(and human rights film festivals more particularly) in Gaza. Contrary to the dominant narrative, 
Hamas has, of late, actively encouraged the development of one particular cinema in the Strip. In 
2013, Gaza Minister of Culture Mohamed al Madhoun articulated his support for Palestinian 
cinema and a potential local movie industry around the necessity of highlighting “Palestinians’ 
suffering” in terms that are similar to those mobilized by humanitarian agencies (Euromed 
Audiovisual 2013, 102). This suggests that human rights film festivals can potentially emerge in 
accordance with the principles and goals of both the humanitarian present and Hamas. With 
humanitarianism being such a central organizing principle in the Strip, the focus on human rights 
supplies film festivals, be they organized by Hamas or independent film practitioners and 
organizations, with a legitimate justification for their existence in the midst of destruction. This is 
all the more pertinent when the temporality of emergency seems to a priori contradict the 
experience of cinema spectatorship. Moreover, such a thematic festival, when organized by non-
government actors, can more easily navigate the opposing political authorities that decide what 
can or cannot happen in Gaza. Finally, film festivals can benefit from the humanitarian logistical 
apparatus and its human rights film counterpart responsible for funneling most funding into the 
Strip. Film festivals thus represent one link within what Ilana Feldman calls the “humanitarian 
circuit,” that is to say, the “relations among donors, relief organizations, and recipients of aid, 
through the medium of assistance technologies” (Feldman 2011).  
This section argues that Gazan film festivals inhabit the humanitarian present by carving 
out a metaphorical “humanitarian space.” Humanitarian actors define their own practice around 
three guiding principles: humanity (universality of human rights), neutrality (independence of the 
agency), and impartiality (all needs must be equally attended to). These principles, established in 
the Geneva Convention, represent the means necessary to secure the humanitarian space. The 
imperative of neutrality in particular allows relief workers to create a safe zone where first care 
can be freely provided. However, the humanitarian space is in practice predicated on “the existence 
of certain conditions that permit humanitarian aid to be given in accordance with its purpose” 
(Terry 2002, 19). The humanitarian space thus results first and foremost from negotiations between 
non-humanitarian actors such as governments or the military, and relief agencies.  
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Widely criticized within the field of humanitarian studies for being actively limited and 
largely politicized, the humanitarian space nonetheless constitutes the expression and aspiration of 
humanitarian assistance (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010). What Rolando Tomasini and Luk Van 
Wassenhove call the “virtual humanitarian space” might be even more suited to thinking about 
film festivals here, as the concept designates “the interaction between the different members of the 
humanitarian ecosystem, and how they create an environment where their mandates can be 
executed” (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove 2009, 26). This mandate relies upon a legitimate 
justification of the space by human rights principles. In our case, cinema proves the ultimate 
outcome of the negotiations between different parties insofar as it procures a certain humanitarian 
relief, either by performing Palestinians’ humanity or building a sense of community and solidarity 
in suffering. Importantly, these festivals emerge from the negotiations between human rights 
organizations, government interests, aid recipients, as well as the professional and amateur film 
community in Gaza.  
 The Red Carpet Karama Human Rights Film Festival results from such an encounter that 
permits films to be shown in the midst of destruction and emergency. First held on 12-14 May 
2015, the Red Carpet Festival was initiated by Gazan filmmaker Khalil Mozian under the umbrella 
of the Jordan-based Karama Human Rights Film Festival (established in 2009) and with the 
financial support of the international human rights organization Amnesty International’s Movies 
That Matter and the French Cultural Institute. The promotional strategy for the first edition very 
much resembled humanitarian campaigns. Engaging with the theatrical metaphor of witnessing 
quite literally, the event’s marketing revolved around the spectacle of Gaza’s ruins after so-called 
Operation Protective Edge in the Summer 2014. A red carpet was rolled out among the rubble 
leading to the outdoor screening area set in the Shuja’yiah neighborhood, the epicenter for the 
Israeli bombings – and the subject of both Hadeel Assali and Fida Qishta’s films cited earlier. The 
promotional video “A Tale of Two Red Carpets,” published by Aljazeera’s online news platform 
AJ+, garnered 8.7 million views on Facebook alone as of 2018.56 The trailer efficiently hinges on 
contrasts: drone-generated bird’s-eye view shots emphasize the incongruity of a red carpet amidst 
destruction (Fig. 13), while the editing introduces Gaza as a direct counterpoint to the Cannes 
                                                
56	 In 2016 when I first cited it, the video had reached 8.5 million viewers. The fact that the video has 
continued circulating much after the festival is a testament of the persisting actuality of the spectacle of 
destruction in Gaza. https://www.facebook.com/ajplusenglish/videos/559487844192727/			
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festival happening simultaneously in France – a country that has also incidentally shown increased 
support for Israel’s colonial policies over the past ten years since the Sarkozy government. Two 
years later in 2017, the irony of this diptych took on even greater significance when Israeli culture 
minister Miri Regev walked up Cannes’ stairs wearing a dress celebrating the fifty years of the 
occupation of Jerusalem (in her own words, its “liberation” and “unification”) since the 1967 Six-
Day War. Among the many memes that circulated of the dress, those replacing the view of 
Jerusalem’s Old City (and the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif) with an Israeli airstrike on Gaza or 
a wailing Palestinian woman standing in the rubble, pointed to the need for a counter-narrative to 









Figure 14: Miri Regev at Cannes 2017, and memes (Mondoweiss and Dawn) 
 
Drawing a visual parallel between Palestinian “victims” and Cannes celebrities as they 
tread their respective carpets achieves several purposes. First, the trailer takes advantage of 
Cannes’ visibility to redirect attention towards Gaza, thus piggy-backing the fame of the former 
that is denied the latter. Second, the video suggests that the human rights thematic of the Red 
Carpet Festival is very much contingent on the damage caused by the war and the humanitarian 
present. Gazans are by the same token claiming the ability to organize cinephiliac events just like 
Cannes – as we will confirm later by looking at the film selection. Third, the focus on dignity 
announced in the festival’s name highlights the shocking difference in privilege, which by contrast 
elevates Gazans to higher moral grounds. In an interview with The Electronic Intifada, Mozian 
explains that “the red carpet symbolizes equality — that not only celebrities and high profile 
personalities or politicians deserve to walk on red carpets but also the people who witnessed the 
brutal war and experienced the loss of a family member or the imprisonment of another” (cited in 
Aburamadan 2015). The video fully engages with the humanitarian present’s politics of life by 
making the point that the people of Gaza, too, are human. Yet, the call for dignity and equality 
further resonates with the demands formulated by the region’s uprisings a few years prior and 
contributes to casting the festival as an expression of popular will deeply grounded in a sense of 
political and economic justice – also foregrounded in the discourse of the mother Karama Festival 
in Jordan – as opposed to a mere demand for compassion. 
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The festival’s trailer and its choice of setting utilize visuals of humanitarian crisis and a 
message of global compassion compatible with Hamas’ recognition of Palestinian suffering as a 
“value” conducive to resistance (Euromed Audiovisual 2013, 102). It also echoes Hamas’ 
“commitment to strengthening society through community life, […] individual and collective 
rights, and the public good,” which the movement honors on a regular basis through educational 
workshops and charity (Allen 2013, 161). We will see later, however, that Hamas did repress the 
festival’s later editions when the event positioned itself as a critique of the Islamic movement’s 
rule. The Red Carpet’s subtle ways of navigating languages of victimhood through dignity and 
“more life” (for example, by upgrading Palestinians’ zoe to the political and communal life of bios) 
allows the festival to speak both to the local population invited to attend, and a global spectatorship 
of human rights sympathizers who were exposed to the horrific images of the 2014 Gaza War. 
Taking place only a few months after the attacks on the people of the Strip, the festival emerges 
as an adequate, positive, if not opportune, response to destruction. It also re-appropriates the 
spectatorship of disaster away from colonial practices, best exemplified by the group of Israelis 
who sat on a hilltop by the city of Sderot, the Israeli town closest to Gaza, in order to watch and 
cheer on their army’s military bombing the Strip (Mackey 2014). This viewing position is similarly 
imposed on Palestinians for whom the shelling becomes normalized. The quote from Fida Qishta 
which opens this chapter reveals that Gazans also watch the spectacle of F16s dropping bombs, 
but only because that comes with looking at their own sky. The festival thus contributes to 
redressing the uneven distribution of visual rights established by colonial practices of surveillance, 
wherein Palestinians can finally be in the position of watching (after) themselves.  
Yet, the humanitarian space of the Gaza Karama Festival is made possible not only because 
of the kind of necessary community relief it provides. Instead, I contend that the festival’s focus 
is also dictated by the fact that human rights films most likely thrive in an environment where 
human rights are under threat, for material as well as practical reasons that derive from the 
festival’s belonging to the humanitarian circuit. The Gazan cinematic landscape illustrates the 
prominence of humanitarian themes because filmmakers with little equipment document what 
surrounds them. As argued earlier with the example of Where Should the Birds Fly, Palestinian 
films from Gaza have partaken in the shaping of a niche of Palestinian human rights films that 
helps them circulate around the world. Significantly, most filmmakers acquire training through TV 
agencies such as Ramattan News or Aljazeera – while Hamas’ media producers gain an education 
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in the offices of Hezbollah’s TV channel Al-Manar and, since 2008, in the Al-Aqsa Center for 
Training and Media Development. For women more specifically, Shashat’s filmmaking 
workshops place the emphasis on human rights, and the training’s end products are distributed in 
human rights festivals worldwide. Gazan filmmaker Riham Al-Ghazali, who recently collaborated 
with May Odeh on the regionally acclaimed short documentary Gaza By Her (2017), acquired 
training through this outlet. Abdelsalam Shehadeh, a filmmaker, cameraman, sound engineer, 
journalist and mentor for Shashat’s workshops, produced several films about child labor and rights 
(Al-Aydi el-Saghira/Little Hands, 1996; The Cane, 2000), women’s rights (Human Rights Are 
Women’s Rights, 1998), and the 2004 Israeli bombings on the Rafah refugee camp (Rainbow, 
2004) even before Qishta’s film. Red Carpet festival director Khalil Mozian similarly provides an 
example: after spending six years studying cinema in Russia (a fascinating reminder of Cold War 
solidarity), he produced many social programs related to women and children for Ramattan and 
international TV stations. Among his independent film productions, the documentary of the theatre 
play The Gaza Mono-logues (2012) brings together testimonies about life in Gaza during so-called 
Operation Cast Lead and the war’s impact on the psychology of children. The film won the Public 
Liberties & Human Rights Award at the Aljazeera International Documentary Film Festival in 
2012. These films weave in, and add to, a media environment centered around humanitarian issues 
that conditions further projects. Not only do international audiences expect these stories from 
Gazan filmmakers, but so do the organizations that provide the funding for production as well as 
local distribution and exhibition endeavors.  
Typically, the Red Carpet Festival partakes in a pre-constituted network of human rights 
film festivals ready to expand. It first benefited from the support of the Jordan-based Karama 
Human Rights Film Festival (hereafter KHRFF), whose partnership Mozian sought in the wake of 
the 2014 Gaza war (interview with the author 2017). There were strong precedents to that 
collaboration. Since its creation, KHRFF has contributed to the emergence of several similar 
human rights film festivals in Tunis (2012), Libya (2012), Mauritania (2013), and later Lebanon 
(2016). It also jointly created the West Bank-based Karama-Palestine HRFF in 2013 with “the 
acknowledgement of many local, regional, and international relevant stakeholders; official bodies; 
Human Rights organizations and activists” (KHRFF website 2016). The sister festivals developed 
as the Arab uprisings were gaining momentum, thus both fulfilling local demands and further 
attracting international donors seeking to circulate stories that so predominantly headlined in the 
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global news. KHRFF’s influence over the multiplication of Arab human rights film festivals partly 
derives from its membership in the Human Rights Film Network (HRFN), a partnership 
established by Amnesty International’s Movies That Matter and forty affiliates strong. The 
HRFN’s very mission since its inauguration in 2004 has been to expand the circuit of human rights 
films and festivals and assist emerging festival organizations (HRFN Charter 2016).  
The model of mutual assistance between festivals seems particularly adapted to the 
region’s needs. In 2011, KHRFF’s founding association Ma3mal 612 Think Factory took 
inspiration from HRFN’s global structure and established a mirroring network specific to the 
region, the Arab Network for Human Rights Film Festivals (hereafter ANHAR), with the hope of 
promoting a vision of human rights less subjected to Western agendas. The network’s objectives 
include: “promotion of Human Rights Film Festivals and enhancing cooperation between 
established and emerging festivals,” and “creat[ing] a safe and supportive environment for Arab 
and international filmmakers, especially those who face censorship repression and risk their lives 
in the process” (ANHAR Charter, website 2018, my emphases). Following the metaphor of the 
humanitarian space, the charter foregrounds both the urgent need to create a safe area for the 
festival (and protect audiences from Hamas and the occupation alike, in Mozian’s view) and the 
professional network that can assist in securing this very space. The Red Carpet Karama Human 
Rights Film Festival has similarly endeavored to expand and strike alliances across the region. In 
2017, filmmaker and producer May Odeh quit the Karama festival held in the West Bank and 
joined the Gaza team to organize a multi-sited and Palestine-wide event that includes the ’48 
territories. That same year, the Red Carpet simultaneously held screenings in Egypt, Jordan, 
Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia, and became a full member of the HRFN. 
These solidarity networks prove all the more necessary as the humanitarian spaces of 
human rights film festivals must constantly re-assert their legitimacy, even within the operational 
field of human rights principles and practices. Reviewing the challenges KHRFF has faced since 
its creation, its director Sawsan Darwaza also mentions financial obstacles. In her own experience, 
“available funds often focus on direct humanitarian rescue projects but consider festivals and 
cultural events to be luxurious, even when they are directly related to human rights issues” 
(Darwaza 2015, 150). International human rights film organizations’ response to these practical 
restrictions has involved mobilizing strategies that cross over activist and humanitarian practices, 
such as the modularization of organizational tools and collective actions. Organizational 
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modularity compliments standardization’s efficiency by adding adaptability to local contexts in 
order to ease cooperation between various actors. The renewed complexity of the human rights 
matrix, with its blend of grassroots politics, Internet culture, and corporate marketing strategies, 
increasingly requires specialized forms of knowledge (McLagan 2005). Activist groups have since 
the 1990s developed modular forms of organization that allow for sharing repertoires of tactics 
transferrable to a variety of contexts. The “fractal structure” of digital media has further 
contributed to this tendency by stimulating the circulation of tutorials and downloadable PDF 
“action kits” (McLagan 2005, 232-233).  
More recently, humanitarian supply chain management literature on emergency rescue has 
focused on how organizational (as well as physical) standards and modularity can enhance 
responsiveness, cost efficiency, flexibility, and inter-operability through standardized manuals, 
guidelines, handbooks, training kits, and pre-departure checklists (Jahre and Fabbe-Costes 2015, 
361). These build off of a long tradition in humanitarian relief. Feldman describes how educational, 
carpenters’, midwives’, and fishermen’s “self-help kits” were distributed by the American secular 
organization CARE (Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere) in Gaza in the 1950s and 
60s (Feldman 2011, 217). CARE’s packages uniquely constituted a technology of assistance 
destined to be used by Palestinians themselves with the optic of adding development to the 
cooperative’s mandate heretofore restricted to relief. In contrast, other relief providers like 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) focused on the kits’ potential to respond to crisis instead of long-
term economic projects (Feldman 2011, 217). Today’s international humanitarian organizations 
have transferred these technologies into their own internal practice, thus generalizing the use of 
modularity across the humanitarian circuit. The suitability of kit formats and practices of 
modularity in both situations of crisis and development risks blurring “self-help” strategies and 
relief (Feldman 2011, 222). Yet, the double address to temporalities of crisis and development also 
responds to the flexible nature of the film festival – an unstable institution, as we saw in Chapter 
Two – and even more so in a context of paradoxical permanent humanitarian crisis.  
HRFN and Movies That Matter have spearheaded the modularization of human rights film 
festivals, from which the Red Carpet has also benefited. Since 2006, Amnesty International’s film 
arm organizes “Cinema Without Borders,” a yearly multi-day programme dedicated to the 
mechanics of setting up a human rights film festival. The 2014 edition, taking place in Jordan and 
co-led by KHRFF director Sawsan Darwaza, was attended by both Khalil Mozian and May Odeh. 
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The workshop arguably proved key to the realization of the Red Carpet Festival the following year 
and the strengthening of regional cooperation. The daily discussions were complemented by night-
time screenings at the Karama Human Rights Film Festival, heralded as a staple for such events in 
the Middle East and North Africa (Movies That Matter). The programme as a whole eventually 
served as a basis for a written version of the topics under scrutiny. In 2015, HRFN, the One World 
International Human Rights Documentary Film Festival in Prague, Movies That Matter, and 
FiSahara collaboratively published a free and downloadable PDF-format guidebook on Setting Up 
a Human Rights Film Festival with a focus on the Global South, an area left unaddressed in the 
eponymous first volume. In 2017, the manual was translated into Arabic by Movies That Matter, 
HRFN, and KHRFF, and the official launch took place during the Jordanian festival.  
A typical example of a “modular repertoire” (Tarrow, cited in McLagan 2005, 233), Setting 
Up a Human Rights Film Festival breaks down the different stages of organizing a human rights 
film festival and features case studies of different contexts in the Global South. The manual 
addresses the importance of the mission statement and the festival’s goals and identity; what, 
where, and when to program in order to attract the desired audience; how to foster a productive 
and safe discussion; different models of team organization; technical aspects; promotional 
strategies; finding financial resources; and evaluating the festival post-event. An additional 
section, which directly speaks to the status of human rights festivals as humanitarian spaces, 
explores how to devise “a security plan to mitigate risks” in contexts of active censorship and 
threats of violence (De Jong 2015, 51) Advice around categorizing risks, optimizing team 
organization, and securing local partnerships with NGOs are here coupled with links to Digital 
First Aid Kits to cope with digital threats. In turn, the funding chapter offers a budget sample as 
well as lists of potential donors and supportive organizations. This information, regarding both 
film festivals and film production as well as grant writing strategies, is also available on Movies 
That Matter’s website. Finally, the online platform provides a film database that compiles 
synopses, trailers, and contact information of productions that have successfully circulated in the 
human rights network, from which (emerging) festivals can take inspiration.  
The selection includes key contemporary Palestinian films that also screened at the Red 
Carpet and in prestigious art festivals around the world, such as Hany Abu Assad’s Ya Tayr el-
Tayer/The Idol (2015), Salim Abu Jabal’s Roshmia (2015), Amer Shomali’s The Wanted 18 
(2014), and Mahdi Fleifel’s Alam Laysa Lana/A World Not Ours (2012). May Odeh has pointed 
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to how the Cinema Without Borders workshop enhanced regional cooperation around exchanges 
of film, subtitles, and contacts (Movies That Matter). Festivals are thus also likely to take 
inspiration from each other in more informal ways and replicate some of their neighbors’ selection 
choices year after year. On the one hand, mixed humanitarian and activist strategies have enforced 
a certain standardization without which modularization is ineffective. On the other, they have 
allowed the de-centralization of organizational efforts (McLagan 2005) and have strengthened a 
flexible human rights festival network and its humanitarian spaces locally, regionally, and globally. 
Just how flexible it is will be the object of further inquiry in the last section of this chapter. 
As a site of negotiation, the humanitarian space of the Red Carpet is subjected to Hamas’ 
approval vis à vis its film selection and the choice of venue. The Islamic movement championed 
the first edition of the Red Carpet because its humanitarian focus drew attention to the plight of 
the Palestinians (The Straits Times 2016). Yet, Gaza’s independent artists generally expect certain 
topics and representations to be censored, and possibly receive death threats. In 2010, Mozian’s 
own short film Masho Matouk was banned locally because its depiction of an (unveiled) woman 
smiling to an Israeli officer was deemed to normalize the occupation after the film went to Cannes. 
Mozian consequently cut out a kissing scene in anticipation of the screening of his film Sara (2014) 
at the Red Carpet. The festival’s second edition was in fact met with more suspicion by the local 
authorities. The 2016 event called for Israel and Egypt to open the checkpoints, and for Hamas to 
loosen its grip over the inhabitants of Gaza. With the slogan “We must breathe,”57 the organizers 
appointed the festival as a space where life could be reclaimed and the basic right to breathe – 
taken literally, the right to live – could be exercised. Initially planned to take place in Gaza City’s 
port, the opening screening was displaced to the Rashad Shawa Cultural Center on the orders of 
Gaza’s Culture Ministry for security reasons. In a personal interview, Mozian recounted how he 
was summoned by officials a few hours prior to the opening ceremony and asked to separate 
women and men in the audience. This division was implemented despite Mozian’s refusal. 
Additional tension was added when Hamas officials turned the lights on during the opening 
screening, to which the organizers responded by turning the lights off, before the authorities turned 
them on again. This battle over two modes of spectatorship, one condoned by Hamas, the other 
defended by cinephiles, continued over the days following the opening, and during the third edition 
                                                
57 The theme interestingly resonates with the slogan “I can’t breathe” mobilized by Black Lives Matter 
activists in the US. However, there is no indication in the promotional material that this is intentional.  
	
	 191 
in 2017 (interview with the author 2017). Despite these constraints, the event counted 12,000 
visitors (Movies That Matter). This success highlighted, among other things, Palestinians’ longing 
for cinematic experiences denied to them since the closure of Gaza’s theatres after the First 
Intifada.  
Despite Hamas’ crackdown on certain types of spectatorships and their historical aversion 
to the development of cinema spaces, the Islamic movement has also recently demonstrated an 
interest towards utilizing film as part of its overall resistance strategy against colonization. The 
metaphor of the humanitarian space functions differently here. While festivals supported by 
Hamas, similarly to the Red Carpet Karama Human Rights Film Festival, draw from the principle 
that “safe areas are based on human dignity” (Yamashita 2004, 2), the movement also utilizes 
cinema events to foreground claims of sovereignty. Political scientist Hikaru Yamashita 
distinguishes several models of safe areas in his study of humanitarian spaces as a practice. He 
argues that while the “conventional model” abides by the framework set by state sovereignty, 
wherein neutralized zones require prior agreement between states, the “homeland model” relies on 
an understanding of sovereign space based on self-determination. Launching from a case study of 
the Kurds in Northern Iraq, Yamashita establishes the homeland model as fluctuating, and one that 
is defined by the potential of a humanitarian space to develop into a new spatial entity. The twin 
norms of human rights and self-determination are here mobilized towards the protection of the 
people claiming independence, whose safety can also be insured by the use of force (Yamashita 
2004, 20). The same combination of human rights claims and aspiration towards self-
determination can be found in Hamas’ mission statement laid out in “This is What We Struggle 
For,”58 a late 1990s memorandum prepared by Hamas Political Bureau at the request of Western 
diplomats in Amman: 
The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) is a Palestinian national liberation movement 
that struggles for the liberation of the Palestinian occupied territories and for the 
recognition of Palestinian legitimate rights… Hamas regards itself as an extension of an 
old tradition that goes back to the early 20th century struggle against British and Zionist 
colonialism in Palestine (cited in Tamimi 2007, 265). 
 
                                                
58 I reference the memorandum as opposed to the Hamas Charter because the latter is largely deemed 
unrepresentative by Hamas officials themselves. More of a historical document that was drafted without 
broad concertation with the movement’s leading base, the charter contains anti-Semitic language that is 




For Hamas scholar Aziz Tamimi, the movement recognizes the diplomatic and strategic need to 
employ human rights’ universal discourse in order to reach out to peoples and nations around the 
world (Tamimi 2007, 155). Cinema in general and film festivals in particular consolidate this 
humanitarian space by strengthening the values at the core of the movement’s struggle, thus 
contributing to Hamas’ larger anti-colonial infrastructure of i‘lam muqawim (resistance media).  
The movement developed an informal media network since its inception in the late 1980s, 
tightly associated with efforts in the cultural, educational, and social sectors. The leaflets, posters, 
booklets, videos and audio-cassettes, mosque pulpits, and graffiti were used to share news items, 
comments on the events of the Intifada, addresses on local issues, or calls for action (Abdelal 2016, 
71). Very early on, these media engaged with discourses of human rights and humanitarian 
economies: Leaflet 45, for example, appealed for UNESCO to pressure for the re-opening of 
schools by the occupation forces in July 1989, with the title: “Education is a sacred human right, 
we are dedicated to it, and it is not a favor from anyone” (Abdelal 2016, 85). Later on, during the 
Oslo years leading to the Second Intifada, and despite much repression from the PNA (who seized 
Hamas’ media equipment and shut down its proxy newspaper Al-Watan), the movement opened a 
new outlet (Al-Risala). It also established the global radio station Al-Aqsa (which was to develop 
into a satellite channel in 2006) addressed to the diaspora as well as those inside. These outlets 
relayed the discourse of humanitarian networks at the same time as they preached values of 
resistance, thus casting human rights as an essential tool to carry the liberation struggle. For Wael 
Abdelal, “Al-Aqsa radio played a prominent role in the transfer of ‘humanitarian appeal’ to the 
people about the shortage of food and medicine, and how to deliver them through international 
organizations such as the Red Cross and the UN” (Abdelal 2016, 115). After the Parliamentary 
elections, al-i‘lam al-muqawim was further centralized and augmented by a rhizome of pro-Hamas 
independent outlets (such as the newspaper Falasteen, the Alquds satellite channel, and SAFA 
news agency). These were put in the service of a mujtama’a muqawim (resistance society), with a 
focus on the moral and humanitarian aspect of resistance (Abdelal 2016, 172).   
While close to no academic literature engages with Hamas’ interest in film, several 
newspaper reports reveal anti-colonial and international alliances designed to materialize into 
cinema infrastructures and film festivals combining rhetorics of human rights and resistance. In 
2015, Atef Asqul, the Director General of the Arts and Creativity Department at Gaza’s Ministry 
of Culture, voiced his support for the establishment of movie theatres in the Strip as a means of 
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stimulating local film production. For him, they constitute “the final link in the movie-making 
process” and “are considered to be a key factor in the effects of the movie industry on society and 
culture” (cited in Othman 2015). In other words, theatres would enable the screening of local 
productions suitable to reinforcing nationalist values.  
A series of projects led the way to Asqul’s public support for cinema. Prior to this statement 
in 2009, the International Al Quds Film Festival (21-23 December) set in Gaza City consolidated 
cinema’s position at the core of resistance strategies in line with both Hamas’ discourse and UN 
values of cultural recognition and development. The Palestinian Film Forum – a branch of the 
Union of Palestinian Artists – organized the event under the umbrella of Jerusalem, Arab Capital 
of Culture 2009. Instituted by the Arab League under UNESCO’s Cultural Capital Program, the 
celebrations took place in different locations over the West Bank, Gaza, and refugee camps in 
Lebanon. Hamas was instrumental in passing the resolution to select Jerusalem that year, which 
was justified by the increased “hebraization” of the city through settler activity and Israel’s 
continuous erasure of Palestinian history. Early on in the discussions, the Palestinian national 
preparatory committee suggested cinema play a role of choice, with the proposal to produce thirty 
documentary films about Jerusalem (Samhan 2008, 9). Gaza’s Festival responded to the program’s 
general mandate by selecting films (between thirty-three and fifty-two) hailing from six to eleven 
Arab countries (Zammit and Daniell 2010, Almeghari 2009)59 that engaged with the history of 
Occupied East Jerusalem and the occupation more generally. As a shared venture, the celebrations 
were divided financially and logistically between all Arab states, Jerusalem, and the rest of the 
Palestinian territories. Gaza’s Ministry of Information thus coordinated the festival while the films 
traveled with the help of an independent Palestinian dignitary from Cairo (Almeghari 2009).  
 In the following years, Hamas struck more international collaborations around cinema and 
Palestinian resistance and rights. In 2013, the Director of Public and Foreign Relations at the 
Ministry of Culture in Gaza, Mohammad Aeraar, announced that the Ministry had signed an 
agreement with Iran in order to coordinate the establishment of movie theatres in Gaza (al-Ghoul 
2013a). While the funds were eventually cut (supposedly over Hamas and Tehran’s diverging 
positions on the conflict in Syria), the memorandum of understanding between the Iranian Ministry 
of Culture, the Palestinian Ministry of Culture in Gaza, and the Hamas cultural department called 
                                                
59 The two sources are in disagreement as to how many films were shown and the number of Arab countries 
involved. I decided to include both as an estimated range.  
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for a substantial cooperation between the two countries around film production and distribution. 
This included: conducting film festivals in Tehran and Gaza about Palestine, Jerusalem, and the 
Intifada; establishing bilateral relations between the film unions in both countries; supporting 
Palestinian film production, especially about Jerusalem; establishing cultural institutions; 
equipping libraries in the Gaza Strip; and establishing a cinema complex and museum to 
commemorate the Palestinian resistance (al-Ghoul 2013b).  
According to Gaza Minister of Culture Mohamed al-Madhoun, the government’s projected 
support to the nascent film industry complied with the movement’s agenda and meant to 
“implement a cinema preaching values and resistance” (cited in Euromed Audiovisual 2013, 102).  
In 2013, Gazan director Sameh al-Madhoun (to the best of my knowledge, unrelated to the 
minister) announced a festival similar in spirit to the partnership designed in the memorandum of 
understanding with Iran and in conversation with Hamas’ discourse of resistance. The founding 
committee counted filmmakers from Palestine, France, Egypt, and Syria, including renowned 
director Mohamed Malas, whose successful navigation of both regional markets and international 
global art cinema circuits was meant to set an example (Sadek 2013).60 The festival planned to 
offer training workshops for Palestinian filmmakers in order to strengthen their skills on the 
ground, but also aimed more broadly to enhance partnerships between local producers, Arab 
artists, and the sympathetic Muslim filmmaking community at large. The diversity of professional 
actors involved in the event was reflected in the selection of genres, from features and 
documentaries to amateur films. Ultimately, the festival would highlight the power of cinema and 
art to convey Palestinian humanity and resistance (El Kahlout 2013), and the project received the 
direct endorsement of Gaza’s Ministry of Culture (Sadek 2013, Euromed Audiovisual 2013). In 
the pro-Hamas newspaper Al-Risala, festival director Sameh Madhoun declared: “The festival 
sends a clear message to the occupation: the talent of Palestinians will shake the dust off your 
crimes, and will re-kindle the spirit of resistance” (Hanieh 2013, my translation).61 While I could 
find no press review of the event after it occurred, thus providing no confirmation that it did in fact 
happen, the conception of the festival itself significantly points to Hamas’ tri-fold strategic 
                                                
60 While nothing confirms that the festival actually took place, neither can we be sure that all the guests 
announced were involved. For example, Bollywood megastar Amitabh Bachchan is cited as a future guest 
in Al-Risala, but there is no mention of his attendance in the other sources and beyond. 
61 This translation was completed with the help of Farah Atoui.  
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approach through the lenses of industrial development, human rights, and resistance, advanced 
either by the Ministry itself or “independent” initiatives that act as its proxy.   
Hamas’ multifaceted plans for cinema in the Strip resonates with decolonization projects 
from the 1960s and 70s in the Pan-Arabic and Pan-African networks of the third world, which 
similarly unfolded at the crossroads of human rights claims, resistance movements, and the 
development of film industries. Festivals in Tunisia (The Journées Cinématographiques de 
Carthage, est. 1966-today), Burkina Faso (FESPACO, est. 1969-today), and Third World Cinema 
Committee meetings in Algiers and Buenos Aires (1973 and 1974) all utilized cinema to solidify 
regional and transcontinental routes of cultural, political, and economic exchange between 
countries of the Global South after they gained their formal (yet incomplete) independence. These 
networks foregrounded militant cinema and nationalist causes as one foundational structure for the 
new liberated societies, thus echoing Hamas’ claims for an i‘lam muqawim. Differently from 
Fateh, Hamas’ engagement with human rights and the humanitarian space of cinema proves more 
than just a rhetorical move. Rather, for Lori Allen, the Islamic movement re-politicizes human 
rights by building the independence project around “the problem of rights violations and the 
impunity of the perpetrators into the political context of occupation and international siege” (Allen 
2013, 178). Hamas thus offers an ambiguous interpretation of human rights that both fits the 
liberalization discourses of violations as attacks on human development, and an anti-colonial 
narrative where rights signal the material liberation of a people. In the context of the movement’s 
media strategy but also in Gaza more broadly, human rights claims are always already articulated 
around discourses of resistance. These, in Hamas’ view, can benefit from a strong film 
infrastructure consolidated through regional partnerships that follow Islamic principles and values. 
The metaphor of the humanitarian space illuminates very practical strategies and 
constraints wherein both Hamas and independent (proxy and non-proxy) cultural actors engage 
with the discourses, funding opportunities, and organizational models of human rights and 
humanitarian economies in order to justify and make possible their focus on cinema in the midst 
of emergency. This instrumentalization constitutes a political and/or artistic choice, and a necessity 
in the face of international pressure (Hamas) and lack of access to diversified resources (Hamas 
and Red Carpet). Emergency therefore shapes cultural and political futures either by transferring 
activist and humanitarian strategies of modularization and crisis management into the realm of 
film festival networks (Red Carpet), or by fueling international political and cultural alliances 
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through the recasting of human rights as paradigms of Islamic resistance to colonization (Hamas). 
In both cases, festivals and movie theatres are constructed as zones of exception where 
humanitarian relief occurs both in the shape of shared experience of suffering and promises of 
political and economic self-determination. Humanitarian economies hold a double mandate of 
saving lives and engineering the reconstruction phase.  According to this discourse, not only is 
society growing stronger through the deployment of humanitarian strategies in cinema economies, 
but the film industry and its infrastructures themselves also find a new life. In what follows, I 
examine how human rights and humanitarianism support a narrative where the regeneration of life 
in Gaza is partly mediated by, and expressed through, the rebuilding of its film industry and 
infrastructure(s).  
 
Infrastructure and the Life of Cinema  
The material turn in media studies has placed the emphasis on built spaces and infrastructures as 
tools of biopolitical control and governance. The destruction of infrastructures, including 
electrical, water, and sewage facilities, has counted among the major strategies of pressure against 
Gaza since Israel declared it a “hostile territory” in 2007. In his seminal study of Israel’s 
architecture of the West Bank’s occupation, Hollow Land (2007), Eyal Weizman examines how 
“Palestinian life, property and political rights are constantly violated not only by the frequent 
actions of the Israeli military, but by a process in which their environment is unpredictably and 
continuously refashioned, tightening around them like a noose” (Weizman 2007, 5). Architecture 
and the land itself become the very medium by which Palestinian life is governed. Similarly, Helga 
Tawil-Souri has shown that the high-tech enclosure of Gaza, which relies on the privatization of 
telecommunications and its dependence on Israeli networks on the one hand, and the multiplication 
of technologies of surveillance and control as a replacement for manpower on the ground on the 
other, continues the colonial work of dispossession and confinement to which Gazans were 
subjected before Israel’s so-called “disengagement” in 2005 (Tawil-Souri 2012).   
In a later communal project developed within the Goldsmiths University-based research 
agency Forensic Architecture, Weizman expands the relationship between infrastructure and life 
beyond the study of spatial and political domination. Developing a methodology inspired by 
forensics, built spaces emerge as the blueprint for reconstituting life as well as attacks on its 
sovereignty. Furthermore, modes of inquiry into infrastructures animate material objects and 
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landscapes by converting them into data and images that can be used as evidence for war crimes 
to be tried in courts of international law, as opposed to only serving policing strategies (Weizman 
2014, 10). The counter-hegemonic work of forensis here establishes collaborations between 
researchers and civil society organizations, NGOs, activist groups and prosecutors, and opens up 
emergency and the humanitarian present to a future of accountability for the violators of human 
rights. What interests me in this perspective is how infrastructures and built spaces come to embody 
models of “sur-vivance” that shift the focus away from bare life and towards the regeneration of 
polities, by using the tools fostered by human rights and humanitarian economies. In this section, 
I do not utilize the methodology of forensics myself; rather, I consider how the discursive and 
methodological process of animating buildings for the defense of human rights can help us 
understand the strategic articulation of the discourses around film theatres and reconstruction 
economies, and the possible development of a film industry in Gaza.  
 Hamas, independent filmmakers, festival organizers, audiences, and human rights 
organizations alike have highlighted the important role of film theatres and cinema infrastructures 
as a cement for social life, conduits for shared values and principles, and a space to defend 
Palestinian human rights. Animated by multiple narratives from these various social actors, 
theatres have been endowed with the role of witnesses to Gazan past life and derelict present, at 
the same time as they have become one site for the development of Gaza’s post-conflict 
humanitarian imaginary of reconstruction. In other words, the memory of theatres, open and 
running, and as contributors to Gazans’ social life, provides the basis for imagining what comes 
after emergency while the siege continues. Just like “suspended time” structures life and 
economies in the West Bank, the temporalities and economies of emergency response and post-
disaster reconstruction strategies paradoxically co-habitate in attempts at proposing a future for 
Gaza. For example, the PLO-led (and thus Oslo-oriented) Palestinian Economic Council for 
Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR) has been funneling funding since 1993 from the 
World Bank and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development towards infrastructural 
improvement programs in the West Bank and Gaza. Historically, humanitarian organizations in 
Gaza have struggled with the scope of their mandate, and they have debated whether it should 
include reconstruction and development plans or be restricted to relief alone (Feldman 2011). This 
tension is resolved in the general, contemporary humanitarian logistics’ disaster management 
cycle, which underlines the various phases of humanitarian intervention. Alessandra Cozzolino 
	
	 198 
describes a typology in which disaster is followed by a first immediate response where 
“temporary” and “silent” networks established during the pre-disaster preparation phase are 
activated. The following “restore sub-phase” tries “to restore in the shortest time possible the basic 
services and delivery of goods to the highest possible number of beneficiaries,” while the 
reconstruction phase engages with a long-term perspective (Cozzolino 2012, 9-10). In Gaza, this 
linear temporality is upset by the permanence of political and structural colonial disaster. As a 
result, the sub-restore phase’s imperative of preserving life overlaps with the reconstruction 
phase’s objective of sustaining it.  
 The focus on film infrastructures and theatres allows Palestinians to both gauge the 
repeated destructions of Gaza’s built landscapes over the years and to plan a post-disaster phase 
where the project of a film industry contributes to the general reconstruction of life. Theatres 
function as a reminder of the chronology of Gaza’s political timeline: established by humanitarian 
agencies, the first cinema spaces in 1940s Gaza were mobile and temporary, just like the refugee 
condition was supposed to be; the Strip’s ten built theatres first closed with the beginning of 
Israel’s occupation in 1967; they were then forcefully shut down by the colonial armed forces 
during the First Intifada; the attempts at opening them again in the 1990s were stopped by arsons 
and acts of vandalism led by Islamic groups among which some were affiliated to Hamas; the siege 
finally prevented most infrastructural expansion and rehabilitation, while a great part of the 
responsibility for the closures is often attributed to Hamas alone. Theatres thus also concentrate 
much of the relationship between governance and the “governed.” In his study of media 
infrastructures in Northern Nigeria, anthropologist Brian Larkin reminds us of the ties between the 
representational logic of infrastructures and the state, as the latter strives to regulate populations 
through mediating built spaces (Larkin 2008). Similarly, Gazan theatres and film infrastructures 
now represent Hamas’ aspiration towards an Islamic society and an independent, decolonized 
Palestinian state, as well as Palestinian populations’ desire for political and public freedoms of all 
kinds – including ones formulated against Hamas. We will start by exploring Hamas’ investment 
in film infrastructures as part of its development plan for Gaza, before turning towards independent 
initiatives for reviving film theatres and new visual regimes that exceed the humanitarian present 
of permanent emergency and destruction.  
	
	 199 
 Soon after its coming to power in the Strip, Hamas announced its project to build a “media 
production city” called ASDAA62 (which translates into “echoes” in English) and located on the 
site of an evacuated Israeli settlement after the so-called “disengagement.” In some ways, ASDAA 
responded to the occupation’s “politics of verticality” (Weizman 2007, 12) used to dispossess 
Palestinians and make them invisible, by replacing a symbol of Israeli colonialization with an 
infrastructure meant to bring Palestinians together through the telling of their history of resistance. 
For the Western press, the media complex itself and the two films that it produced constitute the 
movement’s new propaganda arm (Bernaud 2011). For researcher Wael Abdelal, it represents a 
new front in Hamas resistance, and the site for a counter-psychological warfare (Abdelal 2016, 
145) in response to the long-term traumas engineered by ever more sophisticated techniques of 
occupation (Tawil-Souri 2012). As a result, the project takes part in the movement’s effort to share 
(a specific) Palestinian history (RT online 2008), self-preservation, survival, and claims of 
Palestinians’ right to live.  
It is significant that the city came to include, alongside production and graphics studios and 
satellite technology: gardens, water ponds, a children’s entertainment area, a theme park, a zoo, an 
array of cafés and restaurants, a dairy factory, as well as models of Palestinian villages and cities 
– which add yet another layer to the Gazan landscape. A piece written by the Associated Press 
(AP) and re-published in Israeli liberal newspaper Haaretz before the realization of ASDAA City 
slammed the estimated budget for the realization of the project ($200 million), accusing Hamas of 
misusing funds in times when its population were struggling to feed themselves (Associated Press 
2007). The financing of Hamas’ media infrastructure is largely kept secret and the current budget 
for the city is not confirmed (although some sources mention they raised only one million). 
However, the entertainment complex and theme park were said to partly resolve Hamas’ quest for 
funding, jeopardized by the international sanctions imposed on the movement after 2007, by 
contributing its revenues to the self-financing of the media city (Abdelal 2016, 153). AP’s critique 
resonates with the common dismissal of cinema and entertainment when life is threatened – which 
in the article goes hand in hand with the normalization of Israel’s siege. Another perspective, which 
I develop throughout this section, could also see the building of these infrastructures as being very 
                                                
62 Hamas media scholar Wael Abdelal transcribes the name all in caps, although there is no indication that 
ASDAA stands for an acronym. Newspaper articles use a variety of transcriptions, such as Asdaa, or Asda’.  
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much part of the effort to sustain life by augmenting mere survival through reconstruction under 
emergency.  
As one of the Al-Aqsa media network branches, ASDAA Media Production City was 
meant to become a symbol of popular prosperity for Gazans as much as a political tool to pressure 
the enemy. At the occasion of the invite-only premiere of Hamas’ first film production at Gaza 
City’s Islamic University in 2009, Gaza’s Interior Minister and producer of the film Fathi Hamad 
coined the term “Hamaswood” to celebrate the local achievement (Associated Press 2009). The 
comparison with Hollywood drew more from the symbolic value and narrative of popular power 
than the type of financial investment made in the film, which proved minor ($120,000). The 
parallel also suggested Hamas’ new position vis-à-vis Western film productions, no longer 
considered to be inherently immoral – some officials even cite the Ice Age franchise among their 
favorite films. The film’s theatrical distribution similarly mimicked (at a considerably lower scale) 
Hollywood’s windowing strategies: after the exclusive premiere at the University, the film was 
screened for a week every day at 5pm at the more popular Rashad Shawa Cultural Center in August 
2009. Dedicated to telling the epic story of a hero commander of Hamas’ military wing killed by 
Israeli troops in 1993 and written by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahmoud Zahar, Emad 
Akel (Majed Jundiyeh, 2009) featured many action sequences and no romance, responding to the 
aim of “mak[ing] quality art that is Islamic and about the resistance, without provocative (sexual) 
scenes” (Hamad, cited in AP 2009).  
Losing Shalit (2014), also directed by Majed Jundiyeh and partly funded by Hamas (which 
allegedly put in $95,000 out of $120,000), was intended to be the first volume of a trilogy on the 
popular story of the Israeli soldier’s abduction that led to the release of a thousand Palestinian 
political prisoners. The film celebrated Hamas’ victory but also directly addressed Israeli 
audiences: most of the dialogues delivered by the IDF soldiers in the film were in Hebrew, even 
as most of the Palestinian amateur actors had no prior knowledge of it (Barzak 2014). Film was 
instrumental to the very prisoner swap in the first place: in April 2010, a 3D animated clip in 
Hebrew with English and Arabic subtitles, which pictured Gilad Shalit’s ageing father and evoked 
the imminent death of the soldier, had been used to directly pressure the Israeli army into the 
exchange (Telegraph 2010). By coupling features and musalsalat in both Arabic and Hebrew, the 
media city insures itself a wide and varied audience to a double end of popular resistance and 
“counter-psychological warfare.”   
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Referring to his own productions, Majed Jundiyeh declared that he was “working to 
establish a movie industry of resistance in Gaza, to reflect the Palestinian story with Palestinian 
actors” (Barzak 2014). However, the development of an industry for Palestinians and with 
Palestinians doesn’t seem, in this case, to translate into the recognition of actors’ labor. The 
majority of the Losing Shalit’s performers were amateur volunteers, while in contrast Mohammad 
Qarara, who played the main protagonist, received a salary of 2,000 NIS a month (around $550) 
(Nouvel Observateur 2014), sizable in comparison to the $174 monthly average in Gaza in 2014 
(UNRWA 2015). As a result, the built infrastructure and the films remain the most visible 
witnesses of “Hamaswood” and its promise to forge the path to liberation and Palestinian human 
rights – while labor rights and the institutionalization of a media workforce are suffering.  
The media city represents the possibility of a larger production. Significantly, the Al-Aqsa 
channel built a replica of Jerusalem’s Old City in ASDAA in order to produce a thirty-episode 
long musalsal for Ramadan called Bawaba as-Sama’/Gate of Heaven (2017), which documents 
Palestinian life in Jerusalem and the population’s struggle against the systemic violence of settlers 
and Israeli police (al-Araby 2017). Despite challenges concerning construction materials such as 
cement or iron as well as recurring electricity shortages, the media city is planned to eventually 
include permanent buildings that reproduce the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the Dome of the Rock Mosque, 
prisons, and Bedouin villages (al-Araby 2017). Not only do those replicas function as a claim over 
Palestinian history and land, but they also allow actors and extras to wander the streets of a sacred 
city and maybe even “visit” the third holiest site of Islam in the future, whose access is denied to 
them by the siege (Fig. 15). One can also imagine that these film sets could one day be opened to 
the visitors of the entertainment complex as a whole. ASDAA Media Production City has become 
evidence of Hamas’ growing power over their own narrative of liberation through cinema, which 
intimately connects the end product of film with the very capacity to build entertainment 
infrastructures. The supply of construction materials under the siege therefore also points to 
Hamas’ utilization of the more “secret” and widely used infrastructure of the tunnels (Haddad 






Figure 15: Old Jerusalem’s replica in ASDAA City (al-Araby 2017) 
 
Hamas has also officially (at least discursively) encouraged independent attempts to re-
instate Gaza’s old cinema infrastructure and institutionalize new ones. Gaza’s Ministry of Culture 
official Atef Asqul expressed the government’s support for a local film industry. At the same time, 
the Ministry re-asserted its lack of responsibility in the prolonged closure of the theatres – against 
the popular narrative – arguing that the theatres’ private owners were facing legal issues around 
inheritance that prevented the spaces from running (Ahmad 2017). Civil society projects did 
succeed in temporarily restoring some theatrical spaces. In 2016, the media production company 
Ain Media organized a screening of the Palestinian-Jordanian film Ma’tef Kabir Lihajem/The 
Oversized Coat (Nawras Abu Saleh 2013) in a theatre of the Red Crescent Society (a humanitarian 
infrastructure), which was followed by regular film events under the label “Gaza Cinema.” In 
2017, the iconic Cinema al-Samer, first established in 1944, was re-opened for one night for the 
premiere of Gaza-produced film Ashr Snin/Ten Years (Alaa Alaloul 2017). Both films dealt with 
the reality of the occupation, Israeli assassinations, and Palestinian prisoners. The two screenings 
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were envisioned in a commercial perspective: while the former required a US$ 2.50 entry fee, the 
premiere of the latter was free and attended by local television and cinema critics and professionals. 
Further screenings in an ad hoc theatre, however, charged US$ 5.50. Both events finally 
symbolized a first step towards “bringing back the idea of cinema in Gaza,” as media coordinator 
Ghada Salmi put it (cited in Abou El Oun 2017, my emphasis), thus building on a pre-existing 
local history.  
The prospect of restoring theatres is commonly received as a sign of hope and “revival” 
by Gazan audiences and film professionals (Ahmad 2017, Gostoli 2016), one that also provides an 
opportunity to revisit the Strip’s cinematic and community history. Many spectators have seen the 
theatrical screenings as a bridge across generations, connecting the youth that would experience 
cinema for the first time and those who remembered life before the First Intifada (Erem News 
2016). Some idealized this period as one of abundance, during which American, Egyptian, and 
Chinese films were screened. Samir El-Efranji, al-Samer cinema accountant and manager of al-
Nasr Cinema, referred to this era as the “Golden Age when the cinema was operating in Gaza” 
(Balousha 2018). The recurring idea of “revival,” however, also points to the humanitarian aspect 
of both infrastructures and people’s rights. One attendee of the al-Samer 2017 premiere typically 
invoked Palestinians’ “human rights to have cinemas in the Gaza Strip like so many other people 
who have the chance to go to the cinema in their countries” (Ahmad 2017, my emphasis), thus 
highlighting not only the right to watch films, but also the very right to film infrastructures. This 
claim echoes the larger demand to replace “darkness” with entertainment by putting an end to the 
electricity crisis (Ahmad 2017). Access to electricity has been drastically reduced since the 
destruction of Gaza’s power plant by Israel in 2007. Moreover, both Europe and Israel have 
restricted their diesel imports, necessary to produce power, based on a “humanitarian minimum” 
imposed by Israel after the plant’s reconstruction (Gisha 2009). The re-opening of theatres 
therefore also stands for a future in which Palestinians could access and control their own 
resources, including electricity.  
In the remainder of this section, I examine how the Karama Red Carpet Human Rights 
Film Festival utilizes the flexibility of human rights film networks to revive Gaza’s cinematic 
history and “reconstruct” a film economy through a renewed visual regime. Festival director Khalil 
Mozian counts among the few people who have cumulated an extensive knowledge of Gaza’s film 
history based on active research that has also imbued spirit to the event itself. Mozian’s own 
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production company, which assumes the organization of the Red Carpet Festival, takes its name 
“Lama Films” after the Lama brothers, the first Palestinian filmmakers to ever establish a film 
studio, in 1920s Alexandria. Mozian further reports the findings of his historical investigation in 
the art film Gaza 36mm (2012), in which he reactivates old theatres with an ad hoc 35mm projector 
mounted on a bike. His diegetic and real-life assistants and protégés, soon-to-be-famous 
filmmakers and twin brothers Tarzan and Arab Nasser cited earlier complete this transgenerational 
project. Finally, the film directs a critique at the Islamic movement’s destruction of theatres 
considered to be places of moral corruption and a threat to their own social and political control. 
Significantly, Mozian’s pitch to the funding provider Doha Film Institute humanized film 
infrastructures in order to translate the violence of Hamas’ censorship as equal to bodily harm. The 
blurb concluded that “the assassination of theatres was a personal assassination of [Gazans’] 
thoughts” (Doha Film Institute 2012). The Red Carpet Human Rights Film Festival thus 
constituted one response to these “assassinations,” which called for cinema and theatres’ lives to 
be rescued.  
The festival’s inscription in Gaza’s urban environment enacted the mission to revive 
cinema spaces in order to achieve a better political future for Palestinians. The first edition’s choice 
to hold the screenings in the rubble of Shuja’yiah intentionally played with the metaphor of a 
society and its infrastructures rising from the ashes – thus coming back to life (Emarat Alyaoum 
2015). Mozian had similarly used this imagery to describe the making of his own film Sara (2014), 
which follows a young Palestinian woman refugee threatened by honor killing. Some of the film’s 
shooting took place in Lama Films’ offices in the Basha Tower after it was destroyed by Israeli 
shelling in 2012, along with Mozian’s entire film collection. As he put it, instead of abandoning 
the project in the wake of the collapse, he “turned the ruins and rubble of [his office] into a real 
movie scene that highlights the ability of the Palestinian people to rise from the ashes like a 
phoenix" (cited in Alashqar 2014). Eventually, the Shuja’yiah metaphor turned into a material 
reality. The 2015 festival erected its stage in the very neighborhood that saw the opening of the 
first movie theatre in Gaza in the 1940s, the al-Khadra Cinema, which was relocated soon after 
and changed its name to al-Samer Cinema (Othman 2015). The festival’s slogans have similarly 
focused on infrastructural revival and popular control over the years. The second edition, entitled 
“We must breathe,” referred to Gaza’s confinement as much as Hamas’ restrictions, which cinema 
could overcome by bringing in hopes and dreams. As we have seen, the fight for infrastructural 
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control was then manifold: based on the occupation’s impact on cinema space and resources – 
including limited power supply – Hamas’ interdiction to hold the event in the port, and its 
management of the audience configuration and the lighting environment during the screening. 
More importantly, the third edition’s theme, “we will return” combined the running metaphor of 
coming back to life with the political project of a Palestine for all Palestinians further epitomized 
by the opening ceremony’s location in the port, a symbol for the refugees’ departure and future 
return.  
But the Red Carpet’s literal revival of Gaza’s cinematic history occurred most 
predominantly through the collusion of two a priori distinct projects: the promotion of human 
rights, and the development of a grassroots and market-oriented (as opposed to Hamas’ top-down 
model) cinema industry in Gaza. The festival’s NGO partner Movies That Matter articulates this 
idea in evocative terms: 
The organizers, Lama Film Group, are determined to create an annual event that stimulates 
the Palestinian cinema industry and revives cinemas that have been destroyed. The festival 
hosts film screenings, debates and panel discussions about human rights issues in Palestine 
(Movies That Matter website 2016). 
 
The human rights organization justifies its own intervention by identifying the development of a 
film industry (as opposed to the festival alone as argued in the previous section) with the pursuit 
of human rights, wherein movie theatres stand for metaphorical lives needing to be saved. The 
statement suggests that the disappearances of cinema spaces among the many other material 
damages might have been caused by the recent bombings, rather than as a consequence of the 
protracted historical process of closures. This interpretation of history informed by the temporality 
of crisis feeds into the urgent nature of rebuilding the Palestinian film economy as part of Gaza’s 
reconstruction phase after the latest disaster.  
           While I have so far argued for the prominence of witnessing as the visual regime guiding 
many Gazan independent film productions and festival strategies, I now turn to how Red Carpet 
contributes to expanding the definition of human right films. The rhetoric and material 
achievements of reviving cinema foreground the development of a Palestinian economy of art 
cinema constructed as human rights films, as one locus for Gaza’s reconstruction phase. We 
explored a similar dialectic with respect to art cinema and news’ visual regime in Chapter Two. 
The focus on art cinema is, maybe surprisingly, not unlike the discourse upheld by Hamas’ film 
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director Majed Jundiyeh, who studied filmmaking in 1990s Germany under famous new German 
cinema director Volker Schlöndorff. The advertising billboard poster for Jundiyeh’s film Emad 
Akel suggests that the production embraces the opulent, epic style of war and action movies rather 
than auteur cinema’s calculated austerity (Fig. 16). However, the filmmaker expressed how he 
hoped to enter the film in the Cannes festival competition (Usher 2009). Hamas has similarly 
shown interest in the circuits of art cinema before, as demonstrated by the example of the 
Palestinian International Festival of Films cited earlier. As bizarre as this might seem, art cinema 
represents a point of convergence for Hamas and independent filmmakers that oppose their 
politics. The genre allows celebrating prestige and attracts international alliances, as well as being 
adaptable to an elastic concept of human rights.  
 
 
Figure 16: Emad Akel’s billboard (ABC Australia) 
 
           Red Carpet’s programming reflects the malleable definition of human rights film and the 
potentially new visual regimes that this allows, in accordance with Hamas’ own paralleling 
restrictions. In addition to some European productions often addressed to children and some 
international examples, the selection mainly features films from the Arab world and the Middle 
East more generally that have traveled around the global art cinema circuit and received prestigious 
prizes from institutions such as Cannes, TIFF, Dubai, IDFA and the Oscars. These films, while 
rather foreign to what one could expect in the activist and humanitarian scene, are yet also very 
strongly represented in Movies That Matter’s database for human rights film festivals. As a result, 
Red Carpet doesn’t offer a subversive view on the matter, but rather takes advantage of fluctuating 
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categories put in place as part of the modular structure of the human rights film economy set to 
adjust to situated environments. Red Carpet abides by the principles established by the Human 
Rights Film Network that have underpinned its own partnership with Jordan-based Karama Human 
Rights Film Festival from the start. The Network’s lack of requirements regarding the genre of the 
films, its openness to encouraging fiction films in environments where film literacy is limited 
(Bartošová et al. 2015, 36), and the promotion of “films that have good cinematic quality in 
photography, narrative, rhythm, audio and other technical characteristics” (Charter of the Human 
Rights Film Network) facilitates the festival’s inclusion of global art cinema pieces, and their 
construction as human rights films. As artistic director of Bologna’s Human Rights Nights Festival 
Mariagiulia Grassilli explains, “the definition of a human rights film may be as broad and 
potentially malleable as the film festival’s notion of human rights” (Grassilli 2012, 36), which here 
coincides with the necessity of reconstructing Gaza.  
           In fact, most of the films programmed at Red Carpet do not primarily evoke the human 
rights theme, only flirting with the witnessing gaze of the humanitarian economy rather than 
primarily engaging with it. For Mozian, while most films did not explicitly deal with human rights 
directly, it was easy to find a human rights angle to them (interview with the author 2017). The 
film plots, which are submitted to Hamas’ censorship bureau for approval, must also reflect a 
concern for the Palestinian cause or principles of dignity compatible with Hamas’ Islamic values 
of community and modesty. One might also consider how many of these films have already had 
to adhere to explicit and implicit morality constraints from, for example, the Gulf festivals 
involved in their development or national censorship rulings. These limitations still leave a lot of 
space for creative selection, from Oscar nominees and animation to experimental cinema. Art 
cinema-turned-mainstream films like Hany Abu-Assad’s The Idol (2015), the Jordanian Oscar-
nominee Theeb (Naji Abu-Nowar, 2014), Palestine’s pick for the Oscars The Wanted 18 (Amer 
Shomali 2014), Jordan’s pick for the Oscars 3000 Layla/3000 Nights (Mai Masri, 2015), and A 
World Not Ours (Mahdi Fleifel, 2011) offer very local tales from the human rights-friendly points 
of view of children, women, refugees, and even anthropomorphized animals. The Idol more 
particularly celebrates Gaza’s own singer and winner of Arab Idol contest Mohamed Assaf, who 
embodies Palestinian culture, sumud, and success in the face of colonial erasure. Animation film 
The Wanted 18 starts with telling the story of Palestinians’ White Intifada against Israeli taxes in 
the 1980s through the eyes of anthropomorphized cows and finishes with a critique of Oslo’s 
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failure to address Palestinians’ needs (a commentary aligned with Hamas’ own sentiment). Set in 
the 1980s, 3000 Nights showcases Palestinian historical steadfastness in Israeli prisons with a 
focus on a pregnant woman. Abandoned by her husband (a thread potentially irreconcilable with 
Hamas’ principles), she finds a new family in a community of resisting prisoners (a redeeming 
turn of event). Finally, A World Not Ours follows refugees’ lives in the Lebanese camp ‘Ain el-
Helweh over generations. 
           While it proves rather easy to conceive of the popularity of these productions based on the 
legibility of their storytelling, other films screened at Red Carpet foreground a much more 
experimental style. This might a priori deter non-cinephiles, but the films similarly speak to the 
core of Palestinian life under occupation, to which most viewers can connect intimately. 
Unexpected cinema languages become just as readable by appealing to personal and communal 
experience. For instance, the third edition opened with Raed Andoni’s Ghost Hunting (2017), a 
ninety-minute long re-enactment of the traumas undergone in an Israeli interrogation center, 
reconstructed on set based on the memories of the actors and construction workers who had all 
spent time there. Similarly, Egyptian Jasmina Metwaly and Philip Rizk’s rather sober Barra fel 
Share’/Out on the Street (2015) documents a theatrical workshop of factory workers engaged in 
reenacting daily confrontations with the Egyptian police and management before and during the 
uprisings. Mohanad Yaqubi’s Kharij al-Itar: Thawra Hatta al-Nasr/Off Frame AKA Revolution 
Until Victory (2015) is a seventy-minute long compilation of archival footage produced during the 
militant era of the 1970s, which follows the changing representations of dispossessed Palestinian 
refugees into freedom fighters. Finally, Jessica Habie’s psychedelic Mars at Sunrise (2014) utilizes 
references to painting and poetry in order to evoke the violence of Israeli torture techniques used 
during interrogation.  
           These films replace the witnessing gaze with models of spectatorship built around the 
communal participation in re-enactment workshops (Out on the Street), the mutations of 
Palestinians’ production of their own image and modes of looking at themselves (Off Frame), and 
poetic translations of physical pain (Mars at Sunrise), thus introducing visual regimes in tension 
yet compatible with the humanitarian present. These films, in the context in which they are shown 
to a Gazan audience, no longer rely on the moral validation of a witness, and, rather, demand that 
the spectator confront their own personal and community experiences. In other words, rather than 
mobilizing the narcissistic self of Chouliaraki’s “ironic spectator,” who directly benefits morally 
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from acting for others, the audience’s performance here provokes genuine sym-pathy: 
etymologically, literally suffering with. The endpoint of watching is not the moral enjoyment of 
feeling compassion for someone else, but the possibility, like Mozian told me in an interview, of 
understanding your own suffering and shared experience.   
           The festival has developed its advertising campaign on the two fronts of human rights and 
cinephilia equally. These both contribute to the paradoxical reconstruction of Gaza’s future film 
industry – the revival of a cinema economy that never really was, yet existed as a latent, maybe 
re-fashioned, past desire. Much of the event’s promotion on Facebook (a major outlet and 
archiving tool for the festival) insists on the infrastructures of film spaces with videos that 
document the construction of the outdoor stage during the first and third edition as well as the 
installation of posters and the boat’s carcass (a metaphor for the port which they could not use that 
year) nearby the Rashad Shawa Center during the second edition. These visuals have been 
mobilized to update the Facebook page and keep the momentum going in between editions.  
Regular postings also advertise each film in isolation through screenshots, film descriptions, and 
individual trailers starting a month before the festival until the end of the event. Each edition also 
features at least two promotional videos that mash up films from the yearly selection with fast-
paced editing to the rhythm of thriller-like music, very unlike what one would expect of human 
rights films. The outdoor billboards also sometimes display direct references to the opening films, 
as was the case with The Idol in 2016, a film with particular resonance in Gaza and which opened 
the second edition (Fig. 17). Although Mozian insisted in an interview that the film selection 
reflected human rights issues from all over the world in order to include Gazans in a larger 
community of suffering (interview with the author 2017), the festival eventually proved a conduit 
for the promotion of local Palestinian and occasionally Gazans’ art cinema productions – including 
Mozian’s own Sara and Gaza 36mm. The festival even set up a submission form to encourage 
local participation. The double focus on human rights and cinephilia thus foregrounds the 
Palestinian cause through local productions and reminds us that reconstructing Gaza can also be 
achieved by supporting a film economy that exceeds humanitarian film networks while building 






Figure 17: The Red Carpet Festival’s billboard for the 2016 edition (Lama Films) 
 
           The metaphor of cinema’s revival in Gaza drives a multiplicity of interconnected discourses 
that seek to augment life, at the same time that most international efforts direct themselves towards 
supporting mere survival. What I have termed “reconstruction under emergency” attests to the 
development of seemingly premature film projects that take root in the humanitarian present rather 
than anticipate the end of the disaster management cycle. These cinema endeavors focus on built 
spaces for symbolic reasons: infrastructures represent a major casualty of the war and siege on 
Gaza. Their maintenance and expansion can be proof of Palestinian resistance and operate as a 
catalyst for the people’s liberation, while buildings also become an expression of Gaza’s 
community and cultural history. Finally, film infrastructures represent the condition of possibility 
for a new visual regime that extends beyond humanitarian discourses. This regime utilizes a broad 
definition of human rights as well as the economic and financial networks that support it, in order 
to include artistic, experimental, and globally recognized aesthetic forms of Palestinian narratives 
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necessary to kick start a film economy in Gaza. The material life of cinema thus takes full part in 
the reconstruction efforts of the besieged Strip. 
 
Conclusion 
The cultural life of human rights organizes the convergence of humanitarian and film economies 
in Gaza. A conduit for international funding, a cement for regional solidarity networks, a promise 
of self-determination, and an elastic visual regime, human rights and humanitarianism can be used 
to quench the necessity to preserve “mere life” and enhance and sustain the “surplus life” of 
entertainment and creativity. Palestinians utilize humanitarianism as a symbolic basis for 
expressing the vital issue of developing cinema, and a material framework to establish the 
(re)construction of its infrastructures. The ingenuity Palestinians and Hamas have shown in 
exploiting the malleability of humanitarian and human rights categories and systemic 
arrangements should not, however, distract us from acknowledging the lasting consequences of 
the Human Rights Industry as a provider of political futures. The instrumentalization of human 
rights can prove relatively successful insofar as it obeys or appeases the market forces that cultivate 
their own advantage in sustaining Gazans’ surplus life. In other words, the life of cinema must be 
to a certain extent complicit with the marketization of humanitarian practice and agencies’ 
imperatives of performance, which the multiplication of human rights film festivals fulfils by 
heralding the promise of a supposedly “just” legal and political order. 
           Eventually, the humanitarian imaginary and its focus on theatrical structures of 
communication, whether instrumentalized or not, remain predicated on dialogue as a basis for a 
renewed imaginary of global solidarity. As examined successively in Chapter Two, Three, and 
Four, convergence itself articulates the complex relationships between various economic networks 
and actors. In the following and last chapter, I apply pressure to the paradoxes underlying dynamics 
of convergence, in order to attain the point of highest tension: the moment when the discourses 
and economies of inter-cultural and political dialogue cease to effectively allow any convergence 
or bring any relief to structural colonization through film. By examining the space where ethnic 
cleansing most deeply and yet, less visibly, endures – the 1948 territories – Chapter Five examines 




Chapter Five – Recognition Beyond the End of History 
 
     Man is a yes. I will never stop reiterating that.  
Yes to life. Yes to love. Yes to generosity. 
But man is also a no. No to scorn of man. No to degradation 
of man. No to exploitation of man. No to the butchery of 
what is most human in man: freedom. 
Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 1952, 222.   
 
They want to view me as a good ‘Israeli Arab director’ or a 
‘nice Israeli Arab’…The moment you say Palestinian, 
though, you become the enemy. 
Suha Arraf, cited in The Electronic Intifada, 2014.  
 
In 2014, Hany Abu-Assad’s Omar (2013) entered the Oscar’s competition for the Best Foreign 
Language Film as a representative of Palestine. A major shift in cultural diplomacy, the Academy 
of Motion Pictures Arts and Sciences (AMPAS)’ implicit recognition of an entity named Palestine 
– still deprived of any determined political status – was the result of a decade of negotiation within 
the institution and on the international scene more broadly in spite of pressure from Israel. The 
proto-state of Palestine’s recently acquired status of non-member observer state at the United 
Nations in 2012 certainly helped AMPAS justify their decision. This also reflected the changing 
imaginaries that the name “Palestine” could elicit in US and global cosmopolitan settings after the 
Second Intifada, wherein the proto-state might appear as a partner for commercial and cultural 
exchange as opposed to a terrorist group with whom no discussion is possible. After a failed first 
attempt at presenting Elia Suleiman’s Divine Intervention (2002) at the Oscars in 2002, such a 
turning point in the history of international political and cultural recognition of Palestine initially 
materialized with Abu-Assad’s previous feature Paradise Now (2006). A fictional reconstitution 
of the psychological journey of two suicide-bombers-to-be, the film was also nominated at the 
Oscars for the “Palestinian territories” and won the Golden Globes’ Best Foreign Language Film 
on behalf of “Palestine.” The film’s topic and the fact that it was distributed by Warner Brothers 
in the US pointed to Abu-Assad’s desire for international artistic recognition, his engagement with 
stereotypical international concerns about Palestinians, as well as foreign audiences’ curiosity and 
willingness to be exposed to a more contrasting view on the matter. Yet, ultimately for Abu-Assad, 
the recognition of Paradise Now and Omar as hailing from Palestine did not speak to the actual 
proto-state’s strengthening cultural force, nor did it celebrate the two-state solution. Instead, these 
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two films represented “a nation fighting for equality and freedom and justice” (Abu-Assad cited 
in Herndon 2014) – a political project still in formation and driven by identity rather than 
geography (Associated Press 2014).  
Like twenty percent of Israel’s population, Hany Abu-Assad is Palestinian with Israeli 
citizenship. His claims to Palestine therefore reveal some of the tensions that arise when 
Palestinian identity does not collude with the geopolitically accepted space of Palestine in 
international contexts where culture and diplomacy are closely entwined. At the same time, the 
identities of Palestinian individuals and cultural objects in Israel are constantly negated, contested, 
redefined, and re-appropriated so as to fit the dominant narrative in which Palestinians have been 
“assimilated” or “transferred,” with the hope of finally disappearing. Abu-Assad publicly declared: 
“[Citizenship] doesn’t make us Israeli. As long as the state is exclusive, you can’t identify with the 
state as long as it doesn’t recognize you as equal” (cited in Associated Press 2014). What does the 
international recognition of Palestinian films and directors mean when filmmakers are denied basic 
rights in the local political space in which they exist? How does international recognition impact 
the opportunities for developing Palestinian films and film networks in Israel? How can we 
understand the project of a Palestinian film economy beyond the confines of the Palestinian proto-
state? And what is the potential of such a Palestinian film economy in the process of decolonizing 
Israel? 
Palestinian citizens of Israel belong to the families who stayed in Israel after the state was 
established on the (still ongoing) systematic erasure of Palestinian culture and lives. For them, this 
space remains that of “historic Palestine,” which I will also refer to as “the 1948 territories” or 
“‘48.” Palestinian populations in Israel have not been untouched by colonial violence. Many have 
been forced out of their home and displaced within the current self-defined – yet not officially 
declared – borders of Israel, and were subject to martial law from 1948 to 1966 (Masalha 2005, 
9). Palestinian citizens now hardly enjoy the same rights as Jewish Israelis in terms of access to 
education, housing, and job opportunities because they are not considered to be equal nationals. 
The distinction between citizenship (ezrahut) and nationality (le’um) established in the early days 
of the state63 was meant to enshrine the differential statuses of Jews and Arabs in the legal structure 
                                                
63 The 1950 Law of Return for Jews and the 1952 Nationality Law for Arabs inscribed the distinction 
between (Jewish) colonial immigration and (Arab) native occupants in the legal structure of the state of 
Israel. It was meant “to resolve the ambiguous status of the nearly 180,000 Palestinian Arabs who had used 
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of the state while avoiding claims of discrimination under the guise of equal citizenship.  
According to the recent UN report commissioned by the Economic and Social Commission for 
Western Asia,64 the foundational distinction between the two nationalities constitutes evidence of 
Israel’s apartheid regime. Following the commission’s investigation, the fact that “only one 
nationality, Jewish, has legal standing and only Jewish nationality is associated with the legitimacy 
and mission of the State” (ESCWA 2017, 36) means that Palestinians are considered to be 
temporary residents depending on the government’s “mercy” and de facto excluded from a future 
vision of the Israeli state. Passed in July 2018, the project for a new Basic Law that defines the 
constitutional foundations of the state of Israel confirms and reinforces these apartheid logics. As 
noted by various organizations such as the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel 
(Adalah), the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) and progressive Zionist New Israel 
Fund (NIF), the voted nation-state law forsakes any reference to Israel as a democracy (NIF 2018). 
It also restricts the right of self-determination to the Jewish people and relegates the Arabic 
language from official to one with a “special status.” Finally, the law “formalizes … the possibility 
to discriminate on the grounds of religion, race, and nationality in the allocation of land and in 
promoting settlement” (ACRI 2017), and turns decades-long and illegitimate colonial, racist and 
discriminatory practices into an expression of the rule of law (Adalah 2018, 4).  
It is therefore of little surprise that Abu-Assad considers all of Israel (historic Palestine) 
under occupation, and rejects the abstract “Israeli Arab” identity, imposed on ‘48 Palestinians and 
designed to erase their historical attachment to the land. Yet, to a foreign eye, Abu-Assad’s identity 
constantly oscillates between his Palestinian roots and his legal status in Israel, which also impacts 
the international circulation of Palestinian works as Palestinian. The volatility of cultural 
recognition becomes subordinated to a host of contradicting geopolitical and financial interests, 
but it also provides an opportunity to redefine the parameters of Palestinian existence locally and 
internationally. For example, that Omar was shot in Nazareth, a city located in Israel with a 
majority of Palestinian inhabitants, epitomizes how opposing identity claims both threaten the 
integrity of Palestinian works and may open them up. On the one hand, Israel’s supporters who 
focus on the geographical boundaries of the country argue that the shooting location makes it an 
                                                
and would continue to use all means at their disposal to remain in or return to the country” (Robinson 2013, 
111), while preserving the privilege of Jewish citizens and later immigrants.  
64 The UN Secretary-General António Guterres deemed the report too controversial and had it removed 
from public view – after it was widely shared on the internet and made accessible on various platforms. 
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Israeli film – paradoxically recognizing and claiming the film, endowed with a distinct Palestinian 
narrative, at the very moment they deny its Palestinian origins. On the other, Abu-Assad’s focus 
on the identity and history of Nazareth legitimizes his relationship to both the city and the film as 
his own, and by the same token expands international conceptions of Palestine’s cartography. As 
we will see, strategies of Palestinian existence in Israel may seek to accommodate the egalitarian 
integration of Palestinian filmmakers within the Israeli film economy. Palestinian artists also at 
times build opportunities for the metaphorical and/or material return of those expelled from 
historic Palestine, the West Bank, and Gaza in 1948 and 1967. This contributes to the hypothetical 
space of a Palestine that exceeds the geography of the proto-state and the formation of new 
Palestinian futures. 
 The theme of recognition has run throughout this dissertation as a whole. As explored in 
Chapters Two and Three, cinema projects based in the West Bank have benefitted financially from 
European countries and organizations’ partial recognition of the proto-state. This political 
acknowledgment enabled the development of international funding programs as well as cultural 
and professional exchange with Palestinians. It also supported an impetus for artistic recognition 
in global circuits, manifest in Palestinians’ imaginary of and emphasis on film festivals. Chapter 
Four’s focus on Gaza engaged with a recognition of a different sort, also introduced in Chapter 
Three: that of Palestinians as victims, a process in which human rights and humanitarianism 
primarily mediate flows of capital and sociability. In turn, Chapter Five examines how dynamics 
of recognition inflect Palestinian modalities for local and transnational cultural exchange under 
apartheid and from within the settler colonial state of Israel. I use anthropologist Elizabeth 
Povinelli’s definition of recognition as a technique for governing (racial and cultural) difference, 
a major feature of what she calls “modern late liberalism.” This temporalization critically locates 
current political regimes and economies vis-à-vis teleological discourses that consider liberal 
democracies to intrinsically and uniquely guarantee human freedom. Often exemplified by the 
United States and policies of multiculturalism, the model of liberal democracy is said to mark “the 
end of History” and the completion of human progress. Povinelli’s phrase “modern late liberalism” 
also accounts for the reconfiguration of liberalism’s management of cultural difference in the wake 




late liberal cultural recognition incorporated and disciplined the challenge that anti-colonial 
and new social movements posed to liberal forms of government by shifting the locale of 
crisis and creating a definitive, though undefined, limit on the formative legal and social 
power of cultural difference (Povinelli 2011a., 26).  
 
For Wendy Brown, the discourse of tolerance (and by proxy, multiculturalism) constitutes one 
driving element of contemporary liberal governmentality that regulates the presence of the other 
both inside and outside the liberal democratic nation-state (Brown 2006, 8). As I will examine 
later, liberal practices of recognition are meant to discipline culture as a set of practices that 
threatens the discursive universality of liberalism (Brown 2006, 21).  
 The Israeli state project, designed by Jewish Ashkenazi communities hailing from Europe, 
identified with liberal democracy from the beginning. However, the government was soon 
confronted by the challenge of combining the liberal vision with its own colonial structure and 
reconciling “the separatist imperative of settler rule and the more incorporative expectations of 
liberal democracies after the Second World War” (Robinson 2013, 55). Keeping the appearances 
of a democracy before the international community proved essential in the late 1940s in order to 
advance the new state’s bid to the UN. It was thus in a context where Israel was seeking Western 
recognition that Palestinians were granted the right to vote in 1949 – before a citizenship bill was 
even passed (Robinson 2013, 55). Simultaneously however, the Israeli government retained its 
colonial logics by adopting a permit system that both limited Palestinians’ ability to accumulate 
wealth and increased their dependency on the regime, with the ultimate goal of “render[ing] the 
public suffrage and (after 1952) its citizenship rights meaningless” (Robinson 2013, 44). 
Additionally, the dualism the state created by establishing distinct nationalities for Jewish 
immigrants and Arab natives proved inadequate to position “Oriental Jews” or “Arab Jews” (also 
known as Mizrahim) who came to Israel from the Arab world as part of Zionist immigration 
policies. Ella Shohat points to this other contradiction at the core of the settler liberal state: “Within 
Zionist ideology, the very term ‘Arab Jew’ is an oxymoron and a misnomer, a conceptual 
impossibility” (Shohat 1999 [2017], 102). In many ways, the discrimination against Palestinians 
has thus extended to the Mizrahim, whose Arabness jars with the Ashkenazi European narrative 
of civilizational superiority that both drives liberal discourse and marks its limits. Ethiopian Jews 
figure even lower than Mizrahim in Israel’s ethnocratic structure and racial imaginary and are 
often stigmatized as “infiltrators” (Yerday 2018).  
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Nowadays, Israel’s claim that it constitutes the only democracy in the Middle East 
positions it as a beacon of liberty in a sea of “barbarism” typical of liberalism’s civilizational 
worldview. Beyond sustaining the military engagement of its own “war on terror” against any form 
of violent or non-violent Palestinian resistance (or just existence, for that matter), Israel’s 
identification with liberalism has also re-organized national strategies of inclusion and exclusion 
differentially along the lines of gender, ethnicity, and race. Rebecca Stein reminds us how, in 1990s 
Israel, emerging politics and policies of “tolerance” towards heretofore marginalized groups would 
often take the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as the state-centric site for the integration of non-
conforming sexual practices and gender identifications. Significantly, these new politics of 
integration concurred with Oslo’s forced re-location of West Bank- and Gaza-based Palestinian 
laborers, who worked in Israel, into the job market of the increasingly shrinking and isolated 
occupied territories (Stein 2010). Jasbir Puar further theorizes the articulation between Palestinians 
and Israeli queer minorities by attending to the term “pinkwashing,” the strategy by which Israel 
uses the promotion of gay rights in order to conceal the realities of growing apartheid. At the heart 
of multi-million-dollar campaign Brand Israel, pinkwashing reiterates colonial tropes of the sexual 
backwardness of the Palestinian other and “harness[es] global gays as a new source of affiliation, 
recruiting liberal gays into a dirty bargaining of their own safety against the continued oppression 
of Palestinians” (Puar 2010). This has multiple consequences: from pitting sexual and gender 
minorities against racial ones, thus threatening necessary solidarities, to undermining Palestinian 
queer populations and activism (whether they are based in Israel or the territories).  
Cinema plays a major role in reinforcing the idea that Israel is a safe haven for gay groups 
while negating Palestinians’ rights. At home, the Tel Aviv International LGBT Film Festival (TLV 
Fest, est. 2006) is fully integrated in the global circuits of gay and queer tourism and scheduled to 
coincide with Tel Aviv Pride as a celebration of Israel’s politics of (selective) inclusion. Israeli 
films that suggest a national promotion of gay rights such as Eytan Fox’s Ha-Buah/The Bubble 
(2006) also circulate in art and LGBTQ film festival networks internationally. Additionally, Israel 
has recently sent financial support to similar events abroad, including San Francisco’s veteran 
festival Frameline (est. 1977) whose collusion with pinkwashing has been widely denounced by 
local and international queer and pro-Palestine activist groups.65    
                                                
65 Pro-Palestinian queer and Jewish activist Sarah Schulman supported the work of Palestinian Queers for 
BDS (PQBDS) locally in the US and followed the controversy around Frameline. In her book Israel, Palestine, 
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 While delving into Israeli state politics around sexual and gender minorities is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, pinkwashing here exemplifies how cinema partakes in what Povinelli calls 
“the intercalation of the politics of culture with the culture of capital” (Povinelli 2002, 48). She 
describes as such the ways in which politics of recognition and logics of cultural (in)tolerance are 
of concern to transnational markets and the organization of finance, commerce, and trade. The 
economies of art and tourism in particular build on a liberal imagery of minority inclusion. In the 
Australian context on which Povinelli focuses, state economic strategies have increasingly relied 
on the popular abstraction of “indigenous traditions” to attract private capital, thus using a fiction 
of aboriginal authenticity to sustain the institutions and authorities that have endangered and 
forcefully disciplined indigenous cultural practices in the first place (Povinelli 2002, 136). In 
Israel, Palestinian filmmakers must similarly reckon with the complexity of their own claims of 
authenticity as well as dynamics of un-recognition and co-optation with which they are inevitably 
confronted when they request funding for, promote, and circulate their own work locally and 
internationally.  
In search of a model of social justice, Nancy Fraser considers that identity recognition is 
indivisible from its economic counterpart of redistribution because logics of marketization act as 
processes of differentiation that discriminate between ethnic, gender, social, cultural, and 
economic standings. According to her, “markets do not simply dissolve status distinctions; rather, 
they instrumentalize them, bending pre-existing patterns of cultural value to capitalist purposes” 
(Fraser 2003, 58). Much before Fraser, Frantz Fanon articulated the theoretical bases for thinking 
of capitalism through racial relations when he wrote that “the Negro problem does not resolve 
itself into the problem of Negroes living among white men but rather of Negroes being exploited, 
enslaved, despised by a colonialist, capitalist society that is only accidentally white” (Fanon 1952, 
202). While Zionist colonialization is first driven by cultural claims on the land, the strategies the 
regime uses are fully embedded in capitalist economies and values of property. In other words, 
there is no politics of cultural difference that is not always already imbricated with the capitalist 
                                                
and the Queer International (2012), she reports that Frameline received the modest sum of $2,500 (out of a $1 
million budget) from the Israeli consulate and refused activist groups’ offer to fundraise the equivalent amount 
on the condition that the partnership with Israel be dropped. The festival had received communications from 




division of labor and structures of property ownership (and dispossession), all crucial to 
understanding Israel’s apartheid as a form of racial capitalism (Clarno 2017).  
This chapter engages with recognition and redistribution through the dialectic of 
convergence and divergence. I have discussed different meanings and manifestations of the former 
term in Chapters Two, Three, and Four. Here, convergence refers to Palestinian attempts at 
integrating the liberal and colonial structures of Israeli film production and distribution. Yet, I 
argue that we should always think of convergence in tandem with divergence, manifest through 
either the ways in which institutions undermine minorities’ rights by following skewed politics of 
dialogue, reconciliation, and inclusion; or Palestinians’ suspicion of and/or deliberate move away 
from these liberal logics. The dialectic is further exacerbated by the liminality of Palestinian 
citizens of Israel in the context of Manichean discourses of conflict-resolution. Pegged 
simultaeously as cultural translators and central agents in peace-building, and potentially 
suspicious for being exterior to both sides, Palestinian citizens (and thus, filmmakers) in Israel 
prove, however, key to imagining a post-apartheid film industry.  
Convergence and divergence, engagement and disengagement, may take the shape of small 
refusals and hesitant approvals; they may also boldly assert Palestinian existence against the 
seemingly unstoppable progress of colonial and liberal history in cooperation with Jewish Israelis. 
Yet, opening up decolonized spaces and temporalities of what Eyal Weizman calls “co-resistance” 
(Estefan and Weizman 2017, 103) – that is to say, collaborations between Palestinians and Jewish 
Israelis that go beyond a mere co-habitation blind to the situation of structural violence – is 
challenging. The earlier discussion around recognition and redistribution suggests that co-
resistance can only emerge from a “two-dimensional” perspective (Fraser 2003), which would 
address both the forging of a new identity within the space of Palestine-Israel and the development 
of economic structures in harmony with it. Yet, as Dene First people Glenn Coulthard reminds us, 
this new articulation should always occur at the same time as we question the colonial foundations 
of settler states (Coulthard 2014, 36).66 
                                                
66 In his critique of the politics of recognition in colonial contexts, Coulthard expresses his interest in 
Fraser’s model of recognition and redistribution. However, he convincingly argues, “[Fraser’s] model rests 
on the problematic background assumption that the settler state constitutes a legitimate framework within 
which Indigenous peoples might be more justly included, or from which they could be further excluded” 
(Coulthard 2014, 36). 
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The logics of boycott, deployed over the past fifteen years under the banner of the much-
debated BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions),67 constitute one important example of a 
transformative modality of exchange that mobilizes economic strategies to address the recognition 
of Palestinian rights – before their cultural difference. A grassroots movement developed within 
Palestinian civil society with the growing support of international and Jewish activists, BDS sees 
its roots in multiple contexts, including anti-colonial Palestinian boycott movements in the 1930s, 
similar actions carried out during the First Intifada in the late 1980s, and anti-colonial boycotts of 
the 1960s and ‘70s in the third world at large (Musa 2016). Largely inspired by the strategies of 
institutional and economic pressure against Apartheid South Africa (Soske and Jacobs, n/d; Maira 
2018), the idea of an organized boycott of Israel gained momentum at the 2001 UN-backed World 
Conference against Racism in Durban. It formalized in 2004 around three demands: “1. Ending 
the occupation and colonization of all Arab lands [occupied in 1967] and dismantling the wall 2. 
Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality 3. 
Respecting, protecting, and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes 
and properties, as stipulated in UN Resolution 194” (Barghouti 2011, 6).  
While I unfortunately do not dwell on the material victories of boycott as much as could 
be deemed necessary, I extract some of its theoretical potential to understand Palestinian tactics 
towards self-determination through dialectics of convergence and divergence in processes of 
“intercalation of culture with the culture of capital” (Povinelli 2002, 48). As Sunaina Maira argues, 
Boycott foregrounds “decolonial principles of cultural, in addition to political, liberation enacted 
through the withdrawal of collusions with colonial institutions” (Maira 2018, 46). In Israel proper, 
these institutions are involved in managing Palestinian culture through skewed politics of 
recognition. This chapter thus uses Boycott to frame and understand individual filmmakers’ 
strategies to engage with Israeli institutions in ways that can accommodate some space for 
                                                
67 For pro-Zionist groups and individuals who conflate criticism of the state of Israel with an attack of the 
Jewish people as a whole, BDS is understood as fundamentally anti-Semitic. Yet, the International 
Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), often cited as supportive evidence, defines anti-Semitism as 
possibly targeting “the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. However, criticism of Israel 
similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as anti-Semitic” (IHRA 2018, my 
emphasis). Moreover, echoing the BDS campaign’s self-description as an institutional critique within an 
antiracist and anti-anti-Semitism framework, international pro-Palestinian Jewish activist groups such as 
Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP) in the US, Palestinian Jewish Unity (PAJU) in Québec, and Union Juive 
Française pour la Paix (UJFP) in France have supported the claim that the criticism of Israel and the 
promotion of Palestinian rights as enunciated by the BDS campaign does not constitute anti-Semitism.  
	
	 221 
Palestinianness and Palestinian rights. Cultural industries provide a productive environment for 
observing attempts at negotiating and challenging the politics of segregation that have presided 
over the global fragmentation of the Palestinian people since 1948. This context might finally 
produce new temporalities that conform to the imaginative geographies of a common space of 
return to Palestine-Israel.  
This chapter seeks to examine the aporia of recognition under settler colonialism. Liberal 
rhetorics of dialogue, which drive both the peace process and European cultural policies and 
economic agreements with Israel, provide limited engagement with the reality of Palestinian 
discrimination and dispossession, serving to reinforce the status quo. I then turn to what I call, 
after Povinelli’s insights, the transnational management of cultural difference, which disciplines 
cultural expressions by Palestinian citizens of Israel. I discuss the inclusion mechanisms by which 
successful Palestinian films are designated as Israeli in transnational networks and yet at the same 
time are excluded from the domestic economy and cultural sphere. As a result, what does it mean 
for Palestinian citizens to use funds emanating from the colonial state? Here I introduce the 
potential of BDS, and more particularly boycott, both as a way of theorizing individual Palestinian 
filmmakers’ various relationships to the institution, and as a major organizing discourse in 
Palestinian, Israeli, and worldwide debates around films produced at the intersection of Palestinian 
identity and Israeli funding. I move on to look at more specific dynamics of co-optation, arguing 
that these perpetuate the logics of ethnic cleansing so intrinsic to the settler state. In response, 
Palestinian filmmakers propose various economic strategies of dis/engagement with settler 
institutions that reconfigure their positionalities vis-à-vis recognition. Finally, I analyze the 
articulation of cultural appropriation, property, and claims to the land as they are grounded in 
conceptions of history. Attending to this entanglement points to the “material-symbolic” value of 
images and locates one possibility of re-writing history through aesthetic interventions that reflect 
on the economy and the redistribution of images.  
 
Dialogue Is a Structure, Not an Event 
In his comparative work on the United States, Australia, and Israel, anthropologist Patrick Wolfe 
argues that logics of elimination are inherent characteristics of settler states. These rely on the 
double project of dissolving native societies and erecting a new colonial society on their 
expropriated lands. In other words, “invasion is a structure, not an event. In its positive aspect, 
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elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and 
superseded) occurrence” (Wolfe 2006, 388). The 1948 Nakba, during which the Haganah and the 
Irgun68 destroyed more than 400 Palestinian villages and expelled close to a million natives, 
established the bases for perennial measures of demographic control. A recurring point of debate 
among pre-1948 and post-1967 Zionist leaders revolved around the development of “population 
transfer” policies. These were destined to manage Palestinians’ high fertility rates said to present 
a “demographic threat” to the (future) state of Israel’s Jewish majority and, after 1967, to the 
occupied territories meant to be eventually annexed. Numerous polls conducted among Israeli 
citizens from 1967 on have shown a strong permanent base of popular support (minimum 27-40 
percent) for the transfer of both Palestinians from the territories and those endowed with an Israeli 
citizenship (Masalha 2000, 207). In 1993, at the time when Oslo supposedly marked an effort of 
“reconciliation” that pervaded Israel’s own Palestinian citizens, then-leader of the Likud party and 
soon-to-be Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu wrote: “If the statistics suggest any demographic 
‘threat’ at all, it comes not from the Arabs of the territories but from the Arabs of pre-1967 [that 
is, the Israeli Arab citizens]” (cited in Masalha 2000, 206).  
In fact, in addition to encouraging Jewish migration and fertility, Israel’s demographic 
policies have included the repeated destruction of Palestinian houses and “unrecognized villages”69 
as well as the arbitrary revocation of citizenship within Israel (Cook 2017).70 Both measures have 
targeted, among others, Palestinian Bedouins in the Naqab (Negev) because of their high rate of 
birth and the area’s strategic land reserves. Under the guise of developmental endeavors 
reminiscent of early Zionist rhetoric about making the desert bloom, the Prawer Plan, frozen in 
2013 and re-activated in late 2016, engineers the dispossession and forceful displacement of 
80,000 to 90,000 Palestinian Bedouin citizens of Israel, denies them land ownership rights, and 
violates their constitutional protections (Adalah 2017). Israeli leaders also regularly suggest land 
                                                
68 The Haganah and the Irgun were two Zionist settlers’ paramilitary organizations operating in Mandate 
Palestine. Both played a major role in the 1948 war, and the Irgun was especially involved in perpetuating 
massacres on Palestinians. The two were absorbed in the Israeli Defense Forces after 1948.   
69 For Adalah, Israel describes these Bedouin villages as unrecognized “based on false information…: first 
that the Bedouin community is trespassing on ‘state land’ and their very presence there is ‘illegal’ and 
second, that the Bedouin have no legal claim to their ancestral land in the Naqab and any final settlement 
on Bedouin land claims should be resolved in favor of the state” (Adalah 2017). 
70 Used since the early years of Zionist colonization, house demolition is also a very common measure of 
“collective punishment” in the Palestinian territories since 1967, subordinated to larger goals of 
demographic control.  
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swaps. In 2014, echoing the Liberman Plan devised ten years before, Israeli officials proposed 
swapping a portion of the Galilee, a region with a vast majority of Palestinians, with a future 
Palestinian state in exchange for the full integration of West Bank-based Jewish settlements into 
Israel. This calculation was meant to reduce Israel’s Palestinian population to 12% (Tait 2014). In 
the face of such patent ongoing ethnic cleansing, Palestinian citizens tend to treat with suspicion 
discourses of co-existence and mutual understanding as a basis for the recognition of their culture 
– as opposed to rights – within Israel. In what follows, I explain the aporias of dialogue – the liberal 
solution to all political hostilities – in the context of settler-colonialism.  
 Dialogue is often invoked as a solution to the “Israeli-Palestinian conflict” and constitutes 
the premise for the internationally brokered peace process. The Oslo Accords promised the 
recognition of Israel and Palestine’s “mutual legitimate and political rights” in order to “live in 
peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security” (Declaration of Principles 1993). By 
assuming that Israel and Palestinians could claim equal rights to the land, Oslo framed the issue as 
a conflict between two national movements of symmetrical legitimacy that ignores the settler-
colonial context. The Accords psychologized the reconciliation process by equating the two sides’ 
need for recognition. In Nadim Rouhana’s words, “according to this rationale, if only the mutual 
fear, mistrust, denial, and de-humanization can be addressed, then the parties will be able to 
achieve a peaceful agreement and perhaps even reconciliation” (Rouhana 2018, 653). This 
scenario also supports Israeli allegations that Palestinians are unwilling to engage in a dialogue 
when they demand more rights or disagree to indecent negotiating terms, casting Israel as the 
unique, legitimate “partner for peace.” 
Films are expected to play a great part in bringing the opposing parties to listen to each 
other and foster a just settlement based on mutual cultural understanding, especially within Israeli 
society where Palestinians and Jewish Israelis already “co-habitate.” Liberal Zionist organizations 
external to Israel and based in the US like the Other Israel Film Festival (OIFF) and the New Israel 
Fund (NIF) describe their own scope of action in those terms. For OIFF, the goal “is to use film as 
a catalyst for a dynamic and inclusive forum for exploration of, and dialogue about Israeli and 
Palestinian societies…The Other Israel Film Festival uses film to foster social awareness and 
cultural understanding” (OIFF). Similarly, NIF’s mission rests on “recogniz[ing] and reinforc[ing] 
the essential pluralism of Israeli society and tolerance for diversity” (NIF). In Israel proper, the 
non-governmental New Fund for Cinema and Television (NFCT) “promote[s] the values of 
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tolerance and social justice while enriching the cultural landscape” (NFCT); the Gesher 
Multicultural Film Fund (GMFF) “aims to bridge the significant gaps between the Israeli 
multiculturalism and its representation in film and television” (GMFF); and the Haifa International 
Film Festival (HIFF), set in a predominantly Palestinian area, “makes sure to promote ideas like 
pluralism, co-existence and peace” (HIFF).  
In those instances, dialogue functions as an event as opposed to a structure, detached from 
the historical forces that have shaped power imbalances in the relationship between Palestinians 
and Israelis and in full compatibility with the very erasure of those the process purports to 
recognize. Povinelli comments on liberal ideology’s complicity with overt colonization, where “to 
care for difference is to make a space for culture without disturbing key ways of figuring 
experience,” thus “leaving background assumptions intact” (Povinelli 2011, 26 and 50). So-called 
“Israeli Arabs” may enjoy some of the benefits of citizenship on the condition that they do not re-
activate the colonial past to which their Palestinian identity is testament. Multiculturalism and co-
existence thus prove contingent upon legislations such as the 2011 Nakba Law forbidding any 
celebration of Israel’s “Independence Day” as a mourning of the 1948 Nakba. By denying the 
historical trauma that inherently organizes Palestinian lives, the law insures the permanence of 
multiculturalism and intrinsically rejects the foundations for a “new democratic political order” 
based on decolonization, equality, and reciprocity (Rouhana 2018, 657).  
Cultural diplomacy similarly abides by a configuration of dialogue that maintains 
(transnational) liberal power infrastructures. It shows very little tolerance towards elements that 
upset its management of difference. In March 2004, the Paris-based festival Cinéma du Réel 
partially withdrew its commitment to Eyal Sivan and Michel Khleifi’s Route 181 – Fragments of 
a Journey to Palestine-Israel (2003) and ran only one of the two announced screenings. This 
change of schedule occurred after the French Ministry of Culture and the Centre George 
Pompidou, the festival’s host-institution, labelled the film “a risk to public order” in a “context of 
racial tensions prone to igniting anti-Jewish and anti-Semite sentiments” (Ayad 2004, my 
translation).  By doing so, the government aligned itself with a collective letter signed by French 
intellectuals, directors, and actors (including the notorious supporter of Israel, racist and 
Islamophobe philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy) demanding that the state assume its 
responsibilities, yet “without calling for censorship” (Ayad 2004). The object of what Sivan and 
Khleifi identified as censorship nonetheless (Sindibad Films 2014), Route 181 champions a 
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particular form of dialogue through its production strategy and its message of true reconciliation. 
A road-movie, the film foregrounds the collaboration between the two filmmakers, one Jewish 
Israeli, the other Palestinian, and follows the tentative borders outlined by the 1947 UN Partition 
Plan in Resolution 181, whose implementation was precluded by the 1948 war. The encounters 
the two travelers have along the way reveal the deep racist foundations of Israeli society while also 
suggesting the radical possibility for a decolonized dialogue between Palestinians and Israeli Jews 
through the idea of a common state. In response, the French artists’ petition and the government’s 
execution de-legitimized a dialogue that could unsettle the structures of liberalism and the fantasy 
of multiculturalism (which implicitly blamed the “Arabs” as the source of all societal problems 
both in France and Israel) with the claim to protect democracy. As Eyal Sivan and Armelle Laborie 
put it, critiques of Israel are silenced in the very name of freedom of expression (Laborie and Sivan 
2016, 70). 
In contrast, liberal forms of dialogue thrive due to a tight network of well-funded 
organizations engaged in “peace-building,” commonly referred to as “the dialogue industry” 
(Giacaman 2009; Botmeh 2010).71 To many Palestinians, these non-governmental and 
government-affiliated groups are deemed inefficient yet very lucrative (Mustafa 2009).  Dialogue 
projects such as “Seeds of Peace” organize Summer camps, year-round leadership programs, and 
interfaith and mediation workshops that mix Palestinian and Israeli youth. All these activities 
assume that colonization can be remedied through increased cultural understanding alone – in 
addition to prompting successful diplomatic careers. They operate in the continuity of the NGO-
ization of the West Bank after Oslo (see Chapter Three) and with the financial support of private 
foundations and supra-national and state organizations that include the European Union and 
USAID. The dialogue industry also parallels and often conflates with a new liberal praxis of 
solidarity embodied by a demographics which political scientist Linda Tabar calls “the 
internationals” (el dawleyeen) (Tabar 2017). These activists constitute the product of the 
reformulation of the third world and 1970s anti-imperialist and feminist political movements into 
the one-way (North/South) logics of the aid industry. They enact 
 
                                                
71 Based on an unpublished 2002 report by the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information, the 
San Francisco Chronicle reported that that “between 1993 and 2000 [alone], Western governments and 
foundations spent between $20 million and $25 million on the dialogue groups.” See Kalman 2008.	 
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the ability of privileged Western actors to cross national borders in an uncanny mirroring 
of the movement and logics of global capital…occluding hierarchies, power relations and 
the material realities of the majority of people around the world who cannot cross borders, 
like native Palestinians, who are imprisoned in smaller and smaller parts of their own land 
(Tabar 2017, 415). 
 
In other words, liberal dialogue is primarily aimed at individualistic politics of emancipation that 
normalize the occupation, reproduce racial hierarchies, and reinforce geopolitical power relations 
under the guise of “progress” and “historical advancement.”  
The assessment that “dialogue is a structure, not an event” after Patrick Wolfe’s phrase 
thus also proposes a reflection on temporality, History (with a capital H), and futurity. Here I 
extend Rouhana’s critique of the discourse in which Palestinians and Israel are considered equal 
in dialogue, wherein equality is a means of continuing colonization. Equality can signify its exact 
opposite only if History has reached its end and liberal democracy’s promise of multiculturalism 
constitutes a mechanism that disciplines civil rights demands. In other words, dialogue is perverted 
by a substitution which silences claims for more rights in favor of a de-politicized recognition of 
culture. In what follows, I examine how liberal recognition is attached to a civilizational discourse 
and a conception of History that perpetuate structures of oppression. Theoretical reconfigurations 
of History may in turn suggest alternatives to material inequalities and allow processes of 
decolonization, in which film may also play a role.  
A leading theory of liberalism, Francis Fukuyama’s famous opus The End of History and 
the Last Man (1992) builds on Alexandre Kojève’s study of Hegel’s dialectic of master and slave. 
In this conception, recognition and the search for self-consciousness through reciprocal 
acknowledgment operates as a driving force in the process of superseding the contradictions of 
previous ages. The always incomplete recognition of the master, who is met with the unsatisfying 
approval of a being emerging as inferior to himself (the slave), engenders further stages of History. 
Human dignity and full access to self-consciousness can thus only be realized through a system of 
rights granted by the embodiment of self-government, the liberal democratic state. These rights 
guarantee the persistence and universality of mutual recognition. In this view, human rights mark 
the end point of History and the full completion of human progress, “because what truly satisfies 
human beings is not so much material prosperity as recognition of their status and dignity” 
(Fukuyama 1992, xviii). Without recognition, economic and technological advancement is void; 
yet, recognition is also intimately tied to the economic possibilities and rationalities of capitalism.  
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The main implication of such conception of History lies in the argument that liberal 
democracy is now free of contradictions. Societal and economic inequalities are relegated to mere 
accidents and anomalies independent from the political and economic regime’s structure and 
deemed inconsequential in the face of the larger pattern and movement of a directional, rational, 
and universal History. Ultimately, the larger goal of the end of History and the full achievement 
of human progress gives meaning to, makes legible, and justifies “the particular events of history” 
(Fukuyama 1992, 56). Particular events include imperialism or the Holocaust, interpreted like any 
other historical processes as a desire for recognition. As horrifying as these may be, Fukuyama 
argues, they “do not nullify the obvious fact that modernity is a coherent and extremely powerful 
whole” (Fukuyama 1992, 130). In the present times in which all countries supposedly strive or 
should strive towards liberal democracy, capitalist economic development (the necessary 
companion of human rights) is potentially available to everyone regardless of their resources. 
Cultural habits, customs, religions and social structures of non-Western peoples as well as bad 
policy-making here constitute the real obstacles to economic prosperity and recognition 
(Fukuyama 1992, 103).  
Fukuyama’s description of liberal democracy posits non-Western culture as that which 
precludes the achievement of human rights, and as always already external to liberal democracy. 
Even in a “multicultural” context, non-Western culture forms an object of tolerance, a latent threat 
which may potentially destroy the “host” (Brown 2006, 27). For Wendy Brown, liberal democracy 
recasts “inequality, subordination, marginalization and social conflict, which all require political 
analysis and political solutions, as personal and individual, on the one hand, or as natural, religious, 
or cultural on the other” (Brown 2006, 15). Recommendations for improving emotional, personal, 
and attitudinal practices replace political transformations. Echoing Rouhana’s critique of the 
psychologization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, dialogue functions as a means of redressing 
so-called deviant (cultural) behaviors. Multiculturalism thus fully partakes in the de-politicization 
of culture and the “culturalization of politics,” a discourse heralded by the Cold War’s ethos of a 
Huntingtonian “clash of civilizations” (Brown 2006, 16). Brown pushes this argument even further 
and contends that liberalism represents itself as being altogether antithetical to culture because its 
principles are supposedly universal and therefore cultureless (Brown 2006, 21). She writes: 
Without liberalism, culture is conceived by liberals as oppressive and dangerous not only 
because of its disregard for individual rights and liberties and for the rule of law, but also 
because the inextricability of cultural principles from power, combined with the 
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nonuniversal nature of these principles, renders it devoid of judicial and political 
accountability. Hence culture must be contained by liberalism, forced into a position in 
which it makes no political claim and is established as optional for individuals (Brown 
2006, 21-2, my emphasis).  
  
In other words, Western culture remains invisible as a norm while “foreign” cultures alone imperil 
democracy and must be disciplined. As a result, the rights of individuals framed as culturally other 
are reconfigured by liberalism’s denial of structural marginalization and social conflict and 
confused with these individuals’ access to a superficial and conditional “mutual recognition” 
mediated and contained by politics of tolerance.  
 Tawfik Abu Wael’s Atash/Thirst (2004), for instance, epitomizes the culturalization of 
politics. The film builds on the universal theme of the father-son relationship and portrays the 
family as a timeless and patriarchal tribe refractory to modern civilization, elevating Palestinian 
experience to an abstract metaphor. Atash opens with a wide angle shot depicting the story’s 
primary setting, a dry area with a few isolated concrete buildings – in reality, a former Israeli 
military training camp established on Palestinian land confiscated fifty years prior. Two children, 
a young woman, and their two parents traverse the space of the screen from one corner to the other, 
dragging heavy buckets of water towards a large stack of burning wood and throwing mounds of 
sand in the flames to control the carbonization process. Close-ups reveal faces covered with ash 
and defying looks between the father and the younger male child, who finally escapes to go to 
school without paternal approval (Fig. 18). The water well becomes the focus of the father’s rage 
and heralds the long quest for a proper water pipe irrigation system. The specter of an Israeli soldier 
who allegedly damaged the newly installed water pipe and the intermediary who sells the family’s 
charcoal constitute their only contacts with the outside world. This introduction to a Palestinian 
family and its secluded charcoal business sets the tone for the rest of the film. Significantly, the 
film avoids the depiction of daily colonial violence, psychologizing it through the father’s deep 
trauma also discretely given as a possible alternative explanation for his tyrannical behavior. The 
family’s unlawful occupation of the abandoned site alone accounts for the lack of running water. 
Their forced displacement is additionally characterized as voluntary exile due to politics of shame 
and honor internal to the Palestinian community, rather than being the result of colonial politics of 







Figure 18: The opening scene of Tawfik Abu Wael’s Atash (screenshots) 
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Frantz Fanon articulates a seminal critique of Hegel’s dialectics in Black Skin, White Masks 
(1952) which further deconstructs the liberal foundations of dialogue and its civilizational ethos. 
The assumption guiding Hegel’s struggle for recognition, he remarks, is that the two initial 
consciences setting the dialectics in motion are equal and symmetrical. This false universalism 
proves inconsistent with Fanon’s own experience of structural racism. Instead, Black people are 
trapped in a “zone of nonbeing,” “neither of appearance or disappearance” (Gordon 2007, 9), and 
must struggle to attain the same ontological value as the White man. As a result, for George 
Ciccariello-Maher, the absence of “a shared basis for reciprocity and ultimately recognition… 
prevents the dialectic from entering into motion to begin with” (Ciccariello-Maher 2017, 58).  This 
casts a shadow of doubt onto whether Black populations are really freed from slavery – what is 
freedom when it is conceded by the master himself? Fanon writes: “For Hegel, there is reciprocity; 
here [in reality] the master laughs at the consciousness of the slave. What he wants from the slave 
is not recognition but work” (Fanon 1952, 220). Indigenous political scientist Glenn Coulthard 
transposes Fanon’s insights into the context of Canada’s settler colonial and liberal regime. For 
him, “recognition is not posited as a source of freedom and dignity for the colonized, but rather as 
the field of power through which colonial relations are produced and maintained” (Coulthard 2014, 
17). The future created by politics of recognition is one of continuation, status quo, and steady 
progress towards the colonial takeover of indigenous land. In the case of Palestine, dialogue does 
not undermine the political and legal framework that sustains the occupation and segregation – 
rather, it legitimizes its continuation. Dialogue as event promotes continuation and linearity, 
embedded within teleological accumulation and dispossession. 
 Yet, Fanon does not forsake the recognition paradigm entirely, and instead proposes a focus 
on self-recognition that lays the groundwork for decolonial politics. Reclaiming the Black identity 
disrupts a political and social structure that conceals Blackness and marginalizes it into a zone of 
nonbeing. Fanon’s exegete Lewis Gordon summarizes the paradox of Black self-assertion as 
follows: “to change things is to appear, but to appear is to be violent since that group’s appearance 
is illegitimate. Violence, in this sense, need not be a physical imposition. It need not be a 
consequence of guns and other weapons of destruction. It need simply be appearance” (Gordon 
2015, 11). The Black man’s self-recognition thus risks falling back into the role of violent being 
that is prescribed to him in advance. For Fanon however, and in the words of Ciccariello-Maher, 
making himself known as a Black man primarily offsets outside over-determination with a form 
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of “counterontological violence” (Ciccariello-Maher 2017, 50). As Ciccariello-Maher further 
clarifies in his study of decolonial dialectics to which Fanon contributes considerably, the re-
assertion of difference through counterontological violence directly combats false universalisms 
and what will be later formally referred to as the end of History. In other words, struggle alone 
should lead the way to the transformation of social relations, mutual recognition, and self-
perception away from racial hierarchies. Coulthard’s formulation makes it clear: “Without conflict 
and struggle the terms of recognition tend to remain in the possession of those in power to bestow 
on their inferiors in ways that they deem appropriate” (Coulthard 2014, 39). However, Fanon 
warns us against the temptation to proclaim a resolution to social difference through its 
universalizing subsumption. Dialectics of recognition must remain an open-ended process if they 
are to maintain their emancipatory potential. “Premature reconciliation” or “the preemptive 
closing” of that dialectic would engineer a return to determinist and teleological logics, wherein 
liberal power recolonizes identities and social relations (Ciccariello-Maher 2017, 6 and 50).  
 The Boycott movement (BDS) and its cultural chapters mean to pressure Israel into 
recognizing Palestinians’ rights and similarly engages with fundamental elements of Fanon’s 
“combative moment” of counterontological violence (Ciccariello-Maher 2017, 71). First amongst 
all, it advocates that Palestinians and the world at large bring to a halt any dialogue or 
normalization of social relations with Israel and its institutions. Politics of refusal, which I briefly 
examine later in this chapter, intend to shake the structures of the liberal conflict-resolution 
approach that bypasses the necessity of struggle and fails to alter the formation of mutual 
consciousness. As Palestinian American human rights attorney Noura Erakat explains, the 
abolition of the apartheid regime must include a reformulation of social relations between 
colonizer and colonized: 
 
In contrast to the deployment of dialogue as an opportunistic tactic aimed at reinforcing 
and reproducing the status quo, dialogue must begin with an understanding and 
appreciation of Palestinian rights and demands, if it is to lead to co-resistance. It must begin 
with the awareness that Israelis are not neighbors, or even occupiers, but colonial masters 
and beneficiaries of ongoing Palestinian deprivation (Erakat 2017, 99, my emphasis). 
 
Focused on the present of struggle, BDS takes its strength from its refusal to determine the political 
regime which will bring about Palestinian liberation. The movement remains open-ended as to 
which solution (two-state, one-state, binational, federative or else) can carry the emancipation of 
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both perpetrators and the oppressed and it constantly re-asserts itself as a means towards liberation 
as opposed to an end goal per se – it constitutes a tactic rather than an ideology (Maira 2018, 36). 
Yet, BDS’ focus on human rights potentially heralds its recolonization by naïve universalism and 
liberalism’s unitary rhetorics of reconciliation. Aware of this tension, its supporters articulate 
Boycott as a “rights-based strategy” (Botmeh 2010, my emphasis) and “an instrumentalization [of 
the] universalist framework of international law” (Maira 2017). Instrumentalization suggests yet 
another form of convergence in addition to those examined in previous chapters. Nonetheless, the 
tension between engagement and disengagement is here exacerbated to the limit of breaking point 
– and suspended in a combative moment.  
 It is not my intention to lay out the challenges, impasses, and struggles around recognition 
as a normative framework for the rest of this chapter. In other words, I do not judge Palestinian 
filmmakers for their individual positionality within politics of Israeli and transnational recognition. 
Instead, I have here established philosophical concerns about historical processes and liberation as 
terms for the debate around recognition that already exist in Palestine/Israel. What I provided here 
is the theoretical context for further examining the conditions of Palestinian appearance in 
transnational and domestic markets mediated by Israel’s diplomatic and governmental power. I 
therefore now turn to the role of dialogue in the cultural and economic management of Palestinian 
culture both domestically and internationally. 
 
The Transnational Management of Cultural Difference 
Palestinian filmmakers with Israeli citizenship first accessed this state’s funding in the early 1990s 
with the turn towards global art cinema. In 1995, Elia Suleiman consulted with a team of lawyers 
and lobbied Israeli state film funds to secure the production of Chronicle of a Disappearance 
(1996) (Brooks 2006). Nurith Gertz and George Khleifi note that Rashid Masharawi, Ali Nassar, 
and Nizar Hassan similarly sought subsidies from diverse governmental organizations (Israeli 
Fund for Quality Films; Israeli Film Fund; Channel One of Israeli television) which supported 
some of their most famous features (Gertz and Khleifi 2008, 57). This opportunity, uniquely 
available to Palestinian citizens of Israel, sparked off debate in the Palestinian filmmaking 
community at large. In the mid-2000s, London-based filmmaker and distributor Omar al-Qattan 




I would have no problem working with an Israeli producer. But I would never take money 
from a state that I believe is racist and discriminatory. It is a matter of principle. When you 
take money from a government that doesn’t recognize that you exist, you are automatically 
compromising yourself (cited in Brooks 2006). 
 
The responding arguments are diverse and this chapter examines them in turn. For now, the broader 
context prevails. The expansion of global art cinema and its gradual inclusion and (artistic) 
recognition of Palestinian talents opens up an unprecedented channel of circulation for Palestinian 
works. Despite the multiplication of global film funds inclusive of racial and cultural minorities in 
the past ten to fifteen years (see Chapter Two), the fierce competition for financial support 
encourages filmmakers to seize every chance they might have, including when the latter is supplied 
by an apartheid regime that owes Palestinians the same financial redistribution as its other citizens. 
More often than not, co-producers also require that filmmakers gather a financial basis from their 
own country’s institutions. I am here interested in how Palestinians’ access to state funding is 
mediated by Israel’s transnational management of cultural difference. At the same time, 
Palestinian filmmakers adopt strategies to inhabit what Povinelli calls “the brackets of 
recognition,” where they “endure the material conditions that compose their limbo” (Povinelli 
2011, 78). As “camouflage” (Povinelli 2011, 30) or “mimicry” (Bhabha 1994, 121), Palestinian 
filmmakers’ positionality reflects the ambivalent construction of the “‘reformed’ colonial subject” 
(Bhabha 1994, 124); his or her modalities of representation in accordance, but not quite, with 
colonial discourse and desire; and his or her simultaneous threat to colonial authority. When 
transposed back into the context of film funding, where the market and Israeli state interest tend 
to overlap, mimicry entangles similar intricacies to those uncovered by Irit Neidhardt’s question: 
 
Looking at Middle-Eastern films from an economic perspective demands the reformulation 
of the question as to what stories the films tell or what they represent: what subjects do 
they need to deal with and how do the stories have to be told in order to meet the 
requirements of the market? (Neidhardt 2010, 32, her emphasis) 
 
Tawfik Abu Wael’s film Atash, discussed above for its psychologization of the colonial paradigm, 
provides a typical example of slow art cinema with little dialogue and dazzling cinematography. 
The film’s compliance with the codes of global art cinema as well as the representation of Arabs 
as timeless and “backwards,” compatible with the European liberal imaginary, contributed to 
Atash’s successful international career. Yet, following Bhabha’s ambivalent mimicry, the film’s 
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apparent de-politicizing detachment from any precise geographical or temporal reference to the 
real world also implicitly lays bare the fundamental dynamics of expulsion and dispossession. 
Palestinian filmmaker and scholar Sobhi al-Zobaidi thus reads Atash as symptomatic of the “loss 
of land and of memory” of non-assimilated and doubly-alienated Palestinian citizens of Israel 
(Zobaidi 2008).  
What distinguishes Atash from the majority of contemporary Palestinian films is the refusal 
to grapple with the Second Intifada at the very moment it is unfolding. In the mid-2000s, West 
Bank-based filmmakers were directing their undivided attention towards the deployment of 
checkpoints, curfews, and other methods of collective punishment, a reality with which 
Palestinians in Israel do not have to wrestle in the same terms. Yet, Palestinian filmmakers who 
hold Israeli citizenship were also joining their effort, such as Mohammad Bakri with Jenin, Jenin 
(2002); Elia Suleiman with Divine Intervention (2002); Hany Abu-Assad with Ford Transit (2003) 
and Paradise Now (2005); Sameh Zoabi with Be Quiet (2005); and Sharif Waked with Chic Point 
(2005). In contrast, Abu Wael asserts his entitlement to investigate the structure of Palestinian 
society. In doing so, he argues, he “resists the dictations of both Zionist and Palestinian national 
discourses, or for that matter of the Islamic movement, which has a strong base in the place” (cited 
in Friedman 2008, 59). Atash also subverts the expectations of international audiences – which 
translate into market pressure – who directly associate Palestinians with the contemporary context 
of the Intifada. Despite Abu Wael’s effort of abstraction however, the press kit distributed at 
Cannes addressed the global imaginary of the conflict by including a map of Palestine-Israel and 
a picture of the shooting location in Umm al-Fahm (Mother of Charcoal in Arabic), the 
predominantly Palestinian town from where Abu Wael originates. Situated on the Green Line on 
lands which the Israeli army confiscated after 1967, the town and the military outpost were 
returned to the Palestinian villagers after they conducted large protests. None of this historical 
information, unnecessary to understand the film, is provided in the press release and Umm al-
Fahm is not spotted on the companion map. For Neidhardt who describes the kit, the material 
misled spectators’ expectations about the political content of Atash, yet by the same token missed 
an opportunity to uncover its underlying political message (Neidhardt 2010, 34).  
Funded by the Israeli Yehoshua Rabinowitz Foundation for the Arts, Atash won the 
FIPRESCI prize at Cannes’ Critics Week on behalf of Israel. The film was also successful within 
Israel proper where it was awarded Best Film at the Jerusalem Film Festival and Best 
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Cinematography at the Israeli Film Academy. However, these distinctions did not facilitate the 
film’s circulation in Israel, where local distributors were reluctant to release it in regular theaters. 
The few who agreed demanded that the filmmaker cover all the accompanying costs. This was not 
an isolated case: among others, Ali Nassar’s contemporary Arabic-language (whose official title 
is in Hebrew) BaHodesh HaTeshei/In the Ninth Month (2002) won the second prize at Jerusalem’s 
festival but similarly failed to screen outside festivals in Israel. Abu Wael bitterly concludes: 
“Today I know that the Israeli cinema establishment gave me financial support only to put a check 
on its list. No one really wants an Arabic-language film.” He continues: “I made Israel famous all 
over the world and I expect to be paid for that. I feel like a ‘token Arab,’ not really part of the local 
culture...I put Israel on the map and took it to places it never dreamed of and now they step on me” 
(cited in Pinto 2004). While Atash circulates internationally as evidence of Israel’s so-called 
integration of its Arabic-speaking minorities, the film simultaneously remains “too Palestinian” 
for the domestic audience and institutions, unwilling to start a “cultural dialogue.”  
Yael Friedman’s extensive interviews with several Israeli film officials reveal that support 
for Arab films is considered a risky investment without guaranteed return because of Palestinians’ 
“inability to communicate” with the “average Israeli” (cited in Friedman 2010, 74). Israel Film 
Fund’s vice-manager David Lipkin pointed out that his organization “supported Arab filmmakers 
but [the Fund] ha[d] to take into account that issues that are relevant to the Arab community are 
not necessarily relevant to the Israeli public in general” (cited in Friedman 2010, 74), thus de facto 
excluding Palestinian citizens from the broader Israeli community. Similarly, one of the first 
Palestinian fiction films of the new art cinema wave in the 1980s, Michel Khleifi’s Urs al-
Jalil/Wedding in Galilee (1987) was financed with public and private capital from various 
European TV channels and film institutes. Nonetheless, the film’s release in Israel after it won the 
FIPRESCI prize at Cannes was conditional. One distributor demanded that “Galilee” be dropped 
from the title and the film be shortened by fifteen minutes, allegedly to remove a scene showing 
then Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres’ official portrait (Naficy 2000, 60). 
Palestinian events and venues are also subjected to selective, discriminatory, or outright 
repressive state funding management practices, which puts a lot of pressure on Palestinian 
community spaces and jeopardizes their very existence. For Friedman, “there are no cinema halls 
in the Arab towns in Israel” (Friedman 2008, 60). She then tempers this claim by dwelling on the 
endangered El Sana Cinematheque in the Arab town of Nazareth, subjected to state-induced quotas 
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that require the screening of a minimum amount of (Jewish) Israeli films. Sapha Dabur, the venue 
manager, explains that their “audience is not interested in Hebrew-speaking films. The whole point 
of the cinematheque in Nazareth is that it will meet the demand of the Palestinian public to see 
films in their own language: Arabic” (cited in Friedman 2008, 60-61). The cinematheque thus 
owes its existence to private funding rather than a reliance on public money. More recently, in 
June 2015, the Ministry of Culture withdrew its public funding from the Haifa-based Al-Midan 
theater, a unique space for Arabic speaking films and shows, which had been created after Oslo in 
the spirit of the politics of recognition. The retrieval was first justified by the Ministry’s 
disagreement with a theater play that leant voice to what officials identified as terrorism, which 
gave way to an investigation of the theatre’s finances (Goldlist-Eichler 2015). In the face of 
popular and legal pressure, the Ministry conceded to re-allocating some public funding to al-
Midan, yet a much lesser amount than previously expected. Many Palestinians interpreted this as 
a strategic move to institutionalize the decrease of space and money allocated to Palestinian 
projects (Al Ghussain 2016) while Jewish Israeli allies agreed that “the withdrawal of public 
funding from Al-Midan [wa]s tainted with the racist desire to obliterate Palestinian identity and 
history” (Zigdon 2015). 
The disciplining of Palestinian voices through transnational and national funding has 
extended to groups and cultural organizations that have expressed solidarity with Palestinians. 
Despite its core Zionist values, the leftist New Israel Fund (NIF) has supported non-profit 
organizations condemning governmental racist policies in defense of “Palestinian Israeli” rights 
(NIF 2018). In 2011, at a moment when Israeli NGOs critical of the state found themselves 
increasingly under fire from local politicians, the Ford Foundation, through its Israeli arm the Ford 
Israel Fund, a supporter of Israel-based initiatives since 1948, declared they would not renew their 
$20 million donation in 2013, supposedly because they considered the organization had grown 
enough to gain its independence (Guttman 2011). More recently, the anti-Zionist Jewish 
organization Zochrot, dedicated to raising awareness about the Nakba and supportive of the 
Palestinian right of return, was targeted by the Minister of Culture. In 2017, Miri Regev threatened 
to fine the Tel Aviv Cinematheque for hosting the Nakba Film Festival that the NGO had organized 
because it violated the Nakba Law (Anderman 2017). The next year, for the same reason, Regev 
urged the cancellation of the funding to the Barbour Gallery in Jerusalem after it hosted Zochrot’s 
launch of a book about the Nakba (Asheri 2018).   
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These clear infractions to the spirit of “real” integration and reconciliation emerge in a 
larger cultural context where the Israeli film industry had supposedly re-structured itself in the late 
1990s in order to be more ethnically diverse – also indicated by the various funds’ aforementioned 
celebration of multicultural dialogue. However, as we will see, Israel’s film policies practically 
translate into a complex transnational inclusion of Palestinian minorities in the prestige economy 
and European collaboration agreements, while reinforcing their domestic exclusion through un-
recognition. In the late 1990s after Oslo, the Israeli film industry saw an increase in film funding. 
In addition, the implementation of the New Cinema Law in 2001 meant to offer more access to the 
populations “peripheral to the Ashkenazi-Jewish secular ‘centre’” (Friedman 2010, 56), a shift 
which benefited Atash among others.  
In light of the comments from Israeli officials cited earlier, it is not surprising that the rate 
of Palestinian films produced in Israel in the following years remained remarkably low, as Yael 
Friedman’s study reports. Generally, the Ministry of Culture allocates less than 10% of its budget 
to Mizrahim and less than 3% to Palestinian citizens of Israel (Laborie and Sivan 2016, 99), despite 
the latter representing a fifth of the Israeli population. Reviewing the number of Palestinian films 
produced in Israel from 1995 to 2008, Friedman writes that various Israeli film funds combined 
financed around eight Palestinian fiction films and thirty documentaries. Among the 178 
documentaries funded by the Second Authority for Television and Radio (SATR) between 1999 
and 2003 – which roughly corresponds to the height of the Second Intifada – only three were 
directed by Palestinian filmmakers. The same amount can be counted for the period between 2004 
and 2006, during which two of the projects were directed by the same director (SATR 2006). At 
the same time, the public service television of IBA (Israel Broadcast Authority) barely invested in 
any Palestinian projects (Friedman 2008, 60).72 The misdistribution of funds thus reflects the 
strategic management of the cultural other, whose films are presented as epitomes of Israel’s 
multiculturalism internationally, but whose particularisms threaten the homogeneity of the 
dominant (Ashkenazi) class at home. Even non-governmental funds that dedicate themselves to 
social change reflect a dramatic under-representation of Palestinian filmmakers. Between its 
creation in 1994 and 2018, the NFCT included little more than twenty film projects directed by 
Palestinian directors (NFTC database).  
                                                
72 It has been challenging to find more recent figures from SATR and IBA in English.  
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The promise of inclusion at the national level paralleled the reconfiguration of the Division 
for Cultural & Scientific Affairs’ mandate towards a broader opening to the region after Oslo. 
Incorporated in the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the division as well as its film unit 
are in charge of promoting Israeli culture around the world. In the spirit of the 1990s politics of 
reconciliation, the division’s new mandate advocates “to strengthen the peace process by 
developing and expanding cultural ties with the Arab world, and acquainting each people with the 
other's culture” (MFA). However, effective efforts to develop a cultural dialogue are particularly 
directed at Western countries in ways that re-assert Israel’s greater affinity with Europe than with 
its own Arab populations. For example, the many co-production treaties signed between Israel and 
European countries73 signal a vested interest in intensifying Israeli trade with Europe, a privileged 
economic partner envisioned to share a common history and culture. The European Union report 
for Preparatory Action summarizes Israeli officials’ view: “[For them], culture is the belt that binds 
Israelis to Europe, and cultural exchanges are considered to be evidence of Israeli ‘membership’ 
in the Western world” (EU Israel Country Report 2014, 17). Furthermore, Israel takes inspiration 
from Europe’s very own disciplining of cultural difference. The report continues: “Israel looks to 
Europe and the EU with the expectation of being able to learn how diversity could be managed in 
a better way” (EU Israel Country Report 2014, 17). Multiculturalism, “characteristic of both 
European societies and art scenes,” becomes a “working model for Israeli artists” who “feel 
culturally European” (EU Israel Country Report 2014, 17). Palestinian transnational inclusion is 
thus also always already mediated by larger European politics of tolerance dictated by their own 
colonial history.  
Furthermore, Israel’s transnational trading strategy negotiates the international 
community’s expectation and desire for the state’s reconciliation with the “Arabs” on the one hand, 
and Israel’s own need and wish to be incorporated in the European sphere of cultural and economic 
exchange on the other. The concession of “expanding cultural ties with the Arab world” expressed 
in the Division for Cultural & Scientific Affairs’ new mandate both appeases European demands 
in particular, and yields an economic partnership first implemented through the 1994 and 1998 
MENA Economic Summits chaperoned by the IMF and the World Economic Forum and later in 
                                                
73 As of 2018, Israel has signed a total of twenty co-production agreements, among which fifteen are in the 
European Union: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, 




the 2003 Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA). Yet, cultural dialogue with Arabs is quickly 
evacuated from the state’s priorities and the lack of it is reformulated as the Arabs’ responsibility, 
both at the level of the Arab states and the Palestinian citizens of Israel. The EU report summarizes 
Israeli officials’ position in those terms:  
 
[Israeli officials] feel that they are sometimes “excluded” from EU programmes – although 
Israel, as a partner in the European Neighbourhood Policy, is eligible to participate – 
because the main focus is said to be cultural exchange with the Arab World, while Arabs 
refused to cooperate with the Israelis; this does not only apply to the Palestinians and the 
Arabs in nearby countries in the Middle East, but also to Israeli Arabs. Israeli government 
stakeholders feel that the EU acts with greater consideration towards the Palestinians/Arabs 
than the Israelis (EU Israel Country Report 2014, 16, my emphasis). 
 
Moreover, the officials contend that the transnational inclusion of Arabs happens at the expense 
of Israelis, suggesting that the two are mutually exclusive and one cannot exist on the international 
stage (and domestically) at the same time as the other. By reversing the dynamics of power and 
pointing to a supposed Arab privilege, the officials instrumentalize politics of recognition. They 
foreground the limits of a politics of dialogue, yet here as a re-assertion of liberal cultureless 
principles which the uncooperative Arab culture supposedly disrupts. Further, the report provides 
evidence of Israel’s attempt at bargaining out of a cultural dialogue with Arabs, which is here 
singled out as a European projection in tension with the Israeli reality: 
 
Officials expressed their fears that the EU – in focusing on cooperation with the Arabs and 
in excluding the Israelis – may contribute to widening the gap between Israelis and Arabs 
instead of bridging divides. They therefore proposed that a future EU strategy should 
refrain from requiring Israeli-Arab cooperation within programmes and projects supported 
by the EU. These should not be prescribed from outside. They claimed that the explicit 
propagation of “European values” within EU programmes, for example “peace building,” 
“human rights” and “Arab-Israeli dialogue,” should be de-emphasized, because of the 
sensitive and fragile political situation within Israeli society and in Israel’s relations with 
its neighbours (EU Israel Country Report 2014, 16). 
 
Israeli officials reject dialogue as a European construct, thus temporarily distancing their own 
culture from one that supports a conception of human rights that would imply starting to cooperate 
with Arabs and Palestinians with an Israeli citizenship.  
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The positioning of so-called Arab Israeli filmmakers is therefore tenuous. In this context, 
the transnational visibility of Palestinian films with Israeli funding in the international market can 
only occur through a levelling of cultural difference and the subordination to Israel’s cultural 
diplomacy. The Brand Israel Group (BIG), a marketing group composed of American diplomats 
and marketing specialists charged with re-branding Israel’s deteriorating image following the 
multiple wars on Gaza, places cinema at the center of their strategy. Launched in 2008, the plan 
solidifies earlier logics and advocates to remove any reference to the “conflict,” create positive 
images in relation to Israel, and highlight the cultural and moral similarities between Israelis and 
Europeans (Laborie and Sivan 2016, 34). The liberal Zionist initiatives focusing on film and 
dialogue mentioned earlier, such as the Other Israel Film Festival, also perpetuate the branding of 
Israel as a democracy, without being directly affiliated to the state. Following the adoption of the 
strategy by the government in the wake of the 2008 war on Gaza, then-Israeli president Shimon 
Peres opened the 2009 Haifa International Film Festival by promising Israeli filmmakers that the 
state would increase its support for Israeli cinema, reminding the role Hollywood played in 
building the US’ world influence (Laborie and Sivan 2016, 100-101). As Omar al-Qattan lamented 
earlier, Israeli funding is always already attached to the state’s desire for international celebration 
and specific modes of representations that ignore its colonial history and structural oppression of 
Palestinians, as we will discuss at greater length later.  
However, in differentiating the state from individual practitioners such as Israeli 
distributors, al-Qattan subscribes to the possibility of collective work. Collaborations between 
Palestinian and Israeli artists still remain a controversial affair. In the “Normalization” chapter of 
their self-reflexive graphic novel The Novel of Nonel and Vovel (2009), Oreet Ashery and Larissa 
Sansour humorously concoct a “Collaboration questionnaire.” The form playfully asks the 
respective artists about how their Palestinian or Jewish Israeli communities and international 
audiences are likely to see their collaborative project (among the boxes to be checked: sexy, silly, 
bold, necessary, unethical, delusional, good PR, offensive, good for fundraising, etc.). The last 
question “So why on earth are you doing it?” suggests that previous responses were largely 
negative or counterproductive (Ashery and Sansour 2009, 37). The next section of this chapter 
thus investigates the complex politics and semantics of “collaboration” between Palestinians and 





In an interview to the online magazine of Middle Eastern art and culture Bidoun about Atash, 
Tawfik Abu Wael, as became typical, separates the film’s content and identity from the source of 
funding: “It’s a Palestinian story. I don’t care from where I take the money. No one told me what 
to do. I’m a Palestinian who lives in Israel. I didn’t transfer to Israel. Israel transferred to me. 
They’re not doing me a favor giving me money to make the film” (cited in Jaafar 2004). This 
declaration of independence suggests that Israeli funding operates as a form of unwitting state 
reparation for Palestinian filmmakers who deem that they are owed portions of the financial profit 
cumulated on ancestral land. Filmmakers might consider these subsidies to come with no strings 
attached because of the state’s lack of legitimacy in their eyes.  
Many practitioners share this reasoning and consequently carry various economic 
strategies examined in the following sections. Here I focus on the discursive and material 
dissociation between individual and institution, and how the dis/articulation of the two as either 
estranged, interdependent, or hierarchical shapes debates around filmmaking collaborations in 
historic Palestine. The diverse relationalities reflect conflicting scenarios of Palestinian agency as 
well as different conceptions of futurity. These are partly organized around the negotiations of 
pressures, restrictions, and individual opportunities for representing the community, informed by 
the hopes of a functioning multiculturalism or wider artistic recognition. Simultaneously, the same 
filmmakers also engage in various ways with the critique of this implicit belief in dialogue through 
representation formulated within the boycott movement. BDS advocates for a decolonial and 
antiracist perspective that reshapes forms of interaction in ways that are sometimes perceived 
within the Palestinian filmmaking community as restricting and limiting of artistic creativity. 
While the previous section examined the general socioeconomic and political framework imposed 
on Palestinian artistic productions by the state, here I dwell on the dilemmas and negotiations that 
structure Palestinians’ imagination and practices of “collaboration” with Jewish Israeli individuals 
or state institutions. 
 In the global filmmaking community, “collaboration” summons ideals of cosmopolitanism 
in which transnational funding, institutional partnerships, and multicultural crews constitute 
evidence of artistic recognition and support for individuals and communities’ stories. Transplanted 
into the context of Israel, the term becomes charged with a heavy subtext in which the “mutual” 
recognition constitutive of working together (etymologically co-labor) is first and foremost a 
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matter of sovereignty and population control. Here I do not use “collaboration” as a way of 
asserting a dichotomy between betrayal and resistance, which many have demonstrated is 
fallacious (Fadda 2014, Dallasheh 2016). Rather, I refer to the imaginaries that the term crystallizes 
as well as the structures of oppression that shape its narrative. For Ahmed Sa’di, collaboration – 
as an antecedent to multiculturalism – constitutes the system of governance that mediated 
Palestinians’ incorporation into the newly established state of Israel after 1948 (Sa’di 2003, 75). 
The mechanisms and laws that regulated Palestinian integration as (second-class) citizens were 
themselves directly inherited from the British emergency measures in Mandate Palestine (Khalili 
2013, 60). From the early days on, the segregated structure of Israel precluded the equal inclusion 
of the Palestinian minority, especially in the government’s decisional bodies. After 1967, the new 
system of governance built around the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza demanded a 
reformulation of the Arab leadership that could discipline Palestinian crowds into accepting their 
condition. This is what Sa’di calls “minimal hegemony” after Joseph Femia, in which 
 
the regime develops a coherent political, economic, and ideological worldview for the 
dominant group, while it develops a framework of common interests with some sections 
among the subordinates, propagates abstract ideals, and places special emphasis on social 
norms that serve its interests—such as loyalty and personal success (Sa’di 2003, 81). 
 
Sa’di’s framework closely accommodates Laleh Khalili’s definition of population-centric 
counterinsurgency, a widespread tactic developed into a systematic method by the US military in 
the late twentieth century, “meant to win over that population by ‘securing’ and ‘protecting’ them, 
as well as by providing services that would win over the population” (Khalili 2013, 45).  
Yet, Khalili also identifies a mirroring method integral to counterinsurgency which 
revolves around “deterrence through intimidation” (Khalili 2013, 45). In addition to constituting 
an insidious mechanism of disciplined integration, collaboration also entails direct and violent 
pressure and threats. For human rights scholars Ron Dudai and Hillel Cohen, the motives for 
Palestinian collaboration “were always varied: some collaborated after being … blackmailed; 
others did it for personal gains; some because of ideological disagreement with the Palestinian 
political leadership and others due to disagreements, friendships, or alliances of a local nature” 
(Dudai and Cohen 2007, 40). In a more systematic manner, curfews, closed areas and travel 
permits, and administrative detention without trial were all British measures of intimidation and 
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control adopted against Palestinian citizens of Israel until 1966 and exported into the occupied 
territories after 1967. In the West Bank and Gaza, the occupying authorities now still often rely on 
their control over “favors” – such as permits for family reunification, visits from foreign relatives, 
requests for travel documents, permits to work in Israel and building permits – in order to exert 
pressure on individuals. In a meeting during his mandate as the Israeli Minister of Defense (1967-
74), Moshe Dayan made clear that the pressure could be so great that collaboration ended up being 
very little of a choice, and incentives far from promised protection:  
 
Let the individual know that he has something to lose. His home can be blown up, his bus 
license can be taken away, he can be deported from the region; or the contrary: he can exist 
with dignity, make money, exploit other Arabs, and travel in [his] bus (cited in B’Tselem 
1994, 17).  
 
These different methods produce an environment of direct and indirect control that redefines 
Palestinians’ perimeter of action and claims. But deterrence and incentives also single out 
collaborators of different sorts, from the Intelligence agent, the prison collaborator and the land 
dealer to the intermediary, and involve a wide range of people such as youth and high ranked 
Palestinian accomplices (B’Tselem 1994). As individuals, collaborators develop within a structure 
where freedom and choice are reconfigured around the waning of possibilities for outright 
resistance and the promise of survival.  
The specter of collaboration contributes to organizing Palestinians’ relationship to hope, 
future, and resistance, and as such also drives narratives of life in both occupied and historic 
Palestine. A canonical example, discussed in detail on Chapter One, Emile Habiby’s ironic tale 
The Secret Life of Saeed, the Pessoptimist (1974) describes the main protagonist as a candid, 
foolish, and cowardly Palestinian citizen of Israel who works as an informer for the Zionist state. 
With wit and sarcasm, the book follows Saeed’s comical change of heart when he rejects his role 
as a collaborator, left wondering what his options are. Similarly laced with humor, Elia Suleiman’s 
pantomimic film Divine Intervention (2002) observes how the relationships between neighbors in 
a ‘48 Arab town are poisoned by various loyalties to the Israeli state. Reema Essa’s documentary 
Biram/Ashes (2001) adopts a more tragic tone. The filmmaker seeks to understand why her parents 
did not fight back against the destruction of the village of Biram where they resided in the Galilee, 
her late father even joining the Israeli police force in the wake of the family’s expulsion. 
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Combining images of the ruins of Biram, pictures of her father, and archival footage of Israeli 
military actions during the Nakba, the film sets the stage for the daughter’s “interrogation” of her 
mother. Torn between resignation and hope reminiscent of the pessoptimist’s dilemma, the mother 
snaps: “I’m not interested in politics, I’m interested in living.” Carried by a similar quest, Ibtisam 
Mara‘ana’s Paradise Lost (2003) investigates the repressed silence of the inhabitants of a 
Palestinian village in Northern Israel which suspiciously survived the Nakba. In turn, On récolte 
ce que l’on sème/You Reap What You Sow (2017) records Alaa Ashkar’s return to the Galilee after 
a voluntary exile, wherein he questions his wealthy and reluctant family about what Palestine 
means to them – oftentimes a word they wish to forget. Like in Paradise Lost and Ashes, the 
Palestinian filmmaker is here tricked by a national history of coercions and their own resulting 
frustration into assuming an interrogator role similar to Israeli intelligence officers. Finally, in the 
fiction features Omar (Hany Abu-Assad 2013), and 3000 Layla/3000 Nights (Mai Masri 2016), 
carceral spaces often become the sites for Palestinians’ conversion into informers.  
Sa’di and Khalili’s emphasis on the structure of counterinsurgency represents a theoretical 
and ethical imperative against the binary of collaboration and resistance. However, this perspective 
remains limited for filmmakers who investigate intimate relationships with family members 
perceived to be personally responsible for furthering oppression. The tension between individual 
and structure, or individual and institution, thus determines instinctive desires to redistribute blame 
in the effort to understand transgenerational suffering. How does this suspicion also inform 
Palestinian artists’ interactions with the state and the reception of their films in the community? 
‘48 Palestinian filmmakers have had to justify their use of Israeli funding to state institutions who 
object to watching Arab stories, European organizations that assume there cannot be any Arabs in 
Israel, and Palestinian filmmakers who refuse any form of involvement with the occupying state. 
In a 2018 opinion piece in Haaretz, Ibtisam Mara‘ana meditates on her 2003 film Paradise Lost, 
mentioned earlier. She remembers the compromises she had to make, including changing terms 
deemed unacceptable by Israeli funders such as “mass grave” and “Nakba.” She continues: 
 
That film was aired on Channel 8, a cable channel. It was viewed mainly by Jews who like 
the genre. The Palestinian public in Israel wondered whether a Palestinian and feminist 
film funded by Israeli money was in fact propaganda cinema. Today, if I were to return to 
that same point in time 15 years ago, I would refuse to surrender to the dictates of that same 
artistic-political consultant. On the other hand, perhaps I wouldn’t be making films at all, 
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if that’s what it required to avoid such a paradoxical relationship with the sovereign and 
the state (Mara‘ana 2018, my emphasis). 
 
 The central tension between individual and colonial institution can alternatively constitute 
the framework for designing a path of “moral responsibility,” to use the phrase by Boycott 
Divestment Sanction leader Omar Barghouti (Barghouti 2011, 85). In this context, the boycott 
guidelines established by BDS since the early 2000s have provided a set of strategies for both 
global solidarity with Palestinians in exile, under occupation, and deprived of the rights that their 
citizenship promised; and modes of action for Palestinians themselves to engineer decolonization 
from within Palestine-Israel. More particularly, the civil society organizations who constitute the 
Boycott National Committee (BNC) and wrote the guidelines have been attentive to the role of 
culture in furthering normalization through “collaborations” and partnerships, which occur when 
“events and activities…portray the relationship of colonial oppression, which is inherently 
abnormal, as if it were normal” (Eid 2016). One of BDS’ most valuable theoretical interventions 
lies in the essential distinction between individual and institution which, they advocate, should 
guide foreign solidarity. As Barghouti explains, BDS’ cultural campaign (PACBI – the Palestinian 
Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel) does not target artists who do not 
benefit from state funding, “not because they tend to be more progressive or opposed to injustice 
than the rest of society … but because [BDS is] opposed on principle to political testing and 
blacklisting” (Barghouti 2011, 118, his emphasis). On the contrary, artists who accept Israeli state 
funding are bound to national efforts of international propaganda. For example, travel funding 
provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contractually defines artists as “service providers” 
who are obligated to “creat[e] a positive image of Israel,” yet “will not present [them]sel[ves] as 
an agent, emissary and/or representative of the Ministry” (Laor 2008).  
The BDS guidelines serve as an informal and transnational grassroots policy that defines 
antiracist and decolonial modes of production for cultural works. As the expression of a body of 
Palestinian grassroots organizations, this policy also constitutes Palestinians as a de facto 
sovereign voice authoring a social contract that leads to the full respect of their rights. In the midst 
of these distinctions, PACBI recognizes the particular positionality of Palestinian citizens with 
respect to Israeli institutions and does not extend calls for boycott to those who receive state 
funding. The protocol generally reformulates international artists’ positions vis-à-vis the settler 
colonial state; most importantly, it also carves up a space for Palestinian citizens’ action within the 
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settler structure and legitimizes their coerced interaction with the state, thus clearing the population 
from the colonial imaginary of the collaborator. Very much in line with Abu Wael’s 
abovementioned argument that his Palestinian individuality (and only in this capacity) should be 
separated from the institution supplying the money, the guidelines read:    
 
BDS guidelines distinguish between coercive and voluntary relationships. Palestinian 
citizens of Israel live under Israeli apartheid. As citizens and taxpayers, they cannot but 
engage in everyday relations with Israeli institutions... Thus, Palestinian citizens of Israel 
are not asked to boycott Israeli institutions (PACBI). 
 
PACBI also provides “positive” parameters for a commendable collaboration with Jewish Israeli 
artists: they must respect Palestinian demands shared in the general call, advocate for equal rights 
for the Palestinian citizens, demand an end to the occupation and the possibility for Palestinian 
return. Only then, like Route 181, can a collaboration become a means of co-resistance. 
Palestinians’ relationships to Israeli institutions, despite being exculpated as a matter of principle, 
do not however all lead to co-resistance. To repeat Salma Jayyusi’s words about Emil Habiby’s 
Pessoptimist, many “contradictions…crowd the distance between the extreme poles of Zionist 
colonialism and Palestinian resistance” (Jayyusi 2003, xiii). It is to this grey area in which ‘48 
Palestinian artists “work together” with Jewish Israeli partners or state funding that I now turn. 
Here I take boycott both as a critical grid to understand the articulation of filmmakers and Israeli 
institutions, and as a set of principles that establishes parameters for the debate around Palestinian 
agency vis-à-vis the state.  
Like Tawfik Abu Wael almost fifteen years prior, and in accordance with BDS guidelines, 
Palestinian citizen Maysaloun Hamoud claims her right to use Israeli funds: 
 
I have to make clear about this point: It’s not “taking Israeli money;” we pay taxes as 
citizens who work and live, and we deserve to get advantages from those taxes as any 
citizen of the world would. Unfortunately, we are discriminated against, so we don’t really 
take our share of the cake. I’m taking my money. It’s not Israeli money. It’s not a favor or 
a bone [thrown] toward me. It’s money I deserve (cited in Felsenthal 2018). 
 
Contrary to Abu Wael however, she celebrates her unique partnership with Jewish Israeli producer 
Shlomi Elkabetz on the fiction feature Bar Bahar/In Between (2016), which follows three Tel 
Aviv-based Palestinian women of variegated lifestyles (two are avid party-goers, including a 
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lesbian, the third one is a religious and modest computer science student engaged to a man she 
does not love) and their struggle with Arab patriarchal culture. A Mizrahi also subject to Ashkenazi 
elite’s discrimination, Shlomi Elkabetz forms with Hamoud “the underdog team in the industry.” 
Hamoud continues: “I’m a Palestinian. He’s a non-Zionist…I just have to say that our partnership 
is really a way of life that we can model, a way of being where no one sees him- or herself as better 
than anyone else” (cited in Felsenthal 2018). Elsewhere, she continues: “there is no hierarchy 
between us, he never interferes in the decision-making process, but he always helps me make the 
right choice” (Paname Distribution n/d, my translation). Yet Elkabetz’ status as a Jewish Israeli is 
what allowed the film to be produced, as Hamoud herself points: “Without him as my partner I 
don’t think anything would have happened. His name was also in the budgets, in the connections 
we got for releasing” (cited in Felsenthal 2018). In fact, in addition to French funding, the film 
exclusively relied on and successfully secured the vast majority of Israel’s available grants: the 
Israeli Film Council, the Ministry of Culture and Sport, the Israel Film Fund, Channel 10, the 
Gesher Multicultural Fund, and the Israel State Lottery.  
 Famous for teaming up with his late sister Ronit, widely proclaimed as the face or the 
ambassador of Israeli cinema abroad, Elkabetz directed films critical of Jewish patriarchy in Israel 
(Ve'Lakhta Lehe /To Take a Wife, 2004) and how this translates into the country’s legal system 
(Gett/The Trial of Viviane Amsalem, 2014). Described as a “non-Zionist” (but interestingly, not 
“anti-Zionist”) by Hamoud in order to reflect his opposition to some state practices, the filmmaker, 
however, embraced the recognition of Gett by various Israeli authorities, including the Ministry of 
Justice which endorsed it, along with the film’s selection as the Israeli contender for the 2014 
Oscars. His docu-fiction Edut/Testimony (2011) unveils liberal politics and a trust in multicultural 
dialogue primarily directed at a Jewish Israeli audience – the “Israeli public in general” evoked 
earlier by Israel Film Fund’s vice-manager David Lipkin. The film exclusively employs Mizrahim 
and Hebrew-speaking actors to reenact the testimonies of both Israeli soldiers and Palestinians 
about the traumas they endured during the Second Intifada. The project thus attempts to build 
solidarities between Jewish and non-Jewish Arabs in Israel, which crystallizes around the final 
Andalusian song performed in Arabic. Elkabetz also explains the choice of translating Arabic into 
Hebrew, meant to “‘turn the viewer into a witness’ and turn the language of the occupier ‘into his 
own nightmare’” (cited in Weissberg 2011). Yet, the film simultaneously operates a double 
erasure, first by equating the experiences of the oppressor and the oppressed, then by stripping 
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Palestinians of their own representation and language. The inclusion of testimonies by IDF 
veterans from Breaking the Silence, an NGO that provides a platform of expression for former 
Israeli soldiers traumatized by their participation in war crimes, occurred after Israeli funders 
rejected the focus on Palestinian testimonies alone (Anderman 2012). But the veterans, with all 
their suffering, remain an expression of “the sovereign.” As Mara‘ana puts it in the aforementioned 
opinion piece: 
 
The sovereign [sic], who grew up in and served the political and diplomatic system, is the 
same sovereign who served in the army, stood at the checkpoints, participated in the wars 
and settled in the homes of Palestinians. That same sovereign is both the occupier and the 
one who engages in soul searching and deals with ethical questions; he is seen as both a 
fighter and as a guardian of democracy. That same sovereign also created the organizations 
B’Tselem and Breaking the Silence (Mara‘ana 2018). 
 
Edut thus accommodates a comfort zone for Israeli audiences which is also manifest in the use of 
Hebrew. In the same way that the Jewish Israeli restaurant manager snapped at his Palestinian 
kitchen staff in Hamoud’s witty Bar Bahar, the audiences “don’t want to hear Arabic. It’s 
unpleasant for the customers, who just want to enjoy their meal.” Elkabetz eventually conceded 
the motivations behind Edut: “I made the film to quiet my conscience and I didn’t do it in order to 
change something – because I don't believe it can change anything. I made it to confront this issue, 
to become one of the witnesses to what is happening in this place where I live” (Anderman 2012).  
 Elkabetz, the (half) sovereign, still proved an ally: an equal at the individual level, and a 
facilitator who channeled his relative institutional privilege to the benefit of Palestinian voices. 
His impetus towards the dialogue of multicultural reconciliation materialized through the avenue 
opened by Hamoud. Nothing like Edut, Bar Bahar reached the ‘48 Palestinian youth that the film 
represents. The filmmaker exults: “a lot of women and girls…felt empowered by the movie. It is 
the first movie since, ever, that made Palestinians go en masse to see a movie at the theater” (cited 
in Felsenthal 2018). Bar Bahar targeted its local audience by almost completely evacuating Jewish 
Israeli characters from the story in order to focus on the internal dynamics of the ‘48 Palestinian 
society and shine the spotlight on female solidarity (Felsenthal 2018). In fact, Hamoud argues that 
the film could have taken place anywhere in the Arab world or beyond; it just happened to be set 
in Tel Aviv (Matar 2017). Rather than making the confrontation with Israeli institutional racism 
its focal point, Bar Bahar becomes for its filmmaker the expression of the third generation of 
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Palestinians after the Nakba, the resistant youth that grew up during the Second Intifada and rose 
up in unison with their neighbors against undemocratic regimes and Arab conservatism during the 
so-called Arab Spring (Paname Distribution n/d). The film displaces the cultural and geographic 
focus from Israel’s Eurocentric frame of reference to Arab histories and culture – Tawfiq Zayyad 
and Leila Khaled figure among many visual quotes. As a result, the film’s Palestinian content 
reflects the filmmaker’s expression of independence vis-à-vis Israeli funding by separating the 
thriving Arab society (with its own history, questions, and problems) – and the gender issues that 
Hamoud attaches to it – from the colonial structures in which these develop.  
 Although Hamoud remarks in an interview that colonial assaults on Palestinian “traditions” 
reinforce the Arab patriarchal structure (Paname Distribution n/d), the film’s discursive strategy 
of institutional independence risks dissolving the tight articulation between various systems of 
gender and colonial oppression. Several ‘48 Palestinian critics of the website Arab 48 also reported 
their frustration regarding the narrative’s separation between social issues and the political context 
of “Zionist occupation” (Azem 2017) and the lack of engagement with the political marginalization 
of Palestinians (Ighbaria 2017). The exclusive Arab framework of Bar Bahar accommodates the 
liberal binary between Arab tradition and Israeli modernity, epitomized by the possibilities offered 
by Tel Aviv (Macguire 2018). Bar Bahar was acclaimed in Israel and worldwide for its provoking 
portrayal of “liberated Palestinian women.” The country’s top-grossing movie released in 2016 
with a $5,742,166 global box office (The Numbers), the film won Best Supporting Actress and 
Best Actress at the Israeli Film Academy, Best Debut Feature Film and Artistic Achievement in 
an Israeli Feature Film at the Haifa International Film Festival, the NETPAC (Network for the 
Promotion for Asian Cinema) Award at the Toronto International Film Festival, and Best Film at 
the San Sebastián International Film Festival among others. The poster hints at the hidden practices 
of a whole segment of the Arab youth that the film uncovers, as they drink, smoke cigarettes and 
joints, and dance in bars (Fig. 19). The French co-producer’s title for the film, Je danserai si je 
veux (I dance if I want to) and the Spanish subtitle to the poster, “three women up against traditions 
in their search of freedom” (my translation, see Fig. 19) similarly emphasize female empowerment 




Figure 19: The French and Spanish posters for Maysaloun Hamoud’s Bar Bahar (AlloCiné and 
IMDB) 
 
The heated discussion the film triggered in Israel peaked in the conservative Arab town of 
Umm al-Fahm and served to enshrine the film’s public meaning in a binary narrative. In a collusion 
between patriarchal and colonial sovereignty, the municipality called on the Ministry of Culture 
to ban Bar Bahar. The Arab officials invoked the misrepresentation of two protagonists in the film 
said to originate from the town: a religious man turned rapist, and a young woman (the victim and 
one of the main protagonists) assumed to be of easy virtue. Religious leaders consequently issued 
a fatwa that resulted in a slew of death threats for the filmmakers and the actresses. Following the 
saying that there is no such thing as bad publicity, Hamoud admitted that the controversy 
contributed to the success of the film (Jones 2017), suggesting that audiences were eager to 
position themselves in a debate whose terms (modernity versus tradition) symptomatically 
encapsulate assumptions about the nature of the “Palestinian-Israeli conflict.” Later retracting his 
concerns, with profuse apologies, in the wake of the violent verbal attacks directed at the female 
artists, the prominent Palestinian screenwriter and cultural critic Sayed Kashua attacked Bar 
Bahar’s choice of representational politics in an opinion piece for Haaretz. After praising the 




There’s no justification in the script for making the religious character the rapist, there’s 
no justification for the person from the Triangle74…to be the violent man. There is no doubt 
that these are stereotypes of religious people that reflect Israeli and Western conceptions. 
The fact that the rapist is from Umm al-Fahm is meaningful in a society where the village 
you’re born in serves as a central identity marker. Imagine, for example, a film about the 
oppression of women in Paris where the violent rapist is a Jew (Kashua 2017, my 
emphasis).  
 
Unwittingly then, some of the international and national discussions the film raised contributed to 
reinforcing the liberal vision in which (non-Western) culture undermines and threatens individual 
human rights – and especially women’s rights when that culture is Arab. The discursive and 
diegetic separation of the Palestinian individual from the Israeli institution, which BDS had 
devised as a decolonial human rights-based strategy, came to serve and benefit the inner colonial 
workings of multiculturalism as management of cultural difference. In Bar Bahar, Israeli funding 
objectively became the condition of possibility for Palestinians to discuss “oppressive Arab 
traditions.”  
 The tension between individual Palestinian citizens and Israeli institutions at the core of 
Bar Bahar’s production was further exploited by pro-Israeli newspapers evidently unfamiliar with, 
or deliberately misquoting, the BDS guidelines as pertaining to Palestinian citizens’ work. The 
Jerusalem Post argued that the Toronto Palestine Film Festival (TPFF) hypocritically showed 
Palestinian films with Israeli funding, including Maysaloun Hamoud’s Bar Bahar and Maha Haj’s 
Omor Shakhsiya/Personal Affairs (2016), “in spite of calls from the Boycott, Divestment and 
Sanctions (BDS) movement to boycott all projects that involve Israel” (Brown 2017). Michael 
Mostyn, CEO of the Canadian chapter of ultra-Zionist organization B’nai Brith, interpreted 
TPFF’s choice of programming as an “utter failure of the BDS campaign in Canada,” and asked: 
“if even Palestinians in the Diaspora can’t be bothered to boycott the Jewish State, why should 
anyone else?” (Brown 2017). Similarly, an article in The Times of Israel showed some appreciation 
for the film, in accordance with the liberal values of the reviewer, and highlighted the filmmaker’s 
“precarious position, especially considering how many in the Arab world would like nothing more 
than to sweep her liberal vision under the safety of the BDS umbrella” (Hoffman 2017). This last 
comment misidentifies the grassroots BDS, which as we saw does not call for a boycott of 
                                                
74 “The Triangle” (historically “the Little Triangle”) designates a region with a vast majority of Palestinian 
towns, adjacent to the Green line and located in Israel, which is particularly poor and religious.   
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Palestinian citizens who make films with Israeli money, with the larger boycott of Israel enforced 
by the states of the Arab League since 1945. The latter led Lebanon, for example, to ban the 
Palestinian film Personal Affairs.  
Hamoud herself fails to distinguish the specificities of her situation from that of 
Palestinians in the occupied territories when she laments that a musician from Ramallah declined 
to collaborate with her for fear of being associated with the Israeli state, “despite knowing they 
were contradicting themselves” (Matar 2017). The state of affairs for West Bank (and Gaza) 
Palestinians is however very different. In contrast with ‘48 residents, BDS’ ethical and theoretical 
stance and the general conversation around normalization strongly discourage them from accepting 
any Israeli money because they are under occupation by the state, have access to some Palestinian 
proto-infrastructures and can to a certain extent apply to external funding as Palestinians. Hamoud 
remarks that the different relationalities to the state create a gap that should not jeopardize the 
cultural “synchronization” of all Palestinians (Matar 2017). Yet these varied statuses certainly 
shape separate privileges that change the meaning of the interaction between individuals and the 
colonial state. The complexity of Palestinians’ multifarious positionalities vis-à-vis Israeli 
institutions thus means that the tools provided by BDS may sometimes be misunderstood. 
 Finally, BDS and PACBI’s efforts at clarifying the articulation of individual and structure 
may at times fail to re-organize Palestinians’ persistent fears around collaboration. Palestine-based 
grassroots groups organized around BDS are constantly debating how Palestinian and Arab films 
conform to the guidelines, while some artists are wary that their freedom of expression might be 
further diminished in the process – maybe at times at the expense of a more structural critique. 
Simultaneously, PACBI itself, and the numerous independent grassroots organizations that form 
its sprawling horizontal network, struggle to negotiate what co-resistance can mean and how this 
fits the imperative of rejecting normalization, a leading discourse in the occupied territories to an 
extent unseen in historic Palestine. Here I briefly discuss two examples in the West Bank.  
In October 2017, independent BDS activists lobbied the Ramallah Municipality into 
cancelling the screening of Lebanese filmmaker Ziad Doueiri’s Qadiat Raqam 23/The Insult 
(2017), which closed the Palestine Cinema Days’ fourth edition. Set in Beirut, the film follows the 
escalating tensions between a right-wing Lebanese Christian and a Palestinian refugee worker, 
thus bringing to the fore unresolved class, ethnic, and racial tensions that have survived the 
Lebanese Civil War. Starring veteran Palestinian actor Kamel El Basha, the first Arab actor ever 
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to be awarded Best Male Interpretation at the Venice International Film Festival for his 
performance in the film, The Insult received acclaim in the Arab world at the Journées 
Cinématographiques de Carthage in Tunisia and the El Gouna Film Festival in Egypt. Yet its 
director was controversial for his previous film, The Attack (2012), which he directed in Israel with 
a partially Israeli cast – an achievement for a dual citizen of France and Lebanon, the latter being 
a country that maintains no diplomatic relationship with Israel due its official and ongoing war. 
Described by The Times of Israel as a “collaboration between Israelis, Palestinians, and Lebanese” 
and a “human story” about the Second Intifada that does not pick sides (Miller 2013), The Attack 
has contributed to the normalization of Arab relationships with Israel. In turn, The Insult was also 
criticized by some Palestinians and allies for its collusion with Zionist production companies and 
its underlying Zionist sympathies (Ginsberg 2018), and for a misleading depiction of history (Hage 
2018).  
 Two days prior to the closing ceremony, on 21 October 2017, Palestine Cinema Days 
released a statement on their Facebook page expressing the organizers’ full agreement with 
PACBI’s official position on The Insult, which was “not subject to the current guidelines of BDS 
and therefore not ‘boycottable’” (Palestine Cinema Days Facebook 2017a). The festival took this 
opportunity to re-assert their commitment to BDS, which had led to their refusal of several films 
in the past. Additionally, the statement mentioned the success of The Insult in the Arab world, 
elevated as an epitome of the worldwide recognition of Palestinian and Arab cinema. Two days 
later however, the festival posted a new announcement in reaction to the municipality’s sudden 
decision to cancel the screening under the pressure of activist groups in the defense of BDS, 
including Youth Against Normalization, which followed BDS’ call for boycotting the filmmaker 
– as opposed to the film (Barghouti in Carey and Salman 2017). The festival’s statement 
established that the decision had come as they were in the process of reaching a consensus with 
BDS partners. It concluded: 
 
Filmlab views the repercussions of this decision with a serious concern and calls upon the 
official cultural institutions, the civil society and all those who care about the cultural 
landscape, freedom of expression and thought, to move and assume their responsibilities 
towards preserving the Palestinian cultural achievements and preserving freedom of 




Followed by supporters of the festival, Kamel El Basha condemned the cancellation as “shameful” 
and damaging to Palestinian cinema, promising to “boycott BDS,” while Fimlab director Hanna 
Atallah reiterated his fear of censorship to CNN reporters: “unfortunately now there is 
censorship…Every Palestinian citizen [sic] should have the right to watch the film and decide 
whether it’s good or not” (Carey and Salman translation 2017). Clinging to a term dear to the 
liberal consensus, the CNN journalist passionately ended his video report with an ominous 
question: “What happens next time, what happens when someone doesn’t like the content of the 
next film? Could it lead down the slippery slope of censorship?” (Carey and Salman 2017).  
 The controversy was multi-layered. On the one hand, it revealed PACBI’s unclear 
allocation of blame for the community: if the filmmaker was to be boycotted based on one 
particular film (The Attack), should all his future films also be a target? Many Palestinian 
practitioners answered with the negative, further motivated by the presence of a successful 
Palestinian actor, Kamel el Basha, in the production whose international recognition reflected well 
on Palestine’s growing industry. Yet, the discourse around censorship, applauded by liberal 
proponents of dialogue worldwide, collapsed grassroots pressure with institutional control, a 
Palestinian fear justified by the coercive environment shaped by the occupying state and the 
Palestinian Authority alike as well as broader threats to erase Palestinian culture and resistance 
pertaining to the colonial context.  
The semantic displacement from pressure to censorship materialized in the focus on the 
film’s artistic value. While BDS proponents opposed the structure of normalization to which the 
film was said to contribute because of its production strategies (further illuminated by its racist 
content) and – independently from its aesthetics – the film’s supporters comprehended its 
cancellation through individual appreciation and intersubjective recognition based on taste, calling 
for the audience to judge by themselves “whether the film is good or not.” PACBI’s attempt at 
reconfiguring relations of recognition with a focus on the combative moment of refusal here 
conflicted with the logics of a film industry driven by prestige, wherein mutual recognition is 
discursively always already assumed to be a principle for economic relations. Simultaneously, 
some Palestinian practitioners suspect BDS groups of tracking forms of normalization in an 
obsessive and unjustified manner seen to continue oppressive nationalist discourses. My second 
example examines BDS’s practical (as opposed to theoretical) confusion around normalization and 
means of co-resistance. 
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 A few months after The Insult was cancelled, BDS released a statement in Arabic calling 
for the regional boycott of Palestinian filmmaker (and FilmLab co-founder) Muayad Alayyan’s 
new film Al-Taqareer Hawl Sarah wa Saleem/The Reports on Sarah and Saleem (2018), a political 
take on the dangerous affair between a married Palestinian man and a married Jewish Israeli 
woman. Without providing a full rationale for this decision, BDS’ website vaguely mentioned the 
involvement of Israeli artists and crew members as evidence of the film’s active contribution to 
normalization, linking to their Wikipedia biography pages (BDS 2018). Listing the acceptable 
conditions for working together with Jewish Israelis, the statement failed to investigate in what 
capacity the film’s production contravened those precepts. As a result, Alayyan replied with a 
thorough post on his company PalCine Production’s Facebook page, demonstrating how The 
Reports did not constitute normalization. Addressing each aspect of BDS regulations, Alayyan’s 
response clarified that no Israeli funding was involved in this Palestinian co-production with the 
Netherlands, Germany and Mexico; all participants were supportive of Palestinian rights, with one 
(Israeli) even deeply involved in BDS work and who had helped animate the film screening in the 
Dutch BDS chapter; and the film did not promote Palestinian-Israeli rapprochement (PalCine 
Productions Facebook 2018). Alayyan’s post was warmly received by the Palestinian filmmaking 
community in historic and occupied Palestine and in the diaspora, and garnered support from 
Syrian and Egyptian filmmakers. In fact, the film could even be said to provide an example of “co-
resistance” as defined by BDS’ own guidelines. A Palestinian filmmaker and film trainer at 
Bethlehem’s cinema school Dar el Kalimat, Majdi El-Omari, summarized the challenges raised by 
BDS’ misguided call, detrimental to both Palestinian cinema and the boycott’s growing popular 
support: “I think there is a misunderstanding and I hope people will not seize this opportunity to 
attack the film in the name of BDS, and BDS in the name of the film” (El-Omari Facebook post 
2018, my translation).  
 These three examples, Maysaloun Hamoud’s Bar Bahar, Ziad Doueiri’s The Insult, and 
Muayad Alayyan’s The Reports on Sarah and Saleem, attest to the ongoing work of defining 
Palestinian individuals and works’ relationship to the Israeli state’s colonial structure. The distinct 
positionalities of Palestinian citizens and those who reside in the West Bank and Gaza ultimately 
reveal the imprint of collaboration as a colonial discourse that differentially disciplines, restricts, 
and reformulates Palestinians’ possibilities for action. In the following sections, I further discuss 
Israel’s management of cultural difference through co-optation. Palestinian filmmakers respond to 
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this management with economic and aesthetic strategies that both situate them as individuals 
separate from the colonial structure and re-assert their right to take over Israeli material resources.  
 
Co-optation, Appropriation, and Redistribution  
Just like Hamoud and Abu Wael, Elia Suleiman believes he is entitled to use Israeli funding to 
produce his features. In a 2006 interview, he acknowledges the dilemma this represents: 
 
Of course it’s a dangerous thing to do. If you take money from the Israelis you are basically 
getting into bed with Mephisto. They will ask you to join their festivals. They will try to 
twist what you say and appropriate your films. There are always strings attached. If you 
can get away with not doing it, then of course it is better for your health and better for your 
soul (cited in Brooks 2006).  
 
The discursive separation between individual and institution established by many ‘48 Palestinian 
filmmakers at the level of film production may obscure what happens after, when the film 
circulates on behalf of Israel in the prize economy. As Abu Wael hinted in the first section of this 
chapter, international film festivals and awards constitute strategic sites for the re-appropriation of 
Palestinian works to the benefit of Israel’s international reputation as a liberal patron for the arts 
and a national industry of vibrant multicultural and creative energy. The state’s transnational 
management of Palestinian culture, including through the Brand Israel campaign, systematizes 
what Sa‘di calls co-optation: “a more advanced method of collaboration…set to change the identity 
of the minority, its culture, and its ideological frame of reference” through a process in which the 
Jewish state is viewed as a modernizing agent (Sa‘di 2003, 91). At the same time, Palestinian 
artists seek to actively partake in what James English calls “the economy of prestige.” Filmmakers 
follow postcolonial nations in the “quest for wider, European and metropolitan recognition of a 
national culture whose under-evaluation on the broader and still European-controlled symbolic 
market support […] demands for redistributive justice” (English 2005, 165). Awards thus 
potentially crystallize but may also deny what Nancy Fraser terms two “co-fundamental and 
mutually irreducible dimensions of justice”: recognition and distribution (Fraser 2003, 4). 
Currently, the economy of prestige both ties Palestinians’ access to Israeli funding to their own 
cultural dispossession and un-recognition, and predicates Palestinians’ (conditional) international 
recognition upon Israel’s uneven and discriminatory distribution of financial support.  
	
	 257 
 The settler colonial system of deprivation, land grab, and more generally (cultural) 
appropriation penetrates and organizes politics of recognition and distribution. The co-optation of 
successful Palestinian films as they travel internationally reproduces logics of colonial 
dispossession and ethnic cleansing – which similarly result in erasing the other’s identity. Patrick 
Wolfe discusses the university as a site of knowledge production and identity formation which can 
also describe the film industry, where fund providers and film festivals function as tastemakers 
and gatekeepers. Wolfe reminds us that cultural and academic institutions are entangled with 
settler practices of expropriation: “in a settler-colonial context […] claims to authority over 
indigenous discourse made from within the settler-colonial academy necessarily participate in the 
continuing usurpation of indigenous space” (Wolfe 1999, 3). In response, Palestinians claim the 
financial and symbolic resources considered to have been violently stolen, looted, and exploited 
by the occupier. Palestinians may also as a result redistribute symbolic and/or financial capital 
among themselves, sometimes forcefully and against the state’s will. This section thus examines 
three scenarios of recognition and redistribution from within historic Palestine, which either 
continue the spoliation of Palestinian individuals by the colonial institution examined in the 
previous section or propose a re-formulation of Palestinian filmmakers’ relationship to Israeli 
funding and resources. 
 My first example, the thriller Ajami (2009), was directed by Palestinian citizen of Israel 
Scandar Copti and Jewish Israeli Yaron Shani. Partially funded by the Israel Film Fund, the film 
is set in the poor eponymous neighborhood of Jaffa, whose nickname the “Bride of the Sea” 
reminds us of the city’s glorious past as a regional port before colonization. Five interconnected 
storylines introduce us to drug deals, gang-related murders, and inter-religious and inter-racial 
tensions and violence, centered around the “terrorist” killing of a Jewish policeman’s brother by a 
Palestinian youth. According to an article in The Palestine Chronicle, Ajami was celebrated in 
Israel as a metaphor for the “Israeli-Palestinian conflict” and for its balanced narrative that 
equalizes suffering on both sides (Kinnucan 2010). A 2012 dossier called “A Decade in Motion: 
The New Voice of Israeli Cinema” compiled by the Israel Film Fund marveled at Ajami’s 
multiplicity of points of view and built on Yaron Shani’s quote that, in the film, “each side has its 
narrative. Our idea was to make the audience experience what it meant to be the other” (Bronner 
2012, 46). At the same time, the film was harshly criticized by renowned Palestinian writer and 
human rights advocate Raja Shehadeh for de-contextualizing the history of Jaffa and depicting the 
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city as “a jungle infested by bloodthirsty, uncivilized Arabs who live inside and outside its borders 
exactly as Israeli propagandists claim” (cited in Kinnucan 2010). Such representations can have 
dire material consequences. In his history of Jaffa and Tel Aviv from 1880 until today, Mark 
LeVine discusses how, as of the 1980s and ‘90s, the municipality of Tel Aviv has planned the 
integration of Jaffa to repurpose it as a center for Jewish history, a site of tourism, and a 
neighborhood for the Jewish elite. The active campaign of house eviction and gentrification that 
followed took strength in media representations of the city as crime-ridden and contributed to “the 
systematic erasure of the identity of the city of Jaffa as a Palestinian Arab city” (LeVine 2005, 
227).  
 Ajami’s complacency with the romanticization of violence in Jaffa thus served Israeli 
discourses of modernization and allowed the film’s eventual co-optation during its successful 
international circulation in the economies of prestige, where it received, among others, the Caméra 
d’Or at Cannes and multiple awards in Israel. A few months after so-called Operation Cast Lead 
in Gaza, the 2009 Toronto International Film Festival (TIFF) organized a focus on Tel Aviv that 
showcased Ajami with nine other Israeli films that located Tel Aviv as a symbol of Israel’s cultural 
history. The selection tellingly counted Eytan Fox’s The Bubble (2006), which I drew in earlier on 
account of its fundamental role in Israel’s global pinkwashing campaign (Stein 2010). Moreover, 
the inclusion of Mizrahi director Karen Yedaya’s Yafo/Jaffa (2009) alongside Ajami materialized 
the symbolic annexation of the Palestinian city through curating.  
While this special “City to City” program was funded by the Israeli government, the 
festival co-director Cameron Bailey refused to publicize any Israeli financial support and even 
denied it in a private conversation with concerned filmmakers (Walsh 2009). However, an early 
article in the Canadian Jewish News, dating from August 2008, resurfaced later and cited Israeli 
consul in Canada Amir Gissin announcing that Israel’s presence would culminate at the 2009 TIFF 
as part of Brand Israel (Levy-Azjenkopf 2008). Many Canadian and international filmmakers and 
intellectuals protested the special program in solidarity with Palestinians. They drafted an open 
letter, which gathered fifteen hundred signatures, contextualizing Brand Israel as a million-dollar 
diversion operation. The campaign, so the letter propounded, participated in pulling the 
international community’s attention away from the state’s treatment of Palestinians and redirected 
the focus onto its artistic achievements (Toronto Declaration 2009). Some participants of the 
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festival also withdrew their submissions, such as Canadian John Greyson and Egyptian Sherif 
Mansour. Eventually, Scandar Copti himself cancelled Ajami’s screening, albeit in silence.  
The following year, Ajami was picked and nominated to represent Israel at the Oscars, 
which prompted USACBI (the US branch for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel) to 
identify it as a product of Zionist imagery and launch a call for boycott. Copti, who later 
demonstrated his support to BDS,75 subsequently declined to present the film in Hollywood. 
Echoing Hamoud and Abu Wael, the filmmaker stated in media interviews: “You have an Israeli 
director and a Palestinian director; you have Israeli actors and Palestinian actors. The movie 
represents Israel, but I don’t. I can’t represent a country that doesn’t represent me” (Hartman 2010). 
Yet, Copti here distanced himself, as opposed to his film, from state institution and representation, 
thus leaving it open for Israel to claim Ajami. In fact, his co-director Yaron Shani re-asserted that 
Ajami constituted an Israeli film because it was set in Israel, “spoke Israeli” and dealt with Israeli 
problems (Hartman 2010). After Sa‘di, the circulation of Ajami as an Israeli film, separate from 
the Palestinian identity of its co-director and the city in which it took place, contributed to changing 
its cultural frame of reference. In other words, the film’s success unfolded alongside its very 
“judaization,” a term that describes the program of “territorial restructuring of the land … adopted 
by the nascent Israeli state” (Yiftachel 1999, 371). Judaization survives today in the urban planning 
strategy following which Arab neighborhoods are gradually replaced by Jewish populations. 
Inspired by Henri Lefebvre, famous Israeli legal geography scholar Oren Yiftachel argues this 
“material context of geographical change” reveals “that discourses and spaces constitute one 
another in a ceaseless process of social construction” (Yiftachel 1999, 364-5).  A pawn in the game 
of settler colonial appropriation, Ajami partook in “the process of replacement, [which] maintains 
the refractory imprint of the native counter-claim” (Wolfe 2006, 389).  
The shift in the film’s identity operates at multiple levels. Ajami’s co-optation, permitted 
by the recourse to state funding, supports Israeli cultural diplomacy and the symbolic (and 
potentially material) de-Palestinization of Arab towns and histories. Furthermore, it prevents the 
film from circulating in the countries in the Arab world who still follow the Arab League boycott 
against Israel. The “Israelization” of the film is thus co-constitutive of its partial “de-Arabization,” 
                                                
75 In 2010, Copti signed an open letter published in the French newspaper Le Monde in support of BDS. 





in a dynamic of partition not unlike the pressures exerted on Arab Jews. Ella Shohat explains how 
“the Euro-Israeli separation of the ‘Jewish’ and the ‘Middle Eastern’ parts has ideologically 
facilitated the actual dismantlement of the Jewish communities of the Muslim world, while 
pressuring the oriental Jews in Israel to realign their identities according to Zionist Euro-Israeli 
paradigms” (Shohat 1989, 104). While such realignment proves less evident for Palestinian 
citizens, the forced separation between the Arab and the Euro-Israeli identities certainly 
contributes to fragmenting the “synchronicity” of the Palestinian community, to repeat Hamoud’s 
phrase. In other words, economies of prestige designate paths of recognition that may fragment 
Palestinian belonging to Arab identity as well as regional solidarities. Here again, accepting Israeli 
funding always already subjects Palestinian films to possible appropriation, which statements 
about filmmakers’ independence cannot curtail.  
 Ajami’s use of Israeli funding facilitated co-optation. My second example, Hany Abu-
Assad’s Omar (2013), nominated for the Oscars on behalf of Palestine, demonstrates that the 
filmmaker’s status as a citizen was sufficient to summon the Israeli colonial imaginary and the 
society’s discursive attempts at appropriating Palestinian success and stories. In this instance, the 
Israeli government distinctly focused on de-legitimizing the proto-state of Palestine, which the 
film was understood to represent. In contrast with Scandar Copti’s ambivalence, Abu-Assad 
rejected the legitimacy of Israeli institutions and re-asserted his and his film’s belonging to Arab 
culture. As a consequence, he ambitiously sought to fund Omar almost entirely with Palestinian 
money – none of it coming from the PA – which ostentatiously inscribed his work in the cultural 
and economic environment of the Arab world. Omar benefited largely from the support of rich 
investors in the diaspora, including loans from the family of Palestinian American actor Waleed 
Zuaiter, a lead actor in and producer of Omar. Diasporic investors provided ninety-five per cent 
of the necessary budget for the film while Enjaaz, Dubai Film Festival’s post-production fund, 
supplied the remaining five per cent.  
The film’s successful Oscar nomination occurred while Israel’s pick, Yuval Adler’s 
Bethlehem (2013), did not pass the first round of selections. The two films ironically presented 
similar plots and portrayed Palestinian informers for the Shin Bet (the Israeli Security Agency). 
However, while Omar depicts the forced collaboration of the Palestinian protagonist with a cynical 
Israeli agent (Waleed Zuaiter himself), Bethlehem proposes a fantasy in which the Israeli handler 
and the young Palestinian collaborator entertain a father-son-like relationship only to be 
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interrupted by an oedipal ending. These different approaches materialize in the films’ promotional 
images. Omar’s poster emphasizes the intimacy between the main protagonist (played by Adam 
Bakri) and his girlfriend Nadia (played by Leem Lubany), suggesting that their love is threatened 
by the occupation symbolized by the Wall in the background. In contrast, Bethlehem presents the 
handler and his young informant as two sides of the same coin, wherein the Israeli agent looks 
after the Palestinian boy – protecting him against himself – in a context of military deployment 
against “terrorism” (Fig. 20). 
 
  
Figure 20: The international poster for Abu Assad’s Omar and the French poster for Adler’s 
Bethlehem (Kino Lorber Theatrical and AlloCiné).   
 
The relative resemblance yet exacerbated comparisons and frustrations on the Israeli side 
(Miller 2014), prompting the suggestion that the more successful Omar should be considered 
Israeli because it was “filmed in Nazareth, an Israeli town, and with several Israeli Arab cast 
members” (Kamin and Steinberg 2014). These claims were to a certain extent corroborated by the 
New Cinema Law, a discursive and material framework that facilitates co-optation and defines a 
film as Israeli “primarily according to the identity of the production team, the main language of 
the film and allocation of its budgets” (Friedman 2010, 57). Arabic language and “Israeli residents” 
are included in this definition (this was before the 2018 Basic Law). Detached from current debates 
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within Israeli society, the state did not attempt to claim the film. Rather, it attacked the entity the 
film claimed to represent, Palestine, demanding it be replaced with “Palestinian territories” – 
which the Academy denied. Abu-Assad’s strategy was thus doubly successful. At the level of 
recognition, Omar stood for Palestinians on their own terms, and simultaneously re-organized the 
financial networks that condition the making of Palestinian films. An unsustainable model, the 
film’s transnational and diasporic funding nonetheless established the possibility for Palestinian 
symbolic and material independence from the Israeli colonial structure, from within Israel itself.  
My third example, Suha Arraf’s Villa Touma (2014), both complicates and deconstructs 
Palestinian individuals’ relationship to Israeli institutions with a radical technique of redistribution. 
Arraf, who wrote scenarios for Jewish Israeli filmmaker Eran Riklis (The Syrian Bride, 2004; and 
Etz Limon/Lemon Tree, 2008), directed her first feature Villa Touma with funding from the Israeli 
Film Fund, the National Lottery, and the Israeli Ministry of Economy. Like Bar Bahar and Atash, 
the film refers very little to Israel’s military regime of occupation and depicts the life of three 
unmarried aristocratic Christian Palestinian sisters and their young niece in a timeless house in 
Ramallah – suspended by the failure of Oslo. Villa Touma was selected for the Venice Mostra 
where Arraf registered it on behalf of Palestine, thus enacting the separation between institution 
and individual Palestinian identity. The Israeli Ministry of Culture immediately responded to this 
decision and demanded the reimbursement of the $580,000 which various Israeli agencies had 
allocated to the film (Winer 2014). While the co-producer referred to the film as yet another 
collaboration “between Jews and Arabs” that should be labelled Israeli, Arraf was accused of 
stealing money from the government. She recounts being told by the Ministry that “since seventy 
percent of the funding of the film [wa]s Israeli, the film [wa]s [theirs] and not [hers].” Arraf 
continues: “It is the psyche of the occupier to claim, ‘it is all ours.’ They changed current contracts 
and now any film with Israeli funding needs to be called Israeli” (Nusair 2014). 
Like Elia Suleiman and Tawfik Abu Wael before and Maysaloun Hamoud after her, Arraf 
insisted that Palestinian citizens were bound to pay taxes, yet, unlike Jewish Israelis, they barely 
benefited from the cultural funds that they have contributed to financing. For her fellow 
filmmakers, invoking taxes permitted Palestinian access to Israeli funding and discursively 
challenged the state’s legitimacy, while its material structures and co-opting power remained 
unchanged. In contrast, Arraf’s détournement ties the redistribution of Israeli taxes to the re-
assertion of her own sovereign Palestinian identity in financial as well as representational terms.  
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The meaning and weight of this strategy of redistribution can be further illuminated by the 
role taxes played historically to support both Israeli control over Palestinian populations in the 
occupied territories and this same population’s resistance. Since 1967, the colonial administration 
has imposed taxations as part of its effort to integrate the West Bank and Gaza into its own 
economy, simultaneously creating a maximum dependency on Israeli products while Palestinian 
ones are conversely denied free access to Israeli markets. In his book, Living the Intifada, Andrew 
Rigby describes how tax hikes were used as a measure of collective punishment during the 1980s 
uprisings, with Israel collecting some $160 million in tax revenue from the West Bank in 1987 
(Rigby 1991, 119). In response, the leadership of the uprising called upon Palestinians to disengage 
from their financial “obligations” to the occupier by boycotting the taxes, which complemented a 
commercial strike by store owners. Facing considerable financial loss, Israel placed additional 
pressure on Palestinians, including by enforcing raids, curfews, destructions, and seizures of 
property, as well as tying tax payment to the renewing of permits or identity cards. In Beit Sahour, 
the commitment to the tax strike reached its pinnacle with the slogan “No Taxation Without 
Representation” – reminiscent of similar struggles during the 1939 Arab revolt against the British. 
The occupation army thus organized a six-week siege during which the troops raided the village 
to collect taxes and confiscate property (Rigby 1991, 120).76  
The leadership of the uprising simultaneously replaced Israel’s punitive collection of 
revenue with an alternative taxation system administered by Palestinian popular committees. 
These charged Palestinians differentially according to their means (against a receipt, in order to 
avoid fraud) and redistributed the funds to supply help to the neediest (Rigby 1991, 118). As a 
result, Israel’s rationale for the taxation, the methods it used to enforce it, and Palestinian strikes 
and recourse to informal systems of social support all reveal that the collection and redistribution 
of tax money operate as mechanisms that foster or deny representation and recognition, ultimately 
conditioning nation-, community-, and identity-building. Suha Arraf’s re-appropriation of Israeli 
taxpayer money (centralized by the state’s various agencies) as Palestinian thus functions as 
redistribution with recognition. In a Fanonian turn, Arraf “made herself known as a Palestinian 
woman” and opposed techniques of co-optation, which resolve colonial tensions through the un-
                                                
76 Amer Shomali’s animated documentary The Wanted 18 (2014) humorously recounts this episode of 




recognition of Palestinian difference. Palestinian self-assertion here appears indivisible from the 
actual re-appropriation of colonial financial resources claimed as such from within the structures 
of the prestige economy. Arraf’s gesture proves more than isolated dissent. She suggests 
institutionalizing Palestinian redistribution in ways similar to the First Intifada’s popular 
committees when she adds: “Maybe it is time that we create a Palestinian fund for cinema” (Nusair 
2014). 
 Despite her obvious critique of the colonial foundation of the Israeli state, Arraf did not 
pursue a state-centric vision or intent to represent the proto-state of Palestine. Rather, she delivered 
a statement about Palestinian identity as one that exceeds borders and citizenship – even those 
defined by the Oslo Accords. Contrary to Scandar Copti, Arraf claimed ownership over her film, 
and substantiated Abu Wael and Hamoud’s calls to identify their story as Palestinian with a 
financial strategy of appropriation. After the Israeli government threatened to sue her for 
reparation, Arraf had the classification of Villa Touma as Palestinian removed from the Venice 
Mostra’s website and submitted the film to TIFF as “stateless.” She told The Electronic Intifada: 
“It is my refugee film. Like Palestinians everywhere, it is stateless” (Strickland 2014).  
Following the controversy, then-Minister of Culture Limor Livnat introduced a new law 
preventing the word “Palestine” from appearing in the end credits (Nusair 2018). Two years later, 
the Minister of Culture Miri Regev formally submitted a bill on “loyalty in culture,” to be approved 
by the Ministry of Justice,77 set to give her ministry the power to retroactively withdraw funding 
to arts institutions and artists that “contravene the principles of the state” (Lis et al. 2016). A 
prolongation of the 2011 Nakba Law that forbids Palestinians to commemorate the catastrophe 
brought about by the foundation of Israel, the bill called for a transfer of power from the Ministry 
of Finance to that of Culture in ways that reinforced the close complicity of material and symbolic 
powers – and economic concerns of distribution with social issues of recognition. As Adalah made 
clear in an official statement on their website, the bill primarily targeted Palestinians (Adalah 
2016). The government’s response thus demonstrates that Arraf’s re-appropriation of Israeli funds 
touches upon the foundations of colonial practices of co-optation. She offers a vision that not only 
                                                
77 In November 2018, the bill was removed from the Knesset Agenda. Yet, as the examples of the al-Midan 
theatres and the Barbur Gallery showed, the Ministry of culture has found other ways to jeopardize cultural 
initiatives that “contravened the principles of the state.” 
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delegitimizes Israel, but also bypasses the very structure of the nation-state as the essential 
expression of a people.  
 As a ‘48 Palestinian grappling with colonial cultural institutions, Arraf resembles Fred 
Moten and Stefano Harney’s “maroon” in their theorization of academic resistance from the 
perspective of Black radical tradition. For them, the maroon occupies an impossible position within 
the university, a site that promotes the capitalist philosophy of the enlightenment – and, as we saw 
with Wolfe, one that is part and parcel of settler expropriation. The maroon represents that which 
the enlightenment strove to discipline, and yet the maroon seeks to benefit from a place where 
knowledge is created. As a result, for Moten and Harney, 
 
the only possible relationship to the university today is a criminal one. […] It cannot be 
denied that the university is a place of refuge, and it cannot be accepted that the university 
is a place of enlightenment. In the face of these conditions one can only sneak into the 
university and steal what one can. To abuse its hospitality, to spite its mission, to join its 
refugee colony, its gypsy encampment, to be in but not of – this is the path of the subversive 
intellectual in the modern university (Harney and Moten 2013, 26, my emphasis). 
 
Similarly, Arraf broke away from institutional representation and “stole” from the occupier. Rather 
than an accusation echoing the Israeli government’s, describing Arraf’s redistribution as stealing 
re-positions state and institutional structures as unfair frameworks responsible for the 
epistemological corruption of terms such as legitimacy. Arraf’s form of stealing only proves illegal 
in the oppressive context in which property equates with colonial appropriation. Just like the 
maroon then, she abused Israel’s (coercive and unwilling) hospitality, and joined its refugee colony 
– in the most literal as well as metaphorical way. Finally, Arraf’s “counterontological violence,” 
to repeat Ciccariello-Maher’s useful phrase, according to which she re-asserts her identity as 
Palestinian, situates her in present-day Israel but of Palestine – stateless – thus ultimately pointing 
to a dialectical and geopolitical reconfiguration in which the two political spaces can overlap.  
The re-appropriation of Israeli money to the benefit of Palestinian identity opens up 
geographical futures for the institutionalization of Palestinian culture beyond the confines of the 
proto-state.  Redistribution represents a means and not an end, and as such lays out multiple 
possibilities for political configurations of Palestine-Israel. Redistribution and stealing operate like 
boycott: in both cases, the disengagement from normalizing discourses and financial partnerships 
are meant to produce new forms of recognition unbound by colonial property and liberal 
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multiculturalism. In his contribution to the volume Assuming Boycott (2017), Eyal Weizman 
similarly emphasizes the positive aspects of boycotts and strikes as acts of refusal that lead to the 
formation of alternative means for the production of co-resistance and a decolonized knowledge. 
Building on Rosa Luxemburg’s idea of a mass strike, Weizman argues that withdrawal itself is 
action: “the strike is not only a form of non-action or a means to avoid work; its purpose is to build 
solidarity, steal back time, and make space for other forms of living” (Estefan and Weizman 2017, 
103). In the context of Palestinian film economies, the refusal to partake in the colonial takeover 
of Palestinian culture translates into redistribution and the formation of Palestinian networks like 
those established during the First Intifada. In the following section, I explore further the potential 
of stealing as a term that reconfigures provocative futures, with a focus on the aesthetics and the 
materiality of the image. To that end, I continue paying attention to the mechanisms of cultural 
appropriation and definitions of property to which Palestinian strategies respond.  
 
Stealing and Returning 
In a 1990 opinion piece to the Canadian daily The Globe and Mail unambiguously titled “Stop 
Stealing Native Stories,” Ojibway first people storyteller Lenore Keeshig-Tobias asks: “Why are 
Canadians so obsessed with native stories anyway? Why the urge to write ‘Indian’? Have 
Canadians run out of stories of their own?” She continues: “The Canadian industry is stealing – 
unconsciously, perhaps, but with the same devastating results – native stories as surely as the 
missionaries stole our religion and the politicians stole our land and the residential schools stole 
our language” (Keeshig-Tobias 1990). Similarly, the co-optation of Palestinian films on the 
international scene parallels a different sort of cultural appropriation at the level of Israeli film 
production and storytelling. In 2017, Jewish Israeli Elite Zexer’s Sufat Chol/Sand Storm (2016) 
was presented as Israel’s submission to the Oscars after the film won a slew of awards and 
successfully navigated the independent cinema festival circuit from Berlin to Sundance. A 
portrayal of Bedouin life in the Naqab, Sand Storm more particularly attends to the trope of the 
arranged marriage and the restrictions imposed on Arab women by patriarchal customs. Produced 
with the support of the Rabinovitch Foundation, the Israel Film Council, and the Gesher 
Multicultural Fund, the film was entirely written by Zexer herself and features Palestinian actors 
in lieu of Palestinian Bedouins, allegedly reluctant to appear on camera. Zexer was said to have 
gained access to these communities through her mother, a photographer for the Bedouin council 
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who worked there for many years and “was treated like family” (Avidan 2016). After spending 
twelve years writing the scenario, Zexer admits:  
 
The biggest challenge I faced was making a film about a culture that is not my own. The 
traditions, beliefs, customs, language — all were very different from mine. While 
understanding that this is something I could never bypass or ignore, and by this I mean that 
this film will always be from an outsider, I still wanted to give it my best shot and have it 
feel as if it were an internal voice (Boykin 2016, my emphasis).  
 
This quest for “authenticity” in the narrative (Staff 2017) – at the expense of acknowledging the 
exteriority of the filmmaker – was reflected in the Arabic translation of Sand Storm’s title in 
foreign poster and the film credits which effectively advertised it internationally as an Arab 
production hailing from Israel, including during its Netflix and French releases (Fig. 21). This 
decision is all the more significant that the original title is in Hebrew, thus allowing the film’s 
seamless circulation within Israel. The plan to premiere Sand Storm in Israel with a panel of Jewish 
and Bedouin feminist leaders at the coexistence-promoting Peres Center for Peace (Staff 2017) 
suggests that the confusion around the film’s promotional identity, ultimately serving to advance 
the Israeli filmmaker’s career, was envisioned as yet another attempt at “peaceful dialogue” to the 
benefit of “oppressed Palestinian women.”  
  
Figure 21: The Netflix and French posters for Elite Zexer’s Sand Storm display the Arabic Title 




Yet, at the same time that Sand Storm was being shot, released, amassing awards and 
touring festivals on behalf of Israel, “unrecognized” Bedouin villages such as the one depicted in 
the film were being destroyed with increased intensity. The community at large faced the threat of 
the Prawer Plan mentioned earlier, a state-sponsored “development” project for the Naqab that 
endangers the livelihood and directly denies the historic and cultural permanence of Palestinian 
Bedouins in the area. In her recent book Colonial Lives of Property: Law, Land, and Racial 
Regimes of Property (2018), Brenna Bhandar examines the articulation of racialization and legal 
forms of property under settler colonialism. Studying the specificity of Israeli historical 
appropriation of Bedouin (and broadly Palestinian) lands, she demonstrates how early political 
Zionists used land cultivation, an expression of European modernity, as “the primary basis for 
establishing a moral and legal right to land in Palestine” (Bhandar 2018, 118). In other words, 
early colonial resource extraction was not primarily driven by the accumulation of capital as was 
the case in other colonies like the United States or Canada. Rather, cultivation operated as a 
justification for Zionist encroachment on Palestinian land and provided an opportunity for Jewish 
settlers to reconnect with “ancestral land” through agricultural labor and reassert their cultural 
claim on the area. Just as Ajami’s success had relied on representations that could be seen to 
support the de-Palestinization of Arab cities, Sand Storm’s appropriation of Palestinian Bedouin 
stories was celebrated by the state and the international prestige economy. This cultural 
appropriation significantly concurred with Israel’s material seizure of Bedouin land. While 
contributing to the smoke screen around the Prawer Plan internationally, the film also made 
evident, as Keeshig-Tobias asserts, the parallel and dialectical articulation of “stealing” lands, 
images, culture, and stories, which all become colonial possessions sanctioned by the mechanisms 
of settler culture and cultural industries.  
 This section examines how settler and anti-colonial discourses of belonging are supported 
by a nexus of material and symbolic meanings of property. For Elizabeth Povinelli, this nexus is 
primarily a temporal one. She terms it “the governance of the prior,” and defines it as a liberal 
narrative that both acknowledges the priority of indigenous laws on the land and serves as a legal 
principle for the settler state across various levels and domains of social life, including “the 
juridical properties of the person, the personal property of the market, and the territorial property 
of the state and its colonial holdings” (Povinelli 2011b., 18). The governance of the prior mutually 
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implicates indigenous populations and the settler state in competing narratives of truth-value 
dictated by settler colonial temporalities of belonging and property. For instance, liberal power 
distinguishes between the “governed prior” who is customary and the “governing prior” who is 
free – freedom being here also expressed through access to property (Povinelli 2011b, 24). As a 
result, the governance of the prior assigns different “tenses” and property rights relations to 
“backward” indigenous and “modern” settlers. Indigenous people are relegated to the past perfect 
of a genealogical conception of history, while settlers can access the unmarked present and the 
future anterior as authors of their own destiny (Povinelli 2011b, 23).  
The colonial struggle over material access and land use is thus doubled by a discursive one 
that operates as an infrastructure of its own in the service of perpetual land grabbing. For 
anthropologist Nadia Abu el-Haj, this infrastructure proves primarily visual. To draw a parallel 
with Povinelli’s theoretical proposition, we can observe that the instrumentalization of visual 
materials supports the governing prior’s attempts at superseding and effacing the governed prior 
by re-arranging temporal narratives of precedence. In Facts on the Ground: Archaeological 
Practice and Territorial Self-Fashioning in Israeli Society (2001), Abu el-Haj examines 
archeology’s entanglement with the production of fiction, facts, and the materialization of history. 
She demonstrates how the discipline has developed in Israel as a method of knowledge production 
that serves to establish the precedence of Jewish presence in Palestine through “facts on the 
ground.” The collection and naming practices of immediately visible (arti-)facts, such as pottery 
and architecture, have supported the discursive narrative of Zionist nationalism with material and 
empirical evidence, ultimately justifying colonization (Abu el-Haj 2001, 100).  
Larissa Sansour’s recent video In the Future They Ate from the Finest Porcelain (2016) 
and its parallel set of installations extends Abu el-Haj’s object of inquiry to include broader image-
based modes of fictionalization and storytelling in the production of the governing prior. The film 
is accompanied by a larger exhibition of porcelains with Palestinian motifs usually found on 
keffiyehs fabricated on an assembly line, which discredits their representation as traces of ancient 
civilization in the film (Fig. 22). Just like archeological discoveries, images can function as 
“material-symbolic facts used to render visible the land’s identity” (Abu el-Haj 2001, 18) through 





            
 
Figure 22: Larissa Sansour’s In the Future They Ate from the Finest Porcelain (2016), and 
the accompanying installation piece Revisionist Production Line (2017) (screenshot and the 
artist’s website).  
 
An exploration of the sci-fi genre typical of her broader work, Sansour’s video features a 
“narrative resistance group” whose mission is to make underground deposits of porcelain 
(described as “facts on the grounds”) to anticipate future claims to their vanishing land, and “de 
facto creating a nation” (In the Future 2016). While the civilization represented by those artifacts 
is suggested to be “fictional,” the video muddles the distribution of roles and truth claims for 
whoever considers this a literal translation of the reality of Israeli occupation. The porcelain is 
evidently Palestinian and the self-defined “terrorist” group speaks Arabic. The narrators first 
appear to stand for the Palestinian point of view and culture, yet they also act as Zionist projections 
of Palestinians who have embraced the colonial discourse according to which they constitute a 
fictitious people and a terrorist threat. Meanwhile, the strategy that they implement reproduces the 
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colonial tactics of exploiting archeological findings as facts on the ground, which Abu el-Haj 
imputed to Israel, and the film even turns these into sheer forgery (a point Abu el-Haj did not 
make). Through this blending of positionalities, Sansour seems to be testing the limits of truth 
claims and history-making mechanisms, while simultaneously pointing to how these have been in 
fact constitutive of Israel’s utilization of the discourse of the governance of the prior.  
Images, along with archeology, can be instrumentalized in order to materially and 
discursively support processes of land appropriation and dispossession. Since the early days of 
colonization, the development of a Zionist imagery has proved fundamental to the system of land 
appropriation and colonial legitimation. Zionist modes of representation were largely influenced 
by preceding Christian depictions of Palestine as the holy land in which Palestinians remained 
either stuck in an ahistorical Biblical temporality or completely absent. For Issam Nassar, 
 
the absence of the Palestinian population from most photographs partially reflected both 
the fact that they were also absent, at some level, from the mind and consciousness of the 
European or American photographers and a desire to cleanse the holy land from signs and 
evidence of histories other than the Judeo-Christian one (Nassar 2003, 149). 
 
For instance, between 1898 and 1948, postcards published and distributed by European 
commercial photographers such as the Beirut-based French company Maison Bonfils became an 
essential tool of image-making that travelled the world through growing Christian tourism. These 
postcards promoted an orientalist view of Palestine enhanced by the realistic qualities entrusted to 
the medium of photography at the time. For anthropologists Annelies Moors and Steven Machlin, 
“once Palestine had been defined as the ‘Holy Land’ it was a short step to transform contemporary 
observations into Biblical representations” (Machlin and Moors 1987, 66). Such depictions 
continued after the creation of the state of Israel and have nurtured the imaginary of European 
artists at large.  
Ayreen Anastas’ experimental film Pasolini Pa*Palestine (2005) uncovers the famous 
Italian filmmaker’s use of orientalist and Biblical images as “material-symbolic facts used to 
render visible the land’s identity” in Sopralluoghi in Palestina per il vangelo secondo 
Matteo/Location Hunting in Palestine (1965), his preparatory cinematic notes to Il Vangelo 
Secondo Matteo/The Gospel According to Saint Matthew (1964). Anastas intervenes in the film’s 
editing and narration and illuminates the process by which Pasolini gains knowledge of the 
landscape (by hunting or seeking locations, as the various versions of the translation go) through 
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visual evidence and collectible details of Biblical persistence that function as facts on the ground: 
here the manger where Christ was born, there the faces of the shepherds that followed him. By 
superimposing footage from Sopralluoghi and a hand-drawn map of contemporary fragmented 
Palestine-Israel in Arabic, Anastas visualizes the geopolitical discrepancy between Pasolini’s 
Christian imaginary of Palestine and the reality of the Second Intifada that she is living (Fig. 23). 
Similarly, Pasolini Pa*Palestine plays with the enchanted narrator of Sopralluoghi, which is 
substituted with an ironic Arabic-speaking commentator describing Anastas’ reenactment of 
Pasolini’s travels. Ultimately, the film reveals how Pasolini’s peregrinations materialize his 
epistemological relationship to the Palestinian landscape and 1960s Palestine-Israel is turned into 
an actualized Biblical topography. Palestinians are circumscribed to a different temporality of 
existence (similar to Povinelli’s tense) that ultimately provides a context for their disappearance, 
thus reproducing the logics of Povinelli’s governed prior.  
 
  
Figure 23 : Ayreen Anastas’ Pasolini Pa*Palestine (screenshots). 
 
This temporal dissonance can similarly be found in Zionist imageries. In separate studies, 
Nassar and Christine Pirinoli draw a direct continuity between the Christian imagination of 
Palestine and visualizations of the Zionist narrative of the promised land (Nassar 2003, 149; 
Pirinoli 2005, 68). For Bandhar, the early Zionist movement reproduced systems of value and 
civilizational discourses inherited from the European context in which it emerged. She writes that 
“the Zionist return to Palestine incorporated both Christian teleological and Enlightenment 
perspectives on history that posited the Jews on the side of modernity in opposition to the 
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orientalist world of the Arabs” (Bandhar 2018, 130). Where Christian postcards supported an 
industry of Biblical tourism, Zionist imageries documented the landscape’s transition into 
modernity through the acquisition of the land. The Jewish National Fund (JNF), created at the 
beginning of the twentieth century with the purpose of centralizing the purchase of Palestinian 
land for further Jewish settlements, had its own photography department. This office was in charge 
of buying, ordering, publishing and mailing photographs to Europe in order to attract the 
immigration of new populations as well as donations (Oren 1995, 201). The JNF, along with other 
committed Zionist bodies such as the Jewish Agency, the General Federation of Labor, the United 
Jewish Appeal (UJA), and the Hadassah Jewish Women’s Organization, funded documentaries for 
international audiences in Europe and the United States. Films like Yaakov ben Dov’s Eretz 
Yisrael Hamithadeshet/Eretz Israel Awakening (1923) repeated the common narrative of the 
pioneer discovering the country, converting to the political ideology of Zionism, and promoting it 
to friends and relatives (Rosenthal 1994, 11). For Ella Shohat, early “Hebrew” cinema partook “in 
regarding Palestine as a kind of vacuum, an empty land to be transformed by avodah ivrit [Hebrew 
work] and in eliding the Arab presence there” (Shohat 2010 [1989], 29-30). Driving productions 
like Nathan Axelrod’s HaChalutz/The Pioneer (1933), Aleksander Ford’s Tzabar/ Sabra (1933), 
and Helmar Lersky’s Avodah/Work (1934) was the dominant trope of “making the desert bloom,” 
in which Jewish pioneers’ hard work on the land brought development to a landscape described as 
unpopulated and uncivilized (Fig. 24).  
 
    




 By drawing on the aforementioned funds and on pioneers’ immigration, Zionist 
propaganda films supplied the pre-state institutions in charge of land acquisition with the 
discursive and material infrastructures to support their endeavor. The nexus of Zionist image-
production thus collapsed representation of the land into the act of taking possession of it. In other 
words, representing the land came to imply the near-future of land grabbing. For Ruth Oren, the 
photographs taken in the twenty years following the establishment of the JNF’s photography 
department “gave birth to an iconography that transcended the establishment of the state of Israel, 
[and] contributed significantly to the development of a sense of local heritage and culture” (Oren 
1995, 207). Cultural appropriation, or colonial practices of “stealing,” did not only constitute 
outward violent seizures of resources, representations, cultural practices, and spaces of life. As 
mentioned earlier, cultivation provided the legal basis for claiming ownership over a territory, “in 
keeping with a Lockean rationale for (land) ownership premised on labor, and a German 
romanticism that posited an ideal of ethnonationalism rooted in the possession of land” (Bhandar 
2018, 130-131). Stealing occurred with the establishment of a system of ownership represented in 
propaganda films as a fact on the ground, wherein colonial laws operated as the brutal imposition 
of notions of legality and legitimacy inconsistent with the Palestinian practice of the land.  
Despite previous land reforms under the Ottoman empire and the British Mandate, 
Palestinians had in contrast remained reluctant to register titles of ownership for their land, 
including because of misinformation. Moreover, in practice, their prolonged presence had been 
enough to continue holding their lands throughout. Palestinians’ relationship to the land had not 
been one primarily defined through ownership but active care, as an elderly person whose land 
now falls under the jurisdiction of the Israeli National Parks and Nature Reserves Authority 
reminds us in Rima Essa’s Ashes (2001): 
 
Now they want to teach us how to protect our trees? It’s impossible to teach a farmer how 
to take care of his land. Many refugees have a spiritual and intellectual bond to the land. 
For us, it’s totally a physical bond. It’s not just a bond of faith and intellect. We maintain 
this bond in a practical manner. 
 
When the state of Israel was established, Palestinians’ failure to “officialize” ownership led to their 
dispossession. In the Naqab, this meant that Bedouins were categorized as landless nomads 
(Bhandar 2018, 136). As a result, the reality of “dispossession” claimed by all Palestinians, which 
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supposes a previous property here nonexisting in those terms, can at first glance represent a sort 
of conundrum. Instead, this paradox re-asserts dispossession as part and parcel of the mechanisms 
of both cultural and land appropriation, inherent to the larger system of settler-colonialism in which 
indigenous sovereignty sans property does not earn recognition. Robert Nichols argues that 
dispossession implies “not only the forcible transfer of property but the transformation into 
property, albeit in a manner that is structurally negated for some, i.e. the ‘dispossessed.’” He 
continues: “possession does not precede dispossession but is its effect” (Nichols 2017, 5 and 15). 
This recoding echoes Sa‘di’s definition of co-optation by which appropriation means an identity 
and a cultural change. Cultural appropriation, whose mechanisms are logically and materially tied 
to “dispossession as a mode of property-generating theft,” proves a “recursive” process (Nichols 
2017, 22). Settlers can claim precedence by establishing structural mechanisms of history-telling 
and legitimacy that deny pre-existing systems of sociality.   
So far, I have argued that images functioned as infrastructures for the material 
appropriation of land by producing truth claims and discursive precedence that legitimized and 
materially funded colonization. Furthermore, the very process of image production is also 
implicated in land grabbing. In Making Settler Cinemas: Film and Colonial Encounters in the 
United States, Australia, and New Zealand (2010), Peter Limbrick reminds us of the concrete 
materiality of the practices of producing, making, and distributing films, and their imprint on the 
very space occupied by the colonial state. Among other things, he mentions the cartographic 
method of location scouting, the engagement with landscapes as film set, and the cross-cultural 
negotiations over labor and use of land (Limbrick 2010, 7) as examples of colonial encounters that 
metaphorically and materially leave their mark on indigenous territory. Reflecting on film 
production practices in the Israeli film industry throughout the 1960s until the ‘80s, Kamal Aljafari 
terms the appropriation of Palestinian land through filmmaking “cinematic occupation.” With this 
appellation, he extends the geography of occupation, oftentimes limited to the 1967 territories – as 
is the case, for example, in the BDS call – to historic Palestine.  
In an interview with Nasrin Himada, Aljafari recalls the transformation of his home city of 
Jaffa into a film set for Israeli films. For the producers’ convenience, Palestinians would be 
evacuated from their neighborhood during the shooting. Their depiction was instead assumed by 
Mizrahi actors (who are next to the Palestinians at the bottom of the Ashkenazi hierarchy), who 
had the ironic privilege of playing the Arab terrorists. Aljafari explains: “we were completely 
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excluded from the image and therefore uprooted twice in reality and in fiction. These Israeli films 
were claiming the city” (Himada 2014, 95). A process similar to the one explored with respect to 
Ajami, the filmic erasure of the Palestinian presence in Jaffa has contributed to raising the value 
of the land and aided the integration of the city into the periphery of Tel Aviv and its ultimate 
gentrification. Aljafari documents the continuing systematic expulsion of Palestinians from their 
family houses in his experimental film The Roof (2006). The cinematic occupation of the space of 
Jaffa, utilized for its “Arab look” and its old buildings – which the new and white city of Tel Aviv 
could not provide – also meant that the space was considered to be expandable, as a film set would 
be. Elsewhere, in a chapter dedicated to Aljafari’s study of contested spaces, Peter Limbrick writes 
about the material consequences that resulted from re-casting Jaffa as Beirut for the film Delta 
Force (Menahem Golan, 1986), which featured Chuck Norris fighting Palestinian terrorists in 
Lebanon. The city was decorated with Hezbollah flags and the producers authorized explosions 
that caused damage to the surrounding inhabited buildings (Limbrick 2012, 237). Here as well, the 
imprint of fiction-making practices (as opposed to just representations) functioned as a very 
physical fact on the ground, and a violent stamp of ownership over the land.  
Aljafari’s experimental film Recollection (2016) responds to processes of cinematic 
occupation. Using found footage, Aljafari takes back the land from which Palestinians have been 
dispossessed, by “stealing” and partially erasing the images produced by Israeli films. Recollection 
appropriates boureka films from the 1970s and ‘80s, a popular genre dealing with “Israeli local 
folklore” and ethnic tensions between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim, initially directed at the Jewish 
working class and the Oriental Jews. For Shohat, these films procured some escapism for these 
minority groups who expressed “the almost utopian desire to bridge the gaps of Israeli society and 
thus promote an image of ethnic/class equality, pluralistic tolerance, and solidarity” (Shohat 1989, 
119). Along with the aforementioned Delta Force, Aljafari’s film appropriates Menahem Golan’s 
staple of the genre Casablan (1973), which portrays Jaffa in the process of demographic transition 
from the point of view of the Mizrahim whom the Ashkenazim establishment forces to leave the 
city. Recollection meddles in the very fabric of these films and reworks the bourekas’ articulation 
of ethnic/class (in)equality, which always excludes Palestinians. The result, far from the 
exuberance of popular cinema or even the violent depictions of poverty and crime that Ajami 
presented of the same neighborhood, is a quiet and introspective succession of vignettes.  
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Aljafari’s intervention was allowed by the digitization of a vast number of these bourekas, 
enabling him to delve into the image, modify it, and travel within it. More particularly, Aljafari 
erases the Israeli actors who people these productions at the expense of the Palestinians in a process 
that provocatively responds to – yet arguably does not reproduce – the elision of Palestinian 
presence. Simultaneously, Aljafari’s camera zooms in within the image and redirects our attention 
towards the background (Fig. 25). We can see a Palestinian woman standing by the window in one 
image, and an old Palestinian boat left to decay in the port of Jaffa, a place of exile now razed to 
the ground, in another. In other words, Recollection engineers the return of Palestinians in their 
own landscapes. For Aljafari, these bourekas paradoxically become a potential archive of a 
Palestine lost to colonization and Jaffa in the hands of gentrification. During a screening of the 
film in New York, Aljafari pointed to the irony of these bourekas’ initial desire to erase 
Palestinians, while they simultaneously provided them with a record of their past lives (Lee 2016). 
The film reconstructs a Palestinian history thanks to its new focus and even offers, in the end 
credits, a description of each Palestinian whom Aljafari, based on his family ties, could identify as 
an inhabitant of the neighborhood at the moment of the films’ shooting. The Palestinian memory 






Figure 25: Israeli actors are erased and the camera zooms in the background to bring a Palestinian 
woman to the fore in Kamal Aljafari’s Recollection (screenshots).  
 
Rather than a counter-history, however, I argue that Recollection functions as another 
“combative moment” in the dialectics, to echo Ciccariello-Maher. In other words, the film refuses 
to resolve the tension between the supposed past of ethnic cleansing and the present Palestinian 
struggle. The use of contemporary sounds, captured by Aljafari during a walk in the neighborhood, 
asserts the temporal continuity of violence while pointing to the aural reconfiguration of Jaffa as a 
consequence of the filmic and urban occupation of the city. As a result, the film does not return to 
a time before colonization but revisits what is already lost. This double temporality of return, one 
activated, the other denied, does not necessarily call for a future without Israelis. Their erasure, 
although admittedly violent, opens to a new temporality sans colonization within the remains of 
the present. In other words, here again in ways that remind us of the logic of boycott, Palestinian 
return does not cause erasure; rather, disengaging with Israeli economies of images, 
representations, and modes of appropriation (as opposed to people) is necessary if we are to 
examine how Palestinians can return. Aljafari’s previous film Port of Memory (2009) foregrounds 
this paradoxical temporality of return through a different use of Casablan. In it, the deployment of 
digital tools integrates the ghostly body of his uncle into the landscapes of the port of Jaffa, now 
inaccessible and destroyed. The Palestinian man travels within the past image and accompanies 
Casablan’s protagonist, who in this scene expresses longing for his homeland (Morocco). 
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Aljafari’s uncle here stands in his own homeland, at the same time as his dispossession is made 




Figure 26: Aljafari’s uncle “returns” to Casablan’s untouched Jaffa in Port of Memory (screenshots). 
 
While the title Recollection refers to a new archive of Palestinian images, re-collect could 
also mean “repeatedly taking payment for” and point to a new economy of Israeli images “stolen” 
by Palestinians. Aljafari uses this footage in total contravention of copyrights laws, systems of 
enclosure that reproduce and prolong colonial land grabbing. Although in small amounts, the 
bourekas were partly funded by the Israeli Fund for the Encouragement of Original Quality Films 
(Shohat 1989, 119) and undoubtedly belong to Israeli popular culture. Pertaining to the economy 
of the occupation (which we can extend to its urban ramifications explored earlier), these images 
partook in constructing an Israeli heritage devoid of Palestinians and have supported the 
development of an Israeli industry financed around colonial representations.  
Aljafari’s unlawful use of these films also defies the workings of the film and the 
contemporary art economy more broadly, which, in the context of Palestinian productions, is 
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largely organized around European funding organizations and copyright regulations that reproduce 
colonial dynamics. In the chapter cited earlier, Limbrick discusses Aljafari’s disagreements with 
the German producer ZDF, a public-service television broadcaster, over the funding of The Roof. 
The co-producer wanted to impose a specific historical narrative unsuitable to Aljafari’s politics. 
The filmmaker thus undertook to repossess his images and finished the film on his own terms. In 
a situation reminiscent of Suha Arraf’s confrontation with her Israeli producers, ZDF ruled this 
action illegal because it claimed to own the material (Limbrick 2012, 222-223). In Recollection, 
the “stealing” of and the return into the Israeli image materialized a popular Palestinian space 
“com[ing] to life through a peopleing,” to repeat Nasrin Himada’s words. For Hamid Dabashi,  
 
Aljafari has confiscated the visual registers of th[e Zionist] thievery and released them into 
the eternity of a Palestinian claim on that land. Zionists can never possess what they stole. 
Aljafari, and behind him the entire visual theory of Palestine, have stolen the stolen sign of 
that land and smuggled it back into their homeland (Dabashi 2016).  
 
Aljafari’s claims of re-possession thus do not necessarily re-assert Palestinian ownership over 
images. Rather, it dismantles the structures of dispossession that recursively established property 
as a driving mechanism for colonization and film economies and invites Palestinian lands and 
images to receive Palestinian use and care.   
In other words, as Eyal Weizman phrases it, the right of return is “another name for 
decolonization” (Estefan and Weizman 2017). In his contribution to the collective opus on BDS, 
Assuming Boycott (2017), Nasser Abourahme situates the right of return as the limit of Israeli 
solidarity based on a misunderstanding – with which Recollection provocatively plays by erasing 
Israeli actors. Abourahme writes: “one is struck by how return is always read as a euphemism for 
(vaguely defined) destruction.” Yet, he argues,  
 
[Return] is an invitation to a future no longer bound to the trajectories of the colonial 
encounter, or the antagonistic identities forged in that encounter’s primal event. The future 
not of justice (perhaps always a vanishing point), but of co-habitation in Palestine, 
ultimately rests on joint struggle. That joint struggle will only open up genuine newness by 
connecting future redress to past dispossession, by returning to another time altogether 
(Abourahme 2017, 121-122, his emphasis). 
 
The formulation of return in temporal terms as opposed to geographical ones redefines the nature 
of Palestinian and Israeli collaborations, and the meaning of Israeli interactions with the land. 
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Boycott should precede rightful co-habitation because it functions as a “separatist moment” where 
the refusal to engage with Israeli institutions is not justified by any ethnic or racist component that 
would consolidate the relationship. Rather, rightful co-habitation follows a temporary exclusion 
that allows a new temporality to take shape. Boycott responds to the essentialist separatism of 
ethnic apartheid and its disingenuous dialogues around “premature reconciliation” and 
multiculturalism, with a strategy of institutional division and instability that foresees a different 
temporality of unity, that is, one that is not guided by the perpetual renewal of monolithic 
essentialisms. Recollection’s problematized erasure of Israeli actors and the re-appropriation of 
Israeli films can also be read as the refusal to engage in the normalization of economic interactions 
with Israel as a legitimate partner in trade, similar to the logics of Boycott. The film’s production 
of a new temporality sans colonization within the remains of the present, which I described earlier, 
could thus provide one element for the “return to another time altogether,” in which the place and 
role of Israeli Jews is left undefined and thus radically open for co-resistance.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the politics of recognition that frame, discipline, and to a certain extent 
condition the possibility for the film work of Palestinian citizens of Israel. The driving paradox of 
this chapter lay in the simultaneous recognition of successful Palestinian films as Israeli in 
transnational markets and their exclusion and un-recognition in the domestic space of Israel proper. 
This aporia only makes sense if we consider mechanisms of dispossession and erasure as inherent 
and crucial to the logics of settler states. Any form of recognition and integration devised within 
this context, and especially those that purport to advance multiculturalism, thus contribute to the 
active co-optation and un-recognition of Palestinian culture to the benefit of the international 
reputation and global presence of Israeli culture and liberalism. While the position of Palestinian 
citizens of Israel seems untenable, they have also strategized around the potentialities of 
recognition and found ways to combine it with forms of financial and symbolic redistribution. 
Politics of refusal, partly articulated around various forms of boycott, prove key to the 
reconfiguration of Palestinian identity and access to material resources. In this context, boycott is 
akin to a productive disengagement that translates into the proliferation of opportunities for 
Palestinian expression, claims to existence, and spaces of co-resistance. As a result, Palestinian 
strategies also disrupt the geopolitical space of Israel and share alternative, yet open and undefined, 
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Conclusion: A Means, Not an End 
 
Throughout this dissertation, I have examined the imaginaries and material possibilities of a 
Palestinian film industry rooted in Palestine-Israel since the Second Intifada. I termed this 
economic project “paradoxical” because it takes shape within contradictory political and temporal 
contexts. The so-called Peace Accords of 1994, under the guise of establishing the basis for 
Palestinian self-determination, further impressed Israel’s political and economic domination over 
Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and the 1948 territories. Today, stagnating settler politics of 
occupation, siege, and apartheid by law continue to curtail Palestinians’ industrial and political 
futures. This dissertation argued that, rather than simply impeding Palestinian film production, 
distribution, and exhibition, the persistence of different forms of colonization after the peace 
process framed specific strategies of film industrialization. Palestinian cultural workers and 
filmmakers have been building the foundations for their own cultural institutions in negotiation 
with various geographic scales of economic, diplomatic, cultural, and political power. Drawing 
funding from multiple stakeholders with interests in the region, the emerging Palestinian film 
industry intersects with and depends on economies of human rights, human development, and 
humanitarianism.     
The project of a Palestinian film industry, even when it is localized in terms of social actors, 
audiences, and infrastructures, partially situates itself in dialogue with the global economies of art 
cinema. This dissertation also described contemporary Palestinian film economies as paradoxical 
in order to account for the tensions between global standards of film industrial models that inspire 
cultural workers on the ground and possibilities for their implementation in the fragmented and 
economic spaces of Palestine-Israel. Informed by this inevitable discrepancy, some of its very 
practitioners perceive the Palestinian film economy as “not-yet” an industry. I contended that the 
present of industrial formation ought to be taken seriously, not so much in comparison to what 
“should” be, but, instead, as a temporality that illuminates the articulation of power relations, 
historical structures of domination, as well as Palestinians’ agency. Here, the “not-yet” does not 
represent the incompletion of a “weak” industry in development. “Not-yet” stands for the 
temporalities of Palestinian disengagement from, as well as instrumentalization and re-
appropriation of, economic and cultural norms and material networks to the service of the different 
views of what a Palestinian film industry can become. As a methodological tool, paradox allowed 
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the identification of co-existing and contradictory industrial logics that make the fabric of the 
present. Palestinian cultural workers’ strategies, debates, and attempts came to the fore in the 
process of writing a history of Palestinian cinema in the present tense.  
By examining film industries through the lens of settler colonial economies, this 
dissertation placed under scrutiny unchallenged assumptions about the ways in which film 
industries function, the ideals they put forward, and the futurities they manufacture. Chapter Two 
demonstrated how local art film festivals function as unstable institutions adapted to the political 
context of the West Bank. At the same time, festivals conform to ideals of political and 
infrastructural stability produced both by the developmental economy that coexists with the 
military occupation and the global imaginary of film festivals. Chapter Three examined how the 
discourse of sustainability differentially organizes human rights and human development 
economies as well as historical militant narratives of liberation. I analyzed how this semantic and 
conceptual convergence, supported by very material networks, translates into ambivalent practices 
in Palestinian human rights and art film festivals, which coalesce around cinema outreach projects. 
I concluded that outreach constitutes a key issue for imagining a Palestinian film industry in 
harmony with a renewed project of Palestinian self-determination. Set in Gaza, Chapter Four asked 
how film initiatives respond to the permanent climate of emergency. I explained how Hamas 
authorities on the one hand, and independent filmmakers on the other, utilize humanitarian 
economies in order to support cinema as a basic human right and the reviving of Gazan film 
infrastructures. What emerged was a complex humanitarian visual regime which expands the 
definitions of human rights films and global art cinema alike. Finally, Chapter Five identified the 
many challenges Palestinians in Israel face when producing and circulating their films. Processes 
of material and cultural recognition are inevitably tied to modes of co-optation and appropriation 
by the settler colonial state. Yet, I contended, Palestinian filmmakers are establishing ways to re-
organize modes of recognition and funding redistribution that challenge settler structures. 
Decolonizing the Israeli film economy, this chapter determined, means contesting the epistemic 
and material foundations of property that support both capitalist industrial structures and settler 
colonial regimes of appropriation and dispossession.  
 The project of a Palestinian film industry in Palestine-Israel – that is to say, the very 
possibility for Palestinian films to circulate as Palestinian, represent Palestinians, and reach 
Palestinians with the support of adapted funding and built infrastructures – is undeniably tied to 
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issues of self-determination. This dissertation did not argue that all Palestinian initiatives constitute 
radical projects of liberation. On the contrary, Palestinian strategies often bear the ambivalent 
imprints of liberal human rights and empowerment discourses. Yet, I have highlighted some 
avenues cultural workers and filmmakers have started to explore. The historical imaginary of the 
long sixties’ militant decolonization informs contemporary institutionalization projects, while the 
transnational solidarity campaign against Apartheid South Africa inspires forms of economic and 
cultural disengagements from the Israeli state. The project of a Palestinian film industry may be 
considered young, but it is taking shape amidst a variety of transnational past legacies that attest 
to the complexity of film industrialization processes and the imaginaries that sustain them. Taking 
stock of this historical depth and considering the fabric of the aforementioned “not-yet,” this 
dissertation has introduced a focus on temporality in order to think of the futures of Palestine-Israel 
through the paradoxical present. Instead of indefinitely weighing up the benefits of a two-state 
versus one-state solution, what types of future tenses can be imagined to reconfigure (de)colonial 
relations? What does a film economy of liberation, one that actively works towards liberation, as 
opposed to one that follows its supposed resolution, look like after Oslo? How can cultural and 
film economies contribute to re-organizing the material networks that allowed past colonial 
encounters and perpetuate their present formations? These questions call for very physical and 
tangible responses, which necessarily include the possibility of Palestinian refugees’ return.  
By repeatedly establishing the articulation of discourses and their material consequences, 
this dissertation sought to move beyond a mere epistemological challenge to the definition of film 
industries. At the center of this research lies the simple and obvious re-assertion that film 
economies are inherently ideological and political rather than natural, petrified, and unchangeable. 
Economies are multi-faceted, embedded in social and political projects, and can be manipulated 
and re-channeled. Film economies’ organization reflects global structures of economic and racial 
domination as well as ways to provocatively inhabit hegemonic spaces and redefine power 
relations. Yet, despite its work of deconstruction and “epistemic disobedience” (Mignolo 2009), 
this dissertation does not pretend to effectively decolonize media industries studies. Critical race 
and indigenous studies scholars Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang warned us against academia’s 
tendency to turn “decolonization” into a metaphor that assuages settlers’ guilt and redeems them 
(me!) through conscientization (Tuck and Yang 2012). In Tuck and Yang’s own words, “until 
stolen land is relinquished, critical consciousness does not translate into action that disrupts settler 
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colonialism” (Tuck and Yang 2012, 19). While framing the limitations of academic work 
emanating from the settler university, this does not entirely invalidate it. Rather, we should 
consider conscientization (which may just as well occur through non-academic work) as a 
necessary yet insufficient step towards active participation in indigenous and Palestinian struggles. 
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